Chapter 1
âFriendship So Curstâ: Amor Impossibilis, the Homoerotic Lament and the Nature of Lesbian Desire
Valerie Traub1
In The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England (2002), Valerie Traub traces discursive shifts in representing relations between women, from an assumption that such relations are innocent and insignificant, to a rhetoric of suspicion which brings together the figures of the chaste female friend and the tribade. She argues that âtransformations in representations of female-female eroticism over the course of the seventeenth century ⊠set the stage for Enlightenment attempts to link erotic desire and practices more tightly to gender and to personal identityâ (277). In the chapter from which this extract is adapted, Traub examines the close links between ideas of Nature and the thematic conventions of amor impossibilis, the supposed impossibility of sexual love between women, as seen in Ovidâs tale of Iphis and Ianthe (Metamorphoses Book IX) and in Margaret Cavendishâs The Convent of Pleasure (1668). The poetry of Katherine Philips (1632â64), Traub argues, presents a transformed view of Nature and its relation to same-sex female bonds, becoming a pivotal moment in the representation of lesbianism. Throughout her book, Traub italicizes âlesbianâ and âlesbianismâ in order to defamiliarize these terms and to mark their âepistemological inadequacy, psychological coarseness, and historical contingencyâ in relation to Early Modern literature, history and culture (16).
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â[W]e may generally conclude the Marriage of a Friend to be the Funeral of a Friendship; for then all former Endearments run naturally into the Gulf of that new and strict Relation, and there, like Rivers in the Sea, they lose themselves for ever.â2 So wrote Katherine Philips, in a letter to her literary friend, Sir Charles Cotterell, rejecting precisely the compromise between friendship and marriage that Cavendishâs Assaulted and Pursued Chastity so miraculously achieved (see Traub 2002, 292â95). Wed at age 16 to a man of 54, Philips not only sets up an opposition between these two forms of relatedness, but does so in terms that emotionally privilege friendship (the flowing River of an Endearment) while admitting ruefully the superior social power of that strict Relation, the marital Gulf or Sea.
Philipsâs radical expression of the opposed claims of friendship and marriage registers, from the vantage of historical hindsight, a huge ripple in the waters of female love and friendship. Lauded posthumously as âthe Matchless Orindaâ (the subtitle of the 1667 edition of her poems as well as the title of Webster Souersâs [1931] biography), Philips authored over 50 poems addressed to a succession of women, many of them passionate lyrics of love. Long relegated to an obscurity unknown in her lifetime, Philips has been reclaimed by feminist literary critics as an icon of seventeenth-century womenâs writing.3 This status is based partly on Philipsâs masterful appropriation and revision of masculine poetic conventions and partly on the communitarian impulse of her aesthetic practice. In the 1650s, she instituted a Society of Friendship in order to foster political, literary, aesthetic, and affective bonds among women (as well as select men). This circle of friendship (some aspects of which may have begun during her boarding school years) continued until her death in 1664. Self-consciously appropriating the imaginative resources of pastoralism, she and her coterie adopted pastoral names, wrote and circulated amongst themselves poetry extolling the virtues of friendship, and, in Philipsâs case, explored a range of intense emotions toward women.
Many scholars have attempted to define the precise nature of Philipsâs attachments to the various women with whom she was intimately involved, both during her adolescence and after her marriage, by analyzing the homoerotic content of her verse.4 Although biographical criticism has predominated, critics also have demonstrated Philipsâs indebtedness to a discourse of classical male amicitia, to the genre of pastoral, and to the conventions of heterosexual love poetry, particularly the metaphysical conceits of John Donne. What is striking about all of this scholarship is that it seems to assume that no prior literary traditions of female homoeroticism existed. But Philips clearly was working within and through the tradition of amor impossibilis and homoerotic lament. Her attraction to pastoral was not simply a measure of her indebtedness to neoclassicism, as many critics contend, nor was it merely the means by which she merged concepts of Platonic love with heteroerotic conventions to ennoble female friendship. Rather, her appropriation of pastoral conventions interrupts and reconfigures the tradition of the amor impossibilis which, from Iphis and Ianthe to The Convent of Pleasure, had confronted the claims of Nature while remaining caught within a marital resolution. Philipsâs Poems, published four years before The Convent of Pleasure, breaks the amor impossibilis apart into a diverse set of themes, including emotional longing, ecstasy, heartbreak, anger, bitterness, and betrayal. Central to her lyric repertoire is a homoerotic lament, which focuses not on the self-evident unnaturalness of female-female desire, but on the physical absence of the beloved and the inadequacies of what she calls the ârough, rude worldâ.
