Justice and World Order

A Philosophical Inquiry

Janna Thompson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134912551
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The political changes of recent years and the problems of poverty, the environment and nationalism have led to calls for the establishment of a just world order. But what would such a world be like? This book considers the concept of international justice as it has developed in traditional political theory from Hobbes to Marx and in contemporary writing on the subject. It develops a theory of international justice designed to take account of both individual freedom and the differences among communities.

Part I

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From a cosmopolitan point of view

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Chapter 1

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Being realistic

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The world would be just, as well as peaceful, if every agent in the international world were willing and able, now and in the future, to act in accordance with universally acceptable principles and procedures of justice. In an age when disputes and acts of aggression can lead to enormously destructive wars there are both prudential and moral reasons for wanting to achieve a just and peaceful world. Why, then, can't we do so?

There are, as we have seen, various answers to this question, but among the most powerful and persuasive are the ideas about international politics propounded by those who call themselves ‘realists’. Realism is not merely one theory or doctrine, but a large number of related views, some more extreme in their implications than others. Thus those who refute one version have by no means defeated realism, and indeed philosophers who oppose what they call realism may be realists of another sort – as I have suggested is the case for Walzer.

There are two basic kinds of realism. The first is a set of explanatory theses intended to account for the international world as it is and to explain why idealistic hopes for a just and peaceful world are bound to be frustrated. The second is a collection of moral doctrines which tell us that leaders of states ought to concentrate on pursuing the interests of their states in world affairs, or, alternatively, that they ought to strive to achieve and maintain a balance of power – and that in doing these things they cannot afford to pay much, if any, attention to what is just.¹ The various theses and doctrines which can be labelled as ‘realist’ have different justifications and sometimes incompatible results. For example, realism as a moral doctrine is inconsistent with the idea that there is and can be no morality in international affairs. Those realists who maintain that leaders have an obligation to pursue the interests of their state are likely to reach different conclusions about what ought to be done from realists who believe that leaders ought to strive to maintain a balance of power. For the second objective sometimes requires that national interests be sacrificed.

What all of the versions of realism have in common is that they deny, explicitly or implicitly, the possibility of realising a just world society. The more extreme forms, as, for example, the realism espoused by Thucydides, deny that morality of any kind has an application or makes any sense in world affairs. The less extreme forms merely assert that, given the realities of the world, leaders cannot always afford to act justly. For they will be faced, more or less frequently, with what Walzer calls ‘a supreme emergency’. Realism as a moral doctrine attempts to persuade us that for the sake of the national interest, or for the sake of peace, we cannot afford to worry too much, or at all, about requirements of justice.

The relation between the cosmopolitan point of view and realism is a complex one. On the one hand, they are at odds with each other: realism is what cosmopolitans have to defeat in order to provide sufficient scope for the operation of a cosmopolitan idea of justice in international affairs. On the other hand, realists often presuppose, and themselves subscribe to, a cosmopolitan moral outlook. Realists have often been concerned with questions about world order, and post-World War II realists in particular have often had as their aim to determine how we can achieve peace and security, to the extent that these are possible in an imperfect world. Behind their pronouncements on this matter is often the idea that it would be nice if justice in the form of a universal respect for human rights and individual freedom could prevail in the world, but unfortunately international realities make that impossible; or, in the case of the moral versions of realism, they imply that the morality appropriate to world affairs is some version of consequentialism - another form of cosmopolitan morality. The well-being of everyone in the world, they are saying, is more likely to be maximised if leaders concentrate on pursuing the national interest or maintaining a balance of power rather than on pursuing idealistic objectives. The very term ‘realism’ suggests a cosmopolitan reference point – it invites a contrast between universal moral principles and what it is possible to achieve in the real world.

There are, it is true, doctrines which might be regarded as forms of realism which reject cosmopolitanism, even as a reference point. Hegel, for example, holds that our ethical duties flow out of the relationships we have to others within our state and to the state itself. Outside of what is entailed by the ‘ethical life of the state’ there is nothing on which to base an appeal to justice – not even as an ideal which cannot be realised. Requirements of justice fail to apply to international affairs, not because of the necessities of world politics, but because the very idea of such cosmopolitan prescriptions is incoherent.² This more radical objection to cosmopolitanism will be examined in Chapter 6.

Why is it impossible for the international world to be a just world? The answers realists give to this question differ in detail, but virtually all, including those who think that the perversity of human nature has something to do with our predicament, believe that the answer mainly lies in the peculiar nature of international politics. There is a logic in international relations, they say, which leads inevitably to conflicts in which agents act as they must in order to secure their own survival and are justified in doing so. This situation exists because states are in what the political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, called the ‘state of nature’. Thus in order to determine whether (or to what extent) the realist view is true about our world, let us look critically at this Hobbesian logic which is supposed to govern world affairs, particularly at the assumptions that are being made about the nature of agents and their situation.

