Decolonisation and After

The British French Experience

Georges Fischer, W. H. Morris-Jones

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN:
  9780714630953
  9781138459373
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136277887
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Economy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Published in the year 1980, Decolonisation and After is a valuable contribution to the field of Politics.

II

Economic and Military Relations

5

Some Aspects of the Economic Relationship between France and its Ex-Colonies

Gérard Destanne de Bernis

The question of economic dependence has been right at the heart of economic thinking for more than a decade, illustrating that theory finds it hard to avoid dealing with problems which arise from the heart of reality. The study of relations between the two great traditional colonial powers and their ex-colonies should prove particularly rewarding. We shall confine ourselves to certain aspects of the relations between France and its ex-colonies, but this still raises questions of general interest.

When André Gunder Frank talks of internal-external domination, he is referring to the dual dynamics of relations of dominance: that is, of relations between nations and those internal to the dominated nation, and the multiplicity and complexity of the connections between the two.

Colonialism did not appear out of the blue, a mere result of the whim of governments. It was a part of the natural attempt in the 19th century by France and England to make use of foreign markets to regulate their internal economy and secure their own capital accumulation. At a time when this control was based more on the export of capital than on that of goods – also the time when the German and American economies were threatening the dominant position of the British and French in the rest of the world — the ‘colonial avatar’ (N. Coquery-Visdrovitch) was called for and England felt the need to exchange its universal domination for formal dominion over part of the world (Hobsbawm): hence the Treaty of Berlin. In the same way the process of political and legal independence after World War II was also an integral part of a world-wide movement based on the massive expansion and internationalisation of capital ; France and Britain were involved but they were not the main actors. Just as situations of dependence have never been limited to areas of formal colonial rule, and just as colonial reserves never kept out international capital, so the idea of independence cannot be confined to situations of transfer of power and national liberation.

On the other hand, colonial rule cannot be interpreted as external domination pure and simple. Colonial powers have always tried to lean on particular classes within the colony, and have thereby influenced internal social structures. The changed structures remain after formal independence, and the classes established by the colonial power usually look for external support to maintain their own position within their own society. So, the main aim of international capital, which is to increase its dominance, corresponds to the domestic aim of these dominant social groups who, having taken over at independence, seek to create a domestic situation which will allow them to maintain or increase their power.

This is the context in which we have to examine the economic independence of former colonies. There are four sets of questions to be considered:

—is there any necessary correspondence between independence/dependence and ex-colonial power/excolonies?

—what types of independence process have been put into operation by the ex-colonies?

—can the attempts of the ex-colonial power to maintain its dominant position be separated from its preoccupation with its own independence?¹

—finally, what degree of contradiction is involved in the desire to build independence whilst still remaining in an extremely dependent position?

I

Is the ex-power itself completely independent? There may be doubts about the theory of a hierarchy of national systems of production among the highly industrialised economies, but certainly French undertakings have been pushed out by those of West Germany and the United States from a whole series of contracts with Third World countries in fields of advanced technology. Such constraints have the effect that the ex-colonies have acquired a certain independence with regard to their exmetropolitan power, though without gaining any extra economic independence from industrialised countries as a whole.

Thus formal independence starts a new ‘game’ with three sets of players : the ex-colonies, who will wish to convert their new status into more real terms; the ex-colonial powers, which try to retain their position by new methods including the cultivation of language ties; and thirdly, the non-colonial powers, such as West Germany or the United States with great industrial capacity and desire for fresh markets.²

