Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change

Alan Bloomfield, Shirley V. Scott, Alan Bloomfield, Shirley V. Scott

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317479567
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

Over recent decades International Relations scholars have investigated norm dynamics processes at some length, with the 'norm entrepreneur' concept having become a common reference point in the literature. The focus on norm entrepreneurs has, however, resulted in a bias towards investigating the agents and processes of successful normative change.

This book challenges this inherent bias by explicitly focusing on those who resist normative change - norm 'antipreneurs'. The utility of the norm antipreneur concept is explored through a series of case studies encompassing a range of issue areas and contributed by a mix of well-known and emergent scholars of norm dynamics. In examining the complexity of norm resistance, particular attention is paid to the nature and intent of the actors involved in norm-contestation, the sites and processes of resistance, the strategies and tactics antipreneurs deploy to defend the values and interests they perceive to be threatened by the entrepreneurs, and whether it is the entrepreneurs or the antipreneurs who enjoy greater inherent advantages.

This text will therefore be of interest to scholars and students of International Relations, International Law, Political Science, Sociology and History.

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Norm antipreneurs in world politics

Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott

A norm is said to define ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 891), meaning that norms provide a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1998, 951–952), and define ‘legitimate social purpose[s]’ thereby constraining and/or enabling actors’ behaviour (Skinner, 1988, 177). Norms influence the choices made by international actors across the whole gamut of issues, from trade and finance to dispute resolution, health and security. This book examines how norms diffuse through the international system; or, more precisely, it examines resistance to norm diffusion efforts.

Theorising about how new norms emerge and diffuse, changing the behaviour of international actors as they do so, was the primary purpose of the seminal 1998 study of norm dynamics by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 887). According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896–899; Nadelmann 1990, 479–526), norm dynamic processes are driven by ‘norm entrepreneurs’, that is, by actors who ‘set out to alter the prevailing normative order according to certain ideas or norms that they deem more suitable’ (Wunderlich, 2013, 37). Yet the editors initiated the current project after deciding that an excessive focus on norm entrepreneurs had resulted in the norm dynamics literature over-privileging the phenomenon of norm-change as opposed to stability. This book therefore focuses on the actors who resist, as opposed to promote, normative change in world politics.

To be fair, some of the most seminal norm dynamics studies did not ignore entirely the phenomenon of resistance to normative change (Risse and Sikkink, 1999, 22–24; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 8; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 914). Nevertheless, because the emphasis on norm promotion has meant that resistance has until now been considered mainly in the context of its own failure, the phenomenon of resistance remains far less fully theorised than that of successful norm promotion. This book therefore begins the process of rebalancing the norm dynamics literature by exploring the question as to whether the actors who resist normative change, those whom we suggest might usefully be referred to as ‘norm antipreneurs’, should be recognised as a distinct category of actor, on the basis that their role in norm dynamics is distinct from that fulfilled by norm entrepreneurs.

This chapter begins by briefly explaining the origins of the project in debates at an International Studies Association (ISA) workshop in 2014 to provide some background on the collaborative process through which this volume emerged. The chapter then proceeds to examine some of the problems that have emerged in the theoretical literature on norm contestation. It is submitted that these problems in the research agenda arose in part because until now resistance to norm-change has not been adequately and systematically theorised. The section also examines research by those scholars who have already considered to some extent and in different ways the act of normative resistance. The contributors to this volume are therefore building on, refining and sometimes making explicit what has until now remained largely implicit in these foundational studies. Through this discussion the editors explain the central debate or animating question to which the authors were asked to respond, and the chapter concludes with a brief overview of the case-study chapters to follow.

Background to the project

The antipreneur term was chosen as the theme of a workshop facilitated by the editors at the ISA’s annual convention held in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. Each participant examined resistance to efforts to change the normative framework in a distinct international issue-area, meaning that the workshop as a whole considered a wide range of cases. We are happy to report that many of those workshop participants have remained engaged in the project and contributed chapters to this volume.

