Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War

David M. Glantz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781136287725
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Published in 1989, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.

CHAPTER ONE

THE THEORY OF MASKIROVKA

On 22 June 1941 German forces, spearheaded by four panzer groups, crossed the Polish-Soviet boundary and thrust deep into the Soviet Union. Capitalizing on surprise, in six months they had inflicted a shattering defeat on Soviet armies, and advanced over 800 kilometers along three strategic axes to the very outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. By the time the offensive ground to a halt in the face of stiffened Soviet resistance and deteriorating winter weather, the Germans had destroyed a large portion of the peacetime Red Army, disrupted the Soviet military command structure, and forced the Soviets to initiate a drastic restructuring of their armed forces to insure their survival and promote achievement of ultimate victory.

The devastating consequences of this surprise left an indelible imprint on the work of Soviet military theorists. Although they had long appreciated the value of surprise in war and had studied its use, this was not enough to prevent the catastrophe of 1941. Consequently, during the heat of war Soviet military theorists again focused their attention on the role of surprise in combat and the techniques an army must master to achieve it. The wartime education was effective. By the last two years of war the Soviets had clearly mastered surprise at all levels of war. As a result, German armies experienced the same devastating effects of surprise as the Red Army had suffered in June 1941.

The lessons of the Second World War were not lost on Soviet military theorists in the post-war years. Intense investigation of the subject of surprise dominated Soviet military thought, particularly after Stalin’s death. Improved communications and weaponry and the prospect of nuclear war placed a premium on the timeliness of offensive and defensive war preparations. Thorough Soviet study of the nature of the “initial period of war” has focused first and foremost on surprise and the means for achieving it. It has taught the Soviets that the achievement of surprise by friend, or the denial of surprise to the enemy, is indeed a major factor in achieving rapid victory or avoiding defeat.

Among the many factors contributing to the achievement of surprise, deception is undoubtedly the most important. The Soviet term for deception, maskirovka, is often translated into the simple English term camouflage.¹ This definition, however, belies the complexity of the Russian term. In fact, maskirovka covers a host of measures ranging from disinformation at the strategic level to the skillful masking of an individual soldier’s foxhole. Officially the Soviets define maskirovka as:

The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the command … maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.²

Characteristically, the Soviets categorize maskirovka as strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level maskirovka “is conducted by the high command and includes a complex of measures to protect the secrecy of preparations for strategic operations and campaigns, as well as disinformation of the enemy regarding the true intentions and operations of armed forces.”³

Strategic maskirovka is the principal precondition for achieving strategic surprise, either during the initial period of war or during the course of war, and it contributes to the attainment of strategic aims. Successful use of surprise in the initial period of war

allows the attacking nation to strike the enemy a heavy blow, to gain time for concentration and deployment of its remaining forces, to secure the initiative in operations, to deprive him of important strategic and economic regions by decisive advances, to disrupt or frustrate his organized conduct of mobilization, and to undermine the moral stability of his army and people.”⁴

At the operational level maskirovka “is conducted by front, army, and fleet commanders and is undertaken to secure the secrecy of preparations for operations.”⁵ Operational maskirovka provides forces with the capability of dealing surprise strikes on the enemy which forces him to engage in combat in unfavorable conditions. Also, at the tactical level maskirovka is “undertaken by divisions, regiments, and battalions and on separate objectives in order to hide preparations for battle or the presence (disposition) of objectives.”⁶ Thus, by definition, maskirovka includes both active and passive measures designed to deceive and surprise the enemy.

Deception, in the Soviet view, permeates all levels of war. Since by Marxist-Leninist definition, war is but an extension of politics, deception also transcends war into the political realm – specifically into the period preceding the outbreak of war. Thus “experience demonstrates that to secure surprise blows, the government and military control organs of the aggressor states mobilize all methods and means of influencing the enemy, including political, diplomatic, and military acts, in order to hide from them the secret concept and timing for unleashed aggression.”⁷ Although written about hostile powers, this quote captures the essence of Soviet belief in the all-encompassing nature of deception. Since the state of war is a logical, if not inevitable, extension of peace, then the outcome of war depends in part on how a nation exploits conditions existing in the pre-war period. To be effective, deception designed to ensure victory or forestall defeat must be of constant concern in peacetime as well as wartime. This all-encompassing attitude is as much a product of Marxist ideology as it is a product of prudent military theory.

Marxism-Leninism is founded upon the truth of inevitable and predictable dialectical change.⁸ The dialectic is deterministic. Based on economic, social, and political realities, the dialectical method describes a process of inevitable change resulting in the state of communism. To one who accepts the nature of the dialectical change, any and all measures that accelerate that process are desirable, if not essential. War, in its various forms, is a natural element of that process. Thus, deception is a legitimate tool to hasten change both in peace and war.

The dialectic, and the role of deception in it, assumes a moral character somewhat alien to Western democratic concepts which view deception as immoral, akin to lying. As a result Americans either resort to deception reluctantly, or do it poorly. Marxist-Leninist theory defines morality differently. Simply stated, morality is measured by the degree to which an action impells the dialectical process to its logical and desirable end. What assists in the achievement of socialism is moral. What does not is not. Hence deception in peacetime is a valid, if not an imperative, means for achieving political aims without resort to war. It is likewise a valid means for securing advantage in wartime.

