Battle for the Ukraine

The Korsun'-Shevchenkovskii Operation

David M. Glantz, Harold S. Orenstein, David M. Glantz, Harold S. Orenstein

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• Print ISBN:
  9780415449359
  9780714652788
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135775056
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

A comprehensive guide to the battle for the Ukraine from the Soviet perspective during the winter of 1943-1944. This volume is an unexpurgated translation of the originally classified Soviet General Staff Study No.14.

1
The Korsun’ Shevchenkovskii Operation

GENERAL SITUATION AND OPERATIONAL PLAN

General situation(Map 1)

Having forced the Dnepr and captured Kiev, during the winter campaign of 194344, the 1st Ukrainian Front’s forces purposefully pursued German-fascist forces to the west and southwest. During the second half of January 1944, they reached the Sarny, Kazatin, and Kanev line. By this time the overall length of the front line was more than 600 kilometers. The front consisted of 11 armies, including 4 tank armies. The densest force grouping was formed in the front’s central sector along the Vinnitsa axis. On the whole, the front’s left flank was significantly more saturated with forces than its right flank.

The forces’ advance was temporarily halted at the position they had reached, since, by this time, both the front and its lines of communication had become considerably spread out and overextended. The front-line trace was an extremely winding line. On the right flank it faced to the west, and on the left flank it was turned to the southwest, south, and even southeast. While the left flank was still anchored along the Dnepr River, the right flank in the Sarny region stood more than 300 kilometers forward of the Dnepr. By the end of January 1944, German resistance intensified along the entire front, especially along the Vinnitsa and Uman’ axes.

Having successfully conducted the Kirovograd operation during the first half of January 1944, on 18 January the 2d Ukrainian Front’s forces also halted their advance, consolidated their occupied positions, and, while repelling the enemy’s practically continuous attacks, prepared for further offensive operations. At this time the 2d Ukrainian Front’s overall front line extended up to 250 kilometers.The front consisted of seven armies (including one tank army). There were one cavalry and three mechanized corps in the front reserve, whose rear-area support organizations required replenishment.

Map 1. Situation in the 1st and 2d Ukrainian Fronts at the end of January 1944

The front’s forward line was also fragmented but considerably less than the 1st Ukrainian Front’s front line. The front’s right flank turned to the west and southwest, while the left flank turned to the southwest and, in some sectors, to the south. Enemy resistance intensified considerably, especially along the Kirovograd axis, where he had concentrated five panzer divisions.

Thus, by the second half of January the overall front line of the 1st and 2d Ukrainian Fronts’ combat dispositions ran from Sarny southeast to Kazatin, and further east and northeast to Kanev, from where it ran south to Kirovograd and further southeast to the Piatikhatki region. The boundary line between the fronts ran southeast of Kanev.

In the Kanev, Zvenigorodka, and Smela regions at the junction between the fronts, the enemy occupied a significantly large salient with a length of 90 kilometers from south to north and up to 125 kilometers from west to east and with an overall area of 11,250 kilometers.

The front line of this salient passed through Kosiakovka, Ol’shanitsa, Kanev, Kreshchatik, and Raigorod (Map 2). The enemy held the salient with nine infantry divisions, one panzer division, and one panzer grenadier brigade (the 332d, 167th, 168th, 88th, 82d, 72d, 112th, and 57th Infantry Divisions, the 213th Security Infantry Division, the SS Panzer Division ‘Viking’, and the SS Panzer Grenadier Brigade ‘Wallonia’).

Such a dense enemy grouping in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii salient had been created as a result of previous combat operations. When the 1st Ukrainian Front’s forces forced a crossing over the Dnepr River north of Kanev, our forces captured a significant bridgehead, from which they made serious attempts to advance on Kiev. This forced the enemy to create a most solid defense here and to concentrate his units in this region.

Furthermore, the enemy strove to hold his ground along the Dnepr no matter what, so as to make it impossible for the 1st and 2d Ukrainian Fronts’ forces to link up on the right bank of the Dnepr and to use the rail lines which led to Kanev and Cherkassy. And, finally, by concentrating a large grouping at the junction between the fronts, the enemy attempted to create a threat to the rear area of our advancing forces by means of possible operations along the Dnepr, especially to the north in the direction of Kiev.

Two of our armies opposed these [enemy] forces. These armies were the 2d Ukrainian Front’s 52d Army, which consisted of three rifle divisions (the 373d, 254th, and 294th Rifle Divisions, the latter minus one regiment), and the 1st Ukrainian Front’s 27th Army, which consisted of three rifle divisions and three separate machine gun-artillery battalions (the 180th, 337th, and 206th Rifle Divisions and the 498th, 112th, and 403d Separate Machine Gun-Artillery Battalions). The 4th Guards Army was deployed south of the 52d Army, and the 40th Army was deployed south of the 27th Army.