Hobbes, as is well known, insists that agents who are not governed and controlled by an effective political authority inevitably fall into a state of war of all against all. In the state of nature, he claims, there is no peace, and appeals to justice make no sense. Hobbes' primary concern is the problem of ensuring peace and order among individuals within a state, and thus the war of all against all is, predominantly a struggle among individuals, a civil war. But he clearly believes that the same reasoning applies to states. In fact he uses the international situation as an illustration of what we can expect in the state of nature:

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another

(1651: 61)³

I will look first at Hobbes' arguments for saying that individuals in a state of nature inevitably fall into a state of war, and then at how well they apply to states.

Crucial to Hobbes' argument that the state of nature is a state of war is his insistence on the natural equality of individuals: ‘For as to strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself (1651: 60). The physical and intellectual differences that exist among individuals are not so great that anyone can make himself secure or ensure, in a reliable way, that another shall do his will.

However there is another, equally important, aspect to Hobbes' idea of equality: he insists that there are no natural relations of authority and subordination (except between parents and young children) (1651: 77). This means that there is no moral ground in the state of nature for one person to demand that others defer to him. Hobbes is rejecting those traditional ethical standpoints which use metaphysical premises or ideas about human nature to argue that some kinds of people have a natural or god-given right to rule, and he is more insistent on this point than most philosophers: even the relation between husband and wife is not, he insists, naturally a relation between a superior and a subordinate.⁴

Given that individuals frequently want and need the same thing, Hobbes argues, and all cannot satisfy their desires, given that there is no reason on earth or in heaven for one person to defer to the other, each will be prepared to do what he can to obtain what he desires, and will be justified in so doing. This means that the only way that the issue can be settled is through force or the threat of force: ‘If two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end endeavour to destroy or subdue one another’ (1651: 61).

This conclusion, it seems, is reached too rapidly. If the nature of the object of desire permits, rational protagonists in the state of nature should be prepared to reach a compromise, since all will be rightly fearful about the outcome of a struggle. Hobbes is supposing, in addition, that compromise is often impossible, or that there are a sufficiently large number of individuals in the state of nature who, for one reason or another, are not prepared to reach an accommodation, or at least that agents generally believe that this is so. As a result even those individuals who are prepared to live according to the law of nature and simply want others to leave them in peace can never be certain that they will survive to enjoy the fruits of their labour so long as there are others who want what they have:

If one plant, sow, build or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader is in the like danger of another.

(1651: 61)

For the sake of security these peace-loving individuals will be forced to destroy their enemies and potential enemies before they can be assured of living in peace. They must get their enemies before their enemies get them; and they are entitled to make war on them since this is the only way that they can protect their own lives. But since there is no end to potential enemies, the struggle for life and security also has no end, and what such a person most desires, the peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of his labours, can never be achieved. War, which is only supposed to be a means to an end, becomes the centre of existence, and the struggle for survival comes to dominate all human activity with the consequence that life in the state of nature is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.

This situation, like the much-discussed Prisoners' Dilemma, is created not because individuals are driven by irrational passions or don't know what is good for them or don't understand the position that they are in.⁵ On the contrary. Hobbes' individuals are not only rational; for the most part they also want to live together in peace, and know that doing so would require that they treat each other justly – that is, obey what Hobbes calls the ‘Laws of Nature’ (1651: Ch. 15) which require that they keep their agreements, treat each other as equals and respect each other's rights. Their problem is that they can't manage to do this. Nor will they be able to solve the problem of war, Hobbes argues, by simply agreeing to do so, for no one can trust anyone else to keep the agreement: ‘And covenants, without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’ (1651: 85). The only solution to a brutal existence is thus to leave the state of nature through agreeing to be ruled by a sovereign who has sufficient power to enforce law and order, punish transgressors and thus ensure peace.

The question still remains why the peace-loving individuals who possess ‘convenient Seats’ cannot manage to achieve and maintain peaceful relations with each other by agreement, and at the same time deal with aggressors through some form of collective action. In his own account of the state of nature in the Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690), John Locke sees no reason why individuals should not be able to uphold justice against the encroachments of ‘corrupt and vicious men’, on their own behalf or on the behalf of others – well enough, at least, for just relations to be possible.⁶

In Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory Kavka argues on behalf of Hobbes that the introduction of a sufficiently large number of aggressors (‘dominators’) into the picture decides the issue in favour of war of all against all (1986: 105). For people who want to live in peace but are prepared to attack others for the sake of their own security (the ‘moderates’) will fear that other moderates in striking against dominators may attack them by mistake; and moderates may seek to conquer other moderates to use in future battles against dominators (and other moderates will know or fear this). Hence there will be a war of all against all even among peace-loving individuals. Kavka is right to suppose that this could happen. But the outcome is not so inevitable as he implies. Given the right circumstances, it may be unlikely that moderates will make a mistake: it may not be so difficult to tell foe from friend and to attack the former without attacking the latter. Given the right circumstances, moderates may judge co-operative defence to be easier and more in their interest than conquest of other moderates (and the others know that the others do). In any case, why should we suppose that there will be a large number of aggressors in the state of nature? Aggression is, after all, a risky business.

