Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa

Power shifts, ideas, and institutional change

Kei Koga

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138651746
• eBook ISBN: 9781317229537
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Regional security institutions play a significant role in shaping the behavior of existing and rising regional powers by nurturing security norms and rules, monitoring state activities, and sometimes imposing sanctions, thereby formulating the configuration of regional security dynamics. Yet, their security roles and influence do not remain constant. Their raison d'etre, objectives, and functions experience sporadic changes, and some institutions upgrade military functions for peacekeeping operations, while others limit their functions to political and security dialogues. The question is: why and how do these variances in institutional change emerge?

This book explores the mechanisms of institutional change, focusing on regional security institutions led by non-great powers. It constructs a theoretical model for institutional change that provides a new understanding of their changing roles in regional security, which has yet to be fully explored in the International Relations field. In so doing, the book illuminates why, when, and how each organization restructures its role, function, and influence. Using case studies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/ African Union (AU), it also sheds light on similarities and differences in institutional change between regional security institutions.

1
Introduction

Regional security institutions are intriguingly complex. Scholars have long debated their security utility and many emphasize their limitations in shaping international politics, yet a number of states and policymakers have invested and are willing to invest their diplomatic and economic resources in these “ineffective” institutions. Despite the conventional notion that power politics rules institutions, major powers also engage with these regional institutions and often adhere to their norms and rules. The ability of these institutions to wield such influence hinges not only on their general utility in providing information or reducing transaction costs among members, but also on their political legitimacy as an aggregation of states within the international arena and their role in providing regional norms and rules that determine legitimate conduct for member states. With this power, the institutions can constrain and empower states by shaping states’ choices, behavior, and preferences, and by influencing those of existing and rising regional powers.

The issue of their influence, however, is only half the story. Because the strategic environment rarely remains constant, the regional institutions simultaneously evolve, and do not necessarily emphasize the same objectives, norms, or rules over time. Their institutional raison d’être is subject to change, as is their constraining and empowering ability to shape regional security. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its inception in 1967 never considered having a security mechanism, but it later created security forums in Southeast Asia and beyond, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ) (1994) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (2010). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1975) primarily aimed to create an economic community in West Africa, but it institutionalized a peacekeeping mechanism in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (1999). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) (1963) strictly adhered to the principle of noninterference, and it was inconceivable to have a conditional noninterference principle—which its successor, the African Union (AU), currently holds. Articulating the security effect of these regional security institutions (RSIs) and the dynamics of regional security, therefore, requires an in-depth understanding of institutional change.

However, little of the literature in International Relations (IR) focuses on the questions of why and how institutional changes occur (Acharya 2009; Cottrell 2016).¹ Instead, mainstream IR theories have long focused on the general utility of institutions in the international system, a utility that is characterized by cooperation among states under anarchy. Neorealists argue that the utility of institutions is extremely limited in the international system because it is ultimately the responsibility of the state as a sovereign entity to ensure its own security in the anarchic world. Given the nature of states, which are constantly concerned with relative power vis-à-vis other states and could defect from fulfilling institutional responsibilities, realists claim that institutions do not necessarily guarantee a state’s survival or security.

Other theories, including institutionalism and social constructivism, note that institutions—including security institutions—are not always utility-maximizing tools for states to ensure their own security by the aggregation of military capability. For institutionalists, institutions are useful for states to induce long-term cooperation, even within the security field. Despite their general acceptance of the realist notion that states value relative power, states can effectively cooperate with one another and are satisfied with attaining absolute gains under the conditions that institutions create. These conditions are established by institutions’ monitoring and sanctioning function to prevent states from “cheating,” offering a “shadow of future” effect (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 232; Oye 1986).

Social constructivists argue that institutions “socialize” actors. Institutions not only create “regulative norms,” which constrain members’ behavior by setting obligation, prohibition, and permission, but also nurture a “constitutive norm,” which establishes a new identity and new interests for member states by collectively creating meanings and symbolizing certain actions (Searle 1995, 29). Member states’ shared commitments to social norms then promote increased understanding of appropriate behavior, resulting in a reconstitution of their identity that ultimately shapes their interests, even in the security field (Wendt 1992, 417; Katzenstein 1996, 1–32; Johnston 2001, 487–515).

These studies of general institutional utility are vital to understanding why international institutions are formulated, persist, and occasionally collapse. However, research has suffered from five limitations—both academic and practical —to the broader study of institutions. First, current research treats all institutions monolithically by focusing on their general utility, and therefore has difficulty explaining the variance among institutions and the process of institutional change. Neorealists, institutionalists, and, to a lesser extent, social constructivists explore the common characteristics of a broad range of institutions, and they often fail to distinguish differences among those institutions, particularly RSIs. Second, the research assumes that the functionality of international institutions is a given; it clarifies neither why and how specific objectives, norms, and functions came about, nor what effect they were intended to have. Third, previous studies demonstrate a regional bias toward western states; in their analysis, they fail to focus on regional security institutions created and managed by non-great powers.² Fourth, the omission of RSI’s institutional change as a research agenda in IR diminishes the importance of treating regional institutions as active participants in shaping regional security dynamics. Fifth, although many studies seek to test general theories of institutions by examining a regional institution, these studies do not necessarily encourage a systematic and comparative analysis of institutions across regions, except for the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the most developed regional institutions in the world.

