The Politics of Delegation

Alec Stone Sweet, Mark Thatcher

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781135768966
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.

Index

abstract review 86–7, 90, 95

ADA 203, 206, 211, 217n.4

administration, law-enforcement and 113

administrative agencies, ‘clash of interests’ and 112

administrative courts, influence on agency operations 113

administrative law, reflective in character 179

advisory committees, European Committee and 30

AGCOM (autorità per le Garanzie nelle Communicazioni) 135, 138

Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie (France) 127

agencification 101–2, 118

agency activism, division of labour between politics and administration 120

agency behaviour 118, 202, 204–5, 216

agency costs 25–6, 32–3, 209

agency design and control, bureaucracy and 113

agency discretion and control 5–7

agency innovation, life cycle of 156

agency losses 4, 16, 130, 139, 214–15

agency shirking 28, 55, 139

agency slippage 55, 130, 139

agency vs political control, problem of measurement 201–6

agents 4, 12, 28–9, 32–3, 81, 91–2

Albania 47

Amato, Giuliano (Italian Competition Authority) 149

American bill of rights 83

American courts 184, 195–6

American Courts of Appeal, policy preferences and 183

American delegation theory, supranational politics in EU 1

American judicial review 15, 78–9, 85

American politics literature, American regulatory agencies and 201–2

Americanist theories of delegation, separation of powers system and 211

Americans for Democratic Action see ADA

Amsterdam Treaty (1997) 39, 164

antitrust, symbolic politics 155

APA 181–3, 189

Arnold, Thurman 155

atomic energy conflict, legislation strategy and 113

Austria 79

Austrian constitutional court, democratisation 12

Austrian Second Republic (1920—34) 79

‘autolimitation’, definition 94

Bank of England, independent (1997) 13

Bank for International Settlements 61

Bank of Japan, independent (1996) 65

Bartle, Ian 9–12, 16–18, 175

Bawn, Kathleen 209

Belgium 66

Bergman, Torbjörn 214–15

BKA 108, 149, 151, 162–3

apogee of civil service career 164

appeals against in civil co...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• BOOKS OF RELATED INTEREST
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
• Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?
• Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation
• Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy
• Institutional Choice and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Germany
• Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation
• The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition Agencies
• Judicial Delegation Doctrines: The US, Britain, and France
• Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation
• Abstracts
• Notes on Contributors
• Index