Social Identity in Question

Construction, Subjectivity and Critique

Parisa Dashtipour

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9781848720800
• eBook ISBN: 9781136245374
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Social identity theory is one of the most influential approaches to identity, group processes, intergroup relations and social change. This book draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Lacanian social theorists to investigate and rework the predominant concepts in the social identity framework.

Social Identity in Question begins by reviewing the ways in which the social identity tradition has previously been critiqued by social psychologists who view human relations as conditioned by historical context, culture and language. The author offers an alternative perspective, based upon psychoanalytic notions of subjectivity. The chapters go on to develop these discussions, and they cover topics such as:

• self-categorisation theory
• group attachment and conformity
• the minimal group paradigm
• intergroup conflict, social change and resistance

Each chapter seeks to disrupt the image of the subject as rational and unitary, and to question whether human relations are predictable. It is a book which will be of great interest to lecturers, researchers, and students in critical psychology, social psychology, social sciences and cultural studies.

1
Introduction

In social psychology and other related disciplines, social identity theory (SIT) is among the most influential theories of group processes and group-induced change. It was developed more than a few decades ago, challenging the way groups were previously understood and generating a serious interest in group issues. Some argue that the SIT tradition¹ has been particularly prominent in its theorization of the individual–social relation in the discipline (Brown & Lunt, 2002). The SIT approach is perceived as original in a discipline where theories are becoming increasingly ‘micro’, and its influence has strengthened in recent years (Hornsey, 2008). Part of the reason for this is that it views collective issues, such as social influence, not as effects of intra-personal or inter-personal processes but as part of larger-scale social dynamics. The paradigm takes seriously status differences and power struggles between groups and emphasizes that subordinated groups are able to criticize and propose alternatives to the prevailing social order. It has been characterized as a theory that is primarily focused on social transformation because it illustrates how social identities change, and how categorization is involved in collective action (Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1981).

A focus on the SIT approach is important because it motivates reflection on the nature of conformity, power and resistance – issues that critical psychologists are deeply interested in. Critical psychology aims to criticize inequalities and injustices in the world, and it is acutely concerned with social change. It is equally preoccupied with assessing and challenging mainstream psychological theories. This book is therefore dedicated to investigate, question and reinterpret one of the most dominant traditions in social psychology. The SIT paradigm is a broad field, and it is applied to a variety of topics. One area of social life, which contemporary social identity researchers do not sufficiently explore, is social change (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). Chapters 6–8 in this book concentrate therefore on the part of the theory that focuses on resistance, collective struggle and change.

Given that extensive reviews of the social identity paradigm can be found elsewhere (e.g. Brown, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hornsey, 2008; Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; Tajfel, 1978, 1981, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Giles, 1981), only a brief sketch is provided below, and Chapters 3–6 will open up and scrutinize some aspects of the theory in more detail. The final part of the present chapter offers an overview of the main arguments of this book. Before we move on, however, it should be made clear that this book will largely centre on the original texts of SIT and self-categorization theory (SCT) (as they were presented in, e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978, 1981, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Social identity theory: a motivational and socio-cognitive account of intergroup relations and social change

Tajfel and colleagues developed SIT while a debate had already taken root about the reductionist and individualistic trends in social psychology. The theory emerged as a critique of accounts that depicted prejudice as an effect of intra-psychic frustration or authoritarian personalities (e.g. Adorno, Fenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). One of the main postulates of SIT is that prejudice and conflict are predominantly related to group membership rather than, for example, individual aggression, or even scarce resources as believed by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961).

SIT was initially built to account for the findings of the famous experiments known as the ‘minimal group paradigm’ (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In these experiments, participants were divided randomly, or on the basis of trivial criteria (e.g. preference for Klee or Kandinsky paintings) into two groups. There were no prior interactions between the participants, no knowledge of who was in the ingroup and outgroup. The subjects only knew which group they belonged to and they were given the task of allocating points to other participants. The results of these experiments suggested that subjects allocated maximum rewards to the ingroup in manners that increased the difference between the amount allocated to the ingroup and to the out-group (the minimal group experiments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). Tajfel concluded that this finding must be related to the subjects’ sense of belonging to the groups in which they had been allocated. The change from personal to social identity leads to a shift from interpersonal to intergroup behaviour. Since there was no interpersonal contact, no history and no common goals between members of the groups, the researchers deduced that knowledge of group membership is sufficient for the creation of a sense of group belonging and for positive differentiation (ingroup favouritism). In other words, beyond any historical, economic and political factors, simply belonging to a group is a sufficient condition for the development of ingroup favouritism. The minimal group experiments resulted in the explanation of prejudice in terms of social categorization, social comparison and group membership (see Tajfel, 1978).

