Ethics and Morality in Consumption

Interdisciplinary Perspectives

Deirdre Shaw, Michal Carrington, Andreas Chatzidakis, Deirdre Shaw, Michal Carrington, Andreas Chatzidakis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138790230
• eBook ISBN: 9781317653936
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Ethical consumerism is on the rise. No longer bound to the counter-cultural fringes, ethical concerns and practices are reaching into the mainstream of society and being adopted by everyday consumers – from considering carbon miles to purchasing free-range eggs to making renewable energy choices. The wide reach and magnitude of ethical issues in society across individual and collective consumption has given rise to a series of important questions that are inspiring scholars from a range of disciplinary areas. These differing disciplinary lenses, however, tend to be contained in separate streams of research literature that are developing in parallel and in relative isolation.

Ethics in Morality and Consumption takes an interdisciplinary perspective to provide multiple vantage points in creating a more holistic and integrated view of ethics in consumption. In this sense, interdisciplinary presupposes the consideration of multiple and distinct disciplines, which in this book are considered in delineated chapters. In addition, the Editors make an editorial contribution in the final chapter of the book by combining these separate disciplinary perspectives to develop a nascent interdisciplinary perspective that integrates these perspectives and presents platforms for further research.

Section 1
Consumption Ethics and the Individual

1
Towards a Sustainable Flourishing

Ethical Consumption and the Politics of Prosperity

Kate Soper

Introduction

To date, much engagement with ethical consumption, understood as consumer preference for products involving minimal social and environmental exploitation, has centred primarily on the motives and actions of ‘ethical consumers’ and on the niche marketing that has evolved in response to their purchasing preferences (Miller, 1995; Micheletti, 2003; Micheletti, Follesdal and Stolle, 2004; Barnett, Cloke, Clarke and Malpass, 2005; Harrison, Newholm and Shaw, 2005). ¹ The main object of consideration in social theory has, thus, been the emergence and development of diverse ethical practices of consumption within the existing structures of the growth market economy (see also Chapter 8 in this volume for a discussion of the limits of ethical consumption within the growth-oriented economic system). In philosophy, too, the main focus has been on the moral rationale and implications of those practices within that global order: with what it is that makes some purchases more ethical than others and whether this is to be accounted for by reference to the moral intentions of those doing the shopping or with a regard to the actual consequences of their actions. There is a certain realism in this understanding of the project of ‘ethical consumption’ given the entrenchment of the global market today and the well-established and pervasive influence of those arguing that economic growth and the advancement of consumer culture are the main means to a ‘high’ standard of living and the only reliable vehicle of freedom and democracy (Friedman, 1962; Feher, Heller and Markus, 1983; Campbell, 1987, 1995, 2002; Heller, 1987; Fukuyama, 1992; Hayek, 2014[1944]). Government and corporate elites, for their part, tend to put their faith in economists who argue that eco-modernising technologies will allow economic expansion indefinitely to continue and that we can have unending (if somewhat ‘greener’) growth with little alteration in lifestyle (Hayer, 1995; Mol, 2001; Huber, 2004; Stern, 2007, 2009).

That said, the capacity of new technology to provide for indefinitely sustainable growth is confounded by figures that show that more efficient technologies have hitherto always gone together with an overall expansion in resource use and material productivity (Jackson, 2004, 2009; Victor, 2008; New Economics Foundation, 2010; Kallis, 2011; Koch, 2012). The evidence suggests, then, that the longer the consumerist conception of the ‘good life’ retains its hold, the greater the impact on global warming, the more intense the competition for viable territory and resources and the more uncivil the methods to which richer societies are likely to have recourse in defending their relative advantage. These could include measures that most of us today would regard as deeply repugnant, indeed they could spell an end to rights-based humanitarian morality as we know it: the manipulation of poverty, disease and famine to control global population; the coercion of the poorest economies into servicing of First-World needs for bio-fuels and other energy substitutes; ever-more restrictive policies on immigration in privileged regions, such as the EU, to check the flow of eco-refugees from the more devastated areas of the globe. Such measures are likely to encourage increasingly desperate forms of terrorist activity and could well end in genocidal and even terminal forms of global warfare. If viewed in this light, positions held currently in the name of ‘realism’ may well come to appear in the future as quite limited in their reach.

