On Moral Law and Quest for Selfhood

Mohan Parasain

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138220058
• eBook ISBN: 9781134875375
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Filosofia etica e morale

This book offers an original intersection of concepts from Immanuel Kant's moral command ethics and Søren Kierkegaard's existential ethics. The Kantian formulation of moral law is based on theoretical ground while Kierkegaardian ethics of the quest for selfhood views it as the very act of living. The present work provides an account of both these perspectives and questions whether these approaches to morality are mutually exclusionary. Using Slavoj Žižek's 'parallax view' in the realm of morality, it argues that moral philosophy must engage with a constant critique of 'difference' around which the transformation of our various perspectives to morality revolves. This work appeals for furtherance of the conversation model and participation of perspectives to transcend 'positional confinement'. It advocates the traversing of the ethical parallax to allow for intellectual openness and an empathetic perception of the 'other'.

Engaging and well-researched, this book will be of interest to scholars and researchers of ethics, political philosophy and continental philosophy.

1

Moral imperative and Kant’s critical philosophy

One should never do to another what one regards as injurious to oneself. This, in brief, is the law of dharma.

– Mahabharata XVIII.113.8

Critical philosophy: epistemology to moral philosophy

It is said that Kantianism, at least the universal applicability of a moral ideal, is present in every culture and every time. However, Kant makes a radical departure of this uniform ideal in his theoretical commitment to the moral equality of all rational beings. A philosophical corollary to this conviction is the view that the individual should accept only those beliefs that are found acceptable to reason. Thus customs, conventions and moral authority are no longer the court of appeal for morality. Kant makes ‘reason’ the centre of his conception of a human being, and reason’s self-legislation the basis for his philosophy.

The philosophy of Kant grows out of the demands of its age, the crisis and controversies of the late 18th-century German thought (Beiser 1998: 22) and the decline of ‘German Enlightenment’. The crisis tosses into question its main article of faith: the autonomy of reason. Kant’s ambition is to formulate the project of Enlightenment (the German age of reason), and since reason is considered as a critical power, Kant wished to revive ‘the age of criticism’. Kant defines Enlightenment as man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.

Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without guidance from another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!

(1970: 54)

Now if reason must criticise everything, it cannot avoid being self-critical. But this self-criticism of reason ends in scepticism and nihilism. The critical literature of Kant attempts to resolve this problem. For Kant, reason is not impersonal but essentially a human ability; it is reflexive and open forever. The proper analysis of the structures and functions of reason indicates the possibility of self-criticism of reason.

The aim of critical philosophy is to walk a middle path between dogmatism and scepticism or to cultivate ‘parallactic perception’. This perception engenders from our epistemic humility and readiness to examine our beliefs according to the ‘eternal laws of reason’. This tribunal would avoid dogmatism, because it would meticulously examine all the claims of reason; and it would also break away from scepticism since its eternal laws would be the necessary presupposition of all discourse, even that of sceptic. Kant’s aim was to bring reason’s house back into order by putting it upon a firm ground.

For Kant (1952: 463), philosophy contains the ‘principles of the rational cognition that concepts afford us of things’. As concepts can ‘afford’ only the phenomena, his philosophy can be summarised in the following dictum: ‘Understanding makes nature out of the materials it does not make.’ Our knowledge of the external world is limited to our capacity to know it, but its existence does not depend upon our knowledge of it. Kant extends this ‘epistemic humility’ and human finitude to the realm of morality and still manages to show that moral will is autonomous.

According to Kant, the use of reason is theoretical in the philosophy of nature and it is practical in the philosophy of moral. Whenever we think about empirical laws of nature, we have to observe the laws of thinking, which are the laws of logic or rules of language. Kant believes that the human faculties of perception, feeling, conception, judgement and reason display a systematic unity. These faculties make sense only in relation to their contribution to the whole. This whole is not the result of Hegelian mediation but of the realm of possibility of the unknowable noumena.

