North Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Jong Il

New Perspectives

Seung-Ho Joo, Tae-Hwan Kwak

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754677390
• eBook ISBN: 9781351914321
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) joined the rank of nuclear powers in October 2006 after exploding its first nuclear device. The test was not fully successful yet it unequivocally demonstrated North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-il remains as unpredictable and mysterious as ever. This comprehensive study brings together leading scholars in the field to examine the country's current foreign policy under Kim Jong-il as well as its bilateral relations with the USA, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) joined the ranks of nuclear powers in October 2006 when it exploded its first nuclear device. The test, which was partially successful, unequivocally demonstrated the DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability. The DPRK wants to be recognized as a nuclear power, but the four major powers (the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan) surrounding the Korean peninsula are reluctant to accept the fact, and seek to bring about North Korea’s denuclearization. North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons had far-reaching repercussions for peace and security in Northeast Asia and nuclear proliferation worldwide. The six-party talks, which first began in summer 2003 to resolve North Korea’s second nuclear crisis, have convened intermittently. Despite some setbacks, the talks for North Korea’s denuclearization continue moving forward.

Foreign Policy Objectives, Principles, and Ideology

The DPRK’s key foreign policy objectives include regime survival, national security, and economic development. International cooperation is the key to achieving these objectives, but Washington’s intransigence with Pyongyang has made North Korean leaders frustrated and distrustful. The DPRK seeks the capability to deter U.S. aggression and simultaneously attempts to normalize its relations with the U.S. and Japan. DPRK’s foreign policy is shaped and circumscribed by its political leaders’ idiosyncrasies, domestic needs, Juche (self-reliance) ideology, and external environment.

North Korea’s foreign relations under Kim Jong Il reflect the two crucial concepts, that is, Seongun Jeongchi (“military first” policy) and Gangseong Daeguk (“strong and prosperous great power”). Seongun is intended to ensure national security against external threats, retain the military’s loyalty by elevating it to a privileged position in society, and tighten domestic control through the use of force and indoctrination. North Korea treats Seongun as the “new higher stage” of the Juche idea, and presents Kim Jong Il as its founder. Seongun is now elevated to the position of North Korea’s official ruling ideology, and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea and Seongun have become inseparable. By the same token, the goal of achieving Gangseong Daeguk has become permanent fixture of Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. The North Korean leadership appears to believe that Pyongyang has successfully created a strong state through the Juche indoctrination, Seongun jeongchi, and the successful development of nuclear weapons.

After attaining the goal of a strong state, North Korea needs to double its efforts for the second goal of establishing a prosperous state. To create a prosperous country is a more elusive goal, however. Now, economic interests take precedence over ideological interests. Economic reforms along the road to marketization and concomitant liberalization and opening-up are full of pitfalls and may easily overthrow the Kim Jong Il regime. He is fully aware of this danger, but he also knows that without economic reforms and tangible improvements in North Korea’s economic conditions, his rule cannot last for long. Thus, Kim set 2012 as the target year for achieving the goal of an economic Gangseong daeguk.

Nuclear Diplomacy

The DPRK is small, poor, and isolated. The stakes on the Stalinist regime’s future are still high due to its nuclear capability and geostrategic importance. Ever since Kim Jong Il ascended to the throne upon his father’s death in 1994, he has pursued a two-pronged policy toward the outside world. On the one hand, Kim continued efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability for deterrence and prestige and as a bargaining tool. On the other hand, he has sought to normalize relations with the U.S. and Japan, while reaping economic benefits by cooperating with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) in economic, cultural, sports, and humanitarian realms. The second crisis over North Korea’s nuclear issue that began in late 2002 has consumed most of Kim Jong Il’s diplomatic energy and has been at the center of U.S.-DPRK diplomatic maneuvering. Given its importance in North Korea’s foreign relations, some detailed discussion of the six-nation negotiations over DPRK’s nuclear problem is worthwhile.

