Urban Social Capital

Civil Society and City Life

Gregory W. Streich, Joseph D. Lewandowski

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781409412243
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317003427
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• Subtopic: Geography
• Index: Geography

This volume presents a kaleidoscopic view of the norms and forms of contemporary city life, focusing especially on the processes of social capital (de)formation in the urban milieu. It brings together studies from highly diverse urban settings, such as squatter re-settlement projects in Kathmandu, urban funeral societies in Africa, an HIV/AIDS community in Los Angeles, the poor of Harare, pensioners in Shanghai, Maori gangs in Auckland, and a Roma boxing club in Prague, among others. Contributors draw on contemporary theory and research in social capital, political economy, urban planning and policy, social movements, civil society and democracy to explore how social norms, networks, connections and ties are created, deployed - and often frayed - under conditions of social complexity, inequality, cultural pluralism, and the ethno-racial diversity and division characteristic of urban contexts throughout the world. In this way, the volume engages in a genuinely globalized - and globalizing - discussion of contemporary urban social life and stands as a unique and timely interdisciplinary contribution to the ever-expanding literature devoted to social capital.

Chapter 1

City Seclusion and Social Exclusion: How and Why Economic Disparities Harm Social Capital

Alina R. Oxendine

Social capital encompasses characteristics of community life such as interpersonal trust and vibrant voluntary associations. Scholars contend that it is a prized and precious component of urban public life because it lubricates social relationships and cultivates strong, close-knit community ties which are cohesive enough to combat poverty (Warren et al. 2001), encourage charitable giving (Brooks 2005), keep children in school (Coleman 1988), reduce crime (Putnam 2000), facilitate community-wide technological projects (Oxendine et al. 2003, 2007), and even invigorate people’s physical health (Folland 2007, Kawachi et al. 2005, Kawachi et al. 1997). Moreover, political scientists have harnessed strong evidence that cultural characteristics like social capital are needed to sustain successful democratic government at local and national levels (Knack 2002, Putnam 2000, Inglehart 1998).

Particularly in the 1990s, researchers sought to understand variation in social capital by concentrating on individual characteristics, habits, and activities. For instance, scholars found that viewing television harms social capital and helps to explain recent declines in social trust and civic engagement (Putnam 1995, 1996, 2000, Shah 1998). These factors are important in explaining social capital; however, this approach can be problematic if not accompanied by analyses of larger, structural influences on social capital and the obstacles they may pose to individual-level decision-making. Critics have taken social capital scholars to task for not fully considering the roles of governmental institutions, policy-making, government leaders, socio-economic factors, and other relevant, non-cultural factors (Levi 1996, Skocpol 1996, Jackman and Miller 1996). This debate contributes to a family of literature focused on illuminating the relationship between social capital and wide-ranging societal characteristics, including the character of governmental institutions, ethnic and racial diversity, ideological polarization, and concentrated economic disadvantage (Rupasingha et al. 2006, Rahn and Rudolph 2005, Rahn et al. 2003, Costa and Kahn 2002, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000a, 2000b). While important for communities of all sizes, these societal characteristics are particularly evident in urban and metropolitan areas. Unfortunately, many of these studies contend that societal heterogeneity depresses social capital, in that people have difficulty connecting with and trusting people who are dissimilar (Costa and Kahn 2002, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000a).

One form of societal diversity that has proven particularly consequential to social capital is economic inequality. In comparison to all other advanced democracies, the United States has exceptionally high levels of income inequality and has experienced the largest growth of inequity in recent decades (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, United Nations Reports 2006 and 2008). A recent United Nations Report “State of the World’s Cities 2008/9” (2008) contends that American cities Washington DC, Atlanta and Los Angeles have levels of economic inequality on par with cities in the developing world, such as Abidjan, Nairobi, and Buenos Aires.