Philipsâs translation of the amor impossibilis from a cry of pain about the body, desire, and Nature into a mournful negotiation of the loverâs absence marks an alteration in aesthetic sensibility, strategy, and subjectivity. Cavendishâs characters, for instance, are cardboard spokespersons for abstract concepts: Amity, Amour, and Sensuality (1656) operate like figures on a chessboard, and even Lady Happy (1668) functions more as an allegorical personification than a character possessing interiority. In contrast, despite her often allegorical language, Philipsâs lyrics of female love cut much closer to the bone. Part of the reason is her choice of genre. Like Shakespeare, Sidney, and Spenser, Philips contributed to the construction of a lyric tradition that, at least since the Romantics, has been read under the auspices of the subject: as the exemplary expression of a subjectâs interiority, as the authentic revelation of inward thought, as the immediate outpouring of intimate desire. Read within these terms, the lyric tends to be viewed as a fictionalized private utterance, as soliloquy or dramatic monologue or, in the words of Virginia Jacksonâs critique of this concept, âprivacy gone publicâ.5 The result is that poetic voice, persona, and author tend to be conflated at the same time that all three are sundered from history (and thus, the âindividual voiceâ is rendered timeless and universal).6
Philipsâs production of a compelling homoerotic subjectivity, however, is not best understood as âself-expressionâ at all, but rather as a âsubjectivity effectâ. I appropriate this phrase from Joel Finemanâs account of Shakespearean literary subjectivity to force a wedge between Philips as author and âPhilipsâ as lyric voice and persona.7 Such a dissociation Philips herself would have resisted, as she was passionately invested in her literary subjectivity (âOrindaâ functions within her pastoral coterie as a proper name, a passionate identification, not a pseudonym or cover). Nonetheless, this disarticulation is crucial if we are to apprehend the extent to which Philips participates in a series of conventions that precede and define the terms within which, and against which, she writes. According to Finemanâs analysis of Renaissance poetry, the literary formation of the self occurs in the slippage between self-presence and representation; it is only through such slippages that the voicings of the lyric subject are interpretable as expressing a deeply interiorized desire. Although this fiction of self-presence is in fact predicated on loss and self-distance, it is no less powerful or constitutive for that. My appropriation of Finemanâs argument is both homage and critique. For, in Finemanâs relentlessly masculine and heterosexualizing account of Shakespeare, eroticism and subjectivity are always that of the male subject, whose desire is achieved only by misogynistically erecting a distance between himself and âwomanâ, the figure who thematizes the deceptiveness of literary language. Finemanâs rigid geometry of gender and sexuality, which apprehends the presence of sexuality only within the articulation of (gender) difference, necessarily elides as sexual Shakespeareâs poems to the young man, which are judged instead as âasceticâ.8 By suggesting that Philips manipulates in her epideictic poetry the terms of similitude that Fineman sees governing Shakespeareâs sonnets to the young man, I insist on the erotic power of what Paula Blank (1995) has called in another context, âhomopoeticsâ.9 Philipsâs love poetry attempts to articulate a homoerotic subject through the fictions and temporalities of lyric expression, deploying the lyric voice to disrupt those relations between ideology, causality, and sequence that, in the drama and prose narrative, propel the plot teleologically toward a marital conclusion. Philips bypasses the tradition of miraculous transformation (or the fortuitous replacement of a woman by her brother), crafting instead a strategy of legitimation that is at once profoundly confrontational and conventional: in addition to the idealizing similitude which she ascribes to her loving relationships, over and over again she insists that her love for other women is âinnocentâ.
