Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century

Max G. Manwaring

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780714681603
• eBook ISBN: 9781136336232
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires a new look and new approaches. The requirement is to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with new policy and strategy to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

Part One
Setting the Stage for a Discussion of Deterrence

Reopening the Deterrence Debate: Thinking about a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow

MICHAEL P. C. CARNS

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the global security system and the verities that shaped US purposes, policies, and priorities have undergone fundamental changes. Cold War concepts of security and deterrence are no longer completely relevant. We are in a new global security environment that involves the integration of free markets, technologies, and countries to a degree never before witnessed. The growling, nuclear-armed Soviet bear was relatively easy to understand and deal with. What is not easy to understand and respond to are the many ‘smaller’ threats – and opportunities – that stem from global integration. Yet, as the country that benefits most from global integration, the US has a pressing national interest in maintaining and enhancing the new order.

The New Strategic Environment

When what mattered most were military bases, preserving access to sea lines of communication, chokepoints, and raw materials – and denying those assets to the Soviet Union and its surrogates – the US could generally ignore internal conditions in other countries. But, since the US is now also interested in the need for non-hostile dispositions toward the country, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the capacity of other countries to buy American-made products, the continued development of democratic and free market institutions, and human rights – as well as cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drugs, the environment, and the victims of natural and man-made disasters – then the US must concern itself with the causes and consequences of regional and national instability.

The ‘unstable peace’ and chaos of the post-Cold War era are caused by myriad instabilities. The causes include increasing poverty, human starvation, widespread disease, and lack of political and socio-economic justice. The consequences are seen in such forms as social violence, criminal anarchy, refugee flows, illegal drug trafficking and organized crime, extreme nationalism, irredentism, religious fundamentalism, insurgency, ethnic cleansing, and environmental devastation. These conditions tend to be exploited by militant nationalists, militant reformers, ideologues, demagogues, civil and military bureaucrats, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and rogue states for their own narrow purposes. As a result, in the words of Leslie Gelb, the interdependent global community is experiencing ‘wars of national debilitation, a steady run of uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations’.

In the chaos of the ‘new world disorder’, the threat of devastating attacks on the US, its interests, and its friends perpetrated by the former Soviet Union, China, and other nuclear powers retains a certain credibility. At the same time, the challenges for contemporary security and deterrence policy will intensify with the growing sophistication of biological and chemical war, and cyber war. These challenges to deterrence policy will be gravely complicated by ‘non-traditional’ threats and menaces emanating from rogue states, sub-state and trans-national terrorists, insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, militant fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers, and 1,000 other ‘snakes’ with a cause – and the will to conduct asymmetrical warfare.

In this security environment, the US has little choice but to reexamine and rethink security and deterrence as they apply to the various state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear threats and menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away. As Thomas Friedman has suggested, the US cannot expect the ‘hidden hand’ of the free market to work without a ‘hidden fist’. That is to say, ‘McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonald Douglas. The hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.’

To help sustain and continue to benefit from the new globalization, the US must take the responsibility to lead, control, and manage the negative consequences of global integration. As was the case in determining how to ‘contain’ a hegemonic Soviet bear, the first step would be to craft a carefully thought-out, holistic, long-term, and phased national security policy that deters – or at least manages – existing and emergent threats. This is important not only because the promise is great, but also because the alternative is unacceptable.

Deterrence: The Art of the Possible

To understand precisely what it is we are talking about, a few fundamentals are essential.

First, and most important, deterrence is the attempt to influence how and what an enemy thinks and does. That is, deterrence is a state of mind that – hopefully – prevents a deterree from acting in a way a deterrer considers harmful. Thus, the deterrence ‘rule of thumb’ is to determine precisely what a hostile leadership values most and identify exactly how that cultural ‘thing’ – whatever it is – might be held at risk. At the same time, the deterrence rule of thumb must also consider – as opposed to the proverbial ‘stick’ – what ‘carrots’ might be offered as deterrents. In these terms, deterrence can work only if the intended deterree chooses to be deterred. The problem, by definition, is that conflict and the strategy to pursue or prevent it is a dialogue between two or more independent wills. As a consequence, probably the single most important dimension of a deterrence strategy is clarity of communication between culturally different deterrers and deterees.

In this context, a successful deterrence policy and strategy must recognize that one deterrent or another may fail. The possibility of failure leads to other requirements. As examples, beyond unilateral US military reaction, there are the ideas of enhancing collective security measures, the possibility of going to other already proven and ageless security measures, and the notion of developing ‘new’ means of deterrence. Thus, deterrence must also address the relationship with the other concepts such as traditional and non-traditional compellance, dissuasion, defense, and denial – and how to integrate these ideas into policy, strategy, doctrine, and operations with respect to old, new, and emerging adversaries.

