Water In The Middle East

Conflict Or Cooperation?

Thomas Naff

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000011234
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The scarcity and rapid depletion of water in one of the world's driest regions continues to be a major determinant of the domestic and external policies of the major actors in the Middle East. Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank will have exhausted virtually all their renewable sources of fresh water by 1995 if current patterns of consumption are not radically altered. This study examines the hydrological, historical, legal, and strategic dimensions of water problems in the Middle East and discusses their implications for the future.

1
Water in the Middle East: Complexities, Commonalities, Conflict

Few regions of the planet offer a more varied physiography or a richer mix of ethnicities, religions, languages, societies, cultures and politics than the Middle East. At the same time, no segment of the globe presents its diverse aspects in such an amalgam of conflicts and complexities. Out of this compound, one issue emerges as the most conspicuous, cross-cutting, and problematic: water - or rather its scarcity and rapid diminution in some of the driest sectors of an area where there also happen to exist some of the fiercest national animosities.

Because it is essential to health, agriculture, energy, science, industry, transportation, and recreation - in short, to human existence - water is an incredibly complex matter, at once political, economic, legal, social and ecological in its nature. Water in the Middle East is also a conflict-laden determinant of both the domestic and external policies of the region's principal actors. As water shortages occur and full utilization is reached these policies tend to be framed more and more in zero-sum terms, adding to the probability of discord.

The severity of Middle Eastern water problems will, unavoidably, Increase significantly during the remainder of this century. In an already over-heated atmosphere of political hostility, insufficient water to satisfy burgeoning human, developmental, and security needs among all nations of the Middle East heightens the ambient tensions. As each riparian perceives its legitimate "hydraulic imperatives" threatened or frustrated by

The present study examines the Jordan, Litani, Euphrates, Shatt al-Arab, Orontes, and Nile rivers.

Figure 1: Regional Map (no scale) Source: Middle East Research Institute

another actor, water- generated conflicts - which could easily engulf the entire region - could well be the inevitable outcome.

By 1995, Israel, Jordan and the West Bank will have depleted virtually all of their renewable sources of fresh water if current patterns of consumption are not quickly and radically altered. In this circumstance, the Jordan River system unquestionably holds the greatest potential for conflict. Complicating any possible solution of the problem is the unresolved fate of the Palestinians in the West Bank (from which Israel currently draws upward of forty percent of her water requirements), and Israel's overpowering military advantage in relation to Jordan and her other Arab neighbors. The more Israel's water needs grow in the face of diminishing resources, the more water assumes primacy as a strategic factor in her regional policies. The same is true for Jordan, but being in a much weaker riparian and military posture, Jordan can bolster her position only by establishing a network of linkages to other Middle Eastern states and to powers outside the region, thus increasing the chances that any ensuing conflict could overflow the confines of the region.

How, in the absence of trust between the principals, can such a seemingly intractable problem, with its enormous ramifications, be managed peacefully? How can all the interrelated elements essential to its disposal - the hydrological, territorial, legal, social, political, economic, demographic, religious and symbolic factors (including perceptions of legitimacy) - be applied in just the right and most timely way to make a negotiated approach to the problem effective?

Paradoxically, these very complexities and the virulent danger of hostilities engendered by hydrological problems have often tended to compel cooperation where other non-water antagonisms have degenerated into warfare. Thus, water as an impulsion toward conflict carries its own corollary, being as well an impetus toward cooperation. For example, the sheer salience of water makes it too hazardous an issue even for a regional superpower like Israel to act in a totally arbitrary or unilateral way; or to act in too flagrant violation of any agreed framework of water sharing (without at least maintaining the fiction of doing so). This constraint applies equally to all the riparian actors in the region. In fact, there is a recent history of tacit, albeit limited, cooperation over water even among the bitterest opponents. Iraq and Syria arrived at an arrangement over the Tabqa Dam; Israel and Jordan - until Israel's invasion of Lebanon and her troublesome stand on clearing out obstructions to the intake of Jordan's East Ghor canal - have more or less informally agreed to share the Jordan River system within the framework of the Johnston Plan; Egypt and the Sudan have created a model for cooperation in the 1959 Agreement which not only governs the sharing of the Nile's waters, but contains an instrument for settling controversies by negotiation. The Nile could even serve as a kind of laboratory for other river systems in the application of technology to alleviate water problems. Given the general atmosphere of tension in the Middle East, it is remarkable that so little open conflict over water has erupted. However, this state of affairs is changing rapidly. The closer each riparian comes to depletion of its water resources, the greater the likelihood of conflict.

