The Problem of Solidarity

Theories and Models

Patrick Doreian, Thomas J. Fararo, Patrick Doreian, Thomas J. Fararo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136647888
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Social Sciences

Presently the world is undergoing tremendous social, cultural and economic transformation. For sociologists, the challenge is arriving at a sound mapping of this tumultuous world stage. In this book, the contributing authors consider solidarity as a cognitive problem of basic science. They examine how solidarity is produced and reproduced, how it is related to social processes, and how such processes can be formalized and create conditions for productively studying their properties. Mathematical models and representations are presented by the authors as a coherent set of tools for understanding many social phenomena.

Part II

Rationality and Solidarity

2 A THEORY OF THE STATE AND OF SOCIAL ORDER

SUN-KI CHAI and MICHAEL HECHTER

University of Arizona

After a long period of neglect, the problem of social order has recently revived in social science discourse. This revival is largely due to the efforts of theorists attempting to explain the conditions under which rational egoists cooperate. One line of analysis offers invisible hand theories suggesting how cooperation may emerge spontaneously among rational egoists under anarchy (Axelrod, 1984; Ullman-Margalit, 1977; Taylor, 1987; Calvert, 1991; 1994). Another, drawn from the new institutional economics,¹ focuses on the state’s role in creating and maintaining cooperative equilibrium between individual actors (North, 1981; 1983; 1990; North and Weingast, 1989; see also Hardin, 1991).

Although these two kinds of theories have proven insightful, neither can account for the emergence of order in large groups, let alone national societies. The former theories assume that the attainment of order in national societies is fundamentally similar to that in small groups. However, it is implausible that large numbers of atomized individuals can cooperate as the members of small groups do: the coordination and monitoring problems are simply too severe (Hechter, 1993: 2). The latter theories simply take the state’s existence for granted. Yet if – as is likely – the state must be invoked to solve the problem of order, then its formation and maintenance should be part of the explanation.

If atomized individuals cannot produce social order on their own, one alternative is to assume that cooperation can take place at a higher level of analysis – among a few large groups that encompass many individuals. The apparently insuperable difficulty involved in coordinating the actions of many disconnected individuals then reduces to the more manageable problem of coordinating the actions of a relatively small number of groups. But what justifies the treatment of these groups as unitary actors? If the key to this solution lies in group solidarity, then how does it come about? And what is the interaction between the groups’ internal dynamics and their external relations?

The notion that there is a relationship between group solidarity and social order has been broached for centuries (it dates at least from Althusius [1614], 1964), but evidence for such a link is contradictory. One body of literature suggests that highly solidary civic groups promote social order because they deflect potentially destabilizing popular grievances into more productive channels (Tocqueville [1848], 1945; Kornhauser, 1959; Putnam, 1994). Another suggests that quasikinship groups in post-Confucian societies promote social order and cooperative economic outcomes (Hsu, 1963; Nakane, 1970; Murakami et al., 1981; Murakami, 1984; Tu, 1984).² Finally, the “consociational” literature argues that social order is fostered when the state exercises control via the elites of large communal groups (Lijphart, 1972; 1977).

However, still other literatures come to the opposite conclusion. The “plural society” literature argues that societies containing more than one large, highly solidary group will be plagued by intense political conflict (Furnivall, 1939; 1943; Smith, 1965).³ Likewise, studies of rent-seeking interest groups blame them for economic decline which may ultimately presage social disorder (Olson, 1980; Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982).

To understand why groups sometimes promote order and sometimes inhibit it, a theory of group solidarity is required. Such a theory is missing from all of these literatures.

We attempt to explain social order by redressing this lacuna. Building on earlier research by Hechter and his associates (Hechter, 1987; 1993; Hechter, Friedman and Kanazawa, 1992; Hechter and Kanazawa, 1993) we formalize the theory of group solidarity, paying particular attention to the influence of group size, the extensiveness of corporate obligations, dependence, and coercion. Then we show how highly solidary groups and their control institutions can act as the building blocks for the state in large societies, facilitating social order by mediating between the state and individual members. As a result, social order is attained indirectly at a lower cost than the state must charge for providing it directly. The relative size of groups helps determine their contribution to social order: those that are either too large or too small will not attain optimal levels of social order. Last, we discuss some differences between voluntary and coercive social orders.

Part I offers a formal, rational choice model of group solidarity. It analyzes how the incentives for free riding affect the cost of attaining group solidarity through enforcement of member compliance with obligations to contribute to a set of joint goods. Next we turn to dependence – in particular, the opportunity cost to members of exiting from a group. Dependence affects the cost of enforcement and determines the upper bound on the size of contributions to joint goods that can be maintained without having the group unravel. Finally, we discuss coercion, the forcible removal of the exit option. Although high levels of dependence are conducive to group solidarity, under certain conditions they also lead to coercive control by one subset of members over another.

Part II extends this model to explain the formation and maintenance of the state. It proposes that states maintain order between groups in a fashion isomorphic to that which group control institutions maintain solidarity among individuals. A high level of solidarity is a prerequisite to the consideration of groups as unitary actors at the state level, and thus to their capacity to contribute to social order. Hence, the state emerges either as the control institution of a supergroup created by a small number of highly solidary groups to prevent mutual predation, or as a means used by one set of groups to impose its will on others.

The arrangement of these groups has important implications for social order (Part III). Whereas some form of group mediation between individuals and the state is always necessary to minimize the costs of maintaining social order, the optimal configuration of groups varies across social forms. Sometimes complex structures made up of multiple layers of nested groups are optimal for attaining social order; at other times simpler structures will do the trick. The optimal configuration of groups for the attainment of social order is a function of environmental influences on monitoring costs. These, in turn, affect the optimal size of groups. Dependence affects both the ability of groups to contribute to social order and the coerciveness of the resulting order. A brief summary of the argument and its implications for further research concludes.

PART I: A MODEL OF GROUP SOLIDARITY

We view groups not merely as collections of rational individuals, but also as encompassing control institutions shaping interactions between members. For analytic purposes, our initial focus is on voluntary groups whose members are free to exit and yet who choose to remain. If individuals are rational actors (that is, maximizers of expected utility), then they will form a group only if membership provides each with a higher level of expected net benefit than that attainable elsewhere.⁴ Hence the original impetus for group formation is the prospective member’s desire to obtain the group’s joint goods. Absent institutionalized and enforced mutual agreements, individuals are likely to engage in mutual predation, even if this results in lower net benefits for all concerned.

To consume the joint goods that motivate membership, individuals must agree to a set of corporate obligations (or rules) that permit the goods in question to be produced. However, the mere formation of a group and agreement to a set of corporate obligations (including, but not limited to production rules) is insufficient to guarantee compliance to them. Even if all the members have agreed to honor these obligations, each will do better by ignoring them when doing so is expedient.

Because ensuring compliance with corporate obligations is necessary to gain access to valued joint goods, members have an interest in creating a group-level control institution for monitoring and sanctioning one another. This institution perforce constrains members’ freedom of action t...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• I Introduction
• II Rationality and Solidarity
• III Affect and Solidarity
• IV Social Networks and Solidarity
• V Assessment
• About the Contributors
• Author Index
• Subject Index