The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics

Ricki Bliss, J.T.M. Miller, Ricki Bliss, J.T.M. Miller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781138082250
• eBook ISBN: 9781351622493
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

Philosophical questions regarding the nature and methodology of philosophical inquiry have garnered much attention in recent years. Perhaps nowhere are these discussions more developed than in relation to the field of metaphysics.

The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics is an outstanding reference source to this growing subject. It comprises thirty-eight chapters written by leading international contributors, and is arranged around five themes:

• The history of metametaphysics

• Neo-Quineanism (and its objectors)

• Alternative conceptions of metaphysics

• The epistemology of metaphysics

• Science and metaphysics.

Essential reading for students and researchers in metaphysics, philosophical methodology, and ontology, The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics will also be of interest to those in closely related subjects such as philosophy of language, logic, and philosophy of science.

PART I

The history of metametaphysics

1

METAMETAPHYSICS IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Vasilis Politis

Introduction

To consider whether there is in Plato and Aristotle a philosophical enquiry and mode of argument comparable to what is today called metametaphysics, it will, I think, be useful and important to distinguish two very different ways in which one may conceive of such a philosophical enquiry and mode of argument. Both ways are present, it seems to me, in the current metametaphysics literature, but, if I am not mistaken, one of them is dominant.

On a radical conception of metametaphysics, a philosophical enquiry and mode of argument may be characterized as metametaphysical, if the philosopher, in preparation for engaging in metaphysical enquiry in general, and any metaphysical enquiry in particular, deems it necessary to conduct a different enquiry of a semantic-conceptual character.

On a modest conception of metametaphysics, a philosophical enquiry and mode of argument may be characterized as metametaphysical, if the philosopher, in preparation for engaging in a particular metaphysical enquiry, deems it necessary to conduct a different enquiry of a semantic-conceptual character.

It seems to me the difference between the radical and the modest conception of metametaphysics is very important. On the radical conception, it is possible to separate semantic-conceptual enquiry from metaphysical enquiry; and semantic-conceptual enquiry is, in the order of philosophical enquiry, prior to metaphysical enquiry. Not so on the modest conception. The modest metametaphysician may, in preparation for engaging in a particular metaphysical enquiry, deem it necessary to conduct a different enquiry of a semantic-conceptual character; but he may think that that metaphysical enquiry is part of or tied up with other metaphysical enquiries, and there is no implication that he will deem that in preparation for engaging in them, too, it is necessary to conduct a different enquiry of a semantic-conceptual character.

In this chapter I argue that we can find in Plato and Aristotle significant metametaphysical enquiries of the modest variety, and the modest variety only. I shall demonstrate this with reference to a particular juncture in Plato’s enquiry into being in the Sophist and a comparable juncture in Aristotle’s enquiry into being in Metaphysics IV. Demonstrating that these are metametaphysical enquiries, but of the modest variety only, does not directly establish that there are not radical metametaphysical enquiries in Plato or Aristotle. But it does establish this, if we may suppose that these two particular metametaphysical enquiries in Plato and Aristotle are paradigmatic and exemplary examples of such enquiries. For reasons of space, I cannot defend this supposition in this chapter.

While the commitment to a modest form of metametaphysics seems sensible, I confess that I am puzzled at why anyone would want to commit to the radical form of metametaphysics. At the same time, I recognize that, as metametaphysics is characterized today, it is commonly the radical variety that is being invoked. For, as metametaphysics is commonly characterized, it is ‘the foundation of metaphysics’.¹ And it is clear that, on the modest variety, metametaphysics is not foundational.

Plato takes some time out to reflect on the meaning of the expression “to be”

At a particular juncture in the dialogue Sophist, Plato turns to the question of what there is. He introduces this juncture as follows: ‘It seems to me that Parmenides has communicated with us in a slapdash fashion, as has anyone that ever rushed to judgement in the matter of distinguishing how many the things that are, are, and of what sorts they are’ (242c4–6; trans. Rowe). The question at issue, evidently, is “What is there?”; or, in the precise terms in which Plato formulates it, “How many things are there, and of what sort?” But it appears that Plato intends a complaint about the way in which this question has been taken up by his predecessors. What is the complaint?

Having provided a short and colourful summary of a variety of answers that past thinkers have defended in response to the question of what there is (242c8–243a1), Plato says the following:

Now as to whether any of this, as said by any of them, is true or not, it would be harsh and inappropriate to rebuke men of fame and antiquity for failings on such a scale; but there is that one aspect that no one could begrudge our pointing out … they have been too inclined to look down their noses at us ordinary mortals and treat us with contempt; each pursues his own project without caring at all whether we’re following what they say or being left behind … Whenever anyone utters something to the effect that many, or one, or two are, or have come into being, or are coming into being, … by the gods, Theaetetus, do you ever understand a single thing they’re saying?

(243a2–b7; trans. Rowe)

His complaint, he says here, does not concern the truth or falsity of past theories about what there is; it concerns the intelligibility of those theories. But what is supposed to be unintelligible about them? And why is it supposed to be unintelligible?

The Eleatic Visitor directly spells out what he finds unintelligible in all available theories, to date, about what there is: it is their use of the expression “to be”. He says things like: ‘we need first to investigate what is (to on), and look for exactly what those who use the expression think they are indicating (dēloun) by it’ (243d3–5) ‘“So come on, you people who claim that all things are hot and cold or some other such pair of things: what exactly are you uttering (phtheggesthai) about them both, when you say both and each of them are?’” (243d8–e2). ‘So since we’re quite puzzled about it all, it’s for you to clarify for us what exactly you intend to designate (sēmainein) when you utter (phtheggesthai) the word “is”’ (244a4–6; translations Rowe, with minor changes).

