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1 A new theory of state reconstitution
In this chapter, I present a theoretical framework comprised of causal conditions that I hypothesize are necessary for state reconstitution, or the reconstruction of a state following state collapse. These necessary conditions, however, are not jointly sufficient for state reconstitution. Instead, contingent, case-specific factors – which could be actor choices, context-specific structural circumstances, or both – must combine with these necessary conditions to generate the outcome of successful state reconstitution, as observed, for instance, in the cases this study examines: Republican China and Sengoku Japan. Thus, I employ this theoretical framework to uncover necessary, potentially generalizable causal conditions that can substantially explain successful state reconstitution while explicitly recognizing the uniqueness of each case. My empirical focus is on the role of unifiers, that is, political entrepreneurs who actively seek to reconstruct a collapsed state, and their associated reunification campaigns. Consequently, the core of the framework centers on the influences upon, and choices of, these agents of change. While not conceptually necessary, an assumption of this framework is that these unifiers are domestic actors, and so the framework is most applicable to endogenous state reconstitution.
My argument focuses on the roles of ideology, symbols and geopolitical space in explaining successful state reconstitution through the purposive efforts of unifiers. I will specifically argue that a) ideology plays a crucial role in creating and maintaining a cohesive, durable and effective reunification coalition, b) the manipulation of key political symbols can align and preserve the support of societal actors for the unifier’s cause of state reconstitution, and c) geopolitical space provides vital room for the unifier to develop and propagate new institutions and configurations that can serve as the foundation for a reunification campaign and, subsequently, a reconstituted state. These three broad factors – ideology, symbols and geopolitical space – influence unifiers’ actions by structuring the sociopolitical contexts they operate in and presenting strategies unifiers can choose to use to propel and guide their reunification campaigns.
This theoretical framework has two components. First, I present a conceptual map that clarifies the nature of state reconstitution and its relationship to political agency and state formation in general. Second, I propose an explanatory framework composed of six specific causal conditions, derived from the general factors of ideology, symbols and geopolitical space. These conditions are jointly necessary for successful state reconstitution and fall into two sets. The first set includes three necessary structural conditions that provide the crucial space and/or resources for effective state reconstitution by unifiers. The second set consists of three necessary strategic conditions that constitute the actions intentionally taken by unifiers and their core supporters to realize the successful inception, extension and consolidation of their reunification campaigns and, ultimately, reconstituted states.
These two sets of conditions form the bedrock that I argue is necessary for successful state reconstitution. They have been formulated and identified through analytic induction (see Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997) using data and insights from my two primary cases, Sengoku Japan and Republican China, and the scholarly literature on party formation, state formation, ideology and civil war. Specifically, an initial investigation of Sengoku Japan, combined with a general review of the state formation literature, led to the formulation of my initial set of theoretical expectations. These included the methodological importance of focusing on coalitions, a general belief that widely recognized symbols can diminish conflict between unifiers and their rivals and the claim that regionally-powerful elites can inhibit institutional innovation. A preliminary examination of Republican China confirmed some of these expectations but also demanded modification of others, such as the claim concerning regional elites, which proved to be underdeveloped. Additional review of the literature on ideology and civil war provided the final theoretical input for the development of my framework. In brief, a systematic dialogue between the two main cases and my theoretical expectations culminated in the framework presented in this chapter. Closer consideration of the cases beyond the broad outlines of the historical processes involved provides a partially independent check on the explanatory power of this framework. Still, this theoretical framework must be applied to other distinct cases of both successful and unsuccessful state reconstitution attempts to properly test its validity. Chapter 4 begins this process by briefly looking at three additional cases of successful state reconstitution. These independent assessments indicate that the theoretical framework presented here is largely effective in explaining successful state reconstitution. I discuss the framework’s robustness and limitations in the light of these additional case studies in Chapter 4.
The order of this chapter is as follows. First, I briefly define my general objects of study – the state and state reconstitution. Second, I lay out the general concepts of the political entrepreneur and duality of structure, which is how Anthony Giddens’ conceives of the interplay between structure and agency (Giddens 1984). Third, I discuss how the concepts of the political entrepreneur and the duality of structure 1) define the unifier and her role, and 2) constitute the reunification campaign and its ideal life cycle. Fourth, I discuss how the use of ideology can harness normative power and encourage collective action in service of reunification campaigns. Fifth, I review the analytic use of geopolitical space in the state formation and civil war literature and work out the concept’s relevance to the actions of unifiers. Finally, I present my explanatory framework of specific causal conditions jointly necessary for successful state reconstitution.