Possessing considerable force superiority in this sector, the German command attempted to hold on to this salient no matter what, while counting on the concentration within it of a shock group for operations either along the Belaia Tserkov’ axis against the 1st Ukrainian Front’s rear area or along a southern axis against the flank of the 2d Ukrainian Front’s forces.

Map 2. Overall concept for the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii operation

Thus, the enemy’s salient in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii region represented a real threat to the 1st and 2d Ukrainian Fronts’ forces. The situation required the immediate liquidation of this threat.

Characteristics of the area of combat operations (Map 2)

The terrain in the area of combat operations was hilly, with considerable swampy and forested areas. In addition, the terrain was heavily criss-crossed with balkas [ravines] and streams. The hilly relief created a large number of commanding heights, which provided good visibility for 510 kilometers and more.

The terrain’s considerable ruggedness and the absence of highways and improved roads created great difficulties in the use by attacking forces of motormechanized units and motor vehicle transport, especially during the wet season and the thaw, which arrived in the first half of February 1944.

The region’s northeastern borders were directly adjacent to the Dnepr River, which, in this region, had a very wide swampy valley. A comparatively small number of Dnepr River basin tributaries flowed within the confines of the region. The largest of these tributaries, the Ross’ River, flowed from west to east through the area of combat operations and divided it into two parts—northern and southern portions. The Ross’ River had an average width of 60100 meters, a depth of 0.62 meters, and current speed of 0.50.8 meters per second. The river had many bridges, dams, and crossings along its entire length. In many sectors its banks were steep and, in some areas, abrupt. The ground along the banks and on the river bottom were a sandy loam. The Ross’ River’s southern course was swampy with flood lands of up to 1 kilometer. It posed a considerable obstacle for forces and all types of transport.

The Ol’shanka River flowed basically south to north across the region. In many places it was dammed up and formed swampy flood lands. Its width varied from 5 to 50 meters, its depth from 0.5 to 1.5 meters, and its current speed from 0.2 to 0.7 meters per second. Its banks were also steep and, in many places, abrupt, especially along its southern course.

The Gniloi Tikich River, which flowed through the southwestern part of the region, had a valley whose width averaged 100300 meters, was swampy in places, and was difficult to traverse, even on foot. Its depth was 0.52 meters, and its current speed was 1.5 meters per second. Its bottom was boggy along its entire length. It had many bridges, dams, and fords.

There were many low-lying, swampy areas in the eastern part of the region. Forests and brush covered around 2025 per cent of the area, and these were distributed in separate masses, occupying from 2 to 25 square kilometers each.The forests were predominantly of mixed composition and mature. As a rule, the terrain along the rivers and stream valleys, along the balkas,and around populated areas was covered with bushes.

Despite the region’s dense population, the road network was poorly developed. There were very few roads with stone or even metaled road covering. The few separate sectors of highway in the Boguslav and Zvenigorodka regions were of little significance, since they did not provide for transport along the required axes.

As a result of the very rugged terrain and poor meteorological conditions, the network of improved dirt roads, which had been developed rather extensively throughout the region, did not fully support the movement of our numerous tank and mechanized forces. The Zvenigorodka-Shpola road, which was paved for a considerable extent of its length, played a substantive role during the development of the operation.

The air temperature during almost the entire period was generally favorable.During the day it reached +8 degrees (centigrade), and only on rare days did it drop to between -1 and -4 degrees. A cold snap began rather abruptly on 15 February, when the temperature dropped to -6 to -8 degrees. The weather remained cloudy throughout the duration of the operation. Precipitation in the form of drizzle, rain, and snow fell almost every day, particularly in the later days of the operation.

Up to 30 January, many places still remained snow-covered. There was no snow from 31 January through 13 February, the ground thawed, and this had an immediate negative effect on road conditions. From 24 through 28 January and from 5 through 9 February, there was dense fog in the morning and afternoon, during which horizontal visibility dropped to 200 meters.

In general, within the limits of the area of combat operations, the geographical features of the terrain and meteorological conditions created a very difficult situation for mechanized unit operations as well as for motor vehicle transport. At the same time, the closed terrain and the large number of areas of dense brush and forest tracts were favorable for troop movement and camouflage [maskirovka]. The large forest tracts were rich in construction materials for defensive structures.

Operational plan (Map 2)

To liquidate the Germans’ Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii salient, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command ordered the 1st Ukrainian Front to strike a blow from west to east from the region southeast of Belaia Tserkov’ in the general direction of Zvenigorodka and the 2d Ukrainian Front to attack from east to west from the region north of Kirovograd through Shpola, also in the general direction of Zvenigorodka.

In view of the fact that the 1st Ukrainian Front’s mobile forces had to cover a distance of 50 kilometers to Zvenigorodka, while the 2d Ukrainian Front’s mobile forces had to cover 75 kilometers, the latter was to begin the offensive a day earlier. The first day of the 2d Ukrainian Front’s offensive was set for 25 January, while that of the 1st Ukrainian Front was 26 January.

