Iraq since the Invasion

People and Politics in a State of Conflict

Keiko Sakai, Philip Marfleet

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780367193683
• eBook ISBN: 9780429514036
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book addresses the complex events and unexpected outcomes of military intervention by the United States and its allies in Iraq in 2003. Considering the long-term outcomes of the intervention, this volume examines economic collapse, societal disorder, and increased regional conflict in Iraq.

The book assesses the means by which American strategists imposed a new political order, generalising corruption, sectarian preference, and ethnic cleansing, and stimulating mass population movements in and from Iraq. Mobilising a multidisciplinary perspective, the book explores the rise and fall of Iraq's confessional leaders, the emergence of a popular movement for reform, and the demands of young radicals focused upon revolutionary change. The product of years of intensive research by Iraqis and international scholars, Iraq since the Invasion considers how an initiative designed to produce "regime change" favourable to the United States and its allies brought unprecedented influence for Iran—both in Iraq and the wider Gulf region. It analyses events in Kurdistan and the impacts of change on relations between Iraq and its neighbours.

The book includes a wealth of detail on political, social, and cultural change, and on the experiences of Iraqis during long years of upheaval. It will be of value to researchers and students interested in international relations, development studies, and Middle East politics.

1

Introduction

Agendas for change

Philip Marfleet

The Introduction considers the conduct of the United States and its allies in the aftermath of invasion, focusing on strategies pursued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). An assault on structures of the Ba‘thist state, together with abrupt neo-liberal reform, brought dislocation to economic and social networks. When the CPA imposed a new party political system based on ethno-religious preference, Iraq moved swiftly towards sectarian conflict, prompting ethnic cleansing and mass migrations. Successive governments nonetheless pursued confessional agendas, embedding patronage as a systemic practice and encouraging corruption at the national and local levels.

The Introduction examines the predicaments of young Iraqis, in particular the young adults of “Generation 2000” who seek alternatives to sectarianism and conflict. It assesses the emergence of popular protest in scores of Iraqi cities, focusing on youthful activism and demands for reform of the confessional system. It sets out the structure of the book and summarises the contributions of authors to this holistic assessment of contemporary Iraqi society.

Decades of conflict have left their mark on Iraq. Much of its youthful population has experienced almost continuous war, civil conflict, and intervention by both neighbouring states and global powers. Some older Iraqis recall an era of stability, rising living standards, and social mobility, when absolute poverty was rare and the presence of external forces a memory of the colonial past. Today, most Iraqi cities host large settlements of impoverished people, among whom the majority have been displaced by “internal” conflict, especially by sectarian hostilities and ethnic cleansing following invasion in 2003 by the United States and its allies. The future of Iraq as an integrated state has repeatedly been in question, with demands for independence from Kurdish nationalists and attempts by jihadi militias to enact Islamist secession. Against this background of upheaval, social dislocation, and political uncertainty the country’s elites have engaged in complex and sometimes contradictory efforts to establish coherent agendas for change. This book addresses these conflicts, migrations, and political rivalries—and the implications for Iraq’s people and its place in the region.

In May 2018, Iraqis went to the polls to elect a national government for the fourth time since 2003. The outcome suggested that political change was at last gathering pace. The success of the Sa‘irun coalition, led by Shi‘a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr with the support of secular groups, marked a departure from earlier polls dominated by parties embracing confessional agendas. For many external observers sectarianism is embedded in Iraqi society—seen as characteristic of the wider region and, in effect, as determinative of Iraq’s political system. Large numbers of Iraqis, however, aspire to different values and political principles. Public protests have contested corruption within government and a system of confessional preference seen as harmful to Iraqis’ common interests. Repeated demonstrations in Iraqi cities have highlighted pervasive corruption and shortages of water, power, and basic goods. In 2015, protestors in Baghdad occupied the Green Zone—the fortified complex in the Karkh area of the city that has been a centre for government and administration since 2003. Among them were non-aligned activists identified by the International Crisis Group (ICG) as a “new generation mobilised by a desire to challenge the status quo”.¹ Here, “the Street” was said to have re-entered Iraqi politics, contesting networks of patronage inaccessible to the majority of people, and raising hopes that independent voices would make their mark on national politics.² By 2017, weekly protests were taking place in Baghdad and many large cities, organised initially by secular parties and supported by al-Sadr and his network of largely Shi‘a activists. Associating himself with a populist agenda for change, al-Sadr promised to address corruption and insecurity, offering an alternative to the partisan, confessional administrations of the past.