The six-party nuclear talks convened in 2003 in an effort to resolve North Korea’s nuclear crisis in a peaceful manner. Since then, the talks have produced three significant international agreements—the September 19, 2005, the February 13, 2007, and the October 3, 2007 agreements—for denuclearizing North Korea. Although the September 19 agreement included only general terms of principles for designing a detailed roadmap for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, it marked the first specific agreement among the six parties involving the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas. The February 13 and October 3 agreements, however, contained specific steps toward implementing the September 19 agreement in a phased manner in line with the principle of “action for action.”

The September 19 agreement served as the basis for North Korea’s denuclearization in exchange for economic and political incentives. The joint statement said, “The DPRK committed abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.” It did not, however, mention a verification mechanism. The Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue was a key obstacle to the progress of the six-party talks for implementing the September 19 agreement.¹ North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in July 2006 and nuclear test on October 9, 2006 further complicated the situation. The DPRK finally decided to return to the six-party talks after a 13-month hiatus, partly because the U.S. agreed to discuss the BDA issue at bilateral talks.

The six nations reached a dramatic breakthrough agreement on February 13, 2007, which paved the road to implementing the September 19 joint agreement. The 2.13 action plan has two phases. In the initial phase, the DPRK must shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days. IAEA inspectors should be allowed to monitor and verify the process. In return, Pyongyang will receive energy, food, and other aid worth 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. At the disablement phase, the DPRK must provide a complete list of its nuclear programs and disable all existing nuclear facilities. In return, the DPRK would receive aid worth 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or the equivalent in the form of economic or humanitarian aid, from the U.S., China, Russia, and South Korea.

Subsequently, Washington and Pyongyang agreed to begin talks to normalize bilateral relations and Washington agreed to initiate the process of removing North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list and ending its trade sanctions against the DPRK. But no deadline was set. At the same time, Tokyo and Pyongyang agreed to resume talks to normalize bilateral relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration. The six parties also agreed that after 60 days, foreign ministers of the six nations would discuss security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties would hold a separate forum for a permanent Korean peace regime. Finally, five working groups would be established to implement the joint statement in the following issue areas: (1) denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (chaired by China), (2) normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations, (3) normalization of Japan-DPRK relations, (4) economic and energy cooperation (chaired by the ROK), and (5) Northeast Asia peace and security cooperation (chaired by Russia).

After four years of intermittent negotiations, the DPRK finally shut down its main nuclear reactor on July 15, 2007, shortly after receiving an initial shipment of fuel oil. The IAEA inspectors confirmed all five nuclear facilities were closed. The shutdown marked the first concrete step toward denuclearization. The October 3, 2007 agreement set the deadline for completing the disablement of nuclear facilities at the second phase. The agreement did not resolve the contentious issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but it included important provisions. First, the DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities, including the five megawatt experimental reactor, the reprocessing plant, and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication facility at Yongbyon by December 31, 2007. Second, the DPRK agreed to provide “a complete and correct” declaration of all its nuclear programs by December 31. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to “transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.” Third, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitments to “begin the process of removing” the DPRK from the U.S. terrorism list and end the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act against North Korea “in parallel with the DPRK’s actions.” Fourth, the six nations reaffirmed that economic, energy, and humanitarian aid up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil would be provided to the DPRK. If implemented sincerely, the agreement would effectively end the DPRK’s production of plutonium. This agreement was made possible because the U.S. significantly moderated its hard-line stance after North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006.

The DPRK, however, failed to declare all its nuclear programs by the end of 2007 as stipulated by the October 3 agreement. The six-party nuclear talks were stalled for months because of a disagreement over North Korea’s data declaration. The U.S. maintained that the DPRK missed the December 31 deadline to provide a complete inventory of its nuclear activities and facilities. Pyongyang provided a list to the U. S. in November 2007, but the U.S. announced it incomplete and insisted North Korea include in the declaration its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program and nuclear proliferating activities. In response, the DPRK stated that the U.S. allegations about its HEU program and its provision of nuclear technology to Syria were groundless. On April 8, 2008, the U.S. and the DPRK found a formula to break the deadlock by agreeing to a face-saving compromise under which the DPRK would “acknowledge” the U.S. assertions in a confidential document separate from its nuclear programs declaration. This formula proved face-saving to both sides, particularly to North Korea, because it did not have to directly admit that it had done something wrong.