General objects of study
The state
In this section I present my conceptualization of the state. Scholars have provided many definitions of this central social-scientific term. The most common conceptual dividing line is between organizational and institutional definitions (Vu 2010). An organizational approach treats the state as a collective actor, frequently in terms of its autonomy from forces in society (e.g., Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1992). An institutional approach, though, considers the state to be a coherent set of institutions that structure the actions of individual actors (e.g., Gorski 2003; Ikegami 1995). As this study is concerned with the creation of the state, I follow this latter approach. Thus, the state as an organizational actor does not yet exist for almost the entirety of the historical trajectories I examine. Instead, I seek to understand how the foundations of such an actor can be created, that is, how political agents create the state as an institutional arrangement (i.e., a set of institutions sharing a common structuring logic).
According to Hendrik Spruyt (1996), the state’s fundamental logic has the features of sovereignty and territoriality. The state is sovereign in that it has a final locus of authority (a final decision-making structure), and territorial in that the state’s sovereign authority is confined within demarcated borders and recognizes no superior political center (Spruyt 1996: 153). Michael Mann (1993) also offers a (largely) institutional definition of the state that dovetails considerably with Spruyt’s. The state is a) “a differentiated set of institutions and personnel,” b) “embodying centrality” (i.e., “political relations radiate to and from a center”), c) covering a territorially defined region, d) over which it exercises some degree of “authoritative, binding rule making,” and e) “backed up by some organized force” (Mann 1993: 55). However, Mann’s definition is not entirely institutional. The first component (“a differentiated set of institutions and personnel”) treats the state as an organization because of its consideration of personnel as conceptually part of the state, rather than as a group of individuals operating within the state’s institutional confines. While I do not challenge this viewpoint, because my goal is to determine how the state as an institutional arrangement comes to be reconstituted, I discard this portion of Mann’s definition. Additionally, by including the function of organized force in buttressing state power, Mann includes a causal statement in a definition, which should be avoided (cf. Motyl 1992). And, again, I seek a definition that is purely institutional. The theoretical power of Mann’s definition is its functional agnosticism, in that Mann explicitly recognizes the multiplicity of functions the state has historically taken on (Mann 1993: 55). No one function is unique or necessary to the state.
Stripped of its functional and organizational traits, Mann’s state can be defined as an institutional arrangement embodying centrality; territoriality; and authoritative, binding rule making. Since the latter implies monopolistic rule making (that is, has authority or jurisdiction) over a certain function or functional area, I label this component “functional monopoly” for short. Mann’s and Spruyt’s definitions of territoriality are largely identical. The only difference is that Spruyt includes some notion of sovereignty in his, which should be excluded for conceptual clarity. Spruyt’s “final locus of authority” and Mann’s “functional monopoly” are also largely analogous and complementary where they do not conceptually overlap. Spruyt does not have a direct analog for Mann’s notion of centrality, however, though it is implied in his conception of sovereignty (and is made explicit in his historical argument). Centrality is a valuable addition, however, because it paints a picture of the state as not simply a top-down structure that exercises authority over a given functional area. In a state-society, social groups look to the state not just for authoritative decisions but also for an arena within which to compete and cooperate politically. As Mann argues, this function of the state as an arena is the source of its autonomy. Most societies have required that at least some rules be set monopolistically, and this necessity belongs to the state. The functional necessity of the state for certain groups in society, then, generates the functional monopoly and the final locus of authority upon which the autonomous power of the state (as an organization) rests (Mann 1984: 120).
In sum, the definition of the state I will use comprises the following three components: a) centrality, b) functional monopoly, and c) territoriality. Although the first component has an intrinsic causal connection with the second, because both are necessary for understanding the fundamental institutional elements (i.e., the institutional skeleton) of the state, I include them both.
State formation and state reconstitution
State reconstitution is most properly considered a subtype of state formation. Like state formation more generally, state reconstitution involves the creation and development of institutions that constitute and bolster the fundamental political qualities of centrality, functional monopoly and territoriality. Accordingly, state builders work to centralize their political authority over some or all aspects of social life and to do so over a clearly defined geographic area. These agents pursue these goals whatever kind of state-formation process in which they are engaging. Additionally, both general state formation and state reconstitution are concerned not just with the creation of state forms and institutions, but also with their consolidation. After all, enduring developments in levels of state strength or types of state forms are more analytically and substantively interesting than ephemeral achievements by state builders. Thus, I argue that state reconstitution (like state formation in general) requires not just the creation of a state, but its durable maintenance. A rough operationalization of consolidation would be when the newly recreated state form persists after the initial state ruler, or ruling group, passes from the political scene.
