Three
Metaphysics: The World as Will
The task of Schopenhauerâs philosophy, we saw at the beginning of chapter 2, is to get at the whatness of things, to get at that âessenceâ, âkernelâ, or âin-itselfnessâ that lies concealed behind their surface âappearanceâ. So perhaps â the thought might present itself â we should turn for an answer to natural science. Perhaps it is here that we will find the âinnerâ reality that lies beneath (or within) the âouterâ surface of things. Schopenhauer begins Book II of the main work, at which we have now arrived, by arguing that this is not the case. Physics, he argues, can never be placed on the throne of metaphysics (WR II: 175). The ultimate whatness of things can be discovered, if by anything, only by philosophy.
In a way, this is an odd beginning to Book II. For since it is supposed to have been already argued in Book I that the whole world of nature is radically ideal, a kind of âdreamâ, it would seem to follow immediately and obviously that natural science can at best be concerned with the world as it appears, and cannot have anything at all to say about the world as it is in itself.
Kant, after all, had made clear that the whole point of his idealism was to save religion from the challenge of science by confining the latter to the realm of âappearanceâ. âI haveâ, he says in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, âfound it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faithâ (Critique of Pure Reason B, xxx) â to deny scientific knowledge to make room for, not indeed the knowledge that the world beyond space and time is the way Christianity says it is, but for, at least, the possibility that what Christians accept as a matter of faith might be true. So given, as we saw, that Schopenhauer accepts Kantâs proof of radical idealism as incontestably true, the job of excluding science from access to the ultimate nature of reality has, he ought to accept, already been completed.
But Schopenhauer does argue the point in a new and quite different way. This suggests the hypothesis that radical idealism is not genuinely in play in Book II. That though a partial idealism is assumed, though the everyday or commonsense comprehension of the world is assumed to be ideal, idealism about the space-time world, about nature as such, is not in play. Only on this assumption is natural science even a candidate for the title âthat which reveals the ultimate whatness of thingsâ.
This hypothesis, I shall suggest, represents the truth of the matter. For the project of Book II, radical idealism is fundamentally irrelevant. Though the book discovers something â Schopenhauer calls it, of course, âwillâ â to lie beneath the everyday surface of things, this something is a natural entity, lies within the bounds of space and time.
This being said, however, it also needs to be emphasised that, as a young man, as the author of Volume I, Schopenhauer had a strong inclination to misinterpret his own project, to believe, as I put it in the opening chapter, that he had cracked the problem of Kantâs thing in itself. Many times in Volume I, that is, he calls the âwillâ the âthing in itselfâ, and never gives any clear indication that this term is being used in anything other than its established, Kantian sense. In the next chapter, however, I shall show how the more mature Schopenhauer, the author of Volume II, came to see that this is a mistake; how he came to admit that the âwillâ, though esoteric, though lying beneath the commonsense surface of things, remains a natural entity and as such distinct from Kantâs supra-natural thing in itself.
COMPLETING THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE
One reason, then, for beginning Book II with a discussion of natural science is that the scientific account of things is a candidate for being an account of their ultimate whatness â which would of course make philosophy in general, and Schopenhauerâs own philosophy in particular, redundant.
Another, more interesting, reason is that for Schopenhauer, âjust what the sciences presuppose and lay down as the basis and limit of their explanation is precisely the real problem of philosophyâ (WR I: 81â2), from which it follows that âscience is the corrected statement of the problem of metaphysicsâ (WR II: 178). For Schopenhauer, then, as mentioned in the first chapter, philosophers need to know a good deal of science (a sentiment all modern philosophers of science would endorse). âNo oneâ, he admonishes, âshould venture [into metaphysics] ⊠without having previously acquired a knowledge of all the branches of natural science which, though only general, is yet thorough, clear, and connectedâ. But this is not to find an answer to the question of metaphysics but simply because âthe problem must come before the solutionâ (WR II: 178â9).
