Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France

Daniel Hucker

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781409406259
• eBook ISBN: 9781317073536
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The 1930s policy of appeasement is still fiercely debated by historians, critics and contemporary political commentators, more than 70 years after the signing of the 1938 Munich Agreement. What is less well-understood, however, is the role of public opinion on the formation of British and French policy in the period between Munich and the outbreak of the Second World War; not necessarily what public opinion was but how it was perceived to be by those in power and how this contributed to the policymaking process. It therefore fills a considerable gap in an otherwise vast literature, seeking to ascertain the extent to which public opinion can be said to have influenced the direction of foreign policy in a crucial juncture of British and French diplomatic history. Employing an innovative and unique methodological framework, the author distinguishes between two categories of representation: firstly, 'reactive' representations of opinion, the immediate and spontaneous reactions of the public to circumstances and events as they occur; and secondly, 'residual' representations, which can be defined as the remnants of previous memories and experiences, the more general tendencies of opinion considered characteristic of previous years, even previous decades. It is argued that the French government of Édouard Daladier was consistently more attuned to the evolution of 'reactive' representations than the British government of Neville Chamberlain and, consequently, it was the French rather than the British who first pursued a firmer policy towards the European dictatorships. This comparative approach reveals a hitherto hidden facet of the diplomatic prelude to the Second World War; that British policy towards France and French policy towards Britain were influenced by their respective perceptions of public opinion in the other country. A sophisticated analysis of a crucial period in international history, this book will be essential reading for scholars of the origins of World War II, the political scenes of late 1930s Britain and France, and the study of public opinion and its effects on policy.

Chapter 1
The Prelude to Munich

The prospect of having one’s wife and children, as well as oneself, massacred in one’s own house was one which the European householder had not had to look in the face since he had seen the last of the raids of the Vikings and the Magyars.1

In these momentous hours, certain of expressing the sentiment of the vast majority of the French population, we proclaim our commitment to a peaceful solution of the current international crisis.2

By the time of the September 1938 Munich Agreement several residual representations dominated elite perceptions of public opinion. British policy makers saw a public hostile to fighting another war, suspicious of continental commitments, and equally unsympathetic to both communism and fascism. French decision makers perceived their public as ideologically polarized and infused with a pacifist sentiment bordering on defeatism. This chapter will first examine how such residual representations of opinion were formed and perpetuated in the period preceding Munich. It will then consider how reactive representations at the time of Munich either altered perceptions or merely reinforced the predominant residuals. Firstly, it is necessary to outline the pivotal residual representations. To do so, a brief explanation of the specific political contexts within which Chamberlain and Daladier were acting is required.

Chamberlain and Daladier

A key figure in British politics for many years, Chamberlain’s reputation increased during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931–37. During this time Chamberlain’s influence grew steadily, and there was a degree of inevitability about his becoming Prime Minister on the departure of Stanley Baldwin in May 1937. For Chamberlain, the Premiership provided him with public popularity and parliamentary admiration.3 Although his was a National Government, it was Conservative in all but name. The Conservatives won 53.5 per cent of the vote in the 1935 General Election, equating to a 243 seat parliamentary majority. As Prime Minister, Chamberlain was not swayed easily from his chosen path, preferring to surround himself with like-minded individuals.4 Nonetheless, he was not authoritarian; he had no need to be. The party was loyal, minimizing the potential for internal dissent.5 Furthermore, loyalty to the Prime Minister extended to the grassroots level, ensuring Chamberlain’s standing.6

The massive Parliamentary majority and unswerving loyalty of the Party faithful meant that Chamberlain’s position was untouchable. Even the resignation of the popular foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, in February 1938, failed to undermine his authority. The opposition parties similarly failed to offer a viable challenge. The Liberal Party had rapidly lost influence during the 1930s; the 513 candidates they fielded in 1929 had dwindled to just 161 by 1935. The Labour Party had also experienced a turbulent decade, plagued by factional infighting. The Party leadership, hostile to the notion of a Popular Front alliance due to the perceived extreme-left genesis of the idea, was equally reluctant to embrace potential allies from the other mainstream parties. This later resulted in the Labour leadership rejecting the efforts of dissident Conservatives to form a feasible cross-party alternative to the Chamberlain government.7 Chamberlain himself viewed the Labour Party with disdain, describing it at various times as ‘ignorant’, ‘stupid’, and even a ‘pack of wild beasts’.8

The absence of effective opposition also stretched to the realms of the more extreme political organizations, particularly the Communist Party. This stood in stark contrast to the situation in France. The French Communist Party (Parti communiste français, PCF) boasted 73 deputies in the French Chamber, and a membership of 318,459 in September 1938,9 far greater than their British counterparts. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) had a solitary MP (William Gallacher, in the East Fife constituency) and a membership that had yet to reach 18,000 by the outbreak of war.10 Other far-left organizations, such as the Left Book Club, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the Socialist League, also failed to gain substantial influence.11 Similarly, although the British Trade Union movement boasted a larger paid-up membership than their French counterparts, they were considerably less militant.12 The majority of British unions remained faithful to the Labour Party, and co-operative vis-à-vis the government. By contrast, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) was prone to communist infiltration, despite the attempts of the secretary-general, Léon Jouhaux, to maintain an independent line.13 Subsequently, industrial unrest on the scale that plagued interwar France was largely absent in Britain.