Social categorization is “the ordering of social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 61). It is a meaningful process, related to the individual’s system of beliefs, and it works as a guide for action; it helps one to orient oneself in society. The idea of categorization is largely derived from Tajfel and Wilkes’ (1963) earlier research on the accentuation effect: a cognitive consequence of categorization that leads to stereotyping. It is human nature to try to understand the physical and social environment and thus categorization, which simplifies the complex world, is a means through which people can make sense of this complexity. Social categorization exaggerates differences between groups and minimizes differences within groups. “Social categorization per se induces the perception of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences” (Turner, 1981, p. 79). Social categories are evaluated positively or negatively, and this process helps to enhance differences between and similarities within categories. Tajfel (1978) argues that the “interaction between socially derived value differentials on the one hand and the cognitive ‘mechanics’ of categorization on the other is particularly important in all social divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (p. 62). The interplay between cognition and social structure is thus seen as significant; as well as a cognitive process, categorization is a “socially evolved representation of social structure” (Turner, 1996, p. 20). Categorization changes the way people see themselves and each other, it makes salient ‘us’ and ‘them’ differentiations, which leads to intergroup discrimination: “Social categorization … seems to be the effective cause of intergroup discrimination” (Turner, 1981, p. 78). It is, however, acknowledged that something else has to be involved in discrimination or negative prejudice. There must also exist a motivational aspect to discrimination.

SIT implies that our social identities are constructed by the numerous social categories we identify with. These are not all activated simultaneously. Rather, our social identity depends on the social category made salient in specific contexts. Salient social categories define the self and the social context and lead to a process of social comparison that in turn leads to self-evaluation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Turner argues that

the categorization process produces the perceptual accentuation of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences and thus makes salient or perceptually prominent the criteria or relevant aspects of ingroup– outgroup membership. In this way, it selects the specific dimensions for self-evaluation and social comparison in the given setting.

Turner (1981, p. 82)

Group belonging is important as a basis for self-definition. Individuals therefore search for positive ingroup distinctiveness, and discriminate against other groups. This produces competitive intergroup relations. In other words, our membership categories have significant implications for our self-esteem so there is a strong motive to positively evaluate social identity. People compare their own group with other groups in order to “create, achieve, preserve or defend a positive conception of oneself, a satisfactory self-image” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 338).

Social comparison is an idea borrowed from Festinger (1954) who believed that man is characterized by “a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities” (p. 117) and this occurs through comparison with others, especially with those others who are superior to him. Tajfel (1981) states: “a group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate mainly because other groups are present in the environment” (p. 258). The attributes of a group gain their importance in comparison to other groups, and the values attached to the differences between groups are significant in this process. “The definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there are other groups around” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 66). Turner argues that intergroup comparisons are related to the status differentials between groups in society:

status differences represent the outcomes of intergroup comparisons conferring positive or negative distinctiveness and also the antecedent conditions for different social strategies … directed at the maintenance or protection of self-esteem.

(Turner, 1981, p. 81)

Those who belong to groups that are generally perceived to be ‘inferior’ can resist this representation of their group and gain a more satisfactory sense of self by positively distinguishing their group from other groups. Reicher (2004) emphasizes that the social identity approach allows for flexibility, creativity, innovation and agency. He points out that social change or collective movements fundamentally depend on the way identities are constructed and renegotiated. “What the social identity perspective offers, then, is an understanding of how shifts in categorization come about and how they are related to collective action” (Reicher, 2004, p. 941). He also states that minority members’ group actions are “aimed at challenging and dismantling current structures of inequality rather than creating and defending them” (p. 932). However, subordinated groups very often simply accept their group membership and its ‘inferior’ evaluation. With the exception of a limited number of cases (e.g. Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978; see also Chapter 15 in Tajfel, 1981) this problem has largely been neglected in the SIT paradigm. Investigating the underlying reasons for this acceptance is crucial because not challenging a denigrated group evaluation inhibits social change and generates immense psychological and social costs (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).

SIT points out that instead of identifying with the dominant group and thereby accepting an inferior position, members can act in order to change their status (e.g. Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). The theory focuses on “what explains this new behavior whereby status systems that kept subordinate groups ‘in their place’ for years are now under attack” (Turner & Brown, 1978, p. 202). It is this aspect of the theory that has inspired Billig (2002) to argue that it is essentially “a theory of group freedom”, and that “the most original parts of the theory describe how groups can recreate stereotypes that are applied to them” (p. 179).

In order to reconstruct stereotypes or escape a stigmatized social identity, various resistance strategies could be applied depending on subjective belief structures. When the boundaries of social categories are seen as permeable, people employ an individual strategy and distance themselves from – or exit – the negative social category. They no longer define themselves in terms of this category and will try to gain acknowledgement in the dominant group – this is called the social mobility belief system. For example, this kind of strategy may be used by some people with an immigration background in European countries: they can change their names into Western sounding names, in order to ‘pass’ as a member of the majority group because they believe it will be easier for them to gain access to jobs and other privileges that come with belonging to the majority group. However, this could be seen as an assimilation strategy (Tajfel, 1981), or even as ‘identification with the outgroup’ because the ingroup is discriminated against and the outgroup favoured. Individual mobility does not have any influence on the overall structures of inequality and the status quo will be maintained.

