A Psychoanalytic Theory of Infantile Experience

Conceptual and Clinical Reflections

Eugenio Gaddini, Adam Limentani

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN:
  9781138145559
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134905416
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Developmental Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Eugenio Gaddini, a pioneer within the Italian psychoanalytical movement, devoted a lifetime of research to the organization of infantile mental life.

In this edited collection of his papers Dr Adam Limentani introduces Gaddini's key theories showing how they are closely linked to, but different from, the thinking of Phyllis Greenacre, Donald Winnicott and Melanie Klein.

These ideas are of great clinical relevance for the treatment of adult patients, particularly in the understanding of psychosomatic disorders. The richness of the clinical evidence with which Gaddini supports his hypothesis, and the originality of his conceptions make this a rewarding and stimulating book for the practicing analyst and psychotherapist.

1

On imitation

This paper was first published in the Rivista di Psicoanalisi (1968), XIV, 3 under the title ‘Sulla imitazione’. An amplified version appeared in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (1969) 50: 475–84.

This paper is a first attempt to organize some thoughts of mine on imitation, elaborated during the last ten years. What I propose to do, in the first place, is to distinguish on the metapsychological plane imitation from introjection and identification, and to show how the latter usually presupposes not only introjections but also imitations. Second, I shall try to show how certain infantile psychopathological pictures (taken from personal experience and from psychoanalytical literature) become more comprehensible if one takes into account the use of imitations in relation to the regime of gratifications and frustrations in the first period of life. Finally, I shall attempt to indicate how, in adulthood, pathological imitations may be found even in easily encountered clinical examples. I have purposely avoided developing this last part, as I intend to do so in a later paper.

When Freud (1900) introduced the concept of identification, with reference to the hysterical phenomena of psychic contagion, he stressed above all its distinction from imitation: ‘Thus, identification is not simple imitation, but assimilation on the basis of a similar aetiological pretension; it expresses a resemblance and is derived from a common element which remains in the unconscious’ (p. 145). This distinction did not imply that identification was the opposite of imitation but rather that it was a more complex phenomenon.

However, the later development of the concept of identification has not been very much concerned with imitation, but has been amplified with other complementary concepts, such as incorporation and introjection (Ferenczi 1909), probably arising from the need to underline the genetic and the dynamic aspects respectively. Unfortunately, these partial aspects have often been confused with each other, and with the concept of identification itself, giving rise to no little confusion.

Federn (1952) has objected to the concept of introjection followed by Edoardo Weiss (1960). Federn intended to clarify the confusion by eliminating the concept of introjection and substituting for it that of internalization.

Naturally, all those (even though they are not many) who have detected the presence of imitative phenomena have found themselves forced to distinguish them from what could seem, at the first glance, to be identifications. Among these few, Fenichel (1937). Ferenczi (1932a, b), Deutsch (1942). Greenacre (1958a), Greenson (1966), Stoller (1966), Ritvo and Provence (1953) and Eidelberg (1948) may be mentioned. Owing to the terminological confusions which still exist, one can still find the term ‘identification’ used in the place of ‘imitation’, and this indicates the sufficient elaboration of the concept of imitation. However, it is fairly widely agreed that imitation reveals itself as a disturbance of identification, and with the characteristics of a primitive phenomenon, which probably precedes identification in development. In this sense imitation has been recently set by Jacobson (1964) in a more decidedly metapsychological frame.

As far as the original meaning of identifications is concerned, Jacobson prefers to speak of ‘early identifications’ rather than of ‘primary identifications’. These early identifications permit the internalization of a reality, at first fragmentary and selective, in the sense of part-objects, and later of whole objects, towards which partial and selective identifications correspond to the interests of the ego; the development of identifications permits the development of other essential functions of the ego, such as reality testing, and the formation of a sense of identity and gender identity.

