AirLandBattle21

Transformational Concepts for Integrating Twenty-First Century Air and Ground Forces

Ellwood P. Hinman IV, Thomas E. Jahn, James G. Jinnette, Ellwood P. Hinman Iv

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9780754676348
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351959803
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique

The changed strategic landscape of the 21st century has driven a shift to more flexible, adaptable capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the validity of team warfare between air and land forces during open hostilities with an enemy. The time has come for innovative counter-air and counter-land concepts focused on medium- to large-scale conventional combat operations that will merge air and ground forces even more effectively into a single potent fighting force. Such is the focus of AirLandBattle21. A basic assumption in this study is that, during major combat operations, a relevant number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will conduct distributed operations in a non-linear, non-contiguous and geographically separated fashion. The study introduces a flexible counter-air framework that allows for the most efficient use of limited air assets and advocates only the necessary levels of air control in different areas across the theatre. The study also offers alternative views of strategic attack and explores the critical role tactical airlift will play in employing and sustaining the brigade combat team.

Chapter 1
Laying the Foundation

New conditions require, for solution—and new weapons require, for maximum application—new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.

—General Douglas MacArthur

The changed strategic landscape of the Twenty-first century has driven the Department of Defense (DoD) to direct transformation in the U.S. military. In essence, this mandate requires a shift from legacy technologies and Cold War organizations to more flexible, adaptable capabilities and constructs effective across the spectrum of conflict. At its core, this transformation represents a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Most define an RMA as the confluence of new technologies, new organizations, and new ideas. Each of the Services has embarked on aggressive plans that feature many transformational technologies accompanied by new organizational constructs. The U.S. Army, for example, has shifted to modular forces based on the brigade combat team (BCT) and new technologies such as the Stryker infantry vehicle and many others incorporated into the Future Combat System (FCS).

For the revolution in military affairs to be complete, though, the same transformation must take place in the area of ideas. These new concepts must bridge the ongoing changes within the separate branches and integrate the developing Service-specific technological capabilities into a seamless whole. More specifically, the need exists for a coherent set of transformational concepts that fully integrate Twenty-first century American airpower with the Army’s new brigade combat team. The purpose of this study, then, is to offer innovative thought in the areas of counterland, counterair, strategic attack, and tactical airlift that will merge on-going transformational efforts in the Air Force and Army into a single, potent fighting force. In the last century, the threat of war with the Soviet Union in central Europe led to a similar transformation after the U.S. debacle in Vietnam that culminated with the development of an operational concept for air and ground forces labeled AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle fell away with the Berlin Wall and a comprehensive approach has yet to replace it. The ideas developed in this book will form the baseline for a novel military strategy toward a new AirLand Battle construct for the transformed context of the Twenty-first century.

The Need for Transformational Ideas

The 2006 National Security Strategy observed that “the major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed” and proclaimed that “the United States must transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century” (National Security Strategy 2006, 1, 43). While former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld initially led the DoD transformation, his successor, Secretary Robert Gates clearly stated during the November 2006 Senate confirmation process his intent to stay the transformational course: “If confirmed, I will build upon the President’s commitment to transform our forces to better fit the 21st century. Transformation holds the promise to ensure that our military forces are more agile and lethal when confronting the enemies of this new century” (Gates November 2006, 11). In his initial message to DoD personnel, the Secretary Gates formalized and reaffirmed his position:

It is important that we carry forward the process of what has been referred to as defense transformation. President Bush made it a priority at the beginning of his administration to help our military become more agile, more lethal, and more expeditionary. Much has been accomplished; much remains to be done. This task remains a necessity and a priority today (Gates December 2006).

One could argue that what has been accomplished is the advent of new technology and organizational constructs. What remains to be done, then, would be the inclusion of concepts that will complete the transformation.

While the term transformation means different things to different people, it is generally accepted that the goal is a smaller, more deployable, high-tech force more responsive to the changed strategic environment of the Twenty-first century. Each of the Services and many of the joint combatant commands have embarked on aggressive plans that feature many transformational technologies accompanied by new organizational constructs. The Army’s new baseline fighting force, the BCT, is arguably the most visible and among the most important of these organizational changes. The DoD-mandated transformation has arguably directed a shift from legacy technologies and Cold War organizations to more flexible, adaptable capabilities and constructs which are also more compatible with the new strategic landscape. Indeed, the individual Services and combatant commands are moving in this new direction.

In 2003 guidance to the Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense defined transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world” (Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance April 2003, 3). David Fastabend, a U.S. Army general officer, found that “transformation is most typically associated with the ‘revolution in military affairs’, that is, the technological changes, organizational changes, and operational concepts we typically associate with information technology, extended range, and speed and precision” (Fastabend 2005, 155–156). Both definitions, then, identify the ingredients of an RMA, namely new technologies, new organizations, and new ideas, as the basis for transformation. Some might chafe at the implication that current defense-related changes amount to an RMA, citing evolutionary—vice revolutionary—adjustments. However, fewer of these skeptics would argue with the assertion that, regardless how one might classify recent these technological and organizational developments, such change in these areas necessitates equally innovative ideas as well.