In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office has gathered particularly precise data on after-tax income of the wealthy compared to other citizens between 1979 and 2000.¹ During this period, the income of the top 1 percent has risen 200 percent, the income of the middle fifth has risen 15 percent, and the income of the bottom fifth has risen just 9 percent (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2003). Also, according to Johnston in Class Matters, “The average income for the top 0.1 percent of income earners was $3 million in 2002 … That number is two and half times the $1.2 million, adjusted for inflation, that group reported in 1980” (2005: 182).²

In the United States, economic inequality is higher in urban areas compared to rural towns. Moreover, the growth of inequality in recent decades has also been more pronounced in well-populated cities (Wu et al. 2006). These trends are particularly troubling for the health and well-being of cities because of ample evidence that extreme economic inequality triggers wide-ranging difficulties for urban society. Previous research shows that income inequality is associated with a number of socio-political ills, such as weaker overall democracy, poor public health, and high levels of criminal activity (Folland 2007, Daly et al. 2001, Putnam 2000, Kawachi et al. 1997, Muller and Seligson 1994).

There is also mounting interdisciplinary evidence that economic inequality causes a decline in civic attitudes and behaviors, such as social trust and associational involvement. Scholars have found an inverse relationship between income inequality and trust in “most people” by exploring cross-sectional analyses of US states and localities (Rahn et al. 2003, Uslaner and Brown 2005, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000a, Kawachi et al. 1997). Moreover, evidence suggests that economic inequality diminishes citizens’ participation in voluntary associations (Rupasingha, Goetz and Freshwater 2006, Costa and Kahn 2002, Alesina and Ferrara 2000b, Kawachi et al. 1997).

This chapter expands on these empirical studies and seeks to understand how and why economic inequality harms social capital in the United States. The first section is devoted to how. It explores theoretical distinctions between bridging and bonding social capital and explains why these distinctions are important in researching (and understanding) economic inequality. This section also provides an overview of my own empirical research, which analyzes the specific types of social capital harmed most (and least) by economic inequality. Consistent with Uslaner and others, I find that economic inequality weakens bridging social capital (for instance, racial trust and cross-cutting group memberships) more than other types of civic engagement. My findings suggest that, when evaluating the relationship between economic inequality and social capital, it is important to make clear distinctions between bridging and bonding community ties, both in terms of theory and measurement.

The second section of this chapter is devoted to why. It examines specific reasons for economic inequality’s harm to bridging social capital, and it examines “testable” mechanisms underpinning this relationship. In addition to exploring inequality’s influence on cross-class social interaction, this section also contends that stratification harms social capital among both rich and poor citizens. As wealth accumulates at the top, richer groups have added incentives to retreat from city life and withdraw from diverse social interaction. Concurrently, poor and middle class groups face economic frustration, alienation, and dissatisfaction associated with feelings of relative deprivation. These trends combine to weaken the social fabric of urban communities, feelings of connectedness, diverse interaction and, ultimately, bridging social capital.

Finally, the second section discusses my own preliminary empirical findings, which compare different mediators’ abilities to explain the relationship between inequality and bridging social capital. These findings suggest that economic inequality dampens social capital by causing people to lose confidence in government, by contributing to higher rates of crime, by harming job opportunities, and by enhancing economic dissatisfaction and frustration resulting, in part, from relative deprivation.

Importance of Isolating Bridging Social Capital

An important central critique of social capital studies is that they fail to distinguish between inclusive and exclusive social bonds. This is problematic, particularly because trust and group involvement (often used to measure social capital) can potentially reinforce exclusive social ties associated with intolerance (Paxton 2007, 2004, 2002, Putnam 2000, Levi 1996). Particularly because economic stratification triggers societal fragmentation, it is important to differentiate between bridging and bonding social ties when exploring the relationship between social capital and income inequality.

Bridging social capital refers to social connections that cut across narrow groups and interests, connecting people in a community. Bonding social capital refers to social connections that create and perpetuate in-group cohesion, sometimes at the expense of cross cutting social interaction (Putnam 2000). Bridging social capital is akin to “positive social capital” or the term “weak social ties” used in the sociological literature, just as bonding social capital is akin to “negative social capital” or “strong social ties” (Granovetter 1973). In some cases, bonding social ties can be beneficial for individual citizens or groups, by instilling a strong sense of social support and group identity. There are also instances when bonding social ties are clearly preferable to bridging ties. For instance, in Communist East Germany, “weak ties [were] a liability, not an asset” due to the regime’s repressive political control; it simply wasn’t safe to discuss politics with those unfamiliar or with whom trust was questionable” (Voelker and Flap 2001: 397).

