The Decline of Nation-States after the Arab Spring

The Rise of Communitocracy

Imad Salamey

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138732131
• eBook ISBN: 9781317036241
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Surveying the causes of the Arab Spring, and revealing the governing trends arising from it, this book examines various international relation theories through the lens of the experiences of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. It takes the events of the Arab Spring as an outcome of globalization's double movement whose integrative cultural, political and security frameworks devastated nationally controlled economies, undermining the nation-state system and propagating a decentralized and communitarian-based governance structure. The consequences for many plural, diverse societies were two-fold: autocratic nationalism was discarded while decentralized regimes representing communitarian-based politics came to the fore. The author reveals how the formulation of a new communitocratic order rests on the accommodation of this newly emerging communitarianism and explores the major drivers of political transformation, describing the emerging communities, forecasting their governing options and the possible repercussions for the post-Arab Spring states.

1 Globalization and communitocracy

Progressive liberalism and legitimate government

The 2011 Arab Spring was a historic turning point that led to the sudden collapse of multiple Middle Eastern and North African autocratic republics. Between 2011 and 2015, six Arab presidents in Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, and Libya were forced out of office by mass protests or military takeovers. Governments in almost every Arab state have been reestablished or reorganized, some even formulating new electoral systems and inaugurating new prime ministers. In countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Jordan, and Morocco, governments introduced new constitutions and major legislative amendments. These changes, complemented with promises of representative and democratically elected governments in the Arab world, have created a wave of newly founded anti-authoritarian public sentiments. The promises of a post-Soviet era of globalization have inspired the idealism of an emerging generation of Arab youth demanding a free and democratic Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

The timing of these downfalls and the prospect of new regimes emerging as a result of revolutionary upheavals have important theoretical “remefications” for the debate surrounding the driving forces of political change and the foundation of a legitimate government. Political theorists have advanced a wide range of views on the causes of revolutions and political transformations. Most attributed changes to a governing deficiency that leads to political reform or the overthrow of the entire regime (Giglioli, 2013). Revolutionary events in the Arab world, starting in 2011, can be seen as the product of widespread public dissatisfaction with the ruling establishments. Such developments are also indicative of the fact that national autocratic regimes were struggling to cope with global changes and maintain their capacity for governance. The Arab Spring provides an opportunity to reassess governance in the Arab region and to forecast prospects for “new” emerging alternatives. Examining the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of a given political order is one of the most revealing indicators in the “transformation and consolidation” of power.

Long before the Arab Spring, political philosophers debated the prerequisite foundations for a sustainable regime. The seventeenth-century thinker Thomas Hobbes asserted that the legitimacy of a political order rests on its ability to preserve citizens’ lives and property (Hobbes, 1651). In this context, avoiding a state of war and anarchy is advocated as the essence of government and politics. Absolute governmental authority is rationalized as necessary to counter individual ambitions to pursue “unrestrained” power, and consequential conflicts and war. Cold War-era Arab regimes used this Hobbesian argument as the basis for their claim to legitimacy and absolute rule. Like Louis XV of France, their arguments have run along the lines of ‘après moi, le deluge’. They further use the pretext of religious obedience and solidarity against external enemies as further foundations for their authority and the suppression of dissent.

Decades after Hobbes, John Locke adopted the philosophical tenets of Hobbesianism yet denied state absolutism in favor of the preservation of liberty as a fundamental right. He asserted that liberty, along with life and the preservation of property, is essential for the foundation of a legitimate political order, and so called for limited government (Locke, 1690/1980). Without liberty, Locke argued, neither property nor life can be protected against the interference of uncontrolled tyrannies (Locke, 1690/1980, Chapter XVIII. Of Tyranny). The Hobbesian-Lockean dichotomy has since divided classic liberalism between proponents of security and realpolitik on the one hand, and advocates of liberty and liberalism on the other. These conflicting ideologies have fueled political debate and policy agendas for centuries. The outburst of the Arab Spring has once again reignited the old debate, and given each side a fresh crop of recruits. It appeared evident that Arab absolutism had been significantly eroded when the Arab Spring unleashed demands for liberty and freedom. Yet, a collapsing political order and fragmenting sectarian and tribal realities have instead led to demands for a security-based Hobbesian regime that can curb causes of war and restore peace.