Kant tries to establish that at least in terms of fundamental principles, all scientific disciplines rest on core assumptions that reflect the way our mind works to produce knowledge. He insists that it is the same reason that enables us to make sense of sensory data in scientific theories that guide our moral deliberations and create our political institutions and laws. The thought, action, art and science are intimately bound with the creative activities of the human faculties. Perhaps, for this reason, Kant proceeds with his critical philosophy only after giving a detailed account of the pure reason, that is limitations of human faculties.

Kant does not begin to write his major philosophical works until reading Hume who ‘awakened’ him from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’. Kant defines dogmatism as ‘the procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own power’, that is ‘without first enquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles’ (1952: 11). Hume’s sceptical treatment of the ideas of necessity and causation convinces him that he cannot simply assume that these ideas have metaphysical reality. This gives Kant the impetus for the ‘critical philosophy’, a critique of reason in both its theoretical and practical uses. The thread running through Kant’s critical works is the desire to understand the foundation for ideas like necessity and law that are beyond anything we can experience. Our experiences are of a coherent order structured by causal laws. But we have no adequate empirical basis for the ideas of necessity and law. Therefore, as the ideas of necessity and law do not have an empirical basis, they must have a priori basis (their justification is independent of our actual experiences). Rather, these ideas are themselves conditions of the very possibility of experience. For Kant, the ‘ideas of reason’, namely God, soul and world, are not constitutive but regulative. They are not the object of knowledge but of faith and regarded as postulates of practical reason. Practical reason does not yield knowledge but is higher than pure reason, because moral imperatives arise from the free and ‘noumenal’ self of man.

In his first critique, Kant argues that many of the principles that we consider objective are in reality subjective. They involve only those conditions under which we conceive or understand the object. It is the nature of our process of knowing that leads things to appear to us under the aspects of space and time. In other words, space and time, instead of being attributes inherent in the objects of our knowledge, are elements of that knowing, which is independent of its objects. Space and time are forms, as distinguished from the matter, of our cognition.

Kant’s views on the nature of knowledge, ethics, the possibility of religion and the nature of aesthetic feeling make a significant turning point in the history of human thought. Kantianism has influenced almost every ethical discussion – from common-sense ethical understanding of morality to more complex theorisation of justice (e.g. Rawls’s vision of just society). Kant’s predecessors construct their philosophical systems upon various concepts, but they never examine the origin or the limits within which the employment of such concepts is admissible. It occurs to Kant for the first time in the history of thought to consider the problem of ‘how these concepts come into being and to what extent it is possible to think of studying the nature of human understanding before taking into account its fruits’ (Benda 1942: 5).

The most striking peculiarity of Kant’s moral theory is its connection with epistemology and metaphysics. Kant enquires into the necessary conditions for the very possibility of morality and for central moral notions, such as that of moral duty or obligation. Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy is united by a common approach. As the creative faculties of the mind are crucial in producing cognition, it is the mind’s own creative reason that occupies the central role in Kant’s account of morality. A moral principle, for Kant, is nothing but a dimly conceived metaphysics, which is inherent in every man’s rational constitution. Every man has ‘an obscurely conceived metaphysic within himself, for without it how could he believe that he has within himself a power of universal legislation’ (Kant 1952: 365).

At the heart of Kant’s moral theory is the position that rational human will is autonomous. We can think of a person as free only when he is bound by his own will and not by the will of another. When applied to an individual, autonomy ensures that the source of the authority of the principle that binds him is in his own will. The moral law is just such a principle. Hence, the ‘moral legitimacy’ of the categorical imperative is grounded in its being an expression of each person’s own rational will. The critical philosophy is based upon the conviction that for knowledge and morality to be possible, human mental faculties are to be active in interpreting sensory data and in judging moral rightness. The good is to be found not without but within the acting personality itself. Neither experience nor illustrations make an action good. Every custom, examples and empirically given ideal must first be tested and judged. Hence a theological or psychological basis for ethics is alike impossible. Duty arises neither from authority nor from experience. Hence Kant finds the motive of morality in goodwill.