The overall Stavka concept for the liquidation of the enemy’s large Korsun’- Shevchenkovskii grouping consisted of simultaneous crippling, concentric attacks by the strong shock groups of the two adjacent fronts’ internal flanks. These attacks were to be delivered against the weakest sectors of the enemy’s front.

The decision of the 2d Ukrainian Front commander

In carrying out the instructions received from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the 2d Ukrainian Front commander decided to deliver his main attack by the internal flanks of the 4th Guards and 53d Armies with a force of 14 rifle divisions from the Verbovka and Vasilivka front (in a 19-kilometer sector) in the general direction of Shpola and Zvenigorodka, where the formations would seek to link up with the 1st Ukrainian Front’s mobile group.

Five heavy howitzer artillery brigades, three gun artillery regiments, one light artillery brigade, three antitank [tank destroyer] artillery regiments, six mortar regiments, five guards mortar regiments, one gun artillery brigade, one antitank artillery brigade, and two antiaircraft artillery battalions were attached to the forces operating on the main attack axis. In the main attack sector, the 5th Guards Tank Army, which consisted of the 8th, 20th, and 29th Tank Corps, was to be committed into the penetration to exploit success in the general direction of Zvenigorodka (through Shpola).

In accordance with this decision, the armies received the following missions: The 4th Guards Army, consisting of seven rifle divisions (one in the second echelon), two tank regiments, and one tank brigade (up to 50 tanks in all), with an artillery density [per kilometer] of up to 100 tubes (including 82mm and 120mm mortars), was to penetrate the front in the Verbovka and Balandino sector (with a sector width of 10 kilometers) and attack in the direction of Sam Gorodok and Shpola. The army was supported on the right, along the Gniloi Tashlyk River, by the 52d Army’s operations.

The 53d Army, consisting of 10 rifle divisions (1 in the second echelon) and 1 tank regiment, with an artillery density of up to 100 tubes, was to penetrate the front in the (excluding) Balandino and Vasilivka sector (with a sector width of 9 kilometers) and attack in the general direction of Tishkovka, Mezhirovka, and Krymki, with its front turned toward Panchevo.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, upon arriving at the penetration in the 53d Army’s sector, was to reach the Zhuravka, Listopadovo, and Tashkovka region (a depth of up to 24 kilometers) by the close of the first day of the offensive and to advance into the Shpola, Vasil’kovka, Skotorevo, and Krymki region (a depth of up to 50 kilometers) by the close of the second day of the offensive. Depending on the situation, subsequently the army was to be prepared for operations either against Zvenigorodka or Petrakovka.

Operating to the north, the 52d Army delivered a supporting attack along the left flank in the general direction of Gorodishche. The 5th Guards and 7th Guards Armies, operating to the south, delivered a secondary attack on the main attack axis one day before the beginning of the offensive to prevent the enemy from redeploying the panzer divisions located on the Kirovograd axis.

The 5th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Corps was in the front reserve. The [front’s] mechanized corps continued to recover and refit.

The commencement of the offensive on the main attack axis was designated for 0830 hours on 25 January.

The selection of the main attack axis north of Kirovograd was based upon the consideration that this sector was where the enemy had the weakest defenses, since by this time all of his panzer divisions were concentrated along the Kirovograd axis. All of this permitted the attainment of the favorable correlation of forces on the main attack axis seen in Table 1:

Table 1

The decision of the 1st Ukrainian Front commander

A characteristic feature of the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii operation for the 1st Ukrainian Front forces was that it was conducted under conditions of fierce enemy counterattacks along almost the entire front and it was especially persistent along the Vinnitsa axis in the 38th Army’s sector and against the 40th Army’s right flank. The liquidation of these counterattacks required considerable forces and weaponry and, particularly, artillery and tanks, since, as a rule, the enemy had committed large tank formations into combat.

A shock group was created in the Tynovka, Koshevatoe, and Stavishche region along the internal flanks ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Maps
• Editor’s Foreword
• Foreword
• 1 The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• 2 German Defensive Battles in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Region
• 3 Combat Operations of the 5th Guards Don Red Banner Cavalry Corps in the Korsun’- Shevchenkovskii Operation
• 4 Air Operations During the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• Appendix 1: Documents on the Korsun’-ShevchenkovskiiOperation
• Appendix 2: Creation of the 6th Tank Army and its Operations in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• Appendix 3: The Role of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• Appendix 4: The Engineer Forces of the 2d Ukrainian Front in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• Appendix 5: The Functioning of Transport and the Organization of the Delivery of Materiel Supplies in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• Appendix 6: Soviet Order of Battle in the Korsun’- Shevchenkovskii Operation (as of 1 February 1944)
• Appendix 7: Charts and Tables on Red Army Strength and Losses in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation
• Appendix 8: Key Soviet Command Cadre in the Korsun’- Shevchenkovskii Operation (as of 1 February 1944)
• Appendix 9: Strength of Selected German Armored Formations in the Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation (based on archival reports)
• Appendix 10: Appendix 10: Map Supplement