What precedes these ‘early identifications’ should, in my opinion, be indicated as ‘early imitations’. The term used in this respect by Jacobson, ‘primitive identifications’, is in fact also used by others, but it seems to me a misleading term, since it is used to indicate phenomena which are of an imitative nature. To distinguish them from ‘early identifications’ may perhaps allow not only a greater clarification of both the concepts at the beginning, but perhaps also the distinction of imitation from identification in terms of processes.

Early identifications can be distinguished from imitations by the important fact that a reality, even though fragmentary, becomes introjected and assimilated. In this sense Jacobson uses the term ‘realistic identifications’. I would like to suggest that this realistic element represents, right from the beginning, something which permits us to speak of identification proper. Early imitations, on the other hand, represent and are concerned only with unconscious fantasy. Furthermore they seem to follow a process of their own, which apparently has a distinct role in the development of the ego.

Because imitations precede identifications in the individual development, we should expect, clinically, the possibility of regressions from identification to imitation. Since imitations are concerned with unconscious omnipotent fantasies we should expect a similar regression to involve an object relationship of a more primitive type. In fact, clinical experience offers notable examples of this sort of regression with disturbances of identification of an imitative type, accompanied by fantasies of omnipotence. In my experience it is practically constant in character disturbances in general, and it may be found very frequently in male and female homosexuality, and also in fetishism and transvestism.

As far as the process of development of imitations is concerned, it seems to be distinct from, even though gradually integrated with, that of identifications. On the other hand, it seems evident that imitative activity is placed, in the course of its development, at the service of the ego functions and processes of adaptation. In this connection we should expect, besides a regression to imitation, a regression within the imitation – that is, from a more integrated imitation to one which is less integrated, or not integrated at all, in the structure of the ego; that is to say, pathological disturbances of imitation itself.

Imitation seems to be connected, originally, with perception, in the sense that primitive perception is physically imitative. At first the infant perceives by modifying his own body in relation to the stimulus. In this way, the infant does not perceive the real stimulus, but the modification of his own body. Perhaps the differentiation of the systems of perception and systems of memory has its beginning in this community of physical perception and imitation.

As we shall see, the regime of gratification and frustration to which the infant is subjected has a determining influence on the further destiny of these ‘imitative perceptions’ and their mnemonic traces, in the sense of their normal or pathogenic evolution. In general, a prevailingly frustrating regime tends to reinforce and make them last more than they might. The phenomenon, however, which seems to constitute the first step forward seems to take place under the sign of frustration, and is known by the term ‘hallucinatory image’. Using this term we refer to the fact that, in the absence of the gratifying objects, and in the attempt to end the painful sensations which derive from its separation, the infant has a hallucination; that is, represents some image as reality. In order to understand the meaning of separation from the object and of the subsequent representation, it should be kept in mind that, at this stage, the object is not perceived as such but as a part or an extension of the body self.

Rapaport (1951) has justly defined the hallucinatory image as ‘the prototype of thought’. I would like to suggest that it can also be considered as the psychic prototype of imitation. If one bears in mind that (in the words of Freud) ‘originally the mere existence of a presentation was a guarantee of the reality of what was presented (1925: 237), one can understand the meaning of this primordial psychic imitation. From now on, the biological model, ‘imitating in order to perceive’, changes into the parallel psychic model, in which to perceive becomes ‘to be’. ‘Imitating in order to perceive’ becomes, that is, ‘imitating in order to be’. Or rather, perceiving is still, as before, ‘being’, but whereas this occurred previously on a prevailingly physical level, it now does so on one which tends towards the psychic.

We do not know in what way the functional model becomes converted into a parallel psychic model, even though we can argue the economic advantage of such a conversion, but primitive psychic activity offers us more than one example of this sort. Introjection, for example, with which we shall deal shortly, is today defined as the psychic model parallel to the physical one of ‘putting into the mouth’, of ‘incorporating’ orally (Greenson 1954). We shall shortly see how some early affects may be correlated with bodily functional models. As Federn has written apropos of this,

It will be a further task of psychoanalysis and biology to find out to what extent and detail the mental processes parallel the bodily ones, and how many somatic phenomena may and must be transposed to the mental level.