The situation was similar on the other side of the political spectrum. In Britain, organizations such as Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) were highly visible but of marginal significance.14 Far-right meetings and demonstrations were carefully policed but not considered a genuine threat.15 Police reports from France paint a similar picture; far-right groups were monitored, but rarely (at least by the late 1930s) considered worrying.16 Indeed, in comparison with the attention lavished upon the extreme-left, the French far-right appeared little more than an inconvenience. Nevertheless, the sheer size and scale of such groups in France contrast sharply with those in Britain. Jacques Doriot’s Parti populaire français (PPF) had some 300,000 sympathizers and 60,000 active members in 1937, while Colonel de La Rocque’s Croix de Feu also enjoyed considerable public support.17 On 8 May 1938, de La Rocque organized a parade of 100,000 people in front of the statue of Joan of Arc.18 This figure alone is double the peak membership (50,000) claimed by the BUF in 1934, when they still enjoyed the support of the Rothermere press.19

Extremist groups were not the only problem confronting Édouard Daladier. Having become Président du Conseil for the third time in April 1938, Daladier’s government was the latest in a long line of administrations faced with guiding France through the treacherous waters of internal division and external menace. With the fall of the Popular Front, and the short-lived governments of Camille Chautemps and the second Blum administration, the ‘bull from the Vaucluse’ was seen by many as the ideal candidate to unify the nation. The British government certainly viewed Daladier’s government as an improvement on its predecessor. Blum’s government was derided as ‘the most deplorable Ministry that could possibly be imagined’ in the Foreign Office, ‘A typical Front Populaire administration, composed of little men in the wrong places … We can only hope that they will fall very soon’.20 British dissatisfaction with French politics even led to interference by the British embassy. ‘I am always most particularly careful to avoid intervening in any way in French politics’, wrote Phipps to Halifax, ‘but this time I felt it was my duty to take a certain risk.’21 The British got their wish as Blum’s government proved ephemeral. Although Daladier’s new government was favourably received, Phipps expressed caution: ‘M. Daladier is sensible and honest, but I fear not quite as determined as he looks.’22

The refusal of the French Socialists to participate in Daladier’s government meant the new Cabinet was dominated by the Radical Party, with Daladier himself the dominant player. He was seen as a ‘strong man’, notes his biographer, Elisabeth du Réau, ‘the only one capable of resolving the situation’.23 Churchill shared the confidence in Daladier’s ability to transform the fortunes of France, writing to the French Premier: ‘The time now seems ripe to carry forward those plans for the common safety of our two countries which we talked over together when I had the pleasure to visit you in Paris. You will find the ground well-prepared for you over here: & I do not doubt of success. But strike while the iron is hot.’24

Faced with an increasingly menacing European situation, Daladier sought to eradicate political instability and social schisms. France needed to rediscover national unity, reduce social unrest, and inject energy and discipline to restore economic stability and enhance military preparedness. To achieve this Daladier needed to overcome several hurdles. His administration was a diverse mix of left and right, both pro and anti-Popular Front, and its foreign and domestic agenda was not immediately apparent.25 The extent to which this was a hindrance or benefit to Daladier is questionable. On the one hand, it worked in his favour. Amidst the uncertainty, Daladier portrayed himself as the principal source of unity, thus enhancing his individual prestige.26 Consequently, his government received an almost unanimous vote of confidence in the French Chamber. However, for Phipps, this ‘virtual Parliamentary unanimity’ was no guarantee of longevity, which required ‘a real Government of National Union’.27 Nevertheless, the absence of the Socialists allowed him to assemble ‘his’ Cabinet, omitting those he did not trust. Crucially, this enabled him to distance his administration from the communists and gravitate towards the right.28

Nevertheless, tensions between former Popular Front partners made it difficult to establish a stable government capable of satisfying the multifarious demands of the populace. Jacques Kayser, a close confidant of Daladier, acknowledged such tensions and the inevitable problems that they posed: ‘The tension that exasperatingly persists between Socialists and Radicals, Communists and Socialists, and Radicals and Communists, is incompatible with a resurgence of Rassemblement activity.’29 Such statements reflect the lingering attachment of many Radicals to the Popular Front, and a desire to see the ideals of the Rassemblement populaire maintained. The British certainly perceived French public opinion to be inclined towards the left. ‘...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• The Historiography of Appeasement
• Defining Public Opinion
• Locating Representations of Opinion
• Sources and Methodology
• 1 The Prelude to Munich
• 2 The Aftermath of Munich, October–December 1938
• 3 Beware the Ides of March, January–March 1939
• 4 Repercussions of the Prague Coup
• 5 Appeasement after Prague
• 6 Public Opinion and the Triple Alliance Negotiations
• 7 From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to War
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index