According to Kant, goodwill is the only jewel, which shines in its own light, and the value or worth of action depends upon the goodwill or the motive with which it is done and not upon the consequence of the action. He says, ‘Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will’ (1952: 256). The ‘good’ character traits like ingenuity, intelligence and courage could be used for evil. Therefore, the idea of goodwill is an important common-sense benchmark to which Kant returns throughout his enquiry into moral philosophy. That is, what makes a person good is his possession of a will that is in certain way guided by the moral law formulated by the autonomous being.

As a corollary to the concept of the ‘categorical imperative’, Kantian concept of goodwill demands that all considerations of personal advantage be set aside and the individual seek to do what he would wish others to do to himself in the similar circumstances. In defining moral action in this way, Kant is showing what an individual has to do if he wishes to be genuinely free. Human freedom is derived from the individual’s ability to be self-determining. Here the motivating cause is the faith in the moral law. At the same time, the concept of goodwill itself is implicit in the formulations of the categorical imperative. A will is good not because of its effects but in itself and for itself. Goodwill follows the categorical imperative¹ and should not be actuated by an inclination, feeling or desire for an end or consequence. It should be prompted by pure respect for the moral law. When we think that a person ought to do something, we consider he has some obligation to do so, an obligation that is inescapable. This leads us to Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative.

The categorical imperative

There is a long-standing tradition of grounding morality in the authority of religion or that of the state. But to Kant’s enlightenment mentality, following the decrees of God is to follow the priests and so making one’s own moral reasoning subservient to the outside authority. Similarly, the state is even less plausible source. For Kant, human beings are free and are yet governed by self-imposed laws and regulations. He explains that freedom under law is possible, because human reason has its own principles for determining right actions. In acting upon and obeying laws, people are self-determining, because laws agree with the principles of their own reason. While stressing the importance of moral law, Kant says, ‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and the more steadily we meditate upon them: the starry firmament above and the moral law within’ (1952: 360).

Kant defines an imperative as ‘a practical rule by which an action, otherwise contingent in itself is made necessary’ (1952: 391). An imperative is not a practical law, because even though a law represents the action as necessary, it does not consider whether it is ‘internally’ necessary as involved in the nature of the agent. An imperative is a rule, which not only represents but also makes a subjectively contingent action necessary and accordingly represents the subject as being morally necessitated to act in accordance with this rule.

The moral law or the categorical imperative is an imperative or command as opposed to an assertion of fact. A natural law, on the other hand, is an assertion of fact, for example ‘matter attracts matter’. The moral law is free from empirical factors. Moreover, it is not a ‘hypothetical imperative’ like if you wish to lose weight, eat low-fat foods. Here the condition for the action is set by ‘if’. But there is no such condition in moral law. For example, ‘do not tell a lie’ is to be followed irrespective of conditions. Second, the categorical imperative is concerned not with the matter of the action but with its form. It is imposed by practical reason upon itself. It is to be obeyed not for any higher end, but it is an end-in-itself. So, moral law has reference only to the direction of the will itself.

The categorical imperative does not represent the action in any way mediated through the conception of an end that is to be attained by it. It presents the action to the mind as objectively necessary by the mere representation of its form as an action and thus makes it necessary. In the sphere of morality, following predetermined law is preposterous. At the same time, unless we act according to some laws, our actions become random and purposeless. Rational beings must determine for themselves a set of laws by which they will act. These laws are not ‘analytic’ (true by virtue of their meaning), nor are they determined through experience (a posteriori). The rational being has to determine the substantive rules that can be applied ‘prior to’ experience. According to Kant, the categorical imperative generates all other moral obligations. It is derived from the concept of duty. It is a principle of reason and is based not on contingent facts about the world, such as what would make us happy, but on acting upon the moral law that has no other motive than ‘worthiness of being happy’. Accordingly, Kant holds that moral obligation applies only to rational agents.

