Chapter 1
Per spectives of childhood
Richard Mills
Summary
This first chapter sets out to establish some of the key themes of any investigation of childhood. It lists the disciplines which may be involved in studying the phenomenon; the difficulties in defining what childhood is and who children are; and the factors affecting the various social constructions of childhood. The chapter offers six possible perspectives and describes how each of these comes about (i.e. children as innocent/as apprentices/ as persons in their own right/as members of a distinct group/as vulnerable/as animals). Some of these perspectives are mirrored in a variety of ways in the chapters which follow but, as the appendix shows, there are many more possible constructions of childhood, each with its own interests and limitations.
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams. W.B.Yeats, âHe Wishes for the Cloths of Heavenâ (1899)
This book is not about childhood, but about perspectives of childhood and children. As explained in the introduction, such is the nature of childhood that its study cannot be confined within one academic discipline. It must draw on such areas of study as are felt to be appropriate, and these might include, in large or small degree: anthropology, art, computing, education, history, literature, medicine, philosophy, physiology, psychology, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, sociology, statistics, or theology.
So much for the tools of enquiry but, however wide or narrow oneâs subject, defining terms remains crucial and, in this search for definition, the word âchildhoodâ presents problems. Does the investigation relate to boys, or girls, or both (Waksler, 1991: 234, 244)? Are they in rural or urban areas? (Cunningham contrasts the two states 1991: 150ff.) From which social class do they come? (This is a key issue for Humphries et al., 1988: 35.) Are they contemporary children or from the past? (Ariès, 1996, maintains that childhood did not begin until the seventeenth century; Pollock, 1983 and others forcibly dispute this.) Do the children come from the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the world? (La Fontaine, in Richards and Light, 1986: 10ff., sees cross-cultural comparisons as crucial.) How old is a child? (Gamage, 1992, states that the early childhood period is between birth and ten years; the social historian Walvin, 1982: 11, decides it is age fourteen and under; Miles, 1994: 263, reports childhood as including the years up to eighteen, as a matter of international law, binding on the twenty countries which ratified the United Nations agreement of 1990.)
These are some of the questions relating to the actual people involved. What of the phenomenon itself? What are some of its distinguishing features? Is childhood a state of powerlessness and adaptation to a lack of power (as Waksler maintains, 1991: 69)? Or a time and condition of secrets and shame (according to Postman, 1983: 80)? Or dependency (Shipman, 1972: 13)? Can it not simply be regarded as a period of biological, intellectual, and social development; as a time for the âaccumulation of experienceâ (Wadsworth, 1991: 7), leading to self-definition (1991: 12)? In these terms, is it not best linked with a series of school transitions such as: nurseryâinfantâjuniorâsecondary, in the state system, and nurseryâkindergartenâprepâpublic school in the private system (see James and Prout, 1990: 233)? Or, should it be perceived as a category of child such as âThe Country Childâ (Dudgeon, 1992)? If the talk is in terms of categories, do the terms âinstitutionalâ and ânormativeâ (Wringe, 1981: 88) offer a useful perspective? The former refers to the legal or quasi-legal status of childhood, and the latter to an expectation of certain capacities of children.
Perhaps approaches such as these outlined are too mundane and functional. If so, should an approach be adopted which seeks to capture the timeless essence of childhood in some kind of mystical manner, uniting âa mythical past with a magical presentâ (James and Prout, 1990: 229)? One way into such a world is through fiction and the work (in English, at any rate) of such writers as J.M. Barrie, Lewis Carroll, Kenneth Grahame, Charles Kingsley, C.S. Lewis, A.A. Milne and J.R.R. Tolkien. The world these writers create is timeless and (despite certain potential terrors) safe and contained. In extraordinary and individual ways, these authors are regarded as having captured something elusive and indefinable (see Wullschläger, 1995, for a fascinating commentary on five of these writers). It is not the world of modern childrenâs authors, such as Leila Berg, Edward Blishen, Roald Dahl, Anne Fine, Philippa Pearce and Robert Westall (see Meek et al., 1977; Styles et al., 1996; Tucker, 1991), who seek to represent more immediate ârealâ experiences; it is beyond time, and often archetypal. In this regard it either creates for us, or reflects to us, something which we cannot replicate for ourselves. As George Eliot observed in The Mill on the Floss:
Is there anyone who can recover the experience of his childhood, not merely with a memory of what he did and what happened to him ⌠but with an intimate penetration, a revived consciousness of what he felt then â when it was so long from one Midsummer to another?
(1985: 123)
Such, then, are the problems of defining childhood, with its shifting visions, its lack of watertight compartments, its illusory and elusive nature: what Steedman refers to as its âextraordinary plasticityâ (1995: 7). It is clear that childhood or, rather, childhoods, are social constructions, cultural components inextricably linked to variables of race, class, culture, gender and time. In sociological terms, âTo recognise that âchildâ is a role is to suspend the assumption that childhood has some absolute, real, transcendent existence beyond the socialâ (Waksler, 1991: 146). It needs to be seen as âa shifting social and historical construction ⌠a continually experienced and created social phenomenon which has significance for its present, as well as the past and futureâ (James and Prout, 1990: 231).