If the pairs dependence/independence and metropolitan power/ex-colony have to be interpreted in the context of the internationalisation process which characterises capitalism today, we are forced to ask what the nation really is in economic terms. Easy answers may have been possible in the 1950s but in the case of France, for example, the position has become complex and confused as a result of great changes between the 4th and 7 th Plans. An increasingly large share of the French industrial sector was ‘colonised’ by foreign firms who took over for themselves the ‘rights’ of the old French firms abroad. Can the overseas country be considered dependent on France when it is really dependent on the French subsidiary of a foreign company? At the other end, is the nation any more than a wish if it is divided into sectors, each occupied by different firms working solely for the profit of foreign capital? Cameroun as a colony was dependent on France; this at least was clear. But now, if we speak of the Cameroun economy, what can be meant? Where is its centre? Where are its decisions taken? For whose benefit? Does it make sense to describe it as dependent on a French economy when, in reality, local industries in the Cameroun are directed from decision-making centres which are only nominally ‘French’ and which drain away the surplus from the Cameroun for the profit of capital which is neither French nor Cameroun but international?³

II

What are the processes set in motion by the ex-colonies to attain their much-discussed objective of economic independence? Their first priority must be to have the least unfavourable economic relationship with the ex-metropolitan power and also with international capital. At the same time they will recognise that industrialisation and independence are each necessary supports to the other.

Without in any way considering Algeria as a perfect example of industrialisation, it must be said that it is one of the few countries in the Third World which is attempting an effective policy in this area. It has arrived at the progressive increase of capital within its territory and the establishment of new industries within a system of state companies, thus reducing the use of foreign capital except in providing services in the oil sector where the state still only has a minority holding. Secondly, it has undertaken the systematic investment of the surplus from mining in the setting up of an industrial system aimed both at producing goods to improve agriculture (tractors, motors, pumps, fertiliser, plastics) and at building up the industrial sector (plant, chemicals). Third, Algeria has used foreign trade to acquire capital goods with minimum capital expenditure (gas-liquefaction plants are financed by special credits from gas purchasers) and it has pressed for the collective control of markets by the producing countries, notably through its role within OAPEC (organisation of Arab countries exporting oil). Next, complete state control of the monetary and financial sector has been secured. Fifth, agrarian reform is aimed at a complete reorganisation of agriculture and a considerable change in social status for the peasant. Finally, by developing its own engineering units it has avoided dependence on foreign companies who have often secured control through their engineering services.

None of this has been achieved without mistakes and, while not the cause of all problems, these errors must be identified and analysed so that they do not endanger the whole process. For example, there have been internal social conflicts which have caused a great deal of delay and disequilibrium. Property owners and others have stood in the way of rural development and slowed down agrarian reform. As a result, too many people have left the land, leading to urban unemployment and housing shortages, reduced agricultural production alongside increased population, a dangerous increase in dependence on foreign countries for food, and, finally, a check to industrialisation because of the shortage of foreign currency and inadequate outlets in agriculture for industrial products. This underlines the lack of popular participation in the working out of development policy. The same analysis can be extended to the traders, who have sabotaged domestic trade in agricultural products by insisting on making as much profit as they can from the surplus which is due to the farmer. It is widely recognised that, in the absence of any radically new structures, it is very difficult to organise the supplying of the towns efficiently by means of public trading.

None of this was inevitable. The political set-up, the removal of the Congress of fellahs in 1963, the lack of any really revolutionary party, and probably many other factors, make up the explanation. However, this gives us the key to future possibilities: will they involve a more radical agrarian revolution and the imposition of real workers’ power in the socialist management of businesses, or will they involve the establishment of a leading class of technicians (who exercise effective economic power at the moment by means of the state production apparatus) and lead towards ill-defined or dangerous alliances between classes? There are many indications of the importance today of these internal struggles.

But it would be quite wrong to minimise the barriers erected in the way of the process of industrialisation by the advanced capitalist countries, particularly the ex-colonial power. This is not just a matter of high cost materials bought abroad and delivery delays. It is more important to concentrate on the contradiction between trying to go quickly (through the turnkey contracts and ‘products in hand’ contracts where the seller provides factory and workers and sets it up before receiving his money) and keeping control of industrialisation in a situation where developed countries contrive to maintain the monopoly of engineering knowledge and their firms act for profit quite independently of any specific attention to the needs of development.

