Collision of Empires

Italy's Invasion of Ethiopia and its International Impact

G. Bruce Strang

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317164166
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts

Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 marked a turning point in interwar Europe. The last great European colonial conquest in Africa, the conflict represented an enormous gamble for the Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini. He faced a challenge not only from a stout Ethiopian defence, but also from difficult logistics made worse by the League of Nations' half-hearted sanctions. Mussolini faced down this opposition, and Italian troops, aided by air superiority and liberal use of yprite gas, conquered Addis Ababa within eight months, a victory that shocked many military observers of the time with its speed and suddenness. The invasion had enormous repercussions on European international relations. In the midst of a national election campaign, the British National Government had felt constrained to support the League, despite fears that sanctions through the League could lead to war with Italy. The concentration of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea alienated Mussolini and placed the French government on the horns of dilemma; should France support its military partner, Italy, or its more important potential ally, Great Britain? French attempts to mark out a middle ground did little to placate the Duce, and the crisis seemed to develop a deep rift between Fascist Italy and the Anglo-French democracies, while at the same time creating a crisis in Anglo-French relations. Mussolini turned towards Nazi Germany in an attempt to end his diplomatic isolation during the sanctions episode, although Hitler considered the Duce's friendship a mixed blessing. The question of American adherence to sanctions increased ill will between British politicians and the Roosevelt administration in Washington, as each tended to blame the other for the failure of oil sanctions and the collapse of collective security. The international crisis posed similarly thorny problems for the smaller powers of Europe, and for Japan and the Soviet Union. The crisis impeded common defence against Fascist expansionism while giving impetus to claims of the revisionist powers. Despite the tremendous importance of the international crisis, however, little new work on the subject has appeared in recent decades. In this volume, an international cast of contributors take a fresh look at the crisis through the lens of new evidence and new approaches to international relations history to provide the most comprehensive coverage of the crisis currently possible, and their work provides new frames of reference for exploring imperialism, collective security and genocide.

1 ‘Places in the African Sun': Social Darwinism, Demographics and the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia

G. Bruce Strang

DOI: 10.4324/9781315572727-2

Italian infantry and light tanks rolled across the Eritrea-Ethiopia frontier on 3 October 1935. Fascist Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, a sovereign empire in its own right and a member of the League of Nations, proved cruel even by the dismal standards of the era. Italian soldiers and pilots conducted a vicious campaign and subsequent occupation, freely using poison gas against soldiers and civilians and carrying out summary executions of captured Ethiopian soldiers and insurgents. Mussolini despatched five hundred thousand troops south of the Suez Canal; the invasion was no limited colonial campaign, but rather a national war mobilizing the people and resources of the Fascist state. Ethiopia’s membership in the League of Nations ensured that the war also became an international crisis, reshaping European diplomacy. Britain’s equivocal support for the League and sanctions alienated Italy and prompted a profound crisis in Anglo-French relations. It shattered what was left of the Stresa front and eventually destroyed French and Italian military arrangements that aimed to limit potential German expansion. Small powers understood that the League’s collective security principles had little practical value. The Roosevelt administration’s policy, urging the League powers to rush ahead implementing collective action against Italy while American businesses increased trade with Italy, undermined European confidence in the President and his internationalist credentials. The crisis and the failure of the League and collective security represented a central element in what Zara Steiner’s recent magisterial narrative has called The Triumph of the Dark.¹

¹ For her cogent coverage of the international crisis, see Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–1939 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 100–136.

The international crisis has rightly seized the attention of the historical community, but the national colonial war that sparked the furor has received relatively less attention, and considerable interpretive discord reigns about Mussolini’s motives for launching the war. Debate has advanced far from early attempts to portray Mussolini merely as a sawdust Caesar, spewing out propaganda while having no fixed aims or principles.²Some scholars cite internal motivations as Mussolini’s driving force. Giorgio Rochat argued that the war served primarily as a propaganda exercise, a relatively easy success demonstrating the might of Italy’s modern state that would consolidate Mussolini’s power in the face of economic stagnation and the lack of internal revolution.³George Baer emphasized the failure of social reform at home and the sterility of the fascist movement; Mussolini needed foreign war to divert Italians’ attention from failed attempts to modernize agriculture and from chronic unemployment.⁴Alexander De Grand extended Baer’s argument; violence and control lay at the core of fascism. The invasion could re-launch the revolution at home and could provide a laboratory to test racialist policies.⁵Social historians cited the internal dynamics deriving from Fascist myths as an impetus for war; Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi wrote, ‘The spectacle of fascism exuded war and narratively prefigured the imperialistic outcome of the totalitarian state’s aims.’⁶Matteo Dominioni blended internal and external motivations. Mussolini believed that the war would weld an internal consensus; industrialists would profit directly, the middle class would have increased opportunities for jobs in the bureaucracy, while agricultural labourers could dream of the chance to have land of their own. At the same time, Dominioni allowed that Mussolini also sought increased prestige and to confront the Great Powers from a position of parity.⁷