Striking the balance between liberty and peace, along with achieving a collectively acceptable level of wealth distribution and production, has never been an easy attainment. Throughout the twentieth century, the Lockean vision of legitimate and limited government inspired the foundation of a global nation-state system, operating within a mutually acceptable international legal framework. The United Nations (UN) was formed after the devastation of World War II, and applied the Lockean principles to the community of nations, asserting state equality and sovereignty as prerequisites for membership (United Nations, 1945). The preservation of security and justice among geographically sovereign states within philosophical tenets of political realism became the fundamental aims of the UN and the international system (United Nations, 1945).

Fearing nation-states could become absolute tyrannies, the UN supplemented its initial support of state sovereignty with various liberal human rights declarations in an attempt to ensure domestic liberal justice (United Nations, 1948). Thus, states have continued to draw their national and international legitimacy from their ability to perform the basic functions of protecting the life, liberty, and property of their citizens, while simultaneously submitting themselves to international rules of conduct that ensure their security in an otherwise anarchic world order (Waltz, 1979).

Within the confines of their geographic boundaries, nation-states have claimed sole authority over the preservation of national security, culture, and economy. This mirrors the Lockean foundations of legitimate government: protecting life, liberty, and property. Yet the international state system shied away from demanding that members meet the Lockean criteria. In fact by the twenty-first century, most United Nations’ member states retained, to a large extent, Hobbesian regimes. Sixty percent of the world’s population has been living under partly democratic or non-democratic regimes according to a 2015 Freedom Index (Freedom House Index, 2015). Only 8.9 percent live under full democracies (Table 1.1). The Arab region’s share of these regimes was disproportionately high. Only 5 percent of the total 410,277,000 Arab population is deemed “free” according to a 2015 Freedom House survey (Freedom House Index, 2015).

Table 1.1 Democracy Index 2015, by regime type

Type	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	20	12	8.9
Flawed democracies	59	35.3	39.5
Hybrid regimes	37	22.2	17.5
Authoritarian regimes	51	30.5	34.1

Source: Economic Intelligence Unit, 2016.

Throughout the twentieth century, the persistence of authoritarianism has shattered the idealism of Lockeanism, and particularly that of progressive liberals who had envisioned an inevitable transition towards a world democracy. Democratic peace theory has long prophesized an ‘end of History’, where global democratic triumph leads to lasting peace among nations. Samuel Huntington has captured the essence of liberal progressivism in his democratic wave theory, when he argued that the number of democracies is steadily increasing through periodic revolutions (Huntington, 1991). Huntington claimed that, since the 1820s, waves of democratic revolutions had increased the number of variant democracies to a hundred, or less than half of the UN member states by 2014 (Huntington, 1991). Huntington’s liberal optimism about the ultimate triumph of liberalism inspired modern liberals such as Francis Fukuyama, who, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, declared the end of history (Fukuyama, 1993). Since then, there have been various claims about states joining the ranks of the liberal democracies. For many, the Arab Spring of 2011 signaled the beginning of a fourth wave of democracy, promising another liberal triumph (Howard & Hussain, 2013).

Middle East exceptionalism

As demonstrated in the distribution of countries along the democratic-authoritarian spectrum (Table 1.1), the idealism of progressive liberalism has long been confronted by many authoritarian states’ resistance to change. Almost two hundred years after the 1820s identified by Huntington as the first wave of democracy, the post-WWII state system continues to be populated by mostly Hobbesian nations. This is despite the fact that liberalism has left its imprint on the world economy, security, and cultural values, to a great extent led by the United States and Europe (Freedom House Index, 2015). The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990 and the transition of many Eastern European, Latin American, and Asian countries towards liberal democracy gave rise to hopes of an imminent final wave of democratic transitions (Huntington, 1991). This inevitable end of history, as prophesized by liberal progressivism, appeared to be within reach (Fukuyama, 1993). Optimism was only contradicted by the resilience of various brands of authoritarian rule, such as communism in China, North Korea, and Cuba; theocracy in Iran and Afghanistan; monarchy in Jordan, Morocco, and the Arab Gulf States; and autocracy in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, to name but a few. Forecasting a confrontation between democracies and their antagonists, Samuel Huntington reversed his own third wave view in favor of an emerging civilizational chaos and cultural clash (Huntington, 1993).

The anomalous illiberal nature of many authoritarian post-Cold War countries thus demanded a renewed debate within the liberal discourse. Among the intriguing arguments advanced to explain the Middle East’s democratic deficit is that of Middle Eastern exceptionalism (Bellin, 2004; Lakoff, 2004; Salamey, 2009). Middle Eastern exceptionalism’s theoretical justifications were originally provided by Western orientalist scholars, but many post-colonial theoreticians have since added converging interpretations. Orientalists attributed the cause of the democratic deficit in the MENA region to dominant anti-liberal traditions in Muslim cultures (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2001–2002). Social conformity as a cultural trait is used to explain political behaviors. Arabs were perceived to submit to a patriarchal hierarchy rooted in the family, tribe, and village, and this premise was extrapolated to explain society and politics at large. Islam was characterized as a fostering environment that justifies patriarchy and political conformity. Samuel Huntington positioned cultural Islam as an antithetical tradition to the Western cultural values of individuality, equality, and liberty.