Still, outside of repressive political regimes, many scholars feel strongly that bridging ties are beneficial and essential for overall democracy (Granovetter 1970, Putnam 1993a, 2000). Moreover, bonding social capital can be a liability in so far as it prevents the formation of connections between groups in society. “Imagine … a community partitioned into cliques, such that each person is tied to every other in his clique and to none outside. Community organization would be severely limited” (Granovetter 1970: 1373). In addition to being beneficial for community cooperation, Granovetter (1970: 1378) also contends that weak ties are “indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and to their integration into communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation.” The absence of weak ties harms the ease with which new information flows throughout a community (Granovetter 1970, Huckfeldt et al. 1995) and also dampens the diversity of political opinion (Huckfeldt et al. 2002).

It is important to note that bonding and bridging social capital need not always be at odds, mainly because it is possible to have in-group cohesion in addition to connections to other groups in the community. When two community groups work together on projects, cooperation between the groups need not harm members’ connectedness within each group. Connection with those outside of the group could, under some circumstances, actually strengthen in-group cohesion. Moreover, individuals who have strong familial relationships and an inner circle of close friends may also have a wide array of “bridging” social relationships. McKenzie (2008: 1) finds that African American civic groups—while bonding in some ways—also “encourage African Americans to be involved in a variety of mainstream civic and political activities that reach beyond their own group interests.” My research concurs with McKenzie’s finding that the relationship between bridging and bonding social capital need not be zero-sum.

Limitations of Traditional Measures

Traditional measures of social capital make it difficult to distinguish between inclusive and exclusive bonds. Without such distinctions, scholars may underestimate the influence of income inequality on social capital and/or produce inconsistent findings. In many cases, scholars assume that standard “social trust” and “group involvement” items measure bridging social capital, as opposed to bonding social ties. The generalized trust scale—which includes the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”—is akin to bridging social capital in that it asks about “most people.”

Still, scholars have criticized this scale on a number of grounds, particularly for being too general and for failing to specify specific groups of people that respondents should think about when answering the questions (Levi 1996, Glaeser et al. 2000). Glaeser et al. (2000) have conducted a series of experiments using actual monetary incentives designed to test the validity of the social trust items frequently found on surveys. They find that these items seem to measure trustworthiness much more than the propensity to trust. Also, survey items that ask respondents about trust in a specified group (as opposed to people in general) are more likely to predict trusting behavior displayed in their experimental games. When there are theoretical reasons to differentiate between bridging and bonding social trust, it is particularly important to question the validity of measures that are too general. Without asking respondents how they feel about specific groups, it is difficult to tell how far reaching their feelings of trust actually are. Do respondents only trust those in their inner social circle or do they genuinely trust the array of people who live in their communities?

The standard measures of civic group involvement also cloud distinctions between bridging and bonding social capital (Levi 1996, Putnam 2000). Scholars usually create a group membership scale by asking respondents whether they participate in each of several types of formal civic organizations—for instance, fraternal group, service group, or sports club. Like the social trust scale, this measure is probably picking up on bridging social capital, at least to some degree. More often than not, individuals who are involved in many different organizations are probably exposed to a wider array of people and ideas than those who are not.

The measure can be problematic, though, in that it does not assess the character of civic organizations. One person could be involved with five organizations that are diverse in membership, interact with outside organizations, and seek to improve the broader community. Another person could be involved with five organizations that are all comprised of one demographic, conduct activities for members only, and have the goal of self-improvement instead of community-building. While civic group scores would be identical according to the traditional measure, individual experiences would be fundamentally different.