The social change belief system is based on the assumption that group boundaries are impermeable, and that the status of the denigrated minority group can be changed (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Whether or not subordinated groups will engage in various forms of collective action depends, however, on the existence of ‘cognitive alternatives’. This is when the subordinated group perceives the social system as illegitimate and changeable. When cognitive alternatives exist, one group of strategies that minorities can employ is ‘social creativity’, which may entail the following: The negatively evaluated groups can introduce new dimensions through which they can compare themselves against other groups in more positive terms. Alternatively, they can change the value of those aspects that are considered inferior and reverse these. Another strategy involves comparing with other ‘low-status’ groups rather than with the dominant group. If subordinated groups apply any of the above consistently, they may bring about a change in the way they are perceived, and attain a positive social identity. A more radical social change strategy labelled ‘social competition’ by Turner & Brown (1978), includes the struggle for more profound changes, for example, by engaging in demonstrations, wars or terrorist acts in order to gain the recognition and respect which the affected groups feel they deserve. Social competition involves the idea that recognition is not something that is simply awarded by those in power to those who are disempowered but is something that must be taken, even if by aggressive, violent means, if it is in fact to be worthwhile.

In order to discriminate against other groups and/or engage in collective action, individuals first need to view themselves as part of a group. How are social identities and social categories made salient, and how do people identify with a group? The issues of group membership and group influence are tackled by SCT.

Self-categorization theory: a socio-cognitive account of the group

SIT shows that social categorization is the foundation for psychological group formation: people demonstrate shared responses according to the ingroup. Imposing a shared group membership on subjects seems to be enough for people to like each other and to act in accordance with each other, and discriminate against other groups. SCT (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987) develops this major conclusion of SIT. SCT illustrates how subjects are able to act in terms of a group as a result of social identity, which is “a higher order level of abstraction in the perception of self and others” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42). A psychological group is formed when people define themselves in terms of shared ingroup categorization. This theory moves away from the focus on intergroup relations and investigates group processes in general, and the ways in which the group and its norms and values become significant for individuals. In other words, it deals with the consequences of groups on individual members. It is specifically dedicated to a rereading of traditional theories of social influence. The questions addressed in SCT are, for example,

How does a collection of individuals become a social and psychological group? How do they come to perceive and define themselves and act as a single unit, feeling, thinking and self-aware as a collective entity? What effects does shared group membership have on their social relations and behavior?

(Turner et al., 1987, p. 1)

There is a return here to categorization processes with an emphasis that one’s self-perception is significant in the formation of groups. While SIT could be understood to include some motivational elements, SCT is primarily a cognitive branch of the SIT paradigm.

Self-categorization applies to three general levels; there are three different levels of belonging: superordinate (being part of humanity), intermediate (group membership) and subordinate (individual self-definitions). The claim here is that groups that have psychological importance are based on a shared sense of identity. This sense of identity is founded on the perception of oneself as an interchangeable member of the group, rather than a distinct individual. When a category is salient, people categorize themselves into that group. Group membership or social categories have important psychological and behavioural consequences for the group member. Group membership itself can be understood “as a distinctive explanatory process in social psychology” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 1), and various social phenomena such as social influence, collective behaviour and attributions are directly or indirectly caused by people’s knowledge of being part of a group (see Turner, 1991, 2005; Turner et al., 1987).

Two notions explaining the salience of categories are ‘accessibility’ and ‘fit’. These terms are based on Bruner (1957) who claimed that the activation of categories produces a perception of reality that to a large extent reflects that reality. Fit and accessibility show the significant impact of context on categorization. A category becomes salient when it is readily accessible and can become activated, and when an actual stimulus fits the stored category specifications in a given situation. The accessibility of a category depends on past experiences and current goals and purposes. Perceivers are thus actively selective in their use of relevant categories. ‘Comparative fit’ refers to the idea that a given categorization becomes salient when differences within categories are less than differences between categories; when intergroup rather than intragroup differences are noticeable. This idea is related to earlier work on categorization (see above), but SCT develops it by demonstrating that this process is dynamic and determined by context and situational factors. ‘Normative fit’ means that the fit between category and reality depends on the expected content dimension; salient social categories and the stereotypes associated with them depend on the social meaning, the content, of the observed situation. Self-categorization theorists argue that fit “ties perception firmly to reality” (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994, p. 116). The presumption that categorization is a cognitive distortion of the world is thus rejected:

given the reality of groups and individual’s identifications with them, there would be conditions under which groups-based perception (of both the self and others) would be entirely appropriate (a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgement
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The social identity tradition and its critics
• 3 The category, not the self
• 4 Whatever happened to “‘hot’ aspects of the group”?
• 5 Another story of the minimal group paradigm
• 6 Social change or socio-symbolic symptom?
• 7 Gringo: a case study
• 8 Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index