Small Navies

Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace

Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, Ian Speller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781472417596
• eBook ISBN: 9781317054337
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Whilst maritime studies tend to reflect the dominance of large navies, history shows how relatively small naval forces can have a disproportionately large impact on global events. From Confederate commerce raiders in the nineteenth century, to Somali pirates today, even the most minor of maritime forces can become a key player on a global stage. Examining a broad range of examples, this volume addresses the roles and activities of small navies in the past and the present at the national, regional and international level. In particular, it focusses on the different ways in which such forces have identified and addressed national and international security challenges and the way in which they interact with other navies and security agencies. In addition the collection also investigates the relationship of such navies with non-governmental organisations, institutions and bodies in pursuit of broader maritime goals, be they political, financial or environmental. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach drawing on the best new research from the fields of international relations, security studies, strategic studies and maritime history, the book examines the diversity of experience amongst different smaller navies and also establishes areas of similarity. Divided into two sections, part one begins with a number of chapters that are theoretical in nature, whilst part two provides case studies that offer a more regional focus, including analysis of the challenges facing contemporary navies and historical case studies designed to reveal the experience of small navies over time. By adopting an approach that combines historical considerations with analysis of current events, the collection offers a unique perspective on the role that small navies have played in wider nautical affairs and their continued impact upon global maritime strategies.

Chapter 1
The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited

(Opening address to the conference)

Eric Grove

When I was commissioned to write my book ‘The Future of Sea Power’ by Routledge in the late 1980s¹ I was asked to produce ‘quite an academic’ book with a bit of theory in it. Most of my approach in the book was empirical, a methodology with which I am much happier, but at the end I developed three theoretical frameworks based on the previous analysis. In the first I tried to bring up to date Mahan’s analysis of the foundations of sea power, something that itself had been produced at the request of the great man’s publishers. In the second I based a revised triangular analysis of the roles of navies on the seminal work of Ken Booth.² This has been further developed by the Royal Navy in its latest iteration of British Maritime Doctrine.³

The third was ‘A Typology for Navies’. Again this owed much to existing literature, notably M.A. Morris in his book Expansion of Third World Navies and Steve Haines in his article ‘Third World Navies, Myths and Realities’.⁴ I sought to go further than these authors to produce a global naval hierarchy that would form the basis of ‘some speculative remarks about the future balance of naval power’. I classified as navies ‘all those forces capable of exerting force at sea, not necessarily just those bureaucratically organised into a ‘navy’.⁵ I also used the concept of ‘force projection’ that implied ‘a capacity to engage in “sea control” and “sea denial” as well as “power” projection’. My criteria were not only the sheer number of available assets but their types and sophistication and, crucially, the level of afloat support. This provided ‘reach’ that would also be reflected in the geographical extent of routine deployment.

I came up with nine rungs on the ladder. Top was the only ‘Major Global Force Projection Navy – Complete’ that of the United States. Next was the only rank two navy, that of the other super power, the Soviet Union, which at that time deployed a ‘Major Global Force Projection Navy – Partial’. Third were the ‘Medium Global Force Projection Navies’ which at that time were only two, Britain and France, both of which possessed nuclear powered submarines, both ballistic missile and attack, sea control surface forces, an amphibious squadron and afloat support. Both were, to a greater or lesser extent capable of operating globally, the first on the basis of group deployments based in Europe, the latter with a more global permanent stationing of assets.

Fourth were the ‘Medium Regional Force Projection Navies’ able in Morris’s words ‘to project force into the adjoining ocean basin’.⁶ These were the three main Asian navies at this level: India, Japan and China plus the major NATO navies of Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany and Spain. Both NATO and the Western European Union had provided both force and reach multiplication. Even Belgium had deployed vessels with organic support to the Gulf. South America had two such navies, Brazil and Argentina, both of which had aircraft carriers.

Fifth were ‘Adjacent Force Projection Navies’ with ‘some ability to project force well offshore’.⁷ These included Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Chile, Peru, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, Pakistan and New Zealand. I noted that the two Koreas might be moving into this category along with the major Gulf navies: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These were, however, still in rank six ‘Offshore Territorial Defence Navies’ with high levels of capability in operations up to about 200 miles from the shore. These included most remaining European and North African navies, the mid-level Latin American navies, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines and, in Africa, Nigeria. These navies had the sustainability offered by frigates or large corvettes and/or a submarine force.

