European Identities and Foreign Policy Discourses on Russia

From the Ukraine to the Syrian Crisis

Marco Siddi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781315315140
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the relationship between national identity construction and current foreign policy discourses on Russia in selected European Union member states in 2014–2018.

It shows that divergent national discourses on Russia derive from the different ways in which the country was constructed in national identity. The book develops an interpretive theoretical framework and argues that policy makers' agency can profoundly influence the contestation between different identity narratives. It includes case studies in policy areas that are of primary importance for EU–Russia relations, such as energy security (the Nord Stream 2 controversy), the Ukraine crisis and Russia's military intervention in Syria. Focusing on EU member states that have traditionally taken different stances vis-à-vis Russia (Germany, Poland and Finland), it shows that at the peak of the Ukraine crisis national discourses converged towards a pragmatic, but critical narrative. As the Ukraine crisis subsided and new events took centre stage in foreign policy discussions (i.e. the Syrian civil war, international terrorism), long-standing and identity-based divergences partly re-emerged in the discourses of policy makers. This became particularly evident during the Nord Stream 2 controversy. Deep-rooted and different perceptions of the Russian Other in EU member states are still influential and lead to divergent national agendas for foreign policy towards Russia.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars working in European and EU politics, Russian and Soviet politics, and International Relations.

1 Identity, memory and the Russian Other

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russia has returned to the centre stage of European political debates. Analysts and politicians have argued that in 2014 ‘the European security system established in the wake of the Cold War collapsed in a spectacular manner’ (Sakwa 2017: 1), and described the ensuing confrontation between Russia and the West as ‘the most profound menace to European security for many decades’ (Youngs 2017: 1). While some scholars have described the Ukraine conflict as the culmination of a long-term crisis in relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016), most observers were surprised by its timing and intensity. In the EU, Russia was increasingly seen as a revisionist actor, and no longer as a strategic partner. In Russia, the EU was portrayed as a deceptive and declining power that irresponsibly supported a coup d’état in Ukraine as part of a hegemonic geopolitical agenda (DeBardeleben 2018).

What is more, after 2014, tensions between the EU and Russia extended beyond the Ukraine crisis to other fields and theatres. Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian crisis in September 2015 heightened European concerns about the tumultuous developments in the Middle East, at a time when a growing number of people from this region sought asylum in the EU. While the EU plunged in an internal crisis due to the reluctance of many member states to host asylum seekers, Russian officials stated that Western and EU support of the Arab Spring contributed to destabilising the Middle East and North Africa, and thus to the intensification of the humanitarian crisis (Dannreuther 2019). On the other hand, some analysts argued that the humanitarian crisis provided an opportunity for Russia to put pressure on European leaders. The alleged Russian support of European far right parties (cf. Shekhovtsov 2018), which used the crisis to challenge the political establishment, was seen as part of this scheme. As populist forces won elections in the US and Europe, Russia was also accused of interfering in Western democratic processes as part of a multifaceted ‘hybrid war’ (Siddi 2018a).

At the same time, and despite the mutual imposition of sanctions, the path dependencies forged between Russia and the EU during previous decades prevented a complete breakdown in relations. In fact, EU–Russia energy trade continued almost unhindered and even grew in volume during the Ukraine crisis (Siddi 2018b). In the EU, Russia continued to be seen as an important interlocutor for the resolution of crises such as the one in Syria, and even as a like-minded partner in the international negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear programme. Most significantly for this book, different views persisted in EU member states regarding the best way to approach to Russia. While political leaders in Poland and the Baltic States framed Russia as a geopolitical threat, their colleagues in Italy, Germany and France considered dialogue with Moscow as an essential precondition for a stable security system. The deep crisis and quick succession of political developments in which Russia was involved (or was considered to be involved) since 2014 reawakened constructions of the Russian Other that had become part of national identity narratives in European countries over the previous decades, or even centuries (Siddi 2017b). In turn, these constructions contributed to shaping the response of European states towards Russia in the post-2014 crises.