Interestingly, the workshop facilitators’ request that participants draw a distinction between norm entrepreneurs and antipreneurs provoked discussions that collectively revealed much about the complexity of norm contestation. For example, it was agreed quite early on that the same actor may well act like a norm entrepreneur and antipreneur concurrently or consecutively. In other words, it may ‘play the antipreneur role’ in one issue-area while simultaneously promoting normative change in another. This suggested that it would be inadvisable to simply identify certain international actors as ‘always’ or perhaps even ‘typically’ antipreneurs or entrepreneurs; instead, it was agreed that determinations of this sort can be made only after the context of a particular international issue-area in which norm contestation is occurring has been considered and understood. Similarly, most participants agreed that an actor might promote normative change in an issue-area in one temporal context but – especially if norm-change had resulted – that same actor may later resist other actors’ efforts to alter the newly established normative status quo. Yet substantial unity on matters like this often also contained the seeds of disagreement on finer points; for example, some participants saw the notion that actors might ‘switch’ from the entrepreneur into the antipreneur role over time as potentially problematic conceptually, while others believed that it might actually confer analytical advantages.

Other potential advantages – and complications – inherent in recognising an antipreneur role or category of actor were also explored and discussed at the workshop. Some participants observed that upon closer examination what originally seemed to be a single norm might actually be better characterised as a bundle of closely related but still distinct norms, meaning that a single actor might agree with some but by no means all of these components of the ‘overall’ norm; in other words, the same actor might agree with efforts to promote some but oppose efforts to promote other components of a norm-bundle; alternatively, it might support or oppose some more vehemently than others. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm was discussed at length in this regard because its so-called Pillar III – by which states are said to have a responsibility to consider deploying military force to prevent atrocities within another state – has typically excited much more controversy and resistance than has Pillar I (i.e. states have a responsibility to protect their citizens) and Pillar II (i.e. Pillar I-compliant states should assist states which struggle to fulfil their Pillar I responsibilities). Discussions of this nature led some participants to suggest that it might be necessary to recognise even more categories of norm behaviour, while others felt that doing so might overly complicate analysis.

Building on this last point, some participants observed that at times an actor resisted ‘creatively’ by refining status quo norms and proposing them in opposition to the entrepreneur’s new norm. But the intent of these so-called ‘creative resisters’ then became an object of contention; were they genuinely persuaded by norm entrepreneurs that ‘some (but not much) normative change was necessary’? Or were they simply making a ‘tactical retreat in this battle’ to ‘win the wider war’, and so therefore still essentially defending the status quo? Maybe they were doing both: but was one intention dominant, and if so, how could scholars go about determining which one? These discussions led to consideration of other scholars’ findings (Krook and True, 2012; Hoffman, 2010; Wiener, 2004; Sandholtz, 2008), that at times of normative flux some actors may say they agree on the need for normative change, but they disagree, for example, with the exact scope or content of the norm which has actually been presented by entrepreneurs. But it was pointed out that the ultimate intentions of these resisters might be difficult to discern: were they resisting to ‘force their way to the table’ in another round of negotiations, suggesting they accept the need for ‘some sort’ of normative change? Perhaps they were instead disingenuously deploying delaying tactics to sow confusion and sap the momentum for change that entrepreneurs must generate and sustain. All that could be agreed upon at the workshop was that more work was necessary to refine the conceptual tools to guide empirical analyses aimed at answering these questions.

This book therefore engages with and builds upon these and other discussions that took place on that wintery day in Toronto in March 2014. It grapples with the complexity of norm-resistance versus norm-promotion in 12 cases in order to draw initial conclusions regarding the sorts of dynamics at play across a range of international issue-areas and temporal contexts. But all good scholarship is undertaken with reference to what has gone before and builds on existing foundations; accordingly, the next section reviews some of the more influential studies and proffered models of global norm dynamics.