Overview of Research Project

When exploring the relationship between income inequality and social capital, it is important to employ measurements of social capital, which measure the diversity and breadth of respondents’ trust and social circles. My research analyzes original survey items, as well as “bridging” items featured in the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark project. This survey consists of 40 community samples drawn from more than 25 states across the United States. These survey data, combined with contextual information from the Census Bureau, allow me to evaluate the impact of community-level and individual-level influences on social capital. The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey includes extensive measures of social trust, racial trust, diversity of friendships and civic engagement—in-depth measures of social capital that effectively tap the quality and character of social connections.³ In my research, the complete dataset I analyze consists of 68 different counties (or contextual units) and 22,120 respondents (individual units). The counties included are quite diverse and span a number of different states, range in population from 25,303 to 9,519,340, and differ in terms of economic inequality and generalized trust. The Gini coefficient (which measures inequality) ranges from.35 to.53, and the percentage of respondents claiming that “most people can be trusted” ranges from 31 to 71.

In addition to the Benchmark Survey, I analyze the relationship between economic inequality and social capital using an innovative quasi-experimental survey of households in each of two Minnesotan communities. Grand Rapids and Detroit Lakes are similar in terms of demographics and have the same average income levels, but differ in terms of how equally the income is distributed (with Gini Indexes of 40.9 in Grand Rapids compared to 46.2 in Detroit Lakes).⁴ Because the two communities are notably similar except for income inequality, it is possible to isolate this variable and analyze its impact with some accuracy. A 2003 survey⁵ of these communities includes a variety of “traditional” and “bridging” social capital measurements. It measures the extent to which respondents are exposed to people of different social classes and the extent to which they form cross-class friendships.⁶

Bridging Measures Produce Interesting Results

My research explores several measurements, some of which effectively capture bridging social capital and others that capture general socializing. Does economic inequality affect things like general socializing (with friends and family) or diversity of friendships? Does inequality harm trust in different racial groups more than trust in “most people?” Findings illustrate that bridging connections have a stronger relationship to economic inequality, compared to measurements that fail to “tap” cross-cutting social capital.

Table 1.1 depicts different dimensions of bridging social capital that I explore in my research. I analyze various forms of (1) trust; (2) civic group involvement; and (3) social connectedness, in order to fully grasp the influence of economic stratification. Within each of these three categories, some measurements “grasp” or “capture” bridging social capital more effectively than others. In Table 1.1, I list some measurements as “strong” depictions of cross-cutting social capital, other measurements as “moderate” and the rest as “weak.” The following section explains what these measurements are and how they relate to economic inequality.

Table 1.1 Various types and degrees of “bridging” social capital

One important type of bridging social capital is cross-cutting trust, the degree to which citizens trust different kinds of people and groups. As mentioned previously, many scholars measure trust by asking respondents if they trust “most people”—my research explores this variable, usually called generalized trust. It is unclear, though, whether this measure actually “taps” bridging attitudes. For this reason, my research explores other measures, social trust, racial trust, and group affect. All three of these require respondents to assess the extent to which they trust or feel close to specific groups of people. In the case of social trust, respondents evaluate trust in neighbors, trust in co-workers, trust in people at church, trust in shop employees, and trust in local police. In the case of racial trust, respondents evaluate trust in different racial/ethnic groups, excluding their own. S...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables and Boxes
• Notes on Contributors
• Foreword by Eric M. Uslaner
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Social Capital and City Life
• 1 City Seclusion and Social Exclusion: How and Why Economic Disparities Harm Social Capital
• 2 Social Capital, Social Exclusion and Rehabilitation Policy in the Hungarian Urban Context
• 3 Cooperation and Trust in Urban Residential Communities
• 4 Urban Social Poverty
• 5 City Life and Film: Narratives of Urban Social Capital in Gran Torino
• 6 Staunch: Māori Gangs in Urban New Zealand
• 7 The Care Market: Social Capital and Urban African Funeral Societies
• 8 Social Capital Dynamics in the Post-Colonial Harare Urbanscape
• 9 Urban Development and Social Capital: Lessons from Kathmandu
• 10 Disruptive Social Capital in Los Angeles: (Un)Healthy Socio-Spatial Interactions among Filipino Men Living with HIV/AIDS
• 11 Gender Relations, Migration, and Urban Social Capital in Hong Kong
• 12 Discovering Social Capital among Older Adults in the Urban Communities of Shanghai
• References
• Index