These are the kinds of fundamental issues that this pilot project has sought to uncover and examine, and on which it has attempted to cast some light. Our purpose in undertaking these tasks has been to lay the foundation for a larger more comprehensive study of water in its various dimensions in a region where the peace of the world is at risk.

COMMONALITIES

The potential for conflict and the intrinsic complexity of water problems are not the only matrices that relate one Middle Eastern waterway to another. There are other commonalities pertinent to all of the river systems that constitute the purview of this study. There cannot be productive analysis, let alone the structuring of an effective analytical framework, without factoring in these common hydrological denominators. Most of these shared characteristics relate to matters of law, policy, and planning; unfortunately, almost all have a negative bearing on the issue of water.

Hypothetically, legal principles can be effective devices for settling competing uses of water. These principles are fairly well developed in legal theory, but the institutional machinery for applying them is still rudimentary, especially in the international arena. This becomes a doubly complicating factor in the Middle East because of the extent of international linkages among the region's water systems. In this context, international legislation can result from new approaches to settling water conflicts but it cannot a priori guide the search for a solution.

The first step toward translating legal theory into institutional application is the production of political agreements. Such pacts are essential to the creation of a broader array of legal instruments for solving international disputes over shared water resources. If Middle Eastern riparians are ever going to move from conflict to cooperation, they must create the necessary legal structures. Otherwise the boundaries of the law will act as an equal constraint on all in any efforts to use law as a means of deciding conflicting claims. While law cannot provide all the needed answers, law is nevertheless essential if legitimate answers are to be found.

It is an assumption of law that the allocation of scarce resources requires legal means (rather than coercive force) if conflict is to be avoided. International law recognizes as a customary rule of law the community of property among riparian states. That is, each is entitled to use a share of the river so long as unreasonable injury to another riparian does not ensue. Although this principle has been upheld in the courts, it contains an inherent weakness and has also been challenged by countervailing legal arguments. The flaw lies in the fact that customary rules tend to be highly unstable unless all involved parties have compatible interests, preferably guaranteed by formal agreement. The challenging arguments are exemplified by the principles of absolute sovereignty of territory and absolute integrity of the waterway. Proponents of absolute sovereignty contend that a riparian has unfettered rights to do whatever it deems fit with the water (or any other resource) within its territory. Upholders of absolute integrity maintain that no riparian may significantly alter the quantity or nature of the water before passing it on.

Obviously these legal principles are mutually exclusive and contradictory. Without the regulating influence of clearly defined, consistent, applicable laws, these and other legal arguments will continue to be put forth by various contending Middle Eastern riparians as suits their interests. With the important exception of Egypt and Sudan, who have made a formal regulatory agreement, Middle East riparians simply do not commonly resort to law for the arbitration or resolution of water problems.

Reinforcing this negative disposition is the inadequacy of law in certain aspects of water usage. Aquifers are a case in point. Both political authorities and legists have underrated the importance of aquifers as a potential source of contention. Aquifers have not as yet been a significant object of negotiation. It is only in the last twenty five years or so that courts have begun to deal with groundwater. On the basis of case histories to date, it cannot be easily assumed that aquifers will be consistently treated in the same way as surface water. The legal rules for groundwater are still in process of formulation, especially in the Middle East, where the issue of aquifers is already contentious.

Also common to all the water systems under study are deficiencies in planning, policy making and management. Frequently, plans for managing Middle Eastern water systems have been based on questionable assumptions and data, especially as regards consumption figures. Whenever rational or scientific procedures were not followed in planning, data degenerated to crude estimates and projections to groundless presumptions.

For example, the Johnston Plan, which has been followed in part by Israel, Jordan and Syria without formal agreements, produced what is known as a "scissor effect" that is, ill-considered decisions taken at one stage of the plan led to the blocking of options or the creation of new problems at another. The Johnston Plan was entirely off the mark in assuming that Israel's rate of development would be so far ahead of Jordan's that Israel would need five to seven times more water for consumption than Jordan. This error has been an important factor in the skewed ratio of water usage from the Jordan River system that favors Israel and keeps water tensions high.

Often policy makers are responsible for poor plans because they politicize the planning procedures used in water management. In Israel, the rivalry of two agencies, Tahal, which does water planning, and Mekorot, which implements policy, has retarded progress toward urgently needed water conservation and other measures to meet the impending water crisis. In Lebanon, the Christian-led government made only feeble gestures toward irrigating the south because it did not want to strengthen the Shiite leaders. Poor management is the reason why Syria's large investment in irrigation projects has not yielded commensurate increases in productivity. Generally, even when financing (a persistent problem in itself) is available, policy makers responsible for managing the Middle East's river systems have consistently lacked sufficient numbers of adequately trained native planners, technocrats, and managers, necessary for the effective development of their nation's water resources. They have had to rely to one degree or another on imported or purchased expertise which has never been entirely satisfactory. Considering only the hydrological and technological complexities of water, this situation is understandable. Only the most advanced industrialized states are able to produce enough specialists for their own needs, let alone export them.