Schopenhauer himself, as we saw, satisfied this condition by devoting his first year at Göttingen to the study of natural science. Though his yearning for a âbetter consciousnessâ links him to Romanticism, it is an important fact, as we noted, that he does not share the hatred of science generally characteristic of Romanticism. Throughout his writings he preserves a strong interest in science, the World as Will being regularly punctuated by strongly expressed views on contemporary scientific issues: the impossibility, as he sees it, of reducing biology to physics, the superiority of Goetheâs theory of colours to that of Newton, the wrong-headedness of atomism and so on. Schopenhauer did not like scientism, the claim that science is capable of answering every question that is of human interest. In particular, he disliked the âfine airsâ which misinterpreters of science sometimes adopt towards philosophy (WR II: 172). But science itself fascinated him.
All this suggests a non-hostile, collaborative relation between science and philosophy (traditionally known as âthe queen of the sciencesâ); that natural science, by itself is somehow incomplete, that âphysics is unable to stand on its own feet, but needs a metaphysics on which to support itselfâ (WR II: 172). It suggests a conception of philosophy such that at least one of its fundamental tasks is, as we might put it, the completion of the scientific image of reality.
NATURAL FORCES
So how and why is natural science incomplete?
Science aims at explanation â at explaining particular phenomena by subsuming them under causal laws. So the essence of science is the discovery of causal laws. But what makes something a law as opposed to an accidental correlation? Why are we sure that smoking causes lung cancer but not so sure that eating red meat causes bowel cancer, even though in the latter as in the former case there is a strong statistical correlation between the two phenomena? Ultimately because in the first case but not the second we are able to give an account of what it is that connects the phenomena. We have, that is, some idea of what Schopenhauer calls the âinner mechanismâ (WR I: 100) connecting smoking with lung cancer. This, he holds, is always the case. In so far as we claim something to be a genuine law, we suppose there to be some âinner conditioningâ (FW: 34) in which that law is grounded, something which authenticates its status as a law. Even if we do not know what this âconditioningâ is, our conviction that there is a law is the conviction that such a âconditioningâ exists. When we get down to the fundamental level of matter these items which make laws laws are what Schopenhauer calls ânatural forcesâ. Putative examples he gives are gravity, impenetrability and electricity (WR I: 97, 141).
Forces are neither causes nor effects. They do not belong to, but rather preserve and âexpressâ their natures in, lawful patterns of cause and effect. They preserve âthe unalterable constancyâ of those laws through time (WR I: 97). That small objects are attracted towards the centres of large objects, for example, is both an expression of, and is constituted as a law by, the force which we call âgravityâ.
Science, then, committed as it is to laws of nature, is committed to the existence of natural forces. But what are these forces? What is gravity? To this question it gives no answer. So far as science is concerned gravity is a âqualitas occultaâ an âunknown Xâ, (WR I: 125, WR II: 318, WN: 317â20). Hence, though fascinating and useful, the image of the world produced by science is essentially facile, two-dimensional. It is like âa section of a piece of marble showing many different veins side by side, but not letting us know the course of the veins from the interior of the marble to the surfaceâ (WR I: 98). Though a distinction is generally made between explanatory sciences such as physics and chemistry and descriptive and classificatory sciences such as botany, really, all science is merely descriptive. It shows the âorderly arrangementâ of natural phenomena but explains none of them (WR I: 96â7).
Schopenhauer acknowledges, of course, that in science one theory often gets absorbed into a more fundamental one. Forces such as solubility and rigidity inherent in gross bodies (sugar lumps) may be explained in terms of those bodies being structures of more refined objects (molecules) together with the laws governing the behaviour of the latter. Theory reduction can go, however, only so far. Sooner or later science must reach a bedrock level of entities and a bedrock level of most fundamental laws governing the behaviour of those entities. It is the forces presupposed by these laws, the ultimate, âoriginalâ forces of nature, which Schopenhauer claims to constitute the fundamental mystery, the âinsoluble residuumâ (WR I: 123â4) of natural science.
It might be objected that since theory reduction, explanation, must stop somewhere, it is of course the case that, ultimately, one will arrive at laws grounded in forces which are incapable of further explanation. But this is to misunderstand Schopenhauerâs account of the incompleteness of natural science. His objection is not that science cannot explain fundamental forces, but rather that it canât attach any meaning to its fundamental terms.