The book explores the relationship between national identities and foreign policy discourses concerning Russia in selected member states of the European Union. In doing so, it builds on previous studies that focused on European and national identities and the role of external factors in the process of identity construction. An increasingly large body of European Studies literature has explored the emergence of a shared European identity (cf. Bayley and Williams 2012, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, Herrmann et al. 2004, Kuhn 2015, Risse 2010). These works generally argue that European identity is, at best, still developing next to national identities. Following Willfried Spohn’s (2005: 2) categorisation, three main perspectives can be identified in the literature. The first sees European identity as a weak addendum to strong national identities. The second one assumes that European identity will unfold in the long run and restructure national identities through the gradual Europeanisation of the latter. The third one hypothesises the future emergence of a variable mix of European and national identities. Some scholars have highlighted that the attachment to a European identity is stronger among particular social groups within each country, and that European and national identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Kuhn 2015). Broadly speaking, however, most scholarship converges on the argument that national identities remain more influential than constructions of a shared European identity.

As these initial observations suggest, national identities play an important role in Europe and may provide a key to understanding European politics. Scholars studying nationalism have argued that we are unlikely to see the transcendence of national identities by a strong European identity during our lifetime (Smith 1996a: 363). The recent revival of nationalist and Eurosceptic parties in many European countries seems to corroborate this argument. Researchers working on memory politics, a discipline that partly overlaps with identity studies, have come to similar conclusions in their assessments of the prospects for a common European memory: national discourses are pervasive in collective memory and can hardly be reconciled into a shared European discourse (Bell 2006: 16, Jarausch and Lindenberger 2007: 1, Pakier and Stråth 2010, Siddi 2017a). This is not surprising, as nation-states have a much longer history than European institutions. Linguistic, historical and cultural differences contribute to the endurance of national identities and of political constructions that draw their legitimacy from national communities.

The focus on the national level in this book should not lead to the assumption that the concept of European identity can simply be dismissed. A feeling of attachment to Europe and to the political structures of the European Union is observable both among European elites and citizens, however weak and inconsistent it might be (cf. Standard Eurobarometer 83 2015: 112, 123). The creation of a common European market, the removal of barriers to the free movement of citizens and numerous transnational schemes have contributed to its emergence. However, as most of the relevant scholarly literature argues, in Europe national identities and memories are still stronger than transnational ones. Studying national identities is thus important to understand both the dilemmas surrounding European identity and, most importantly, current European politics.

Social constructivist literature has highlighted the strong relationship between national identity and foreign policy discourses.¹ The book applies a social constructivist theoretical model to examine this relationship in three European states – Germany, Poland and Finland – and assess the prospects for a shared European foreign policy discourse concerning Russia. The key argument is that divergent national foreign policy approaches to Russia are due to the different ways in which the country was constructed in national identity. However, the analysis also shows that national identity is malleable, and a country’s leaders can reformulate dominant narratives in order to achieve particular foreign policy goals. Under certain circumstances, for instance in response to major international crises, national discourses on Russia can be reconciled if divisive identity narratives are marginalised and common foreign policy goals are pursued.

Relations with Russia have been chosen as a litmus test for a shared European foreign policy discourse because they have proven to be one of the most dividing issues among European Union countries (Cadier 2014, Casier 2011, David and Romanova 2015, David et al., 2011 and 2013, Gromyko 2015, Haukkala 2015 and 2010a, Korosteleva 2016, Nitoiu 2016, Romanova 2016). In 2007, former EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson stated that ‘no other country reveals our differences as does Russia’ (cited in Kagan 2008: 14). Over a decade later, such divisions continue to exist and are reflected in the different stances of EU member states concerning the future of relations with Russia after the Ukraine crisis (Emmott 2016, Romanova 2016). Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour, a key energy supplier and an essential, though often very controversial factor in the European security architecture. As highlighted by the profound crisis that erupted in Ukraine in the fall of 2013, the European Union and its member states cannot guarantee the stability of their Eastern neighbours without taking into account Russia as a geopolitical factor. Furthermore, the political system built by post-Soviet Russian leaders arguably challenges some of the European Union’s founding values, particularly in the field of democracy and human rights (Shiraev 2013).²

