While the sacrificial contest reenacted the enigmatic relationship of life and death, ritualismâstripping away the contestâposited the absolute rule of ritual beyond life and death. It thereby opened up a definitive split between the dynamic sacrality of the life-and-death nexus and the static transcendence of the Vedic injunctionâ between the awesome uncertainty of the sacred and the dead certainty of the transcendent. . . . [I]t is ancient Indian ritualism . . . that offers the clearest and by far the best documented case of such an âaxialâ breakthrough. . . . When . . . a breakthrough like Vedic ritualism did occur, it âdisenchantedâ a world held in thrall by the sacred brokenness of the contest.8
Before the Vedic period, sacrifice had been a communal affair; indeed, what Marcel Mauss referred to as a âprestation totaleâ, at which social groups came together and reestablished their bonds through the festive rivalry of the âThree FâsââFeasting, Fighting and Falling in Love. The MahÄvrata festival, for example, shows âthe remnants of a rowdy and orgiastic New Yearâs festivalâ.9 After the Brahmin priests domesticated the sacrifice, it became an individualistic, even antisocial, affair that led logically to movements of renunciation and asceticism.
Heestermanâs reconstruction has been admired for its boldness as well as questioned for its speculative leaps by other scholars of the Vedas.10 Stephanie Jamison posed, among other criticisms, the following:
A more dubious method of reconstruction is the constant derivation of the figurative and symbolic from the literal. Heesterman regularly argues that apparent symbolic representations in Ĺrauta ritual are denatured, âdeconstructedâ survivals of actual, literal procedures in the older system. For example, the presence of a chariot or even a chariot wheel points to a real, lengthy journey embedded in the older sacrifice; a symbolic contest (with dice or with words) to a real fight to the death. . . . [T]o what extent are we required (or allowed) to assume that a particular element in a ritual is the diachronic schematization of something originally real?11
More cuttingly, Christopher Minkowski stated: âThe misfortune is that each of [Heestermanâs] brilliant insights is, as it were, dragged up the side of an ideological volcano and sacrificed whole to the angry, catastrophic god of [his] grand theoryâ.12
Despite such critiques, Heestermanâs historical reconstruction of the development of Vedic sacrifice remains as one of the last important interpretations of this key tradition. To my knowledge, there has been no serious effort to trace the genealogy of his account in the history of European ideas, as opposed to that part which may derive directly from a reading of the Vedic texts. I will argue that Heestermanâs account is premised on a series of tropes, mythemes and narratives that reveal much more about the European mind than they do about the ancient history and prehistory of the subcontinent. His depiction of the primal scene of sacrifice as a combat among warriors drew both on his countryman Johan Huizingaâs focus in Homo Ludens (1938) on agonistic play as the key to culture and on various early 20th-century and Weimar- and Nazi-era studies of the Aryan or Indo-German Männerbund, or âmale bandâ, as the original social formation. Heestermanâs account of the degeneration of sacrifice at the hands of priests resembles narratives of the decline of ancient Israelite sacrifice from a joyous communal meal into empty ritualism, narratives that received influential expression by the late-19th-century Protestant Bible scholars Julius Wellhausen and William Robertson Smith. More generally, Heestermanâs account echoed Max Weberâs thesis of the routinisation of charisma;13 he actually appropriated Weberâs term âdisenchantmentâ to label the ancient Indian developments. The fact that each of these older theories has by now been criticised itself as encoding certain biases, whether theological or racialist, lends urgency to the task of a genealogical critique.
Protestant narratives of the decline from sacrifice to ritual
First let me summarise a few more of the main points of Heestermanâs theory. Sacrifice normally consists of three components: immolation or killing, generally (although not always) of an animal or even a human being; the destruction of an offering and a meal.14 The element of destruction signals abandonment, and it is what distinguishes the sacrifice from the gift.15 Heesterman acknowledges that âthere are well-known cases in which one of the three basic elements is missing. . . . Thus the holocaust or the biblical âolah is wholly burnt without any part being eaten. Here oblational destruction has taken over from the otherwise normal mealâ.16 However, the presence of the three elements in some combination is what defines sacrifice. Contradicting a long scholarly tradition that regards sacrifice as a type or subset of ritual, Heesterman posits a fundamental distinction between these two categories. Where sacrifice is spontaneous, natural and communal, ritual is artificial, mechanistic and sharply separated from social life: âthe ritualists have remolded the animal sacrifice so as to eliminate the âinauspiciousâ awesomeness and excitement of blood and killing. The result . . . is an utterly flat, though intricate, sequence of acts and mantras, perfectly regulated and without ups or downs, which agrees with the ritualistsâ aim of taming sacrificeâ.17 Heestermanâs archive is the developed system of Ĺrauta or âsolemnâ rites in the Vedic texts, which are complex and carried out by specialists. These rituals are some of the most elaborate and well-documented that we know of. The form of ritual is adapted to its purpose, which is to provide a âfail-safe, risk-free mechanism that will automatically deliver the goods of life . . . that took out the sting of death and absolutized the capacity of sacrifice for establishing orderâ.18 Ritual replaced the âawesome uncertaintyâ of sacrifice with âdead certaintyâ.
This required a denaturation of sacrifice, as shown not only by its increasingly scripted nature, but also by the loss of its communal dimensionsâ represented above all by the displacement of the festival mealâas well as by the rise of a specialised cadre of priests. Tamed by ritual, âsacrifice . . . no longer even contains a festive mealâ.19 The burnt oblation, or the element of destruction by fire, took over until âlittle room was left for the direct and tangible manipulation of life and death epitomized in the two other moments of sacrifice, the immolatory kill and its material purpose, the sacrificial meal. . . . Sacrifice was dematerialized as it was desocializedâ.20 The focus of sacrifice as a social event had been the communal meal, which, because of its involvement in an âever-shifting web of conflict and allianceâ, had to be pushed to the margins.21 The potlatch was broken up and the punchbowl taken away; all that remained was the vegetarian odana meal, as an afterthought.
The villains in Heestermanâs drama are the Brahmin priests, who gradually take over as sacrifice gives way to ritual. The original sacrificer was a warrior consecrated unto death, who entered into combat for the goods of sacrifice and enjoyed the Three Fâs as previously mentioned. âBriefly and crudely, before there were priests there were warriorsâ.22 A key example is the VrÄtya, ...