The norm dynamics literature

A review of norm dynamics literature must start with Finnemore and Sikkink’s influential ‘norm life cycle’ model from 1998. It described a three-stage process of norm diffusion. First, norm entrepreneurs (typically prominent individuals or civil society groups) ‘call attention to issues or even “create” issues’ that they say require new norms to change the behaviour of other powerful international actors, especially states. They then attempt to persuade a ‘critical mass’ of powerful states to accept the new norm; those that do – the ‘norm leaders’ – then try to diffuse the new norm widely across the international system. Exactly how this occurs was said to be context-dependent but would typically include some mixture of the targets of socialisation ‘caving in’ to extrinsic pressure to conform, or they may be intrinsically motivated to conform in pursuit of legitimacy and/or self-esteem (i.e. they would ‘fall into line’ with the norm leaders’ new normative framework). Then, after the norm had been internalised into many actors’ identities, it would acquire a ‘taken-for-granted quality’ and subsequently shape those actors’ behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 894–905). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 897) conceded that new norms ‘must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest’, but the actors who resisted this norm diffusion process – and how they did so – remained conceptually neglected.

Finnemore and Sikkink’s attempt to ‘model’ the typical process by which a norm became diffused in world politics built on a wave of empirical studies published in the mid-1990s which examined how specific norms emerged, diffused, and became widely internalised by international actors (Klotz, 1995; Finnemore, 1996; Price and Tannenwald, 1996). But a corollary of this focus on the experience of individual norms over time was that many studies essentially ‘froze’ the content of the norm under consideration; although Finnemore and Sikkink’s three-stage model treated the process of diffusion as dynamic the norm itself was typically treated as unchanging throughout this process (Krook and True, 2012; Wiener, 2014, 19–24). Hoffman (2010, 3) has argued that these ‘first wave’ studies treated norms as relatively static independent variables to ‘facilitate analysis and dialogue with competing [established IR] perspectives’. Wiener (2004, 191) calls them ‘compliance’ studies because they involved studying how weaker actors were pressured to comply with the new norm and ‘socialised’, or drawn into a normative community whose boundaries were defined by powerful Western states.

This approach to conceptualising norm dynamics arguably contributed to three related problems emerging in the research agenda. First, it obscured deeper contestation of the dominant global normative framework (which is currently Western-liberal). The targets of socialisation were typically treated as passive ‘norm followers’ (Wiener, 2004, 192), with limited agency in terms of potential for resistance or the ability to actively contribute to debates about the content of norms. Second, a distinct ‘liberal bias’ emerged; scholars tended to only study the spread of liberal norms, especially human rights norms (Klotz, 1995; Risse and Sikkink, 1999), but also other norms held dear by Western liberals, including those pertaining to arms control (Price, 1997, 1998; Tannenwald, 1999) and to the environment (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The overall process was therefore assumed to be teleologically progressive, meaning that Western norm entrepreneurs were implicitly assumed to be ‘enlightened’ while their targets – non-Western norm followers – were ‘unenlightened’ and required ‘guidance’ (Acharya, 2013; Epstein, 2013). Third, a sort of ‘linear-progress assumption’ crept in (Wiener, 2009; Krook and True, 2012, 108; Wunderlich, 2013, 24, 26–27), as most norm dynamics studies examined successful cases of norm diffusion. As a result, to the extent that resistance was acknowledged at all, it was typically studied only in the context of its own failure; these studies were permeated with a sense that any resistance encountered by the new norm would likely fail.

Consider, for example, the so-called ‘spiral model’ of norm dynamics proposed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink in 1999. According to the model proposed in their edited volume’s introduction, new norms – or at least new human rights norms – typically diffused in five broad stages. First, human rights abuses in a particular state may lead to the emergence of a transnational network of local and foreign activists which calls attention to the regime’s repression and demands change. In the second stage, the repressive regime typically ‘refuses to accept the validity of international human rights norms themselves’ (Risse and Sikkink, 1999, 23). Then, if international pressure remained strong enough for long enough in a third phase the regime may begin offering ‘minor cosmetic changes’, like releasing prisoners or allowing protests, which may enable the internal activists to build momentum for change. Risse and Sikkink conceded that the regime may respond with further repression, but they also noted that some regimes switched from denying the validity of human rights norms to denying that repression was occurring, causing them ‘to become “entrapped” in their own rhetoric’ (27). Thus, a fourth phase may begin: the human rights norms may achieve ‘prescriptive status’, meaning the regime begins to ‘regularly refer to … [them] to describe … their own behaviour … even if their actual behaviour continues violating the rules’ (29). Finally, this may lead to actual behavioural change in a fifth stage as ‘human rights norms are fully institutionalised domestically and norm compliance becomes habitual’ (33).

