Introduction: a common history?
The history of Southern Africa, like that of the whole of the continent, is characterised by migration, settlements, intergroup relations and interactions, identity diffusion, conflicts and collaboration. In a sense therefore, it is a region with strong historical ties, yet with marked differences in terms of economic structures and stages of economic development in the modern state system. As Ndangwa Noyoo (2013: 100) rightly noted, Southern African countries “have a shared history as well as linguistic and cultural ties. Thus, it is not incidental that the present political economy of Southern Africa is linked to the historical trajectory of the area”.
Early settlement in Southern Africa, especially of the San and Khoekhoe groups, saw the gradual emergence of pastoral and farming communities, which were complemented by migration from other parts of the continent especially Central Africa in creating new identity groups.1 Issues of intergroup conflicts and conquests, trade, labour migration, and centralised colonial administration system fostered the growth of transboundary ethnic identities, which encouraged social cohesion and served as a foundation for regional cooperation and integration. For example, the Sotho speaking people criss-cross South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia, while the vast majority of the Shona people can be found in Zimbabwe, but they are also present in South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique.2
The political economy of Southern Africa changed dramatically in the 19th century with the discovery of minerals and metals like gold, diamond and copper and the growth of large farms and plantation agriculture in the region. This had three profound effects. First, mineral sourcing and exploitation led to the inflow of capital from the West in the development of mines and in a sense facilitated the colonial enterprise in the region. Second, labour migration assumed a new but heightened phenomenon with labour flows from all parts of the region in search of employment. Wage labour, urbanisation and multi-culturalism accompanied the process. Third, there was the growth of regional or transboundary infrastructure of roads, railways and the like to facilitate the export of minerals and goods across and beyond the region and transport labour as well. Kyu-Deug Hwang (2007: 56) captures this 19th-century trend in these telling terms:
Since the discovery of diamonds (1867), and gold (1886) in South Africa, copper in Zambia, and coal in Zimbabwe, the regional setting of relations within and among nations have had a “long but infamous pedigree”, even so much as to influence the current regional orders. Therefore, the present and the future scenario of regionalism in Southern Africa can be, to some extent, approached and understood in the context of the past.
The rise of intraregional labour migration and market facilitated greater cultural ties and identity diffusion in the region. Intraregional labour migration, as Jonathan Crush et al. (2005: 1) noted, was the “single most important factor tying together all of the various colonies and countries of the sub-continent into a single regional labour market during the twentieth century”. The Kimberley diamond mines in South Africa attracted labour migrants from modern-day Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand brought a new dynamic to labour flows in the region during that period. Labour flows also tended towards countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mauritius, Swaziland and Tanzania, where commercial agriculture and plantation farms existed. As Crush et al. (2005: 2) further noted, “by 1970, there were over 260,000 male labour migrants in the South African mines. Migrants came from as far north as Tanzania. Other mining centres in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Tanzania also became magnets for labour migrants from other countries”.
Colonial rule, in its efforts to rationalise administration, reduce cost, and ensure effective political control in Southern Africa, in some cases, opted for a transboundary governance system. For example, the federation of Nyasa-land and Rhodesia consisting of present-day Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe was administered by the British through centralised administration from 1953–1963. This encouraged the free movement of people, goods and services amongst the three countries. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were part of the British High Commission territories and shared many institutions that were run from South Africa, and Namibia was administered as part of South Africa after the end of World War I in 1918 (Mbuende, 2012: 41–42). As Kaire Mbuende rightly puts it, “the settler regimes created an environment that helped to solidify the affinities established among the peoples of the region” (Ibid: 42).
As such, transboundary human mobility, settlement and social acculturation produced accumulated social capital, while the construction of transboundary economic infrastructure of roads and railways, trade and the exchange of goods and services facilitated economic capital, all supportive of regional integration in the region. Hence, the incentive for economic cooperation was quite high. Thus, in 1910, the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) was negotiated including South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to facilitate a meso-regional market and customs union in Southern Africa.
In this introductory chapter, we provide the historical context to the issue of regional integration in Southern Africa by mapping the socio-cultural affinities of the peoples of the region, their collective encounters in the struggle against colonial rule and the apartheid system, which further provided a bond of solidarity and a basis for regional cooperation and the metamorphosis of that process towards establishing regional integration arrangement. The chapter also captures the economic similarities and differences amongst countries of the region, which sometimes create tensions and contradictions for the regional integration project and the call for developmental regionalism that “leaves no nation or people” behind in the process and dividends of regional integration. Finally, the chapter previews the subsequent chapters of the book, outlining their main arguments and conclusions.