Moreover, it is clear that the growing contradictions between economic and ecological imperatives are already beginning to generate distinctive forms of concern and discontent. There is the anger many now feel about living in a world that has so plainly favoured the greed and evermore conspicuous—and environmentally vandalising—consumption of the already very wealthy, and the allowance of the gap between rich and poor to grow to inflammatory proportions both within the nation state and globally. There is also extensive fear of the potentially explosive consequences of a system that is so deeply troubled, both socially and environmentally. In Europe, much of this anger and fear is currently being channelled into forms of political expression (opposition to immigration, anti-austerity programmes, fanatical nationalism) that do not challenge mainstream thinking on consumption and the ‘good life.’ But the recent surge in support for the Green parties suggests that there is also some interest in a more radical shift of ethical focus; and there is evidence, too, of a pervasive disquiet over the negative consequences for people themselves of the consumerist lifestyle, even if this to date has not been translated into any very definite political expression (Lane, 2001; Kasser, 2002; Fevre, 2003; Soper, 2007a; Thomas, 2008, 2009; Schor, 2013).

There are, then, some good reasons to seek to associate the ethics of consumption with a larger vision and critique than that of green and fair-trade purchases within the confines of existing economic relations: to conceive of it more holistically in terms of resistance to affluent consumer culture itself and its understanding of prosperity and the ‘good life.’ ² In this expanded conception, ethical consumption would be critical of the ‘work-and-spend’ spiral promoted by the growth economy and seek to advance alternative ideas on time expenditure and the ‘work-life’ balance. It would be concerned not only to encourage fair trade but also to reduce consumption altogether, especially that of polluting and wasteful goods and services. And it would advocate much greater equality and global justice as conditions not only of sustainability but also of personal pleasure and well-being. Ethical consumers as understood more conventionally are clearly also concerned to avoid human and animal exploitation in their buying and investment and thus share in some of these broader commitments, but they are not, to date, on the whole, associated with the more radical forms of objection to the shopping mall culture nor with the larger optic on post-consumerist values and priorities that these open up.

I recognise, however, that in seeking to enlarge the scope or remit of ethical consumption along these lines, I am also inviting it to confront some pretty intractable conceptual problems. The critique of the capitalist growth model with its Euro-American ideas of prosperity and development clearly implies a less market-blinkered understanding of human needs and the conditions of flourishing. But it must also raise questions about the ‘true’ nature of happiness and the ‘good life’ and who is best placed to pronounce on this. The exposure of the injustice and environmental destruction resulting from globalised capitalist growth also implies a commitment to a fair and indefinitely sustainable economic and social order—and this in turn would seem to depend upon the emergence of some kind of cross-cultural consensus on human needs and well-being. It raises, in other words, the question of the criteria and norms of a universally satisfying and enduringly sustainable consumption. So although it may be important (and is arguably essential to a sustainable global order) that we do not let ideas of human happiness and well-being be defined solely in terms of market provision and sale, we also need to be sensitive to the difficulties of arriving at any agreement on the qualities of the ‘good life’ (as also to the objections of liberal critics to attempts to impose any particular set of views on this) (see also Chapter 8 in this volume for an introduction to Bauman’s perspective on market provision).

Hedonism and the ‘Good Life’: Conceptual Issues

Aristotelian Versus Utilitarian Views on Well-Being

These questions differ somewhat from those more usually addressed in philosophical debates on ethical consumption. I am not, for example, here concerned very much with the relative merits of deontological versus consequentialist approaches to the explanation or justification of ethical consumption. In other words, I am not trying to decide between an approach that locates the morality of ethical consumption in our sense of duty to others (particularly to less fortunate others) as opposed to one that judges the morality of consumer behaviour by reference not to its motivating altruism but by its actual outcomes in correcting for various forms of exploitation-human or environmental. This is in part because I am less concerned here with the moral justification of ethical consumption (which I am in a sense already presuming) than with opening it up to an alternative politics of prosperity. It is also in part because neither the deontological nor the consequentialist traditions are very directly addressed in the reconceptualization of happiness or well-being in an era of environmental constraints. Deontologists are, in any case, more focussed on duties than pleasures, and although Consequentialists are concerned with the calculation of pleasures and happiness as outcomes, these ideas tend to be invoked in the course of the argument rather than made the object of its analysis. Consequentialism, however, is associated with Utilitarian arguments and these in turn with a reliance on subjective reports of happiness or well-being; and this is certainly of relevance, as we shall see, to my more particular concerns here.

