China Under Communism

Alan Lawrance

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• eBook ISBN: 9781134747917
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

China Under Communism examines how Marxism took root, flourished and developed within the context of an ancient Chinese civilization.

Through analysis of China's history and traditional culture, the author explores the nature of Chinese communism and how it has diverged from the Soviet model. This book also provides insight into the changing perceptions Westerners have of the Chinese, and vice versa.

Key features include:

* assessment of controversial issues: The Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and Mao's record
* coverage of gender and family, ethnicity, nationalism, and popular culture
* long historical context.

This timely evaluation details how China's political and economic policies have been inextricably linked, and assesses past failures and successes, as well as major problems for the future.

1:The Communist victory and consolidation of power, 1949–53

We shall soon put aside some of the things we know well and be compelled to do things we don't know well…We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are. matter who they are.

Mao Zedong, 30 June 1949.
‘On the People's Democratic Dictatorship’.

The inherent weaknesses of the Nationalist regime were a major reason for the Communist victory in the civil war. The unexpected collapse of the Nationalists in 1949 gave the CCP a mandate to govern the whole of China. Starting with very limited experience of ruling big cities and industrial areas they were remarkably successful. Within three years they had united the country, revived industry and communications and had begun to promote social revolution in a new political framework.

WHY THE NATIONALISTS LOST THE CIVIL WAR

It is a paradox that the Nationalists were unable to proceed to ultimate success despite their apparently advantageous position in 1945. They were the internationally recognized government of China supported diplomatically by both the United States and the Soviet Union.¹ They had a large army of which 39 divisions were trained and equipped by the Americans and they had a virtual monopoly of airpower. The Communist fighting experience had been in guerrilla warfare rather than in the standup battle of tactics of large armies using sophisticated weapons. In military terms the Communists had serious losses by mid-1947 when the Nationalists took control of southern Manchuria. For a time the Communists were even driven out of Yanan, although this was of little more than symbolic importance.

However, the Nationalists were failing even before the Civil War erupted in 1946. The Japanese invasion of China and the circumstances of World War II were very important factors leading to Communist victory. The GMD was unable to stand up to the Japanese and effective resistance was largely in the hands of the Communists working behind the Japanese lines. Moreover, the Japanese had driven the Nationalists out of their bases of political power in the lower Yangzi region. When at the end of World War II the Nationalists returned to take over from the Japanese, they brought exploitation and corruption which alienated even those urban groups who saw socialism as a menace.² In contrast, the Communists in the (relatively few) cities they controlled, won support, after some initial excessive confiscation in Manchuria, by effective controls which encouraged productivity and curtailed labour agitation.

The Nationalists’ failure to stop runaway inflation convinced a great many people, particularly the erstwhile middle classes, that they had nothing more to lose. At least the Communists were offering a new broom reputedly capable of sweeping away corruption and giving some stability to the wartorn nation. As the Communist armies began to gain ground in 1948, the Nationalist forces became increasingly demoralised. Some units deserted, others defected to the Communists. Few people, certainly not the Communists themselves, seem to have anticipated the speed with which the half of the country south of the Yangzi fell to the Reds after April 1949.

How far did the Communists’ own ideas and policies promote their success? The mobilization of guerrilla forces went hand in hand with land reform. In the period of the united front against Japan the Communists’ moderate aims of reducing rents and interest to benefit the poorer people in the countryside were widely accepted. Even the rural elite whose income was reduced appreciated the efficiency with which dues were collected under new village governments.

In May 1946 the Communists introduced in the ‘liberated areas’ a more radical policy intended to transfer land ownership to the poorer peasants. This was designed to confirm the loyalty of the majority of the villagers to the Communists in the impending civil war. The 1947 Land Law abolished landowner rights and authorised village associations to redistribute the land. The goal of ‘land to the tiller’ was being realized in accordance with the Communists’ views of a hierarchy of peasant classes. The poorer and middle class peasants were to benefit but how precisely were the lines to be drawn and policies implemented? The problems raised led to the Directive on Land Reform and Party Rectification Work in February 1948. This February directive recognized that the attack on the middle peasants had gone too far. In 1948 the Central Committee accepted that middle peasants could make up to 25 per cent of their income by ‘exploitation’ e.g. from hiring seasonal hands, rent and interest.

By 1949 it would be unsafe to characterize the process of liberation as a victory of the exploited classes. Far more pragmatically than Marxist theory might imply, the Communists won allegiance by leading the attack on the obvious grievances such as corruption, rack rents and hypertaxation. Most importantly their record contrasted with the Nationalists’ failure to implement reforms.

Explanations for the Communist victory must weigh the importance of their economic line and social policies against their strong political organization and military successes. These are not of course mutually exclusive.