The election of May 2018 and eventual formation of a new government changed little, however. Protests continued, accompanied by strikes and work stoppages, renewed in 2019 when demonstrators in Basra, the hub of earlier public protests, returned to the streets. In an assessment of Iraq since the 2018 election, Maria Fantappie of the ICG observed that efforts to bring change had been inhibited by senior bureaucrats and politicians of the major parties. The political elite manipulated popular demands for change, she suggested, “emptying them of content” in order to serve its own purposes.³ Alaaldin reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that an intensification of identity politics and institutionalisation of mistrust have been pursued purposefully by Iraq’s political elites, “to deflect attention away from poor governance, corruption, and lack of services”.⁴ When in July 2019 demonstrators in Basra again protested over failing services and lack of jobs, they attacked local and national politicians as “thieves”, declaring: “The brave create the revolution and sinners steal it”.⁵

Can repeated protests and new electoral choices unsettle the sectarian system? Can Iraqis effectively challenge networks of privilege embedded in a corrupt, dysfunctional state? What is the future for communities fragmented by repeated mass migration? Can Iraq survive secessionists’ insistent demands for change? What are the implications of continuing instability for relations with its neighbours? Contributors to this book examine the background to pressing questions about Iraq, its population of almost 40 million, and a region in crisis.

Systemic failures

“Regime change” in 2003 had been accompanied by promises of a new era of stability and prosperity. A decade later, however, many Iraqis gave testimony to a society afflicted by systemic crisis. Protestors contrasted their circumstances with those of politicians and others holding high office among whom, they alleged, corruption had become endemic.⁶ Iraq has proven oil reserves of almost 150 billion barrels—the third largest in the Middle East and one of the largest worldwide.⁷ This assures a large state income and means to accumulate international currency reserves. For several years after the invasion of 2003, world oil prices rose continuously and government revenues increased dramatically: by 2011 annual revenue from oil amounted to $80 billion,⁸ and by 2013 the government had access to $84 billion in international reserves.⁹ At the same time, millions of people experienced a collapse in living standards. During the 1990s international sanctions against the Ba‘thist regime had contributed to a rise in poverty that, by 2000, affected some 17% of the urban population.¹⁰ By 2010, the proportion of urban residents living in poverty had increased to 53%—over 10 million people.¹¹ State resources had meanwhile been channelled to the country’s elites and to political networks based upon sectarian affiliation: Haithem Kareem Sawaan describes “endemic corruption … that left the Iraqi people exposed to a wide array of harms”:

Graft and kickback schemes of every stripe are rife throughout the country, and monies donated in the form of international assistance have served to line the pockets of the corrupt, never reaching the intended recipients among the average Iraqi population.¹²

Illicit practices have continued: in 2016, the Guardian investigated “a 13-year pillage on public money in the pursuit of power”, quoting a leading anti-corruption official to the effect that: “There is no solution … Everybody is corrupt, from the top of society to the bottom. Everyone. Including me”.¹³

Many states worldwide give evidence of such practices at the heart of government, sometimes amounting to what Green and Ward call “state crime”.¹⁴ Iraq is distinguished, however, by the embracing nature of corruption across political and administrative networks and its impact upon public confidence in the state and the political process. For Toby Dodge, corruption, sectarianism, and increasingly authoritarian rule have undermined confidence in public politics, becoming so corrosive that, “Iraqi society’s capacity to mobilize in support of its democracy must be in question”.¹⁵

“Shock doctrine”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “transition” of centralised states to free markets and pluralist democracies has been a key concern of governments in Europe and North America, and of international financial institutions. Over several decades, states based upon command economies and Stalinist-style political systems have undergone rapid change. As Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way point out, among such states: “Different mixes of authoritarian and democratic features have distinct historical roots, and they may have different implications for economic performance, human rights, and the prospects for democracy.”¹⁶ Among many examples of “transition” worldwide, few are as significant as Iraq, where change has been shaped by the specific experience of invasion and military occupation, and by economic and political reforms conceived and implemented by external actors.

For US President George W. Bush, removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba‘th Party was to open new vistas for an Iraqi population subordinated by decades of authoritarian rule. In 2002, his administration produced a National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This identified a new era of danger for the United States and its allies, and the need for pre-emptive action against “rogue states” including Iraq.¹⁷ Direct intervention would not only neutralise such enemies but would also “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe”, bringing “hope of de...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of contributors
• Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction: Agendas for change
• PART I: State of conflict
• PART II: Migrations
• PART III: Nation and nationalisms
• PART IV: Iraq in the region
• Index