First, a few reflections on what is perhaps the most general and abstract of these, the question, namely, of the constituents of ‘happiness’ and the ‘good life,’ and the difficulty of pronouncing their quality or the extent to which their associated states of pleasure, well-being or satisfaction have been achieved. For what, we might ask, should count primarily in the estimation of the ‘good life?’ Is it the intensity of its isolated moments of pleasure or its overall level of contentment; is it the avoidance of pain and difficulty or their successful overcoming? And who, finally is best placed to decide on whether personal well-being has been increased? Is this entirely a matter of subjective report, or is it open to objective appraisal and decision?

Such questions have long been at the centre of debates between Utilitarianism and Aristotelianism. Where the former has looked to a ‘hedonic calculus’ of subjectively experienced pleasure or avoidance of pain in assessing life satisfaction, the more objectively oriented Aristotelian focus has been on capacities, functions and achievements (with what one has been enabled to do with one’s life rather than with its more immediate feelings of gratification). Hence its attention to the overall fulfilment and happiness (eudaimonia) of a life taken as a whole (Aristotle, 1975; Nussbaum, 1992; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; O’Neill 2006, 2008; de Geus, 2009). In defence of this stance, Aristotelians will argue that if we disallow any objective knowledge of another person’s well-being or of what makes for a life well spent, we shall also be deprived of grounds to criticize personally self-destructive or selfish and environmentally irresponsible forms of pleasure seeking. It has also been claimed, relatedly, that a ‘happiness’ conceived or measured in terms of subjective feeling discourages the development of the republican sentiment and intergenerational solidarity essential to social and environmental well-being (O’Neill, 2008: 182–190).

On the other hand, the ‘hedonic calculus’ for its part need not rule out the more civically oriented forms of felt pleasure, nor the more immediately experienced gratifications of consuming in socially and environmentally responsible ways. The pleasure of many activities, after all, riding a bike, for example, include both personal sensual enjoyments and those which come from not contributing to social harms—in this case, the danger and damage of car driving. Moreover, it is difficult in the last analysis to legitimate claims about well-being without some element of subjective endorsement on the part of those about whom they are being made.

There is, then, a tension in discussions of hedonism and the ‘good life’ between the Utilitarian privileging of experienced pleasure and the less subjective bias of the eudaimonic tradition. The focus on the having of good feelings risks overlooking the more long-term or objective constituents of the ‘good life’ and the ‘good society’; the Aristotelian emphasis does justice to those constituents but runs the risk of patronage and condoning the superior knowingness of experts over individuals themselves.

Liberal Versus Marxist Argument on Needs and Consumption

Whereas the Utilitarian subjective approach has proved more influential on liberal theories of need and pleasure, the Aristotelian bias is more evident in left wing, and particularly Marxist, accounts. There are points to recommend in both liberal and Marxist positions, but both also invite discourses on needs, and the legitimacy of ascribing them, that are problematic in their implications and can licence undemocratic attitudes on the part of policy makers to those they represent. Where the liberal pro-market position regards needs as subjectively experienced and therefore most typically and reliably revealed in the exercise of purchasing power, left-wing theory points to the vast range of needs that remain unmet precisely for lack of effective demand and in general affirms that needs can exist even where they are neither consciously felt nor acted upon. Liberal approaches, it argues, fail to accommodate the possibility of inexperienced or latent needs: needs that can be ascribed to individuals whether or not there is purchasing power to act on them and sometimes even in the absence of any expression or articulation of them (the abused child’s need for love, for example, the anorexic’s need for food, the depressive’s need for joyful experience).

Yet there are also limitations with the left appr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Foreword
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of Contributors
• Introduction
• SECTION 1 Consumption Ethics and the Individual
• SECTION 2 Consumption Ethics and Society
• Conclusion
• Index