PROBLEMS FACING THE NEW LEADERS

Who were the men about to become the leaders of a united China? In May 1949 there were about 4 million members in the Chinese Communist Party out of a total population estimated at 540 million. Their leader Mao Zedong, 55 years old in 1949, had been in charge of the Party since 8 January 1935, at Zunyi on the Long March.

With Mao since 1928 had been the military commander, Zhu De, rightly credited with the early successes of the Red Army. He remained as commander in chief of the newly named People's Liberation Army after 1949, and continued to be widely respected if less prominent in affairs.

Zhou Enlai, who went to Europe in 1920 with other revolutionary minded young Chinese in the aftermath of the 4 May Movement, became a leading negotiator for the Communists. During the anti-Japanese war he was in charge of the liaison with the Nationalists in Chongqing. From the time of the Long March he appears as a close supporter of Mao's policies. In 1949 he became Premier, the head of the state executive apparatus, and throughout his career also played a particularly important role in foreign affairs.

In 1949 the Party's second in command was Liu Shaoqi. During the Yanan years he strongly supported Mao's leadership and his political ideas. He had a leading role in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which founded the People's Republic. Among other important posts he was the head of the labour federation and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. When Mao went to Moscow at the end of 1949, Liu took over state and party affairs as his deputy. He was widely regarded as Mao's successor (until 1966).

Another supporter of Mao in his rise to power at Yanan was Chen Yun. Chen had a particular interest in economics and he was to hold a key position in the new republic as head of the Finance and Economic Commission directing measures for immediate economic rehabilitation and later helping to establish the Five Year Plan.

Peng Dehuai had joined Mao in the mountains in 1928. As military leader he rose to a position second only to Zhu De. Having directed the conquest of the north-west in the civil war he took charge of the administration of the North-west region. In 1950 he led the Chinese forces in Korea.

The problems facing the men who suddenly found themselves controlling the world's most populous country were daunting. They needed to eliminate their enemies, install their new government throughout the country and restore production, while taking steps towards modernizing backward areas of the economy.

The first was relatively straightforward. As Chiang Kai-shek fled desperately through parts of south and west China before heading for Taiwan, the majority of China's long-suffering people seemed prepared to accept the new regime. Mopping-up operations in Hainan, which fell to the Communists in April 1950, were extended to Xinjiang where various local independent regimes had to be suppressed. In October 1950 the Communist troops advanced into Tibet.

Lacking amphibian forces it was not easy to pursue Chiang and liberate Taiwan. In the case of the smaller islands, Zhoushan (Chusan) at the mouth of the Yangzi fell to the Communists in May 1950 while Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matzu) a few miles off- shore remained in Nationalist hands.

The importance of the People's Liberation army in the new state was implicit in the division of the country into six regions.³ Although these regions were geographically larger they were not unlike the macro-regions of the mid-Qing in that regional leaders held both military and administrative power over and above provincial governors.⁴ The 1949 military regions were: North-east, North-west, North, East, Central- South and South-west. In each region there were four main posts: first party secretary, chairman of the military-political council (regional government), military commander and army political commissar. These twenty-four positions were held by a total of thirteen men since it was usual to hold more than one post.⁵ The five most powerful men in this setup were Gao Gang who held all four posts in the North-east—formerly Manchuria, Peng Dehuai who was both chairman and military commander in the North-west; Rao Shushi who held three posts in the East; Lin Biao who had three posts in the Central-South and Deng Xiaoping with two posts in the South-west. It may be noted that all five men sooner or later fell out with Mao Zedong and were purged.

Although they had ruled successfully in the base areas, the Communists lacked experience of city administration and they were inevitably dependent on the knowledge and expertise of administrators, traders and industrialists, few of whom were at that time inclined to communism or socialism. So in the summer of 1949 the CCP accepted a framework for a broad based society. Workers, peasants, petite bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie were to have a recognized place in the new republic albeit under the leadership of the Communist party.⁶ If it was not clear how long the status of all four classes would be preserved, they had the immediate satisfaction of being represented as four small stars alongside the large star of the Party on the new national flag.

The Communists, notwithstanding their long years in the countryside, recognized the need to introduce modern techniques if the economy were to thrive. It fitted the concept that China had been held back by ‘feudal’ oppression and foreign imperialists to assume that liberation would go hand in hand with economic growth. Overall China's economy had suffered during twelve years of war. In 1949 industrial production was half the pre-war level. Moreover, half of the 18,000 kilometres of railway track had been put out of action by military operations. On top of this something had to be done to restore a national currency after the disastrously high inflation of the GMD regime. Where would China find the necessary expertise and financial backing to promote modernization? Where at the least could China find trading partners?