Deterrence, then, should not be reduced to a single dominant aspect. Success cannot be guaranteed by buying more or better nuclear forces, conventional and unconventional military forces, superior intelligence, genius in command, or relative morality. Success will be the result of a unified, coherent, long-term, and culturally-oriented policy and strategy that integrates all the civil and military elements of US national power synergistically to influence the behavior of diverse possible adversaries.

The Russian Bear, Asian Dragons, and other Nuclear Powers

It is a paradox of the present global security environment that at a time when powerful forces in the US have argued that America is the only superpower in the contemporary world – and has nothing to fear from any other global political actor – some actors are in fact actively acquiring nuclear weapons for potential use against the US and its interests. These actors range from Russia to China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan to Iran, Israel, and even South Africa. Then, there are those countries such as Brazil who could develop their own nuclear capabilities very soon after a political decision was made to do so. In all, it is arguable that a fresh policy framework is called for to manage the evolution of twenty-first century power relationships. Success in doing so depends on applying innovative perspectives, coupled with vigorous and enlightened US leadership.

Russia

The Russian nuclear threat is well documented in the media and in international arms control agreements. Nevertheless, it is important to review some fundamental issues regarding Russian nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. For a variety of reasons, we may wish to ignore or cleverly ‘spin’ what the Russian leadership says about the US and how they see the world. If we do, however, we may well forgo opportunities to manage a better relationship, and we do so at our own peril. If we place any credence in what its political and military leaders are saying, Russia considers the US to be a threat to international stability and – more directly – a threat to its own national security. They have said this from former-President Yeltsin on down. They have been saying so for several years and on numerous occasions – over NATO enlargement, over Bosnia, over Kosovo, and over Chechnya.

In November 1999, Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev publicly accused the US of ‘seeking to establish control over the North Caucasus’ by playing the Afghan card in Chechnya. Sergeyev’s argument is the US and NATO are trying to weaken Russia by all means, including the ‘the use of force, disregard for the norms of international law, and diktat and high-handedness’. Also, recently, the Chief of the Russian General Staff suggested that Moscow could expect NATO to use force against former Soviet territory, just as it had in Iraq. In this context, he and others have almost proudly noted the conduct of Russian missile, submarine, and aircraft exercises that to many appear to be patterned after Cold War activities.

More disturbing than the words we are hearing is the turbulence and the growing dysfunctioning of the Russian government. Even among those who discount what Russian leaders are saying, most would agree that the strategic uncertainties regarding Russian internal instability are staggering. Few would venture to guess where Russia will be politically in five years – or even one year. Yet, most would predict that, even with resource limitations, Russia will continue to possess a large nuclear stockpile. It appears, then, that Russia intends to rely on its nuclear arsenal for at least the next decade as the primary means to ensure its security. Indicative of this greater reliance on nuclear weapons for both defense planning and declaratory policy is the recent announcement of an across-the-board increase in research and development as well as a start of production of new mobile ‘tactical’ weapons.

In sum, Russia is doing what it can to maintain as much nuclear capability as it can. It is expending very scarce resources on deploying a new mobile missile, keeping heavy multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRVed) missiles in the field, and retaining a massive infrastructure and the capability to produce new warheads. These developments are serious, indeed, and it is time for the US to think through the issue in an effort to manage the Russian relationship in such a manner as to sustain a hard-won peace.

China

Unlike Russia, China is an emerging power. Here again, the best we can do is note what Chinese leaders are saying, as well as what they are doing.

First, even more forcefully than in Russia, the Chinese are declaring the US to be a threat to their national security and to global security. It is argued that the US 1998 bombing of the pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was an act of state terrorism; that the 1999 bombing in the former Yugoslavia was an overt illegal act of aggression against a sovereign state; and that the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was a war crime.

Second, in terms of behavior, it appears that the Chinese have made a long-term commitment to improve their nuclear capabilities. As examples, the acquisition of MIRV and solid fuel technologies, the deployment of increasingly longer-range mobile missiles, the announcement of the development of neutron warheads, the construction of a new strategic submarine to carry long-range missiles, and firing ballistic missiles near Taiwan indicate a determination to develop and deploy a robust nuclear arsenal.

Finally, it is argued that Americans should be concerned about Chinese nuclear modernization because soon they will be able to target all major US population centers.

These are sobering developments. As with Russia, it is time to reconsider the issue of Chinese deterrence in light of changing conditions and the need to manage correctly global power relationships. The fundamentals of deterrence, however, have not changed. Effective deterrence continues to depend on both real, not virtual, capabilities, and the perception of US resolve to respond against something of high value.