Cooperation through adversity: liberation struggles as a regional asset
The generic form of colonial rule, which manifested in settler colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa, prompted an armed struggle approach to political liberation, unlike in many parts of the continent, where negotiated but peaceful political transition was the route to independence. Also, the fact that Southern Africa was relatively more developed than other parts of the continent with different stakes and interests in the region meant that the struggle for independence would be rough and tortuous. The liberation movements, in order to stabilise, grow and mobilise support, had to form both regional and international networks and solidarities. Thus, liberation movements developed organic solidarity across borders based on ideological, political and leadership linkages and provided support on logistical and tactical issues to each other. For example, as Timothy Shaw (1976: 11) noted, organisations like FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC were grouped in the Conference of National Organisations in the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), while the ANC and ZAPU had military cooperation. Countries like Zambia and Tanzania also provided bases for military training, political shelter and diplomatic networking for many of the liberation movements in Southern Africa.
At the international level, countries like Cuba, the Soviet Union and China provided support largely based on ideological affinities, while the Scandinavian countries rooted in social democracy adopted a humanist and human rights approach in their support to the liberation movements. For example, the Soviet Union supported the ANC, MPLA, ZAPU, FRELIMO and SWAPO. While, China supported liberation movements like the PAC, FNLA/UNITA, ZANU, SWANU and FRELIMO (Shaw, 1976: 11).
But this is not to suggest that there was unity of purpose and collaboration amongst all liberation movements in national contexts. There were rivalries, tensions and contradictions in national jurisdictions. For example, the ANC and the PAC had their differences in South Africa in terms of approach, strategy and result, while the MPLA and UNITA were arch-enemies in the struggle for independence in Angola. The rivalries and differences continued after Angolan independence in 1975.
The highpoint of collaboration and collective solidarity amongst the liberation movements and Southern African countries generally in the struggle for independence was with the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) whose purpose was to ensure the total independence of the region. The signing of the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 brought together a group of countries that came to be known as the “Frontline States” (Plaut et al., 1981: 44). At this point, Mozambique and Angola were still considered part of the Portuguese territory, Rhodesia was a British colony in rebellion, Namibia was still being firmly ruled from Pretoria and South Africa was in the clutches of apartheid in which the liberation movements had been driven underground (Plaut et al., 1981: 44). The expanding influence of apartheid in South Africa and its urge to subdue or even destabilise many of the countries in the region was a major rallying point in the formation of the FLS. By 1976, the members of the FLS were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, with Zimbabwe joining after independence in 1980. The FLS as Evans (1984: 5) noted, “represent a loose coalition bound by common perceptions and beliefs concerning regional liberation and Africanist ideology” and were committed to the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and protecting the newly independent states. The FLS was the subset of the OAU Liberation Committee in Southern Africa, which assumed the mantle of coordinating the struggle for political liberation in the region. The leadership of Julius Nyerere of both the OAU Liberation Committee and the FLS was central to ensuring cohesion, commitment and sacrifice in the work of the FLS. Nyerere displayed exemplary leadership and commitment in the work of the FLS. The flexibility of the organisation in terms of absence of a permanent Secretariat was also a major asset, which allowed meetings to be called at short notice and in different locations and prevented any form of attack or sabotage of its Secretariat by Pretoria. The approach to decisions by consensus also boded well for the group in which dissent or disagreements were not muzzled, but respected. Finally, the group did not discourage individual diplomatic initiatives or those that did not emerge from it as long as they supported the cause of political freedom in the region. Some of these included the 1982 Kaunda-Botha summit, the 1984 Lusaka Understanding and, most significantly, the Nkomati Accord of March 1984 (Evans, 1984: 5).
It was in the womb of the FLS that the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was born in 1980. Regional liberation cooperation served as a useful asset in promoting regional economic cooperation in Southern Africa. As Samora Machel observed, “the experience of unity and cohesion of the Frontline States in the political liberation struggle of the people should be extended to other majority ruled states and governments in Southern Africa in economic liberation” (cited in Plaut, 1981: 44).
However, there is a paradox in the urge for regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa. Even the apartheid state desired regional cooperation and integration but for different reasons—to boost its sphere of influence and control, perpetuate dependence and thereby create acceptance and legitimacy for the apartheid system. The apartheid government initiated the “Cons...