Rank seven were ‘Inshore Territorial Defence Navies’, navies capable of coastal combat rather than just constabulary duties. Rank eight were those navies only capable of constabulary duties. Some countries of course, then as now, deployed specialist coastguards in this role but other navies in Africa, Latin America and Africa, (and Ireland in Europe) had few, if any capabilities beyond the policing function. Finally came Rank nine, the ‘token navies’ those of the poorest countries with ‘a formal organisational structure and a few coastal craft, but little else’.⁸

In my conclusions, I expected that ‘the naval balance’ would change more towards the top than further down the scale. I thought that the US Navy would not maintain quite the level of supremacy it had in 1990 and the Soviet, Chinese and Japanese navies would approach it more closely as global navies as would a collective European navy. Then, in the next rank would come the ‘significant regional navies’: India, the larger South American fleets and Australia. Below these would be ‘the lesser African and Asian navies, and the two mavericks in Israel and South Africa; then would come the longer-ranged and the shorter-ranged coast defence navies, the coastguards; and finally the mass of token navies’.⁹

Things have not quite gone as expected, although navies have indeed moved towards the top of the scale. Most notably the end of the Soviet Union abolished rank two as it existed in 1990. The old rank three navies now became rank two medium global force projection navies, a group that now includes a diminished Russian fleet. France remains here as does Britain, despite its temporary abandonment of aircraft carriers, given the UK’s powerful nuclear submarine fleet and still significant amphibious ‘Response Force Task Group’ and afloat support capacity. Carriers will soon be back. China and India are both now coming into this level with carriers, nuclear powered submarines, major amphibious units and the beginnings of afloat support. China has projected force into the Mediterranean and India has gone both to the limits of the Indian Ocean and beyond and its wider ambitions are clear.

Japan is a difficult navy to classify. It is still deliberately kept limited in reach, although perhaps paradoxically, it has used its tankers to support coalition forces in the Indian Ocean. Its coastguard also utilises its large patrol vessels as escorts for plutonium transport ships on distant voyages. There will soon be four helicopter carriers (euphemistically referred to as ‘destroyers’) and its MSDF has some of the most sophisticated surface combatants in the world. It does not yet have nuclear powered submarines, although it has perhaps the finest fleet of conventional boats in the world, the latest of which have air independent propulsion, useful at shorter ranges. The three LPDs are designed for regional contingencies. On balance, therefore, I would put Japan at the head of rank three ‘Medium Regional Force Projection Navies’, although more by choice than sheer national potential.

Other rank three medium navies ‘on the up’ are South Korea that has jumped from moving into the old rank five in 1990 to this elevated status with its Aegis destroyers, large submarine flotilla and growing amphibious and replenishment force. North Korea has moved down a rank. Other rank threes are Australia with its impressive Canberra class LHDs, Hobart class destroyers and Brazil with its carrier and nuclear submarine plans (rank two by the 2020s?). Singapore has also moved rapidly up the order from the old rank seven to the current rank three with its frigates, general purpose LPDs and growing submarine force. Few navies get more capability from 4,500 personnel. Singapore is perhaps the world’s most powerful ‘small navy’.

The other major NATO and European navies remain at the new rank three: Canada, especially if it replaces its support vessels; Italy with its new carrier; Spain with its new strategic projection ship, LPDs and missile frigates; and Germany with its Berlin class auxiliaries giving useful reach. The combined Dutch/Belgian fleet is still there despite cut-backs. Both the Danish and Norwegian navies have in their different ways made considerable improvements in force posture and are now in rank three. Sweden is moving into it with a remarkably wide-ranging fleet of conventional submarines and corvettes, but it requires the delivery of the much discussed support/logistic vessels to be firmly in the category.

We are now coming to what I would describe as the ‘small navies’ in terms of capability, although some are quite large in terms of personnel. My new ranks four to eight begin with the adjacent force protection navies, those navies able to project force well off shore. These include NATO’s Eastern Mediterranean rivals: Turkey and Greece (currently the former in much better shape than the latter); Portugal and Poland; Romania (on the way up); Chile and Peru; Israel and South Africa (the former perhaps with nuclear armed submarines aimed at Iran, based in East Africa). Taiwan and Pakistan remain powerful fleets in this category, while Thailand and Indonesia have moved up into it, the latter with its five innovative multi-role vessels. Malaysia may move up too once she acquires similar vessels. Despite cut-backs and given its requirement for extended Pacific reach outside its own 200-mile zone New Zealand still makes new rank four. The capabilities of HMNZS Canterbury are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Its victories against the Tamil Tiger rebels and its decisive blockade of the territories they held, that required operations at some distance, also argue for putting the brave and battle hardened Sri Lankan Navy in at rank four, moving up two categories. Saudi Arabia’s auxiliaries have indeed put that country on the cusp of rank four but her dalliance with the American littoral combat ship and her slowness in adopting submarines keep her in rank four.