Other Emerging Nuclear Powers

Moving on to the next category of states that we must consider in a deterrence context, there is a consensus that about two dozen countries including North Korea, Iraq, and Iran – those that the State Department refers to as ‘rogues’ – represent a growing threat. These states, as does Russia, define the US as the enemy without any subtlety or reservation. They believe, quite correctly it is hoped, that we are the major barrier in the way of their strategic territorial, political, religious, and personal goals. As a rule, these states are more risk prone than was the former Soviet Union. As an example, Iran fired the Shahab 3, with a range of some 1,300 kilometers, and further indicated that it was developing a Shahab 4, with an estimated range of at least 2,000 kilometers.

At the same time, North Korea tested a multi-stage missile – the Taepo Dong 1 – in the summer of 1998. It over-flew Japan, splashed down in the Pacific Ocean, and convinced several vulnerable countries that North Korea must be considered a serious threat to stability and peace all along the Asian Rim. North Korea is also reportedly working on a Taepo Dong 2 that might be capable of striking the continental US with a nuclear-weapons-size payload. As Keith Payne has pointed out, the conditions that we always valued in our Cold War deterrent relationship are not likely to pertain with North Korea and other new nuclear powers. Additionally, ‘rogue’ states see as their task deterring the US from intervening in their regions. As a consequence, deterrence is a proverbial two-way street – and in this case, the symmetry of the East-West relationship is absent.

Again, these developments are sufficiently threatening to require rethinking policy and strategy. In developing regional deterrent and defense strategies, understanding the regional and national military/political/cultural dynamics is critical to identifying those assets that should be held at risk for deterrent purposes. It is also essential to determine how best to communicate intentions, both with regard to public declaratory policy, as well as private communications and non-verbal messages to demonstrate resolve.

‘The Poor Man’s Nukes’

In addition to nuclear arms, weapons of mass destruction include cheap and accessible biological agents and man-made chemical compounds that attack the nervous system, skin, or blood. Biological and chemical weapons strikes could make whole regions of the world uninhabitable for long periods. Additionally, electronic (or cyber) warfare exposes enormous vital areas of national life to sabotage by virtually any computer ‘hacker’. Such concerted sabotage could render a country, or part of it, unable to function. Given the low cost and virtually universal ease of access, it has been said that terrorists can order the poor man’s nuclear bomb (chemical and biological weapons) from a catalog. Similarly, terrorists, or anyone else with the will, can find a computer hacker to create destruction and mayhem.

The hard evidence over time is that violence is all too often considered an acceptable option in attempting to achieve personal or institutional goals; that non-state and even state actors prefer to resort to ambiguous and asymmetric forms of force to achieve their ends; and that ‘only the foolish will fight fair’. For these reasons, the ‘poor man’s nuke’ represents a growing and direct threat to US security and well-being, and to the ability of the US to use direct military force against ambiguous non-state targets as an instrument of that strategy.

There is a clear requirement to prepare and plan more comprehensively for the threat represented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In these terms, it cannot be assumed that the ‘proven’ logic of mutual assured destruction will apply in a regional, sub-state, organizational, or individual context. That is, regional states and messianic anti-Western zealots may well risk annihilation for outcomes Americans and other Westerners would consider ‘irrational’. It would be wise for the US to think through these complex problems, case by case, before a conflict. Crisis management is not likely to suffice in the context of a multi-polar world in which one or a hundred ‘irrational’ actors are exerting differing types and levels of power.

Terrorists, Illegal Drug Traffickers, Other Organized Criminals, and 1,000 Other ‘Snakes’

Current definitions of terrorism fail to capture the magnitude of the global threat. It has been defined as the sub-state application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow a given regime, and to bring about political change. It shades, sometimes, into insurgency and a substitute for conventional declared war between countries. The problem of sorting out an acceptable definition of terrorism is exacerbated by the development of hundreds of aggressive movements espousing varieties of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenarianism – from Hindu nationalism in India to neo-fascism in Europe and the developing world to the example of the Branch Davidian cultism of Waco, Texas. Thus, the contemporary global community faces not one type of terrorism, but many. Importantly, terrorists, drug traffickers, organized criminals, and other ‘snakes’ are now significant global actors with the ability to compromise the integrity and sovereignty of individual nation states.

The common denominator seems to be that terrorists of all stripes have in fact become organized, highly trained paramilitary units who are con...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Editor’s Preface
• Introduction
• PART ONE: SETTING THE STAGE FOR A DISCUSSION OF DETERRENCE
• PART TWO: RETHINKING PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
• PART THREE: WHERE TO FROM HERE?
• Abstracts
• About the Contributors
• Index