² For a brief survey of some of the early literature on Fascist Foreign Policy, see Alan Cassels, ‘Was there a fascist foreign policy? Tradition and Novelty’, International History Review, 5/2 (1983), pp. 262–3. ³ Giorgio Rochat, Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna d’Etiopia. Studio e documenti (Milano, 1971), pp. 104–7; Le guerre italiane in Libia e in Etiopia dal 1896 al 1939 (Udine, 2009), p. 45. ⁴ George Baer, The Coming of the Italian–Ethiopian War (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. 29–35. ⁵ Alexander De Grand, ‘Mussolini’s Follies: Fascism in its Imperialist and Racist Phase, 1935–1940’, Contemporary European History, 13/2 (2004), pp. 137, 147; Italian Fascism: Its Origins and Development, 3rd Edition (Lincoln, 2000), pp. 100–101. ⁶ Simonetta Falasca–Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: the Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Empire (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 9, 148. For a broadly similar approach, see Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge, 1996), p. ix. ⁷ Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’impero: Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936–1941 (Bari, 2008), pp. 8–10.

The doyen of Italian historians of Italian fascism, Renzo De Felice, argued that a series of ‘historical and psychological’ reasons drove Mussolini’s calculations, including a search for increased prestige and power. Tactical diplomatic considerations meant that 1935 represented Italy’s only chance for colonial expansion, as the Duce calculated that Britain and France would not block Italy’s conquest. Italy’s role as the peso determinante, the decisive weight, meant that both countries would need Italian military power to constrain the rapidly rearming Germany.⁸Esmonde B. Robertson’s Mussolini as Empire Builder shares substantial elements of this view. Robertson’s detailed analysis of Italy’s external relations suggested that Mussolini calculated that he could secure the tacit connivance of Britain and France, conquer Ethiopia in a quick campaign during a time of otherwise relative quiet in Europe, and then return Italian troops to the Brenner frontier in order to confront a resurgent Germany alongside a French ally.⁹

⁸ Renzo De Felice, Mussolini: Il duce, I, Gli anni del consenso 1929–1936 (Torino, 1981), pp. 603, 614. ⁹ Esmonde B. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder: Europe and Africa 1932–36 (London, 1977), pp. 5, 111–12. Alan Cassels cites Robertson’s assessment of external factors as the most compelling explanation. Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy, 2nd Edition (Arlington Heights, 1985), pp. 87–8.

R.J.B. Bosworth argues a continuity thesis. In his view, Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia had little to do with Nazi millenarian visions of race and Lebensraum, instead, Mussolini’s quest for ‘Glory, God, Gold’, was reminiscent of an earlier era of European imperialism, and especially of Prime Minister Giolitti’s conquest of Libya in 1911–12. The major difference between the two episodes was that Mussolini proved less determined and less decisive than the Liberal Giolitti.¹⁰Italy’s leading scholar on the Ethiopian war, the distinguished historian Angelo Del Boca, despairs of determining Mussolini’s precise motive. He shares some views of economic determinists, as only rearmament could have served to have pulled Fascist Italy out of the depression. He agrees that Mussolini had to distract Italians from the loss of liberty inherent in Fascist rule, and he also accepts De Felice’s view that external factors provided a unique and time-sensitive opportunity to carry out the invasion. For Del Boca, ‘no single determining motive’ existed. Instead, the invasion could solve various internal and external problems, while giving the restless Duce an opportunity to increase his prestige at home and in Europe.¹¹

¹⁰ R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini (London, 2002), pp. 297–8. ¹¹ Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale, II. La conquista dell’impero (Milano, 2002), pp. 288–91.

These analyses often beg the central question; they seek to explain tactical benefits that Mussolini might derive from a war, but they do not explain why he would consider a national colonial war in the first place and why against Ethiopia in particular. Historical explanations have either downplayed or failed to consider a fundamental element: Mussolini’s ideology – his obsession with population demographics and his social Darwinist worldview. This study will examine three primary issues. First, Mussolini hoped to spark resurgence in Italy’s birthrate, which he viewed as a vital aspect of Italian power. More births meant more people and more national vitality. As Britain and France faced demographic decline, the creation of a settlement colony – a colony that would create a new, growing, ethnically Italian demographic outlet – would tilt the balance of power towards Italy, fully utilizing the work of Italy’s often under-employed peasant labourers. Second, Mussolini also saw the occupation of colonies through a social Darwinist lens. Increased national territory, wealth and population base would allow Italy to compete with the Great Powers for domination of the Mediterranean Basin. At the same time, the destruction of Ethiopia’s military would create stable, secure colonies in East Africa, removing a threat to Italy’s imperial foothold. Third, while Mussolini emphasized demographic and social Darwinist arguments in his planning for the invasion, the war was not the case of one man acting alone. A cadre of senior diplomatic and military advisors shared the goal of creating a demographic colony in Ethiopia that would safeguard Italy’s position in East Africa and would alter the European balance of power. What separated the Duce from his senior diplomats and military officials was not a difference in ends, but rather Mussolini’s willingness to risk war in conditions that horrified the more cautious of his advisors.