Assertions of innocence in Philipsâs poetry generally have been read by critics as an elevation of lesbian love into the spiritually lofty realm of Platonic friendship; proof positive that she did not carnally desire her friends; a phobic disavowal of the fact that she did desire her friends; or a strategic cover for a lesbian not yet ready to come out of the closet. None of these interpretations, I believe, adequately accounts for Philipsâs appropriation of innocence as the proper term for passion among women.
We can gain some purchase on Philipsâs deployment of a rhetoric of innocence by noting the way certain discriminations are negotiated in those masculine discourses of amicitia which Philips so deliberately regenders. The locus classicus for the uneasy if productive proximity of masculine friendship to eroticism in the early modern era is Michel de Montaigneâs âDe IâamitiĂ©â. (Montaigne 1997, 205â19). Eulogizing with a keen sense of loss his intense friendship with Etienne de LaBoĂ«tie, Montaigne idealizes the bonds of sympathy and equality among men. But while drawing on a web of classical allusion, Montaigne nonetheless distinguishes his concept of amitiĂ© from âthat alternative licence of the Greeksâ which âis rightly abhorrent to our manners; [C] moreover since as they practised it it required a great disparity of age and divergence of favours between the lovers, it did not correspond either to that perfect union and congruity which we are seeking hereâ.10 The distance Montaigne would erect between his own pure, equal love and that of the licentious and hierarchical Greeks, however, does little to dispel the erotic force animating those passages articulated through somatic metaphors, as when Montaigne describes how âthe same affection [was] revealed each to each other right down to the very entrailsâ, or through the use of penetrative tropes:
This friendship has had no ideal to follow other than itself; no comparison but with itself. [A] There is no one particular consideration â nor two nor three nor four nor a thousand of them â but rather some inexplicable quintessence of them all mixed up together which, having captured my will, brought it to plunge into his and lose itself [C] and which, having captured his will, brought it to plunge and lose itself in mine with an equal hunger and emulation. [A] I say âlose myselfâ in very truth; we kept nothing back for ourselves: nothing was his or mine. (212â13)
Despite Montaigneâs own effort to delineate between the passion of men for women (which he describes as âactive, sharp and keenâ; ârash ⊠fickle, fluctuating and variableâ) and the love of men for men (a âgeneral universal warmth, temperate moreover and smooth, a warmth which is constant and at rest, all gentleness and evenness, having nothing sharp nor keenâ (209), the salient difference seems to be less the gender of the beloved object than the relative state of ease experienced by the desiring subject. For as soon as âsexual loveâ, which is but âa mad craving for something which escapes usâ,
enters the territory of friendship (where wills work together, that is) it languishes and grows faint. To enjoy it is to lose it; its end is in the body and therefore subject to satiety. Friendship on the contrary is enjoyed in proportion to our desire: since it is a matter of the mind, with our souls being purified by practising it, it can spring forth, be nourished and grow only when enjoyed. (209)
In Montaigneâs ecology of desire, it is less that male-male love is not of the body than that male-female love is not of the mind. Linking friendship to a desire that can never be sated, that is nourished and grows through its enjoyment, Montaigneâs metaphors for male friendship thoroughly eroticize it.
Such eroticized friendship is, as Alan Brayâs The Friend (2003) makes clear, one aspect of a widespread network of affects and obligations among men. Tracing the rituals of sworn brotherhood through a variety of medieval and early modern documents and artifacts, Bray provides an archaeology of masculine friendship that demonstrates its utility to other social institutions, including the family. Indeed, Brayâs research suggests that the early modern family, rather than providing the only basis of social cohesion, subsists within larger structures of relation, including the âvoluntary kinshipâ of intimate male friends.
Both the discourse of amicitia and the practices of voluntary kinship were predominantly masculine prerogatives. Montaigne provides one of the most potent ideological expressions of female insufficiency in this regard:
women are in truth not normally capable of responding to such familiarity and mutual confidence as sustain that holy bond of friendship, nor do their souls seem firm enough to withstand the clasp of a knot so lasting and so tightly drawn. And indeed if it were not for that, if it were possible to fashion such a relationship, willing and free, in which not only the souls had this full enjoyment but in which the bodies too shared in the union â [C] where the whole human being was involved â it is certain [A] that the loving-...