Consequently, it is usually difficult for planners and ministers in the Middle East (and elsewhere) to mobilize the trained manpower (and money) to prepare and implement effective, comprehensive long-range plans. The norm is piecemeal, defective planning, frequently without adequate impact or feasibility studies, carried out only as money becomes available for each phase, and with inputs from a variety of foreign specialists who probably are employed only for specific segments of the project. Moreover, action on water issues tends to occur only when a super-power or its allies supply the money and technology. Local decision-makers may then face loss of control of priorities or other similar pressures and the connection of water issues to the ideological rivalries of the super-powers.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that shortcomings common to all the river systems produce common problems. Because of the urgent need to produce quick results, there is a persistent tendency in the Middle East to produce high-consumptive, energy-intensive agricultural schemes. Even though such projects will result in the depletion of vital water and other resources in twenty-five years, planning continues to be based on highly energy-intensive cropping and advanced technology (which must be imported). Such policies are driven by the pressures of population growth, which lead to a cycle of increasing consumption, need for greater food production, and demands for larger and larger irrigation schemes.

Water quality has now become as immediate a problem as water quantity in the Middle East. The salinity of wells due to overpumping, and the salination of land from increased irrigation are common problems in the region. Salinated acreage must be allowed to lie fallow in order to leech the salts, thereby reducing the chances of more production from increased irrigation. Urban and industrial effluents are turning some ancient Middle Eastern waterways into virtual sewers.

Planners and managers in the Middle East know that in addition to the application of hydrological technology and population control, other measures must be instituted if serious water shortages are to be avoided. There must be reductions in water subsidies, better on-farm management, a modernization of water distribution systems, and, above all, improved conservation practices such as land reclamation, water pollution control, re-use of drainage water, the adoption of drip irrigation which can reduce water use by up to two thirds, new seeds, and better evaporation control. Responsible officials must often make heroic efforts to introduce conservation and make it work because everywhere they are confronted with an uninformed, undereducated public, resistence to breaks in tradition and innovation in agriculture, understaffed and underfunded water agencies, stultifying bureaucracies, opposition from special interests, political wrangling, and corruption.

The net result of these conditions is a misfortune common to all the riparians of the Middle East. Virtually no productivity and conservation targets have been reached. Or, they have taken so much longer to achieve than planned that, when the original goal is met, needs and conditions have changed necessitating new targets and new cycles of planning and funding, with the process of ten ending up as a downward spiral. There is a Pennsylvania Dutch maxim that reflects the frustrations of those water planners and managers caught up in the spiral: "The hurrier we go, the behinder we get."

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The breadth and difficulty of water as a problem for analysis compels, on the one hand, organizing principles for structuring a study of the issues, and, on the other, an analytical framework for understanding and explaining the problem. Satisfying these requirements, within the scope of a short-term pilot project on a subject so large and intricate as water, is hardly to be expected. The results tend to be more suggestive than definitive. Nevertheless, some conceptual pegs on which to hang the conclusions of these endeavors are necessary.

The organizing principles have obviously been the complexities, the commonality of issues, and the potential for conflict that characterize the water systems of this study. A single encompassing theory or model adequate to explain all the variegated facets of water has simply not been possible to devise owing to a lack of the time needed to construct such a model and an insufficiency of data.

It might be argued, in principle, that the previously discussed conceptual legal framework, which exists in theory, might serve the purpose. But we have already seen that on water issues, particularly international water issues, the law is inconclusive. It has yet to establish firm rules in some key areas of contention, and, where such rules exist, legal institutions responsible for their effective application are missing; principles can thus be argued in contradictory and mutually exclusive ways. This circumstance has allowed water issues to be manipulated as part of the power relationships throughout the area without legal instruments or precedents for settling conflicts.

Whatever the specific water controversy between or among the riparians, its ultimate resolution comes down to the power relationships involved. It is these power relationships that have afforded us one of the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Tables
• Figures
• Preface
• Contributors
• 1. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: COMPLEXITIES, COMMONALITIES, CONFLICT
• 2. THE JORDAN RIVER
• 3. THE LITANI
• 4. THE EUPHRATES RIVER AND THE SHATT AL-ARAB
• 5. THE ORONTES RIVER
• 6. THE NILE RIVER
• 7. LEGAL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MIDDLE EASTERN RIVERS
• 8. MIDDLE EAST WATER: THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT OR COOPERATION
• 9. BIBLIOGRAPHY
• APPENDIXES