It is less clear why the Eleatic Visitor finds their use of the expression “to be” unintelligible and puzzling.² It seems to me that two very different answers suggest themselves. According to one answer, Plato is articulating a puzzle about the use of the expression “to be” in theories about what there is, because he is in general puzzled about the use of this expression. According to a different answer, Plato is articulating a puzzle about the use of the expression “to be” in theories about what there is, because of something peculiar about how this expression is used in such theories.

I do not believe the first answer finds support in Plato’s text; the second answer, rather, is the right reading. The choice between the two answers is critical for our present purposes. Suppose we accept the first answer. This lends itself to the suggestion that what Plato intends at this point is to step out of metaphysical questions altogether, such as the question “What is there?”, and intends to take up the semantic question, “What do we mean by the expression ‘to be’?”, for its own sake purely. This would be a general turn from a metaphysical to a semantic question, and a semantic question that is not intended to be related, either directly or through the justification for asking it, to metaphysical questions. While this is not by itself a turn to radical metametaphysics, it prepares for such a turn.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we accept the second answer. In this case, we may expect that Plato intends to take up, and to stay with, the metaphysical question, “What is there?”; but he thinks that, to advance the enquiry into this particular question, it is necessary to take some time out and investigate how the expression “to be” is used. In the first instance, this means that it is necessary to investigate how the expression “to be” is used in available theories about what there is. As we shall see later, Plato thinks this may lead to a wider investigation, into the use of the expression “to be” more generally. This investigation will, evidently, be semantic-conceptual; but it will, no less, be part of a metaphysical enquiry. Apparently, it will not be possible to separate the semantic-conceptual enquiry from the metaphysical enquiry; because, first, that which is puzzling is the use of the expression “to be” specifically in theories about what there is; and, second, the desire to resolve this puzzle is, in large part at any rate, rooted in the desire to take up and to search for an answer to the metaphysical question, “What is there?”

I think it is beyond question that the second answer is the correct one: what Plato intends to be the source of the puzzlement and impression of unintelligibility is the expression “to be” as used in theories about what there is. Here are my reasons for thinking this.

First, in order to state and articulate this puzzlement and impression of unintelligibility regarding the expression “to be”, Plato refers to a variety of theories about what there is; and he does not refer to a use of this expression outside the context of such theories. He does so, first, by distinguishing several such views (242c8–243a1). He then divides them into two main varieties: pluralism (243c10–244b2) and monism (244b2–245e5). Finally, he distinguishes two further ways of answering the question “What is there?”: the view of ‘the giants’, or what we would call physicalism or materialism; and the view of ‘the gods’, which includes both Platonists and Parmenideans (245e6–250b11). He begins by stating and articulating the puzzlement and impression of unintelligibility in regard to all such views (up to 243c9). He then repeats this, with greater care and precision, in regard to a simple variety of pluralism, namely, the dualist view that all things ultimately consist of the hot and the cold; and in regard to monism. Finally, he repeats it in regard to physicalism and Platonism-Parmenideanism. He concludes that we are as puzzled about the use of the expression “to be” in regard to the last views as we were in regard to the first, and for similar reasons (see 249d9–250b11). In all of this, appeal to the use of the expression “to be” outside the context of theories about what there is, is entirely absent.

Second, Plato is emphatic in making the hyperbolically sounding statement that the use of the expression “to be” in such theories is unintelligible to us. This statement would be outrageous hyperbole, or plain absurdity, if it were intended to concern any and every use of the expression “to be”, such as, for instance, in the statements “There is something in the larder” or “There is nothing in the larder”. But it is not obviously absurd to maintain that, as things currently stand, this word is unintelligible as used in such theories.

Third, having first made the claim to the unintelligibility of the expression “to be” in regard to a variety of such theories (242c8–243b7), Plato goes on to defend this claim, with rigorous argument, when he distinguishes two main varieties of such theories: (a simple variety of) pluralism; and monism. He argues, in what is clearly intended as a rigorous and demonstrative way, that neither of these theories have the resources to explain what they mean by the expression “to be”, in contradistinction to what they mean by, e.g., “to be hot” or “to be cold” (for the pluralists) or “to be one” (for the monists). It is hard to see how anyone could intend to argue, in such rigorous and demonstrative fashion, that the use of the expression “to be” is unintelligible quite generally.

These arguments are quite complex and difficult to analyse, but let me indicate briefly what they look like. What resources, Plato asks first (243c10–244b2), does a simple dualist have, who thinks that all there is ultimately consists of the hot and the cold, to explain what he means by the expression “to be”? He has, it appears, precisely three options: he can explain “x is” as meaning “x is hot”; or as meaning “x is cold”; or as meaning “x is both hot and cold”. It is not so difficult to see that none of these options will work: the first option implies that, contrary to what the dualist supposes, cold things cannot be or exist, since “x is cold” means something different from “x is hot”; the second option founders for the same reason; the third option would, at best, allow for lukewarm things only!

What resources, Plato asks next (244b2–245e5), does a monist have, who thinks that all there is is a single unitary whole of parts, to explain what he means by the expression “to be”? Again, the conclusion of his argument is that the monist does not have the resources to explain this. But the argument is more difficult to follow. The gist of it is that such a monist must distinguish between what the expression “to be” means and what the expression “to be a single unitary whole of parts” means; and that he does not have the resources to do this, since he is co...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction: what is metametaphysics?
• Part I The history of metametaphysics
• Part II Neo-Quineanism (and its objectors)
• Part III Alternative conceptions of metaphysics
• Part IV The epistemology of metaphysics
• Part V Science and metaphysics
• Index