The DPRK finally submitted on June 26, 2008 a long-overdue 60-page document to China, chair of the six-party talks. The North Korean declaration was part of a hard-won deal between Washington and Pyongyang after several months of painful negotiations. The declaration included: (1) North Korea’s disclosure of its plutonium stockpile, which Pyongyang estimated at 66 pounds (30 kilograms), as well as records that would allow the United States to verify this figure; and (2) U.S. concerns about North Korea’s suspected uranium enrichment program (UEP) as well as its suspected nuclear proliferation activities. North Korea acknowledged the U.S. concerns in a confidential document. North Korean acknowledgment of U.S. concerns, however, hardly translated into North Korea’s “complete and correct” declaration of its past activities under the February 13 deal. North Korea gave the U.S. over 18,000 pages of records from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor dating back to 1990 to complement the declaration of its nuclear programs. The U.S. still demanded access to those records and to the site where North Korea conducted its 2006 nuclear test, as well as samples from toxic waste and the destruction of the “cooling tower” at the North’s main nuclear complex. In return for complying with these demands, the U.S. promised to remove North Korea from its terrorism list and lift its trading restrictions on North Korea.

After a nine-month hiatus, the six-party talks were held in Beijing in July 2008 to negotiate the completion of the disablement phase of the February 13 agreement. On July 12, the DPRK agreed on a timetable for completing the ongoing disabling by the end of October 2008, and also agreed to general principles for a verification mechanism. In accordance with the July agreement, the DPRK would complete disabling its nuclear facilities and the five nations would complete shipments of promised energy aid by the end of October. The six nations agreed to establish two sets of mechanisms—one on verifying plutonium-based programs and the other on monitoring the uranium enrichment program and proliferation of its nuclear activities. But the six nations failed to produce a concrete plan for verification.

The DPRK received from the U.S. a four-page draft verification protocol on July 11, 2008, calling for interviews, on-site visits, and materials sampling. The DPRK could not accept some of the proposed terms. The DPRK thus threatened on August 26, 2008 to restart its nuclear weapons program, arguing that the U.S. did not keep its promise to remove North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list, and announced that it “suspended disabling” its nuclear facilities on August 14, 2008. This move had a profound impact on the denuclearization process. The announcement appeared to be Pyongyang’s rejection of the U.S. proposal made during the bilateral talks in August 2008 in New York on establishing a “complete and accurate” verification mechanism.

Since the June 27 demolition of the “cooling tower” in Yongbyon, the U.S. has maintained that it will not remove North Korea from the terrorism sponsor list until North Korea puts forward a verification protocol. The U.S. wanted full access by IAEA inspectors to all locations it suspected of being nuclear sites to ensure that there were no hidden nuclear assets. In response, the DPRK has stated that extra inspections would be a violation of its sovereignty. When the August 11 deadline for dropping North Korea from the terrorism-sponsor list passed, the DPRK on August 14 informed the five parties to the six-party talks of its decision to suspend its disabling efforts. The U.S. reaffirmed its decision to keep North Korea on the terrorism list until North Korea agreed on terms of a verification mechanism. After announcing the restoration the nuclear complex at Yongbyon, the DPRK expelled IAEA monitors from the plutonium-producing nuclear plant and threatened to start reactivating the reprocessing plant. Pyongyang’s action obviously undermined the six-party process and violated the February 13, 2007 agreement. This move resulted from the Washington’s demand for an intrusive verification system as a precondition for delisting North Korea. Pyongyang argued that the U.S. precondition for delisting was unacceptable.