(1952: 352)

Concerning the psychic protomodel of imitation – ‘imitating in order to be’ – it may be helpful to repeat that it installs itself not in the presence of the object but in its absence, and that precisely because of this, its aim seems to be that of re-establishing in a magical and omnipotent way the fusion of the self with the object.

The period immediately following consists in the active development of fantasies in which these two characteristics – no objective reference to reality and a magical restoration of the omnipotent fusion with the object – continue to constitute the essential fact. This belongs to the ‘symbiotic phase’ (second-fifth-sixth month) of Mahler and La Perriere (1965). These fantasies of fusion, however, can last for a long time, even beyond the pre-Oedipal period (Jacobson 1964).

As far as the early introjections are concerned, according to Fenichel (1945: 37) in this period ‘in the unconscious all sense organs are conceived as mouth-like’. That is, the introjections also aim at the fusion of the self with the object which may come to be lacking: and this seems to be what Fenichel intends in saying that, originally, “‘putting into the mouth” and “imitation for perception’s sake” are one and the same’ (1945).

However, these two functional models seem to determine in a distinct way, right from the beginning, that two-fold attitude taken towards an object which Freud has detected and defined: ‘what one would like to be’ and ‘what one would like to possess’. The fact that these can be lived as one and the same thing does not mean that they are. The primitive imitative perception seems to lead to the hallucinatory image, to the fantasies of fusion through modification of one’s own body, and to imitations, in the direction of the wish to be the object. Oral incorporation seems to lead to the fantasies of fusion through incorporation and to introjections, in the direction of having, of possessing, the object. In the narcissistic cathexis these two basic dispositions coexist, providing the reason for the fact, indicated by Freud, that in the identifications called by him primary, the relationship is both one and the other.

The early affects seem, in turn, to be modelled on the same original physical paradigms, and this seems to determine the sense of early conflicts. The early appearance of envy and rivalry (Klein 1957; Jacobson 1964) becomes in fact more comprehensible if one takes into account how near rivalry is to the imitative-perceptive model (the object as what one would like to be) and envy to the incorporating-introjective model (the object as what one would like to have). According to Jacobson, still in the first year of life, affectomotor imitations between mother and child would follow the fantasies of fusion, and in turn would be followed by imitations of the parents’ emotional expressions ‘induced’ by them (1964).

The following step in development, however, seems to be represented by the first assimilations of imitations or introjections relative to partial or fragmentary realities. The maturational development of perceptive and mnemonic functions has certainly a determining role in this step, but other factors also intervene, connected with the characteristics of the relationship. I shall not enter here into the meta-psychological problems relative to this passage. I shall limit myself to saying that the internalization of reality involves a quantitative and a qualitative modification of the object cathexes so that an external reality, gradually recognized as separate from self, and an internal part of the ego, more stable and separate from non-ego, correspond to the accumulation of the imitations and the introjections assimilated in a realistic way. Imitations and introjections converge therefore in this process, originally fragmentary and gradually more integrated, for which I would like to reserve the term ‘identification’.

I should say that the distinction between imitation, introjection and identification is not found in psychoanalytical literature in the terms now described, and the reason for this, apart from the general lack of distinction between imitations and identifications, lies also in the fact that the term ‘introjection’ has been in turn widely fused and confused with that of identification, right from the moment when it was introduced by Ferenczi (1909). Here the confusion was justified by the fact that introjections were concerned with the oral base of identification, constantly underlined by Freud, who wrote, ‘There are … good reasons why a child sucking at his mother’s breast has become the prototype of every relation of love’ (1905: 222).

However, what has complicated the development of the concept of identification seems to be the difficulty of integrating, on the conceptual plane, the evolution of the developmental area, which seems to be characterized by psychosensory activity, with that of the area which could be defined as psycho-oral. Naturally, the oral psychic area is not limited to the oral zone, just as the sensory psychic area does not exclude the oral zone. That is, if it is true that all sense organs may unconsciously be conceived as mouth-like, it is also true that the oral zone and cavity may be experienced as a sensory organ inasmuch as they are the seat of perceptions with their relative mnemonic traces. Further on, an extraordinary example will be given of imitative reactivation of the perceptions of the oral cavity, as the result of serious oral frustrations. I would like to point out here, however, that certain early conditions of oral frustration may determine disturbances of the oral psychic area – namely, of introjective mechanisms – with the result that an imitative activity of introjections may partly substitute introjective activity.