We must, however, also acknowledge that Algeria is definitely an exception amongst the ex-French colonies. (Clearly Vietnam is on a quite different level, with industrialisation taking place in the context of a hard-fought war, demonstrating the potential power of a people’s political will.) It may be said that other French excolonies do not have Algeria’s oil resources, and that this is why they can establish neither industry nor independence. But this will not do. For one thing, Algeria began its development in 1972, when oil was still fetching a low price, when none of the other oil-producing countries, far richer than Algeria, had made any efforts in this field; the importance of political will cannot be denied. What is more, many French ex-colonies – not Gabon alone – have abundant raw materials. The problem is not the possession of such resources; it is wanting to use them for industrialisation and independence. This is not an economic problem, but a political one. This explains why Gabon allows itself to be robbed and why Mauritania and Togo decided to recover control of their natural resources. But even nationalisation of mineral deposits, however important, does not guarantee independence.

However, it would be mistaken to put all the blame on the excolonial power. Naturally, we cannot study the policies of all France’s ex-colonies. However, it is worth looking at Ivory Coast, for this is always taken to show that independence can be established in the framework of capitalist policy in close cooperation with the ex-colonial power. No one can deny that countries such as Brazil, Iran and Hong Kong have reached a certain level of industrial development. The question remains whether they have laid the basis for real industrialisation, that is, a process of building an autonomous base of ‘home-made’ accumulation and a process of distributing income so that the majority of the people benefit from the productive results of their own labour. Here again, politics and economics cannot be considered separately.

The list of the industries set up in Ivory Coast since independence excludes practically all branches which could constitute a material basis for growth. The main ones are in food (34.5 per cent of the industrial turnover in 1974) and textiles (12.6 per cent). The wood industry concentrates on exports (9 per cent). The chemical industry (plastics, rubber, etc.) only involves goods for domestic use or exports (21.2 per cent). The mechanical and electrical industry includes the assembly of vehicles and bicycles (9.8 per cent). Mining is currently limited to diamonds (0.6 per cent). The best examples of growth are in the construction industry (2.6 per cent); a small rolling mill (0.7 per cent), a 40,000 tonnes fertiliser factory, a ship-repairing scheme, and the setting up of a small electric cable plant. Agricultural diversification mainly takes the form of the development of plantations and products for export (coffee, cocoa, bananas, etc.) and an increase in rice-growing and market gardening. None of these industries are controlled by the government of Ivory Coast, nor even by its own capitalists. Although most of the limited companies belong to Ivory Coast formally, this means very little in fact. Even in the food or textile industries we can find the same international companies mentioned earlier in connection with Cameroun. Construction materials are under the control of French cement companies. When Ivory Coast offered the exploitation of iron deposits it was to the United States within the framework of a syndicate of metallurgy companies including Japanese, United States, and European interests.

Banking is mainly French- or European-controlled. Since the reform of the statutes of the West African Monetary Union and the Central Bank of the States of West Africa in 1973, the Ivory Coast has managed, through its National Monetary Committee, to play an active part in issue policy. The liberalisation of exchanges world-wide has reduced the importance of the currency pool. The Malagasy experience shows that the rules of accounting practice can be far more flexible than might have been thought. However, all these countries are affected by fluctuations in the franc, which are decided exclusively by Paris. On the other hand, Franco- European (and American) involvement is considerable in banking, even though the share of the Ivory Coast is increasing.

With regard to commercial banks, there are three local banks which are 40 per cent Ivory Coast owned,⁴ a branch of the Paris BIAO (International Bank of West Africa) which alone handles 25 to 27 per cent of the trade in coffee and cocoa, and five branches of other foreign banks. Ivory Coast is a majority shareholder in two development banks and the National Savings and Credit Bank (housing and plant) is a State-owned company. But Ivory Coast holds a small minority of shares in the main development bank and owns only 49 per cent of the ca...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• About the Series
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• I Transfer of Power
• II Economic and Military Relations
• III Institutions and Cultures
• IV International Relations
• Index