The background to this is Schopenhauerâs empiricist criterion of meaningfulness discussed in the last chapter. According to that principle, âit must be possible to verify the [meaningfulness of a] concept with perceptions which stand to abstractions in the relation of examplesâ; it must be possible to specify in experiential terms, what it would be like to come across whatever it is that is being talked about. As we saw, Schopenhauer uses this empiricist principle to debunk pseudo-philosophical âscribblingâ about âthe Absoluteâ and âthe Infiniteâs evolution into the Finiteâ. But, he now observes, left to its own devices, science is in the same boat. Just like Hegelâs âAbsoluteâ, gravity is, to science, a mere âXâ. It uses empty words so that, quite literally, it doesnât know what it is talking about.
In Michael Fraynâs play Copenhagen, which concerns a meeting in 1941 between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, the founders (along with Einstein and Max Plank) of quantum physics, Bohr raises an objection against Heisenbergâs âIndeterminacy Principleâ (if you know the position of a subatomic particle you canât know its momentum and vice versa) and against his approach to fundamental science in general. His complaint is that he, Heisenberg, doesnât care what his theory means, only that the sums come out right. This I think is Schopenhauerâs complaint about natural science as such. At its fundamental level, he suggests, it doesnât know what it means.
So, left to its own devices, it is âinadequateâ (WR II: 176). It needs help, âis unable to stand on its own feet but needs a metaphysics on which to support itselfâ (WR II: 172).
THE NATURE OF MATTER
So physics needs metaphysics, science needs philosophy. But equally, as we saw, metaphysics needs science, since it is the latter that is the âcorrected statement of the problem of metaphysicsâ. Why does philosophy need science? Why does philosophy, in particular, need to get its fundamental science right in order to even start its thinking from the right place?
Schopenhauer has decided views about the nature of matter. Matter, he says, is âpure causalityâ (WR II: 305). Its âwhole essence consists in acting (ibid.). It is ânot extended [in space] and is consequently incorporealâ (WR II: 308). It cannot itself be perceived but merely âexhibits itself as bodyâ (WR II: 305, 309). These interesting remarks are intended to oppose âatomismâ â the view that the worldâs ultimate constituents are tiny chunks of matter in terms of whose behaviour everything else is to be explained. This view, which Schopenhauer calls a ârevolting absurdityâ, though propounded by Locke (and two thousand years before him by Democritus), finds particular favour in France due to âthe backward state of [French] ⊠metaphysicsâ (WR II: 302), the inability of French philosophers to think seriously about the foundations of natural science (an inability, one might be tempted to add, which continues to this very day.)
Putting these remarks together, we can understand Schopenhauerâs view to be that what the best science does is to dematerialise or desubstantialise matter. Opposing the âchunkyâ view1, Schopenhauer understands good science to hold that the ultimate constituents of matter are extensionless centres of âpure causalityâ, in other words of force. The natural world is nothing but space filled with (as modern science calls them) force fields. These fields of force, as Schopenhauer puts it, âobjectifyâ themselves â are experienced by us â as perceptible bodies, yet outside the human mind such bodies have no existence. When we say that a body is âhard, heavy, fluid, green, alkaline, organic and so onâ, we are merely reporting the âaction or effectâ of force fields on the human mind (WR I: 458).
This account of the status and nature of material bodies casts the theory of perception discussed in the last chapter (pp. 36â9) in a new light. According to that theory, it will be remembered, the âunderstandingâ constructs its account of the external world by inferring from sensations to objects as their external causes. In this way it produces what we might call the âmanifestâ or âcommon senseâ image of the world. In fact, however, according to what Schopenhauer takes to be good science, all these inferences (inferences that are absolutely necessary to human survival) are mistaken. Nothing object-like exists outside the mind. According to the best science, bodies are nothing but âspaces filled with forceâ (WN: 207).2
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There is, then, a relation of mutual dependence between science and philosophy. On the one hand physics needs some further discipline to attach meaning to its fundamental terms (and if not âmeta-physicsâ what else?) for otherwise it is, at root, a meaningless, though technologically useful, enterprise. But on the other hand, philosophy needs science to tell it, with precision, just what the problem of understanding the whatness of the world amounts to. The problem, we now know, is to describe the character of the fundamental forces of nature and thereby to do what science itself cannot do, complete the scientific image. How might it...