Despite these fundamental commonalities, state reconstitution is different from general state formation in three substantively important ways. First, state formation covers all processes of political centralization and territorial ordering. These include the emergence of diverse state forms (e.g., Tilly 1992), the accumulation, dissipation or stagnation of state strength (e.g., Tilly 1975; Centeno 2002), and the development of distinct administrative infrastructures utilized by state rulers (Ertman 1997). State reconstitution, however, is specifically concerned with the creation of the institutional arrangement known as the state following a period of state collapse.1 The development of administrative infrastructure and accumulation of state strength can be elements of a mechanism that leads to the recreation of a state, but such processes are not the primary objects of analysis. Additionally, though the type of state that is recreated can vary (e.g., national, city- or imperial; federal or unitary), this potential variation is secondary to the goal of explaining how the state’s institutional skeleton of centrality, functional monopoly and territoriality can be reconstituted.
The second important difference is that the institutional and political legacies of the previous state very often impact how state collapse occurs, what social conditions are present during the period of state reconstitution and whether or not successful state reconstitution is achieved. As Thomas Ertman has noted about post-Roman Europe, regional elites took over Roman institutions and used them to establish autonomous political power. The successor polities of Europe were unable to overcome these autonomous power structures and recreate the Western Empire in the immediate centuries following the fall of Rome (Ertman 1997). Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong make an analogous argument when looking at state formation and regime change in post-Communist countries. They argue that societies that inherited well-institutionalized central state apparatuses from the Communist era maintained such institutionalization past the point of regime change. Societies that did not have a well-institutionalized central Communist state became either fractious or personalistic in the 1990s (Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002). In other words, rulers had to rely on the available institutional resources at hand when consolidating their authority following the collapse of the old regime. Though not directly concerned with state reconstitution per se, these two works do point to the causal impact the structure of previous political entities can have on the development of future ones, including states. In analyses of state formation, recent political events (e.g., instances of state collapse) may or may not play a central role in the causal account. When examining state reconstitution, however, the nature of the previous state structures and the manner in which they collapsed must be taken into account in any causal analysis of the conditions and processes that lead to a reconstituted state.
The third key distinction is that state reconstitution unfolds on a shorter time scale. Although many states and groups claim their origins in political entities long past (e.g., Holy Roman Emperors or Carolingian kings claiming descent from the Roman Empire, ISIS drawing inspiration from the Islamic Caliphate today), I restrict the conceptual scope of state reconstitution to periods immediately following the collapse of a state. Thus, if a stable political arrangement emerges post-collapse that is not a state that at least mostly conforms to the borders of the previous state, then successful state reconstitution did not occur.2 An alternative arrangement could be a form of heavily decentralized rule (e.g., feudalism, clan-based system), a multi-state system or conquest by an external state. The processes of state reconstitution are likely to be shorter in duration than those associated with long duree state formation, the topic studied by most state formation scholars (e.g., Tilly 1992; Spruyt 1996; Ertman 1997; Wong 1997). Moreover, the pace at which institutions that centralize and territorially order political power are created and developed will be faster than can be found in other instances of state formation.
Thus, the attributes that define, first, general state formation and, second, state reconstitution are as follows. State formation can be defined as: the creation and development of institutions that constitute and bolster the fundamental political qualities of centrality, functional monopoly and territoriality. This political process can vary in duration and tempo. State reconstitution involves the same process but has the following analytical restrictions: 1) shorter duration and faster tempo, 2) direct impact of the institutional and political legacies of the past state and its demise, and 3) direct progression to the recreation of a stable state. To be explicit, recreation requires that an unequivocal predecessor state exist. Thus, reconstitution as a concept does not encompass state formation in contexts without such a predecessor.
This conceptual requirement functions as a scope condition for the theoretical framework presented in this study. The universe of relevant cases only includes societies that were governed by a state prior to a period of internal disunion and state deformation (that is, a period of state collapse). By definition, the state must have sovereignty, territoriality and function monopoly. So, political units created by colonial powers would qualify only if after decolonization, sovereign, territorial power was clearly exercised by post-colonial governments. Political units still under colonial control would not be relevant cases because they do not enjoy sovereignty. Post-colonial societies that are immediately consumed by civil war or other forms of state deformation following decolonization would also not be applicable since their institutional arrangements never met of any of the conditions to qualify as a state. In addition, pre-colonial states – that may have served as the basis for colonial rule – would not qualify as predecessor states for state reconstitution because there was an intervening period of stable, non-sovereign rule – that is, colonial rule. It may be the case that the theoretical framework presented here applies beyond this scope condition, but...