Mussolini and Population Demographics

Mussolini saw the demographic problem in millenarian terms. He feared the terminal decline of the white race, as comparative birthrates suggested that whites would be swamped by the more prolific African and, particularly, oriental races. Mussolini bitterly and sweepingly condemned Malthusian reasoning. He boasted that Italian population growth provided its greatest strength. He lamented past Italian emigration that had deprived the country of millions of workers and soldiers. Faced with three choices to deal with a growing population in an Italy bounded by sea and mountains and deprived of natural resources, Mussolini rejected out of hand two – voluntary sterilization and emigration – leaving his audience to draw the inevitable conclusion that the Duce preferred the third choice – wars of expansion. Italy ‘cannot live eternally in its confines without the threat of suffocation and death’. The regime should seek limits on emigration and gradual expansion through the Mediterranean Basin to provide land and opportunity for Italy’s population that Mussolini hoped could grow to seventy million within a few decades.¹²

¹² Eduardo and Duilio Susmel (eds), Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini [OO], Volume XVI. Volumes I to XXXVI (Firenze, 1951–63); Volumes XXXVII to XLIV (Roma, 1978–80), Discorso di Verona, 13 May 1921, pp. 334–6. For more on Mussolini’s early views, see: OO, XXVI, Per essere liberi, published in Il Popolo d’Italia, 8 January 1921, pp. 104–6; OO, XIX, Il problema dell’emigrazione, 30 March 1923, published in Il Popolo d’Italia, 1 April 1923, pp. 191–3; OO, XXI, Il governo fascista e la nazione, 4 October 1924, pp. 88–99.

Although his views on the subject from the early 1920s were quite consistent with his later speeches, articles, and policy, he became much more active in promoting demographic changes after assuming dictatorial power. His Ascension Day speech to the Chamber of Deputies on 26 May 1927 provided a clear indication of his views. A nation’s birthrate was the fundamental element of a nation’s health. The people derived their political, economic and moral strength from the spiritual vitality provided by large numbers of young people. Nations that saw declining rates of fertility were doomed to see economic stagnation and decline. Forty million Italians found themselves outnumbered by ninety million ethnic Germans and two hundred million Slavs. Italy would have to increase its population to seventy million in order to confront the hostile world. Mussolini scornfully dismissed his critics; ‘Unintelligent people say, “We are too many.” Intelligent ones respond, “We are too few.”’ For the Duce, the laws of demographics were natural and immutable; ‘all the nations and Empires have felt the pangs of their decadence when they have seen their birthrate diminish’.¹³

¹³ 13 OO, XXII, Discorso dell’ascensione, 26 May 1937, pp. ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 ‘Places in the African Sun': Social Darwinism, Demographics and the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia
• 2 The Ethiopian Crisis and the Emergence of Ethiopia in a Changing State System
• 3 Philip Noel-Baker, the League of Nations and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–1936
• 4 ‘This Silly African Business': The Military Dimension of Britain's Response to the Abyssinian Crisis
• 5 France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935–1936: Security Dilemmas and Adjustable Interests
• 6 ‘A Sad Commentary on World Ethics': Italy and the United States during the Ethiopian Crisis
• 7 ‘The Last Ditch Defender of National Sovereignty at Geneva': The Realities behind Canadian Diplomacy during the Ethiopian Crisis
• 8 The Paradox of Peaceful Co-existenceTM: British Dominions' Response to the Italo-Abyssinian crisis 1935–1936
• 9 Schreck and Schadenfreude: Hitler, German Alliance Priorities and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–1936
• 10 An Alliance of the ‘Coloured' Peoples: Ethiopia and Japan
• 11 Soviet Appeasement, Collective Security and the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935 and 1936
• 12 A Way Out of Isolation: Fascist Italy's Relationship with the Vatican during the Ethiopian Crisis
• 13 The Former European Neutrals, the Ethiopian Crisis and its Aftermath, 1935–1938
• Select Bibliography
• Index