Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

NATO and EU Options in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Thanos P Dokos

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000155051
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

As counter-profileration is expected to become the central element in the new national security policy of the US, such actions will constitute a central element of every major international conflict in the first decades of the 21 st century. One of the most important geostrategic phenomena of the past decade has been the extraordinary diffusion of war-making capabilities from the developed North to the developing South. In the eyes of some proliferant states, possessing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West's massive superiority in conventional forces.

In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, a number of countries are assumed to possess varying levels of NBC-weapons capabilities. Reasons for concern include the fact that such weapons have been used in the past; the region's geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them); the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems; and the general instability in the region (including the spread of religious extremism).

This important and timely book assesses, in detail, the accuracy of predictions, and perceptions, about a possible military threat from the Southern Mediterranean (Muslim) world; and their impact on NATO's political and military posture. Thanos P. Doxos presents an assessment of the Alliance's options for dealing with the problem. This book represents an invaluable, topical resource for researchers and policy makers.

1 The emerging security environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and much of their surrounding regions have been placed in the midst of a rapid and directionless geopolitical evolution. The end of the Cold War has upset many of the old faultlines in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the strategic environment is more diverse and uncertain. An ‘arc or triangle of crisis’ emerged in the 1990s,¹ extending from the Balkans to Central Asia/Transcaucasus and the Middle East. As a result, several regimes in the wider region that have not yet faced a legitimacy crisis could face one in the near future.

The Mediterranean and its adjoining regions contain a sizable number of flashpoints and the security environment remains ‘Hobbesian’. Although the Palestinian–Israeli conflict,² Lebanon, the future of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear programme remain the most important unsettled issues, the wider Mediterranean security environment is predominantly characterized by multiple sources of insecurity, fluidity, instability and continued change and evolution.³ Accordingly, increasing stability of the region has been a high priority for Europe and the US.

In addition to the direct and indirect consequences of the events of 11 September 2001, there is a plethora of other developments which have – or will have in the near future – a significant impact in international and/or regional stability and are re-shaping the strategic landscape. These developments include EU and NATO enlargement; the evolution of EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Policy (EMP), New Neighborhood Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP) and the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force; US unilateralism and its impact on the Transatlantic relationship; burden-sharing in the context of NATO and the gap in military capabilities between the two pillars of the Alliance; the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; American policy towards Iraq and Iraq’s future; Iran’s nuclear programme; US relations with Saudi Arabia; Russia’s new relationship with NATO and the US as well as its emergence as an ‘energy superpower’; new asymmetric threats in NATO’s southern flank and general concern about the South as zone of instability in a region of vital interest for the West; to name but a few. Furthermore, after the US occupation of Iraq, there appears to be a relative power vacuum in the Gulf region and even beyond.⁴ Key Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have expressed their anxiety about the creation of a new Shi’ite block or crescent that could include Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and that could redefine the balance of power in the region across sectarian lines.⁵ However, it is argued that the Persian ethnic and Shi’a religious factors limit Iran’s appeal.⁶ Even if this is true, there will continue to be strategic uncertainty in the region for the foreseeable future. The common element of all those developments is increased instability and fluidity in regional affairs.

There are divergent views on the strategic unity of the Mediterranean. Is it correct to assert, as Fernand Braudel predicted, that ‘the fate of the whole Mediterranean will be a common one’? Does the Mediterranean constitute a single ‘regional security complex’⁷ or is it actually a matter of overlapping, interwoven regions and security sub-systems (for instance, the Middle East, the Balkans and Transcaucasus)? Given the differences in religion and culture and the diversity of political systems, does it make sense to study the Mediterranean (for research purposes) as a single entity? Is there a common denominator for the countries in the region, apart from geographical proximity and problems – such as environmental ones – which is widely perceived as common to all?

Increasingly, the view is being expressed that the Mediterranean may be a unified geographic entity, but this does not make it either a political or strategic whole. Various conflicts may impinge on or affect the Mediterranean, but it is not central to any of them. No one regards the Mediterranean as the focal point of military conflict; neither is the Mediterranean the source of security-related problems. As far as military relations are concerned, it is more of a security vacuum.

The great majority of analysts agree that this is a highly heterogeneous region.⁸ At a minimum, two – rather loosely defined – regional sub-systems⁹ can be identified: Eastern Mediterranean (Mashreq), with predominantly ‘hard’ security problems, and Western Mediterranean (Maghreb), with ‘soft’ security problems. Still others describe the Mediterranean as a multi-fragmented region.¹⁰ In any case, it is difficult to examine the Mediterranean from a security perspective in isolation from developments in the surrounding regions of Transcaucasus/Central Asia, the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf.¹¹ According to Ian Lesser, an alternative approach to security in the [eastern] Mediterranean focuses on the functional dimension, cutting across regional lines.¹²

The traditional definition of security in military terms (so-called hard security issues) is obviously inadequate in the post-Cold War era. Economic, social, demographic and environmental problems (so-called soft security issues) have a considerable impact on national security and political stability.¹³ Therefore, a broader concept of security is required. Most security challenges and problems in the Mediterranean are of a non-military nature and therefore cannot be dealt with by military means. Military issues, however, still have a considerable impact on regional stability. The strategic environment on Europe’s periphery is characterized by numerous actual and potential flashpoints for conflict and crises that may demand a Western response.¹⁴ The character of military capabilities, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles on Europe’s periphery, will be a key strategic issue in the overall evolution of relations between Muslim and Arab states and the West.¹⁵

Most security problems in the Mediterranean will be largely transnational¹⁶ in that they will affect the security of many states and their resolution will require the co-operation of many states (governments, as well as other societal components). According to one school of thought,¹⁷ today and for the foreseeable future, the main sources of friction between the North and the South will be problems of migration, religious extremism, enivronmental degradation, trade energy and raw material issues, lack of democracy and respect for human rights, etc. Another school of thought (best exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s theory on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’) argues that Islam constitutes at least as grave a threat to the West as the one posed in the past by communism (see, for instance, the statement of then General Secretary of NATO, Willi Claes, in February 1995).¹⁸ It is likely that this friction would manifest itself mainly across the Mediterranean – a major ‘faultline’ between those two ‘worlds’ – or, as Christopher Coker puts it, the ‘Mediterranean is no longer a flank, as it was in the Cold War; it has become an “interface” between two different cultures or ways of life’.¹⁹ There will be problems of migration, religious extremism, environmental degradation, trade energy and raw material issues, lack of democracy and respect for human rights, etc. Another school of thought (best exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s theory on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’) argues that Islam constitutes at least as grave a threat to the West as the one posed in the past by communism (see, for instance, the statement of then General Secretary of NATO, Willi Claes, in February 1995).²⁰

An important issue that needs to be tackled for methodological, as well as substantive reasons, is the lack of a single, agreed definition of the political and geographic boundaries of the Mediterranean (and the Middle East). For the purposes of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Mediterranean has been geographically defined as including all littoral states (although Libya has so far been excluded from the EMP, for political reasons), but excluding the Balkan states²¹ (Albania and the states of former Yugoslavia).²² In the past few years, this...