The categorical imperative implies an unconditional obligation. Kant makes an important distinction between two kinds of commands: hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative leads to a ‘material’ end, where one ought to do something only as a means to some end. A material end is dependent on contingent factors or desires, while the categorical imperative leads to an unconditional end or a goal like fulfilment of a duty ignoring all the contingent factors and desires. The categorical imperative springs from reason. Our actions are guided by practical reason. Individual beings are part of an intelligible world that is not determined by laws of nature, but by laws of reason. An action is morally good if and only if it not only conforms to the moral law but also is done for the sake of the law. A right action should satisfy two conditions: it should conform to the moral law revealed by reason, and it should be performed out of the pure regard for the moral law. Kant tries to make the moral law more definite by laying down three formulations of the categorical imperative.

1. 1 Universal law of nature: ‘Act only on that maxim whereby though canst at the same time will that it should become universal law.’ (Kant 1952: 268)

The decision procedure of moral reasoning involved in this formulation is: first, ‘a maxim is to be formulated in order to enshrine one’s reason for acting as one proposes’. For example, in the maxim ‘I will lie for personal benefit’, lying is the action and the motivation is the personal benefit. Second, project the maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents and hold that each must, by natural law, act as one proposes to act in certain given circumstances. Third, imagine a possible world where everyone in a similar position will do the same. Fourth, decide whether any contradictions or irrationalities arise in the possible world as a result of following the maxim. If a contradiction or irrationality arises, acting on that maxim is not allowed in the real world. Fifth, ask one whether he or she could rationally will to act on his or her maxim in such a world. If one could, then the action is morally permissible.

In the previous example, the universalisability of ‘lying’ leads to everyone lying and no one believing anyone, thereby destroying the very idea of ‘successful lying’. This formulation is also known as the ‘universalisability test’. According to Kant, an agent’s maxim is his ‘subjective principle of human action’. That is, what the agent believes is his reason to act. That is, if we try to universalise the maxim on which an immoral action is based, we run into a kind of contradiction. The categorical imperative instructs us to act on only those maxims that can be universalised without any contradiction.

Korsgaard (1996a: 78) talks about two kinds of such contradictions: when the universalised maxim cannot even be thought, we have ‘contradiction in conception’, and where it is impossible only to ‘will’ the universalisation, there is ‘contradiction in the will’. Any instance of promise making, for example, depends on its efficacy upon the existence of the conventional institution of promising. In the world of the universalised maxim from Kant’s second example, the agent’s maxim of falsely promising to return money he wants to acquire would be impossible, because the practice of promise making could not exist if it were universally abused. A world where every needy agent falsely promises to return borrowed money cannot be thought of. The universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible.

1. 2 The humanity formula: ‘Act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end in itself and never as a mere means.’ (Kant 1952: 272)

To use someone as a mere ‘means’ is to involve him or her in a scheme of action to which he cannot consent in principle. Kant does not say that there is anything wrong about using someone as a means, which we, of course, have to do in any kind of mutual social agreement or transaction. For example, I am using my LPG supplier as a means, but this does not seem to be immoral. Evidently we have to do so in any cooperative scheme of actions. However, using one another as a ‘mere’ means is wrong. This formulation introduces the concept of ‘respect of the dignity of each individual’. Here Kant gives the example of ‘suicide’. If a person ends his own life to escape from painful circumstances, the person uses himself merely as a mean to avoid pain. The principle ‘humanity is an end in itself’ is not borrowed from experience, because it is universal. It is applicable to all rational beings, and experience is not capable of determining anything about them.

According to Kant, when we want to work out whether an act we propose to do is right or wrong,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Moral imperative and Kant’s critical philosophy
• 2 Kierkegaard and the quest for selfhood
• 3 Dialogue of perspectives: Nietzsche, Kant, Kierkegaard, Bhagavad-Gita
• 4 Issues in perspectives
• 5 Freedom in framework
• 6 Traversing the ethical parallax
• Bibliography
• Index