Risse and Sikkink also explicitly characterised the ‘community of “liberal states” ’ as a ‘sphere of peace, democracy and human rights’, and conceived of the spread of norms as a process by which ‘target states’ were admitted to this liberal community on the latter’s normative terms only after undergoing ‘identity transformation’ (8–10). Resistance was only really contemplated at the third and ‘most precarious stage’, when oppressive regimes might ‘crack down’ on domestic norm entrepreneurs (the Tiananmen Square incident was cited, for example: 25). All three of the broader problems identified above are therefore apparent in this model. First, the target states have no real agency other than to issue blanket denials and/or ‘squirm’ by tying themselves in rhetorical knots (see also: Hobson and Seabrooke, 2009, 17) in stage three or offering institutional concessions in stage four. There is no real sense that they resist by engaging in truly normative debates; instead, the only truly effective form of resistance they are seen capable of is the cynical application of coercion. Second, liberal bias – the sense of enlightened versus unenlightened actors – obviously permeates the model. And third, despite the concession that the process may be derailed in stage three by repression, there is still a sense of inherent linearity, even teleology insofar as the international system is assumed to be steadily ‘evolving’ towards a more peaceful, moral, liberal future.

Given the recent dominance of Western/liberal states, the spiral model no doubt accurately describes some, perhaps even many, or most, contemporary norm-diffusion processes; the case study chapters certainly all present convincing empirical examples of liberal norms successfully diffusing. But these early models still created a ‘dog which didn’t bark’ problem (Checkel, 1999, 86; Wunderlich, 2013, 26) by overemphasising the agents of change, the norm entrepreneurs (who all happened to be Western). In other words, it is at least arguable that by failing to recognise an oppositional norm antipreneur category or role, the attention of norm dynamics scholars was drawn towards ‘more noticeable’ cases in which norms changed, leading to the neglect of cases in which entrepreneurs proposed new norms but normative change did not occur, or not to the extent aimed for by the entrepreneurs. Thus an overarching or ‘meta-problem’ of the early norm dynamic literature is apparent; it became unbalanced because it was beset with selection biases.

Rodger Payne was one of the first scholars in the norm dynamics research agenda to begin theorising more explicitly about the resistance that norm entrepreneurs might face. He examined how one of their most crucial strategies – ‘framing’ a new norm to connect it to a pre-existing widely accepted norm – was often a ‘highly contested’ process. He noted that labour and human rights activists had tried to promote new norms to improve the plight of vulnerable workers globally, and how they had largely failed, due to determined counter-framing; the resisters – mainly developing world actors – invoked anti-imperialist and free-trade norms to c...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword
• 1 Norm antipreneurs in world politics
• 2 Resisting the responsibility to protect
• 3 Resisting the ban on cluster munitions
• 4 Resistance to the emergent norm to advance progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
• 5 Rival networks and the conflict over assassination/targeted killing
• 6 Resisting the emerging ‘humanitarian access’ norm
• 7 Resisting Japan’s promotion of a norm of sustainable whaling
• 8 Resisting the norm of climate security
• 9 Additional categories of agency: ‘creative resisters’ to normative change in post-crisis global financial governance
• 10 Contesting private sustainability norms in primary commodity production: norm hybridisation in the palm oil sector
• 11 Whose norm is it anyway? Mediating contested norm-histories in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2013)
• 12 To boldly go where no country has gone before: U.S. norm antipreneurism and the weaponization of outer space
• 13 Resisting ‘good governance’ norms in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy
• 14 Norm entrepreneurs and antipreneurs: chalk and cheese, or two faces of the same coin?
• Index