It became clear in 1949 that the United States despite its past sympathy for China was not about to help the Communist regime. The publication of the China White Paper, in August 1949, explained the ‘loss’ of China to Communism, and those in the State Department who might be thought to have had any truck with the Chinese Reds were particularly concerned to save their careers now that China was on the wrong side in the Cold War.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN 1949

When Mao proclaimed the inauguration of the People's Republic on 1 October 1949 he highlighted the emergence of a new and independent China. It was in the spirit of appealing to national unity that the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference passed a temporary constitution (Organic Law) and set out policies (Common Programme) appropriate to a broad coalition. Eight ‘democratic parties’ were permitted, including the Guomindang Revolutionary Committee (comprised of former Nationalists), but the activities of these parties were controlled. The Communist Party directed the media which were bound to disseminate the Party line and promote the ideology of reform.

The idea of power sharing was exemplified in the ruling councils. The Government council chaired by Mao Zedong had six deputy chairpersons: three from the Communist Party, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and Gao Gang; plus Madame Sun Yat-sen (widow of the founder of the Republic of China), Li Jishen from the GMD Revolutionary Committee and Zhang Lan of the Democratic League. The State Administration Council (the cabinet) under Zhou Enlai had ten party members and eleven non-party members.

Government direction of the economy was facilitated by the degree of state control which had already been put in place by the Nationalist regime. The GMD had gone some way to taking over private assets, e.g. 90 per cent of the metallurgical industries, 73 per cent of machine building and 75 per cent of chemicals.⁷ This process had been compounded by taking over all Japanese held property at the end of the World War in 1945. The new government's policy was to allow the private sector of industry and trade to continue for the time being. Businessmen were given some assurances in 1949 that the takeover of private enterprise was not imminent. Some entrepreneurs had preferred to flee to Hong Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere throughout the world. Although this was a loss of capital and expertise, it was offset by removing people potentially hostile to the new regime. But many industrialists and professional people remained to serve their homeland. A high proportion of scientists as well as writers and artists chose to stay.

COMMUNIST POLICIES, 1949–53

Within three years the new government had an impressive record of achievements. By the end of 1952 the gross output of industry and agriculture had risen by 77.5 per cent, back to pre-war levels. Coal production was up to 63.5 million tons, steel to 1.3 million tons, while grain production was ten per cent up on that of 1936, the best pre-war year. The railway system had been restored and expanded to 24,000 kilometres of track. Inflation was brought down; the new renminbi (people's currency) under tight control began to gain respect as one of the most stable currencies in the world.

Land reform in a relatively moderate form was to be extended across the whole country. The intention was to eliminate the landlords as a class and to redistribute land without destroying the middle peasants. There were important regional differences. In the provinces of the lower Yangzi farming was commercialized to an extent which benefited the wealthier peasants. It was realized that interference with the marketing of the agricultural surplus would be bad for the overall economy. This was taken into account in the Land Reform Law of 28 June 1950 which allowed rich peasants throughout China to retain, in addition to land worked by their families, land worked by hired hands and land rented out, provided it was no more than 50 per cent of the whole.

In the period 1947–52 land reform spreading across China during and after the civil war is calculated to have taken 40 per cent of China's arable land from 4 per cent of the people and redistributed it to 300 million peasants. Similarly tools, draught animals and housing were redistributed. The former landlords were denounced at ‘speak bitterness’ meetings. Many years ago Mao had said that ‘a revolution is not a dinner party’ and certainly the process of land reform had an element of violence which varied according to time and place and the zeal of local cadres. Landlords were also targets of the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries which gained momentum from October 1950 when China entered the Korean War. The number of landlords executed has been variously estimated from 800,000 (government figure) upward to about 2 million. Many who were not killed were sent to labour camps, but the majority of those who had their land distributed remained in the villages as cultivators. Nevertheless, they had lost their political and social standing. It is noteworthy that one effect of land reform, particularly in south China, was that it undermined lineage as a social force, thus removing an alternative focus of loyalty to the...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• CHINA UNDER COMMUNISM
• THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD EDITED BY ERIC EVANS AND RUTH HENIGUNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• CHRONOLOGY
• ABBREVIATIONS
• INTRODUCTION
• 1: THE COMMUNIST VICTORY AND CONSOLIDATION OF POWER, 1949–53
• 2: ‘LEANING TO ONE SIDE’, 1950–3
• 3: THE POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, 1953–7
• 4: CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ROAD, 1954–64
• 5: THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD, 1956–64
• 6: THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1965–71
• 7: A GREAT POWER TRIANGLE, 1964–79
• 8: A DECADE OF TRANSITION, 1972–81
• 9: ‘SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS’, 1981–9
• 10: CHINESE SOCIETY IN THE 1990S
• 11: CONCLUSION
• NOTES
• FURTHER READING