Coexisting with this overall attitude toward the morality of deception and its relationship to historical change is the Soviet attitude toward the morality of war in general. To the Soviets there are “just” and “unjust’’ wars, and their justness is measured against the same scale as for measuring morality. Simply stated, “just” wars contribute to progress toward Socialism while “unjust” wars do not. The use of deception is justified in both cases, either in achieving “just” goals or in thwarting the actions of the “unjust.”

Thus, Soviet attitudes toward war and historical change in general place an ideological as well as a practical emphasis on the art of peacetime and wartime deception. This study concentrates on Soviet experiences with deception only in the military realm.

CHAPTER TWO

PREWAR THEORY AND PRACTICE

The scope and sophistication of Soviet deception has evolved with the changing nature of war. Before the Second World War the Soviets were more concerned with the physical, rather than with the more intellectual, aspect of deception at the strategic level. This attitude was derived from the nature of the Soviet military establishment and the technological level of the Soviet state. Some nations (for example Japan in 1904 and Germany in 1914) have been able to use strategic deception at the onset of war, because their sophisticated military establishments permitted hasty but efficient mobilization and rapid implementation of complex war plans in the opening phase of hostilities. It was beyond the capability of the Soviet Union, however, with its ponderous peacetime military establishment and a cumbersome mobilization process, inhibited by the immense size and the relative technological backwardness of the Soviet state. Certainly the Soviets realized the potential benefit of strategic deception. In their Civil War they had, on occasion, achieved deception and enjoyed its benefits; but that had been done with small forces employing limited weaponry. For example, they had used secret rail movements to regroup large forces before major offensives against the forces of Admiral Kolchak and Generals Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel. To do likewise against the most efficient military machines of the more technologically advanced Western powers was impossible.

This attitude was reflected in Soviet military regulations and war plans. They focused on operational and tactical deception, but paid only scant attention to strategic deception. However, as we shall see, in their military theoretical writings of the inter-war period, the Soviets displayed a growing realization that technological changes, particularly the development of air and mechanized forces, offered prospects for the conduct of more meaningful deception on a higher level.

Soviet military writings during the 1920s concentrated on the, by then, classic realm of deception involving concealment of location and strength of offensive operations. They conceded that offensive intent and the timing of an offensive were more difficult to conceal.¹ Regulations and directives adopted a similar focus by limiting the impact of deception primarily to the operational and tactical levels of war. Thus, “in Soviet military art during the 1920s the theory of operational maskirovka [deception] was developed as one of the most important means of achieving surprise in operations.”² The 1924 official directive for front and army commanders and field commands, “Vyshee komandovanie”, [Higher Commands], emphasizing the importance of operational maskirovka, pointed out that operational maskirovka, one of the basic means for achieving surprise, “must be based upon the principles of aktivnost’ [activity], naturalness, diversity, and continuity and includes secrecy, imitation, demonstrative actions, and disinformation.”³

In a more concrete vein, the 1929 Field Regulations of the Red Army enunciated the role of deception in achieving surprise:

Surprise has a stunning effect on the enemy. For this reason all troop operations must be accomplished with the greatest concealment and speed. Rapidity of action combined with organization is the main guarantee of success in combat …. Surprise is also achieved by the sudden use for the enemy of new means of warfare and new methods of combat.⁴

Thus, while underscoring the importance of concealment, the regulation hinted of the impact of further technological developments in the realm of deception. For the first time the Soviets put forward the often ignored idea of achieving surprise through the use of new combat methods unforseen by the enemy. The remainder of the regulation referred only tangentially to deception by detailing the role concealment played in the successful conduct of maneuver. Concealment was achieved by:

a. confusion of the enemy by active operations of the covering force;

b. adaptation to the terrain, and camouflage;

c. performance of the maneuver swiftly and properly, particularly at night, in fog, and so forth, and;

d. keeping secret the preparations for the maneuver and its goal.⁵

The Soviet mechanization program undertaken in the 1930s widened the horizons of deception by increasing the speed and maneuverability of combat units and the importance of the time factor in the preparation and conduct of operations. Soviet military theorists first developed the theory of deep battle [glubokii boi] and subsequently the theory of deep operations [glubokaya operatsiya]. As a corollary for these theories the role of deception, as defined in regulations, expanded in scope and importance – but still only at the operational and tactical levels.

The 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle and the 1936 Field Regulations emphasized the growing importance of deception within the confines of the battlefield. The Instructions recognized that new weaponry and the tactics of deep battle had increased the importance of surprise. It articulated the bases of surprise as being “air s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• List of Maps
• Explanation of Map Transliterations
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. The Theory of Maskirovka
• 2. Prewar Theory and Practice
• 3. Theory and War Experience
• 4. The Practice of Maskirovka: The First Period of War (1941–November 1942)
• 5. The Practice of Maskirovka: The Second Period of War (November 1942–December 1943)
• 6. The Practice of Maskirovka: The Third Period of War (1944)
• 7. The Practice of Maskirovka: The Third Period of War, 1945
• 8. Patterns of Deception: Reflections on Soviet Second World War Maskirovka Experiences
• 9. Implications for the Future
• Notes
• Appendices
• Index