Relations with Russia are a test for the very idea of a united EU foreign policy because they have traditionally been based on a bilateral, national dimension. The most frequent explanations for this bilateralism refer to the different economic interests and security concerns of EU member states, as well as to Russia’s preference for dealing with European countries separately (cf. David et al. 2011: 183–184). This book proposes an alternative understanding of the EU’s and its member states’ relations with Russia that is based on national identity. The focus on national identity provides a useful research angle because, in contrast with predominant analyses focusing on power politics and economics, it seeks to explain relations with Russia through an investigation of historical and cultural factors.

The conceptualisation of identity as a key element in international relations provides a much-needed alternative to realist and liberal institutionalist models framed around the notions of anarchy, balance of power and institutional cooperation. The book analyses international relations as a social construction, of which national identities are essential constituents. Drawing on constructivist literature, a theoretical model is developed highlighting the mutually constitutive relationship among national identity, interests and foreign policy discourses. In particular, the historical dimension of national identity formation is explored in order to examine its relevance in current foreign policy discourses. Hence, the book adopts a historicist approach, which assigns key importance to cultural and historical context. Foreign policy discourses are studied through discourse-historical analysis (DHA), a variant of critical discourse analysis developed by Ruth Wodak (2002a). DHA was previously used by scholars to study debates about immigration and identity politics in the media, in EU institutions and among the wider public (Krzyzanowski 2010 and 2009, Oberhuber et al. 2005, Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Wodak 2009). This book constitutes one of the first applications of the methodology to the analysis of national foreign policy elites’ public discourses.

Empirically, the book also contributes to the understanding of the European Union’s and its member states’ current foreign policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood. It constitutes an attempt to strengthen the strand of research focusing on the role of nationalism, identity and memory politics in EU–Russia relations. The surge of nationalist sentiment and widespread political use of history during the current Ukrainian crisis has exposed that these are powerful factors in EU–Russia relations (Klymenko 2019, Luhn 2014, Siddi 2017a). The book shows that national identity and memory politics played an important role in this relationship well before the beginning of turmoil in Ukraine. The empirical chapters highlight the significance of identity and memory politics in events that took place during the last decade in fields of extreme importance for the EU, such as energy security, the stability of the neighbourhood and Russia’s role in the European security system. Through an interdisciplinary approach combining social constructivist theory, discourse theory and historical analysis, the book sheds light on the deep identity and cultural roots of relevant foreign policy discourses.

The focus of the empirical analysis is restricted to key foreign policy leaders (heads of state or government and foreign ministers) for reasons of feasibility and relevance. Covering thoroughly three national discursive arenas, each having thousands of participants, would not be possible within the scope of this book. However, in countries such as those under analysis, key foreign policy decisions are ultimately made by a restricted group of leaders who received a mandate from a parliamentary majority or a majority of electors. These leaders also represent the country internationally and, thanks to their political prominence, they have the discursive power to steer the country’s main foreign policy debates. Most important for this analysis, their behaviours and decisions are influenced by the national identities in which they are embedded.³ Furthermore, the discourses of state officials enjoy a powerful position in constructing national identity due to their access to information from the state, their constitutional legitimacy, and privileged access to the media (Aydın-Düzgit 2018).