Once again, the DPRK’s brinkmanship effectively persuaded the United States to soften its harsh demand for a strict verification regime. Chief U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill proposed a face-saving compromise to the DPRK in Pyongyang on October 1–3, 2008, in a last-ditch effort to revive the crumbling disarmament-for-aid deal. Hill’s goal was to offer a compromise plan for a verification system so as to dissuade North Korea from restarting its reprocessing plant. The U.S. became flexible in the contents and format of verification. The key points of the new agreement were as follows. First, both agreed to a two-step verification package that separated a verification plan of the DPRK’s June 26 nuclear declaration from that of its undeclared nuclear-related activities and facilities, such as the status of its uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons programs and nuclear proliferation activities. Second, the DPRK would submit an approved verification protocol to China, chair of the six-party talks, and would agree to cooperate with the comprehensive verification of its nuclear weapons programs and other undeclared nuclear facilities and programs by IAEA inspectors. Meanwhile, the DPRK increased pressures on the Bush administration on October 9 by barring IAEA inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor complex.

The U.S. officially announced on October 11, 2008 its new verification agreement with the DPRK. The most significant part of the accord was North Korea’s agreement to a verification plan that would allow inspectors access to its declared nuclear site at Yongbyon. The deal, however, put off decisions on the thorniest verification issues regarding undeclared nuclear sites and the uranium enrichment program. Under the new agreement, international inspectors would be allowed to access suspected undeclared sites “based on mutual consent.” Verification would thus require long, painful negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK.

In this deal, the DPRK made a concession by dropping its objections to international inspectors’ access to undeclared nuclear facilities and their right to take samples. North Korea also conceded to Japanese and South Korean participation in inspections. Ambiguities still remain in the new agreement. Access to undeclared sites would be possible only with “mutual consent,” and North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities and its proliferation connections with Syria would be covered in the agreement. Needless to say, this was not the best deal, but the U.S. made concessions in the last-ditch effort to revive the six-party process. The DPRK agreed in principle to give up all its nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, but the next U.S. administration would have to negotiate these issues. The new agreement was reached after weeks of intense negotiations in Pyongyang. In Washington, the State Department’s proponents of the deal, including Secretary Rice and Assistant Secretary Hill, faced stiff criticism from conservatives inside and outside the administration. Despite objections from critics in the office of Vice President Dick Cheney and some members of the State Department’s verification and compliance office, Secretary Rice convinced President Bush that this was the best deal the administration could get.

The U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list was made after the DPRK agreed on international inspectors’ access to all declared nuclear facilities and undeclared sites (based on “mutual consent”). The U.S. decided to delist the DPRK from its terrorism list on October 11, 2008, in an effort to salvage the crumbling nuclear dismantlement-for-aid deal that seemed on the verge of collapse. The DPRK, which was first placed on the blacklist after the bombing of a South Korean jetliner in 1987, was finally removed from the list after 21 years. Secretary of State Rice signed the document officially deleting North Korea from the terrorism list, and the DPRK agreed not to reactivate its partially disabled reprocessing plant. Bush’s decision reflected a more pragmatic effort to get the six-party process to move forward despite conservatives’ criticism at home and abroad, hoping to complete the disablement stage during his term of presidency. The growing concern about the possibility of North Korea’s second nuclear weapon test reportedly played an important role in his decision.

The four other members (China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea) of the six-party talks must endorse the verification agreement reached between the U.S. and the DPRK at the next six-party talks. The DPRK Foreign Ministry said in a statement on October 12, 2008 that it would resume the disablement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and “allow the inspectors of the United States and the IAEA to perform their duties on the principle of ‘action for action,’” in response to the U.S. decis...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Juche’s Role in North Korea’s Foreign Policy
• 3 Assessing North Korea’s Strategic Intentions and Motivations
• 4 North Korea’s Negotiating Position during Fifteen Years of Chronic Crisis: Continuities and Discontinuities
• 5 Kim Jong Il and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
• 6 DPRK WMD Programs
• 7 North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime-building Initiative
• 8 North Korean Policy toward the United States: Pyongyang Copes with an Evolving U.S. Context
• 9 North Korea’s China Policy
• 10 North Korean Policy toward Russia
• 11 The DPRK’s Diplomatic Normalization with Japan
• 12 North Korea’s Policy toward the South after the June 15 Joint Declaration: A Strategy of National Cooperation
• 13 Summary and Conclusion
• Index