The eclecticism apparent earlier in the range of relevant disciplines will now be apparent as some of the key social constructions of childhood are outlined. These are presented in no hierarchical order and the intention at this stage is to keep them fairly discrete, although in reality they cannot be isolated but are interlinked and overlapping, in the manner of a Venn diagram. The constructions I have chosen are:
- children as innocent
- children as apprentices
- children as persons in their own right
- children as members of a distinct group
- children as vulnerable
- children as animals
Children as innocent
They are idols of heart and of household; They are angels of God in disguise;
His sunlight still sleeps in their tresses, His glory still gleams in their eyes.
His glory still gleams in their (Dickinson, âThe Childrenâ)
The notion of the child as innocent has had, and still has, a powerful hold on the imagination. Its origin or appeal seems to reside in one or more (or possibly an undifferentiated amalgam), of the following perspectives:
- child as theological construct
- child as being in need of protection
- child as a force for good
Child as theological construct
From a sociological point of view, the term âtheological constructâ would be quite acceptable; from a religious point of view it might be more debatable, since what is being addressed is nothing less than the essence of human life. As Shipman has suggested, up until the twentieth century child-rearing and education in the western world had been dominated by two contrasting, and hardly compatible, Christian viewpoints: âOne view stressed the angelic, unsullied, natural goodness of children. The other stressed their devilish, potentially evil, self-willed natureâ (1972: 8). As a sample of the first view, Shipman quotes from the essayist, John Earle, subsequently Bishop of Salisbury, who in 1628, at the age of eighteen, wrote in Microcosmographie:
The child is the best copy of Adam before he tasted of Eve or the apple; and he is happy whose small practice in the world can only write his Character. He is Natureâs fresh picture newly drawn in oil, which time, and much handling, dims and defaces. His soul is yet a white paper unscribbled with observations of the world, wherewith, at length, it becomes a blurred notebook.
(Shipman, 1972: 9)
It is a view for which some justification could be found in the New Testament of the Bible and which foreshadowed later thinking. Words such as âbestâ, âfreshâ and âwhiteâ, denote a quality of purity and newness which found powerful endorsement in much late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century writing, not least in Rousseau, who announces his personal manifesto early in Ămile by stating: âGod makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evilâ (1762: Book 1, p. 5).
However they might disagree theologically about Original Sin or Original Innocence, both Earle and Rousseau are united in believing that something goes wrong, that the new beginning promised in childhood somehow founders. Postman is specific about the polarity. He writes:
In the Protestant view, the child is an unformed person who, through literacy, education, reason, self-control and shame, may be made into a civilized adult. In the Romantic view, it is not the unformed child but the deformed adult who is the problem. The child possesses, as his or her birthright, capacities for candour, understanding, curiosity and spontaneity that are deadened by literacy, education, reason, self-control and shame.
(1983: 59)
John Lockeâs metaphor of the âtabula rasaâ, the clean slate (1693), clearly fits the first of these polarities in that it assumes an incremental build-up of knowledge, skills and attitudes through the acquisition and practice of literacy. For Rousseau, the child was within âa state of natureâ and, given the absence of adverse circumstances, that would be sufficient to develop what Postman calls âthe childhood virtues of spontaneity, purity, strength, and joy, all of which came to be seen as features to nurture and celebrateâ (1983: 59).
The controversy, which goes back to the early Christian church, still has significance for the secular twentieth century, although the language has changed and the debate is more pragmatic, focusing not so much on essence but on practical import: namely, how should parents and professional educators treat young children? Hannah More faced this issue in 1799 in her book Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education, and asked the question:
Is it not a fundamental error to consider children as innocent beings, whose little weaknesses may, perhaps, want some correction, rather than as beings who bring into the world a corrupt nature and evil dispositions, which it should be the great end of education to rectify?
(Brown, 1993: 44)
The question, albeit in different terms, is still with us. Should parents follow the advice of John Wesley âto break the will of your child, to bring his will into subjection to yoursâ (quoted by Hendrick in James and Prout, 1990: 38), or should a more sensitive, subtle, enabling route be followed? Expressed in that loaded form, the choice is perhaps fairly simple, but as we shall see throughout this book, such is the multi-faceted nature of the enquiry into the essence of human nature that the ground appears constantly to be shifting: one discipline offers insights which might seem to conflict with those from another discipline, one set of practical experiences is often at variance with another set, and new knowledge, particularly in the area of genetics (see Jones, 1994: 68ff), can enforce radical reappraisal of previously held convictions.
In short, the philosophical and ideological stances taken by parents, carers, and educators, whether precisely articulated or merely implicit, will determine how children are treated. That is a key premise of this present work.
Child as being in need of protection
It is axiomatic that, however the period of childhood is defined, children are in need of physical protection and nurture for their well-being. This is true of the young of any animal species. However, within the literature of childhood innocence, protection has a different significance. It refers to the preservation of a state of ignorance, of unknowingness, about certain areas of life which adults feel should best remain secret from those inhabiting the world of childhood.
Indeed, based on this premise, the movement out of childhood is seen as the gradual acquiring of secret knowledge. The transition from childhood in the western world is thus not some sudden act of ritualised initiation, as in some societies. Rather, it is a slow, increme...