National identity is a very useful concept to understand the domestic construction of international politics because it encompasses and is forged by the defining cultural, historical and political constituents of a state. Its relationship with foreign policy discourses is complex. It is mutually constitutive, because national identity and foreign policy discourses influence each other. It is also malleable, because the two concepts are in constant flux and change over time. Moreover, as Aydın-Düzgit (2018) has noted, foreign policy is a key area through which state officials’ role in the discursive construction of a state’s identity becomes possible and visible. For some scholars, the notion of national identity might be elusive (cf. Malesevic 2011). However, it is exactly the complexity of the concept and its changing and multifaceted nature that make it a fascinating research topic. National identities are not the only element in the complex scenario of international politics, but certainly one that scholars cannot ignore in a comprehensive analysis.

Nations, national identity and collective memory

Constructivist scholars argue that grasping the relationship between national identity and foreign policy is essential in order to understand international relations. Before exploring why this might be so, it is fundamental to define and explore the concepts of nation and national identity. Due to their diverse uses and confusion with concepts such as nationalism, the terms are highly ambiguous and have generated a lively discussion among academics. The most relevant debates took place among historians and sociologists who, especially from the 1980s onwards, attempted to assess the role played by nations and nationalism in international politics during modern and contemporary times.

Prominent scholars such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith used different parameters to define nation and national identity, alternatively emphasising concrete elements (for instance territory, economy), psychological and abstract factors (memories, myths) or both. Some considered the terms too ambiguous for a precise classification and adopted only working definitions (Hobsbawm 1990), others rejected them altogether as explanatory variables (Malesevic 2011). Most treated national identity as a corollary of the nation, a collective belief in belonging to a national community and to its defining elements. Although the relationship between nation and national identity is in fact more complex, a close link exists between the two concepts. To understand national identity, we thus have to grasp the concept of nation first (cf. Guibernau 2004: 134, Smith 1991: 9).

One of the most widely debated definitions of nation is the one provided by Anthony D. Smith (1996a: 359): ‘A named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members’. Smith’s definition provides an apparently easy way out of terminological issues: it includes both the concrete and the abstract factors highlighted in previous definitions of nations. However, Smith broadens the scope of the definition at the expense of clarity: does a nation need to satisfy all these characteristics to be classified as such? Which elements are more important? Furthermore, additional terminological problems arise: what is ‘a mass public culture’ and what is meant by ‘historic territory’? Cannot diasporas constitute or be part of a nation because they do not share a historic territory?

Smith’s definition reveals one of the main confusions that occur in debates on the nature of nations: by listing ‘common rights and duties for all members’ as one of their key elements, it conflates the concepts of nation and state. As Montserrat Guibernau (2004: 127) argues, judicial functions pertain to the state and are not inherent in the nation. While most nations have their own states, and thus also their own judicial systems, some do not. Furthermore, due to immigration and globalisation, many states are no longer nation-states: they include sizeable minorities that are bound by the same rights and duties and yet do not lose their distinctive identity. To avoid confusion, states and nations have to be classified differently. Borrowing from Max Weber’s conceptual framework, a state can be defined on the basis of its coercive powers, namely as a body that successfully claims monopoly of legitimate force in a particular territory (cited in Miller 1997: 19–20). A state has the means to enforce its rules and a legal system to discipline those who do not comply with them.

In contrast, a nation is defined more by feelings of attachment to both concrete and abstract elements, rather than in terms of powers and prerogatives. Ernest Gellner (1983: 7), a pioneer in the study of nationalism, identified two essential components of the nation, namely a shared culture – broadly meant as a system of ideas, signs, associations and ways of behaving and communicating – and its members’ mutual recognition of belonging to the same nation. Gellner stressed that nations are human artefacts, social constructions deriving from people’s convic...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Identity, memory and the Russian Other
• 2 Identity and foreign policy: a discourse-historical approach
• 3 The historic construction of German, Polish and Finnish identities and their Russian Other
• 4 Confronting the Russian Other – the Ukraine crisis
• 5 The EU’s discursive strife on Nord Stream 2
• 6 The Russian Other in the Syrian crisis and MENA geopolitics
• Conclusion: (dis)united we stand? National discourses and the Russian Other, 2014–2018
• Bibliography
• Index