While technological and organizational innovation continues at a feverish pace within the defense establishment, though, the infusion of new ideas has not kept the same pace. Fastabend went on to rhetorically query “where are the fundamentally new ways to visualize warfare or operations?” and answered by arguing that, “sadly, there are all too few. To date, we generally apply faster drying paint to draw the same type of picture more rapidly and precisely. There is all too little transformation in our operational concepts, particularly at the joint level” (Fastabend 2005, 157). In essence, there appears to be an incremental evolution in military theory while the new strategic environment of the Twenty-first century demands revolutionary change. Despite transformation elsewhere, then, operational concepts for prosecuting warfare within this new context remain wedded to legacy ideas developed decades ago. Although generally accepted in the past century, the practice of “pouring new wine in old bottles” may no longer suffice. Accordingly, a fundamental argument in this paper is that, while the U.S. military is leaning forward with transformational change in the areas of technology and organization, the requisite development of new ideas that provide the operational framework for such change has been slower. For the RMA to be complete, the same transformation must take place in the area of ideas. This study, then, aims to answer Fastabend’s admonition with transformational thought in the same joint arena where he saw it sorely lacking.

Regrettably, limits on the development of transformational concepts might be related to an emphasis on technology. In an essay titled “The American Way of War”, Colin Gray found the United States defense establishment obsessed with technology, specifically relating that fixation both to American airpower and the nation’s ground forces:

The exploitation of machinery is the American way of war. One may claim that airpower is virtually synonymous with the American way of war and that its employment as the leading military instrument of choice has become routine … America is the land of technological marvels and of extraordinary technology dependency … American soldiers say that the human being matters most, but in practice the American way of war, past, present, and prospectively future, is quintessentially and uniquely technologically dependent (Gray 2005, 29).

In a later chapter of the same book, Grant Hammond submitted a similar argument. He began by citing former Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s dictum, “people first; ideas second; things third”, and then showed America’s divergent approach:

Unfortunately, the U.S. military tends to reverse the priorities. Oddly enough, that is in part because of a concern for people. Rather than masses of manpower to accomplish a military mission, the United States seeks to put fewer people in harm’s way, to substitute technology and firepower for manpower. The emphasis on technological solutions for problems is a peculiarly American trait. Nowhere is that more apparent in the high technology investments made in air, space, and information power (Hammond 2005, 123–124).

While today’s military emphasizes hardware, then, there tends to be less emphasis on what might be called the “software” that brings the technology to life. While problematic at any period in American history, this phenomenon would be even more troublesome in the Twenty-first century. As Robert Scales argued, “more than ever war is a thinking game. Wars today must be fought with intellect as well as technology” (Scales 2005, 43). Similarly, former Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker made the critical point that “transformation is not about equipment. It’s about intellect; it’s about judgment; it’s about the development of leaders and soldiers. You’ve got to make that intellectual transformation before you can make the visible transformation” (Risher 2005, 245).

In his forward to the 2004 National Military Strategy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, emphasized the importance of not just technological development but also concept development as the military transforms. He explained that transformation involved both “fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts.” He went on to submit that “transformation requires a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments—adjustments that reward innovation and creativity” (National Military Strategy 2004, v). Later in the same document, writers drove home the point:

While the United States enjoys an overwhelming qualitative advantage today, sustaining and increasing this advantage will require transformation—a transformation achieved by combining technology, intellect and cultural change across the joint community. The Armed Forces must be able to evaluate challenges, leverage innovation and technology and act decisively in pursuit of national goals (National Military Strategy 2004, 15).

Successfully completing the defense transformation, then, may require a parallel effort toward cultural transformation. Such an effort might shift the American military’s past cultural fascination with technology toward an equitable emphasis on the development of innovative ideas.

Conventional War Remains Relevant

In addition to the need for transformational concepts, this study was also inspired by the need to refocus America’s cognitive effort on medium- to large-scale conventional war. Much ink has been spilled of late on unconventional war, international terrorism, failed states, transnational weapons of mass destruction, conflict with non-state actors, counterinsurgency operations, and similar trends dubbed fourth-generation warfare (4GW). The Services, the joint community, and the Defense Department as a whole are spending substantial collective time and intellectual energy addressing such issues. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) explained the transformation as “a shift of emphasis to meet the new strategic environment.” One quite pertinent example it highlighted was a shift “from major conventional combat operations—to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations” (Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, iv). A wholesale shift in this new direction, however, could have dangerous implications for the U.S. Armed Forces and their ability to fight conventional war in the future.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) asserted that,

U.S. predominance in traditional warfare is not unchallenged, but is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. The 2006 QDR focused on non-traditional or irregular challenges. We will continue to focus our investments on building capabilities to address these other challenges, while examining areas where we can assume greater risk … An underlying assumption in our understanding of the strategic environment is that the predominant near-term challenges to the United States will come from state and non-state actors using irregular and catastrophic capabilities (National Defense Strategy 2008, 21–22).