These rank five offshore territorial defence navies, capable of combat operations out to 200 miles have lost members up and down since 1990. In Europe the navies have either moved up, or in East Germany’s and Yugoslavia’s case, disappeared (the latter to be succeeded by the lesser rank six Croatian navy). Bulgaria remains here. Along the North African littoral, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt also remain, although Algeria appears to be going up in the world with its ambitious LHD plans. Iran remains quite powerful at the top of this category, although it has not moved up, as expected. Other Gulf members are Bahrain, the UAE and Oman. In South America this category still includes Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela and now also includes Mexico which has moved up and Argentina that has moved down. In South Asia Bangladesh remains here but Philippines is more rank seven, effectively a coastguard. Vietnam is, however moving up into rank five, especially with its submarine programme.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, economically stricken North Korea has now moved down to the sixth rank, the inshore territorial defence navies. Kuwait with its powerful flotilla of missile small craft is a classic example of the type. Finland also remains stolidly here with a similar fleet. Other navies have moved down, however, because of difficulties in maintaining and supporting sufficient assets in service.

Sensibly, a large number of countries have decided to concentrate on constabulary navies/ coastguards and they remain in rank seven. Classic examples are, of course Ireland with its very effective Naval Service, and Iceland with its equally effective coastguard. Brunei has moved down into this category with the non-delivery of its frigates and the post-war Iraq navy is also now to be found here, Saddam’s ambitions for higher status having disappeared with his defeats. The dissolution of the Nigerian navy and attempts to rebuild its capacity with constabulary vessels make it definitely of this category while the growing threat of piracy in West African waters is also countered by a very constabulary Ghana Navy. In East Africa the formerly combatant navy of Kenya has become a constabulary force. The standard Caribbean and South Pacific naval force is in this category (the latter often maintained by successful Australian support in capacity building), as are the lesser Latin American navies such as Uruguay. The main priority for such countries is safeguarding their offshore zones. As noted above, the Philippines has come down to the constabulary category with the acquisition, like Nigeria, of large second-hand American coastguard cutters (offshore patrol vessels) as their core surface units. Myanmar’s also remains a constabulary fleet. Rather than the move up a rank I thought would happen, if anything the movement here has been in the opposite direction.

As for rank nine, the token navies, we must probably include, perhaps temporarily, the Libyan Navy that could do little about the maritime power projection that brought down Gaddafi and which suffered serious losses. Another navy getting over losses is Georgia, whose vessels were grouped into a coastguard after the 2008 conflict with Russia. Some of the smallest constabulary navies, such as the Gambia that used to have to pay for itself out of fines levied on arrested fishing vessels probably qualify as such, also with assets in need of repairs. Its support by Taiwan, however, that abruptly replaced Communist Chinese support, may maintain some limited patrol capacity. The maritime forces of Belize remain exiguous with a national Coastguard Service only equipped with very small craft. Benin is, however, building up its patrol forces with 100-ton French-built vessels – as well it might with a growing pirate threat and ambitious 200-mile territorial sea claims.

Returning to these assessments demonstrates how the ranking of the world’s navies has been squeezed up and down as smaller navies of my older ranks six and seven have grown into forces of greater reach and capability while others have declined to purely constabulary fleets as the priorities of maintaining order and safeguarding resources have prevailed over the deployment of the apparent ‘equalisers’ of missile armed fast attack craft. Everyone has moved up of course with the departure of the old rank two and in general at least some of my predictions have come true. The USA, however, does still retain its supremacy by some considerable margin – for the time being at least. The American political and fiscal crisis and the resulting sequestration promise major cuts in capability that will take time to overcome and could be the beginning of a greater medium term decline and rebalancing. The European navy I optimistically predicted has not come about although the close cooperation of European navies has occurred, in NATO and EU contexts, extending collective reach, sometimes with US support, sometimes not. One cannot rule out future operations by European carrier and amphibious forces as increasingly important global substitutes for the Americans as the USA increasingly concentrates upon China.

My 1990 conclusion has certainly stood the test of time:

‘Whatever the pecking order, … sea power will still be more than a mere slogan. It will be a vital factor in the world political order. Countries will have good reason to care about what goes on at sea and they will want, within their means, to have some way of exerting some level of force there. Maritime forces will continue to absorb large amounts of resources, depending on the capacity of nation to invest in them and its perception of...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Series Editors’ Preface
• Preface
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited
• 2 Are Small Navies Different?
• 3 Small Navies in Perspective: Deconstructing the Hierarch
• 4 Transforming Small Navies b
• 5 Adaptive D
• 6 Small Navies in Asia: The Strategic Rationale for Growth
• 7 The Republic of Korea Nav
• 8 ‘Best Little Nav
• 9 Small Navies and Border and Immigration Control: Frontex Operations in the Mediterranean
• 10 Small Navies in the Black Sea: A Case Stud
• 11 A Small Nav
• 12 The Strategic Value of Small Navies: The Strange Case of the Confederate Nav
• 13 Learning to Be Small: The Experience of the British Pacific Fleet, 1944–45
• Appendix A
• Bibliograph
• Index