From the dynamic point of view the psycho-oral area seems to be proportionately much more exposed to the conflicts in the object relationship, while the sensory area seems to provide a possible withdrawal from the conflicts, and the exclusion of the external object which promotes them. If we refer to individual development in terms of object cathexes, identifications may be considered, in this development, as an intermediate station of crucial importance, in which the imitative phenomena of the sensory area and the introjective ones of the oral area become integrated in the service of reality and the ego processes of adaptation. In this sense, what Freud has described as secondary identification is perhaps to be considered as the only conceivable one whose appearance is to be dated right from the moment of ‘early identifications’ Jacobson), or ‘realistic identifications’, whose development continues uninterruptedly till adulthood. What precedes I would designate as ‘imitations’ and ‘introjections’ with reference to their respective basic bodily models of perception and of oral incorporation. Imitations and introjections obey the pleasure principle, while identifications are orientated towards reality and lead, in their gradual development, to the possibility of mature object relationship, which in turn functions according to the reality principle. What Freud called ‘narcissistic relationship’ had originally more to do with the self than with the object, and in this sense is to be referred to the perceptive-imitative area in which the object is experienced in the service of the self; while what Freud called the ‘anaclitic relationship’ has more to do with the object than with the self and is to be referred to the incorporating-introjective area in which the self experiences its real dependence on the object.

Deutsch has described the ‘as if kind of identifications, which in her opinion are found in a characteristic way in the pre-Oedipal period, and which are found clinically in certain schizoid personalities which Deutsch defines as being of the ‘as if type. These patients behave as though they themselves were their love objects (1942).

There seems to be no doubt, to my mind, that Deutsch intends to refer to a markedly imitative kind of object relationship, primitive in nature, even though in the terms used by her imitation is not clearly distinguished from identification and from introjection. Deutsch seems in fact to maintain that the ‘as if phenomena are a type of ‘imitative identification’ based on fantasies of oral incorporation. The ‘imitative identifications’ of infancy are, in my opinion, ‘imitations’ and, compared to identifications, can at the most be considered as precursors of the latter. Consequently we are not faced, on the clinical plane, with a particular type of identification but with a regressive defence from the relationship which would involve identification. The seriousness of these patients is equal to the entity and to the extension of the imitative phenomena which substitute identifications, and to their primitive character (regression within the imitation). They lead to what one could correctly define as an attempt to gain a vicarious identity, magically acquired through imitation.

In a case of ‘as if’ character, a girl of 21, the patient tried to make up, by a striking use of imitative mechanisms, for the painful emptying of her own identity, consequent on the necessity of cutting off an essential part of herself relative to the oral area of her object relationship. Her more serious disturbances had begun in early adolescence, after her father, whom she loved very much, had abandoned the family and after a period of several months spent alone in a school in a foreign...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 On imitation (1969)
• 2 Aggression and the pleasure principle: towards a psychoanalytic theory of aggression (1972)
• 3 Beyond the death instinct: problems of psychoanalytic research on aggression (1972)
• 4 Formation of the father and the primal scene (1974)
• 5 On father formation in early child development (1976)
• 6 Therapeutic technique in psychoanalysis: research, controversies and evolution (1975)
• 7 The invention of space in psychoanalysis (1976)
• 8 Notes on the mind–body question (1980)
• 9 Early defensive fantasies and the psychoanalytical process (1981)
• 10 Acting out in the psychoanalytic session (1982)
• 11 The pre-symbolic activity of the infant mind (1984)
• 12 The mask and the circle (1985)
• 13 Changes in psychoanalytic patients up to the present day (1984)
• Bibliography
• Name index
• Subject index