For the most part, this assumption may very well be true. Unfortunately, it may lead some in DoD to expend disproportionate effort on irregular methods at the expense of a very real traditional threat. A key point not recognized by these documents is that, if American brainpower swings too far for too long in this new direction, its potential adversaries may perceive a new “asymmetric” advantage in atrophied and outdated U.S. traditional capabilities. In fact, a report released by House Armed Services Committee in December 2006 cited this possibility: “Despite the increased demands of the GWOT [global war on terror], the committee does not believe that the requirement to be prepared to fight and win two major regional contingencies simultaneously has been rendered moot. In fact, the committee believes that the requirement may have increased as potential aggressors see opportunities to exploit the U.S. commitment to the GWOT” (Committee Defense Review Report 2006, 70).

Irregular warfare is a critically important dimension of war in this century and one that was largely foreign to the prevailing concepts for conflict in the last century. America must meet the challenges of the Long War with continued effort in this area. However, what once was the niche is now the mainstream. Out of favor at present is focused study on medium- to large-scale conventional conflict against a state with credible ground and air forces. It is certainly true that the war on terror and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan mandate the development of new ideas in the area of irregular war. However, as Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula argued, “it’s not enough to fight today’s war against today’s enemy. We must be prepared for tomorrow” (Deptula 2007, A14).

Non-traditional conflict or 4GW is certainly a likely form of war in the future but, contrary to the teachings of some contemporary thinkers, it is by no means the future of war. It would be quite problematic and arguably dangerous to shift too far in this new direction. Current focus on the Long War and the war in Iraq may be blurring what should be a very clearly evident conventional threat to America’s national security in the Twenty-first century. The American defense establishment also needs novel concepts for “regular war” in a new era of increasingly modern technology. Conventional war against an enemy with a credible land and air force is equally important and likely in the future. The Congressional report concluded that “state-on-state conflict remains, and will be, a major component of the international system. The threat panel identified several countries with significant military capabilities that were developing in a direction that could challenge the U.S. Armed Forces: the People’s Republic of China (PRC); India; Pakistan; North Korea; Iran; and Russia” (Committee Defense Review Report 2006, 20). The 2008 NDS also acknowledged the potential for competition from Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia (NDS 2008, 3–4, 13). In fact, just following the June 2008 publication of this document, Russian aggression toward Georgia in August of the same year offered evidence of conventional threats to the United States and its partners around the globe.

Both the Army and Air Force recognize the continued relevance of conventional war in the Twenty-first century. Retired Air Force General Ronald E. Keys, former commander of the Air Force’s largest major command, Air Combat Command, argued that national security considerations go beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: “You’ve got to be able to fight North Korea … You’ve got to be able to defend in the China–Taiwan Strait. You’ve got to be able to go to Iran” (Dudney 2006, 2). Robert S. Dudney, editor of Air Force Magazine, added that “such scenarios would entail high-intensity clashes with large national forces. Those nations could be defeated only by a technologically advanced ‘conventional’ military” (Dudney 2006, 2). Renowned Air Force historian Phillip Meilinger agreed:

Airmen must make it clear that traditional threats—a major conventional war against a peer competitor—have not disappeared. No one predicted twenty years ago that the Cold War would soon be over and that the U.S. would then fight two major wars against Iraq—a country we had been courting as a balance against a volatile Iran—while also conducting two other major air campaigns in the Balkans (Meilinger, unpublished manuscript, 31, emphasis in original).

A 2006 Army document that analyzed the strategic environment in the next few decades arrived at conclusions remarkably similar to their sister Service:

Conventional operations conducted within a state-on-state framework will continue to be relevant in the future environment. States will remain wedded to strategies based on the use of military power to achieve their goals, in conflicts that range in size from smaller scale contingencies (SSC) to MCO [major combat operations] and occur in often unforeseen locations and varied climatic and topographical conditions. As recent events have shown, even smaller scale or stability operations may escalate with little warning into larger scale hostilities. Thus, regional aggressors will continue to modernize conventional forces and invest in capabilities that will enable them to dominate their neighbors (The United States Army’s Operating Concept for Operational Maneuver: 2015–2024 2006, 5).

The 2006 National Security Str...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• Notes on Contributors
• Disclaimer
• 1 Laying the Foundation
• 2 The Brigade Combat Team Construct
• 3 Battlespace Transformation
• 4 The Concept of Air as a Maneuver Force
• 5 Expanding AirLandBattle21 Counterland Concepts
• 6 Counterair Concepts
• 7 Alternatives to Strategic Attack
• 8 From Strategic Attack to Strategic Cordon
• 9 Tactical Airlift Concepts
• 10 Engaging the Debate and Completing the Transformation
• Appendix: Airlift Calculations and Assumptions
• Selected Bibliography
• Index