These considerations indicate that Hobbes' conclusion is not as well supported as his comments lead us to suppose. He is depending upon assumptions about agents and their situation which may not always hold. It is important to bear this in mind when considering how his arguments are supposed to apply to the international state of nature.

Hobbes' own position on international affairs is unclear, and apparently inconsistent. On the one hand, as we have seen, he uses international relations to illustrate what happens in a state of nature, and he insists that in the international world there is no such thing as justice. Since states are in a state of nature in relation to each other it is not wrong, he says, to injure a foreigner for the benefit of the commonwealth or to kill innocent people in a war (1651: 165). For all those who are outside the state are enemies, or potential enemies, and we are entitled by the original right of nature to exercise whatever power over them is necessary for our self-protection. Neither, presumably, is it wrong for one commonwealth to attack and try to invade another.

On the other hand, he also notes that the state of nature among states does not pose the same kind of problem as the state of nature among individuals. Culture, science can still thrive, he says, individuals can live in security, even while their state is carrying on perpetual hostilities with other states (1651: 63). Ending the state of nature among individuals is an urgent matter, but the state of nature among states is something Hobbes thinks we can live with. This big difference between the situation of states and the situation of individuals, along with other related differences, suggests, as critics of realism have often pointed out, that there may be more room for peace and justice in world affairs than Hobbes allows (Cohen 1984: 319–29).

First of all, as Hobbes admits, states are not so vulnerable and insecure as individuals. Their relative security is assured by two factors: being a collective body with control over territory, they are in a better position to provide for their own needs, and thus their reasons for coming into conflict with others are likely to be less pressing. Compromise ought to be in most cases a viable option. Furthermore, the state is less vulnerable to attack and more able to defend itself effectively. States do not sleep or turn their backs, and those who attack them have to fear retaliation. Moreover, states are not equals. Some states are considerably more powerful than others, and those which are weak have little choice but to be allies or subordinates of those which are strong. There are only a few very powerful states in the world, and they can without too much difficulty keep each other under surveillance and at bay.

What these differences between the state of nature among states and the state of nature among individuals suggest is that given the right conditions, confrontation between states can take the form of threats rather than actual fighting, and thus in a world where dominant powers can police the behaviour of smaller states, and at the same time can deter other big powers from attacking them or their allies, peace is possible and requirements of justice have some meaning even if they are often ignored. In fact the great powers, to the extent that their leaders are rational, will be inclined to treat each other fairly, for this contributes to perpetuating a system which it is in their interest to maintain. Furthermore, in a world where most confrontations take the form of threats rather than actual fighting, and states are not generally driven by desperation, there is no reason why leaders and citizens should not on most occasions be able to acknowledge and act in accordance with the Laws of Nature with respect to foreigners. Their security will by no means be jeopardised by acts of justice, and in fact treating foreigners and other states justly may increase security by giving others fewer causes for conflict.

Hobbes does sometimes insist that without a sovereign there is no such thing as justice, and he might be prepared to argue that this will continue to be so for the international world, whatever form the state of nature takes. But if so, he and other realists must rest their case on something other than the right of each agent to do whatever is necessary to preserve his own existence. For states, though in the state of nature, can often ensure their own security without destroying or fighting others.

What the right conditions are for achieving this result is a matter of debate. Is a world system with two dominant powers safer than a world system with three or more? Does the existence of nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous, or do nuclear weapons provide a reliable means of keeping the peace? What system of nuclear deterrence is most likely to do this? These questions, especially the latter two, have been discussed endlessly in the last forty years. But however optimistic the outcome of the discussion, it is clear that the result of this challenge to Hobbes' argument is not the defeat of realism, but realism in another form. Peace in this realist world will be possible, but only in the form of a balance of threat. A peace based upon trust, co-operation and good will – the kind of peace many people desire – remains outside the realm of possibility. Moreover, keeping the peace will never cease to be a precarious and uncertain business. The best we can hope for in this world is that the confrontation between great powers will become a formal, habitual affair – a very cold Cold War – and that war, or at least major war, will become a more remote possibility. But the contingencies which could affect such a peaceful modus vivendi are never likely to be completely controllable. The balance may be upset by a change in power relations, the rise of a new power, the invention of new technology, a change of government, an ambitious or irrational leader, internal political and economic factors of the sort discussed by E.P. Thompson. In the past, attempts to maintain a balance of power have always been upset sooner or later. There is no reason to think that in the nuclear age all the relevant factors are under control.

Furthermore, the pursuit of justice in this realist world will always have to be subordinated to the goal of security. It is this point which Walzer is probably making when he says that in an age of nuclear deterrence, supreme emergency has become a permanent condition. It is this point realists are making when they say that the common good – namely preserving the balance of power or the system of deterrence – has to become our over-riding moral goal in world politics. For the sake of their own security and in the name of this ‘common good’ powerful states have justified aggression and other violations of sovereignty, subordination of populations, support of unjust political systems. In the name of peace and security, and to prevent the spread of Soviet power...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction – the problems of international justice: a survey
• Part I From a cosmopolitan point of view
• Part II From a communitarian point of view
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index