Further support for Middle Eastern exceptionalism has been offered by post-colonial and Marxist discourse, which blames imperialism and colonial countries for backing authoritarian regimes with a view to extracting resources and maintaining economic dependency. Regimes were perceived as part of a larger Western post-colonial order which was not receptive to peaceful or local change and reform. Widespread confrontation linked to the demise of international colonialism and imperialism was perceived as essential for any kind of regime change. In fact, authoritarian leaders soon discovered that they could capitalize on anti-imperialist discourse, using it as a means to consolidate their own rule and silence voices of dissent (Salamey & Pearson, 2012).

Both orientalism and post-colonial discourses found common ground in the formulation of exceptionalism’s many claims. Cultural exceptionalism associated religious and patrimonial cultural practices with the consolidation of authoritarianism, thus denying the possibility of individual liberty and limited government (Huntington, 1993). Economic exceptionalism attributed a permanent disjunction between state and society in Arab states, given the former’s unchecked reign of power over the latter (Kamrava, 2002; Luciani, 2009). Security exceptionalism argued that unchecked coercive security apparatuses were a by-product of the strategic significance of Arab states, and the tendency of post-colonial powers to prioritize their stability over the attainment of liberty (Bellin, 2004; Posusney & Angrist, 2005).

Facilitating the transition from a Hobbesian to a Lockean political order remained a puzzle among liberal and post-colonial political thinkers. At various times and places, the cost of attaining liberty appeared too costly, jeopardizing both life and property. The fear of returning to a state of anarchy and a restoration of primitive natural rule has often dissuaded people from pursuing the overthrow of the existing order through violence. Many Arab autocratic and monarchic states have justified their rules on the grounds of providing stability in the face of extremism and chaos (Salamey & Pearson, 2012). Their geopolitical importance and vast wealth has helped authoritarians to shield themselves from serious international condemnation (Bellin, 2004). Some have come to explain the democratic deficit of the Arab region by the lack of democratic prerequisites. The absence of mass literacy, urbanization, an expanded middle class, a developed economy, institutionalism, a civil society, and egalitarian culture are just a few of the reasons frequently cited for persisting authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959; Wiarda, 2012; Zgurić, 2012).

The various exceptionalist interpretations thus were seen as indicating that the obstacles for achieving the necessary conditions for liberty in society were almost insurmountable. The implicit conclusion was that only the West could meet the conditions to enjoy a liberal order. This idea continued to gain ground, giving rise to the proposition that some parts of the world are simply frozen in time, incapable of change. Convinced by this deterministic argument, Western liberalism preoccupied itself with co-opting and cooperating with autocracies within a shared world.

The Arab Spring and globalization’s double movement

The 2003 invasion and subsequent regime change in Iraq, the 2005 Cedar Revolution ending Syrian domination of Lebanon, the 2009 Green Movement against the theocratic regime in Iran, and the civilian and armed revolts against autocratic regimes in numerous Arab states collectively referred to as the Arab Spring have challenged exceptionalism’s long-held assumptions. Snowballing protests led to the collapses of autocratic governments in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. They were replaced by democratically elected governments, and Huntington’s requirements for a fourth wave of democracy appeared as being met in the Arab region (Salamey & Pearson, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013).

Yet the uprisings and regime changes of the Arab Spring failed to develop into full-fledged democracies. Monarchies were resilient and exceptionally persistent. Armed struggles and violent clashes in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain proved incumbent regimes were far from willing to concede power without a fight. Domestic struggles in some of the most important Arab Spring states plunged societies into a state of anarchy. In post-revolutionary Egypt, the democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by the military. Islamist extremists flourished throughout many Arab states, calling for new states and societies based on the principles of Sharia law. Ethno-sectarian communitarian mobilization divided groups among major fault lines. Communitarianism appeared as a dominant mode of political discourse, fueling power struggles within the co...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Foreword
• 1 Globalization and communitocracy
• 2 Middle Eastern exceptionalism
• 3 The Arab Spring
• 4 Communitarianism
• 5 Communitocracy
• 6 Conclusion: communitocratic prospects
• Bibliography
• Index