To overcome these limitations, this book analyzes institutional changes in RSIs led by non-great powers. Constructing a new theoretical model, the book explains why and how variances in institutional change among RSIs emerge. This theoretical model illustrates a two-step process of institutional change. First, expected or actual changes in the regional distribution of power create the conditions for an RSI’s institutional change. The model posits that the changes in the distribution of power are neither sole determinants nor a sufficient condition for an institutional change, but that they are a necessary condition. Second, member states reassess an RSI’s security utility in the face of actual or expected changes in the distribution of power, and the outcome of such a reassessment determines the type of institutional change. These member states’ reassessments are based on a reference point, “institutional security preference” (ISP)—an institution’s preference order consisting of its objectives, rules, and norms for addressing certain regional security issues. In short, when the regional distribution of power changes or is expected to change, member states assess its effects on the RSI’s security utility. Through internal evaluation of the future security utility with financial and political cost calculations, member states determine the specific direction of institutional change or lack thereof.

An agent-centered historical institutionalism in comparative politics has been particularly instrumental in constructing this theoretical model. This historical institutionalism emphasizes the role of both structure and agent in explaining institutional change. Its unique contribution rests on two basic concepts that deepen our understanding of how and when agents shape institutions. One such concept is its definition of change. Unlike ahistorical IR theories, historical institutionalism emphasizes a historical reference point to identify change. Institutional history such as sunk costs, institutional legacy, and past decisions create this reference point, which helps actors to evaluate and judge an institution’s current utility relative to the past. The other such concept is a “critical juncture” created by an exogenous shock. A critical juncture produces a “window of opportunity” in which actors’ choices are most likely to affect an outcome. Unlike conventional historical institutionalism, however, agent-centered historical institutionalism does not consider exogenous shock the sole cause of institutional change; it posits that the actors within the institution also play a pivotal role in determining the direction of institutional change, although they still face a certain degree of constraints from the institution. Thus this model contributes to deepening the understanding of the roles of both structure and agent in institutional change.

Still, the historical institutionalism model needs refinement. It does not clarify how structure and agent interact and influence one another at a given moment in time in the international realm. A new theoretical model of institutional change synthesizes this approach in the literature on institution in IR to enhance its explanatory power further. The model can specify the degree to which structural and agent factors are integral to institutional change. This book, therefore, introduces a new theoretical synthesis, one that considers both structure and agent imperative to understanding the causes and processes of institutional change.

Why should we care about the mechanism of institutional change? Explaining this phenomenon contributes to both policy development and academic knowledge. From a policy perspective, this study offers policymakers a better understanding of the utility of each RSI and the dynamics of its institutional change. With this knowledge, policymakers can anticipate when institutional change is likely to occur and what type of institutional change an RSI would likely experience. Moreover, policymakers can anticipate when their ideas and proposals will most influence the outcome of institutional change. Doing so allows them to allocate effectively diplomatic and political resources toward such institutions and to formulate their security policies concerning the utilization of RSIs to achieve their policy objectives. In short, the analysis provides an understanding of “when” and “how” policy initiatives can have the most effect on RSIs’ institutional design.

From an academic perspective, this research offers three main contributions. First, it fills a gap in the existing literature on international institutions because little within IR theory focuses on institutional change. This contribution will help scholars avoid treating security institutions monolithically and to identify and understand each institution’s functions, effects, and qualitative change. Second, it addresses both continuity and change, whereas mainstream IR theories predominantly tend to focus on continuity. Although constructivism attempts to explore the evolution of international norms, it faces difficulty explaining the process of interaction between agent and structure due to different prioritization of structure and agent within its own paradigm (Checkel 1998; Copeland 2000). Unlike these mainstream theories, this theoretical model—based on agent-centered historical institutionalism—enhances the explanatory power of the characteristics of RSIs by emphasizing discontinuity and continuity. Third, this study deepens the understanding of the utility of RSIs led by small- and medium-sized powers. To date, there has been no systematic research on their institutional change; however, their role is gaining currency in regional security, particularly considering how small- and medium-powers can manage and counter-influence great power politics and how they address the emergence of transnational security threats, including international terrorism. In this sense, this systematic examination contributes to further understanding the utility of RSIs.

Based on this theoretical model of institutional change in RSIs, the book conducts its analysis by employing the method of structured, focused comparison to illustrate clearly the two-step process of institutional change. This method helps to uncover causal paths of institutional change: how changes in the regional distribution of power generally induce institutional change (George and Bennett 2005, 75). Additionally, the method illuminates a clear comparison of each case by focusing on the particular aspects of the historical cases and makes “systematic comparison and [accumulation] of the findings of the cases” possible (George and Bennett 2005, 67). It verifies the degree of applicability of the model of institutional change. Furthermore, examining each case through process-tracing helps to investigate a detailed causal chain concerning how member states’ expectations or perceptions influence institutional change and how actors within an RSI influence a specific direction of institutional change. With these theoretical and methodological frameworks, this book examines three RSIs led by non-great powers: ASEAN, ECOWAS, and OAU/AU. I selected these RSIs because they are led by small and medium powers, do not have great powers as members, and evolved to have security objectives, norms, or functions despite this role being beyond the scope of their original objectives. Thus I examine periods for each RSI when changes in its security norms, rules, functions, objectives, or actions were observed.

To operationalize the model of institutional change, I analyzed the evolution of agendas, discussions, decisions, and actions within each RSI by employing process-tracing through archival research, interviews, government reports, and secondary sources such as journal articles and newspapers. Specifically, archival research on these three institutions included over 1,000 documents, some of which—gained through my field research in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Singapore—have yet to be explored in IR. This detailed process-tracing through primary and secondary materials has helped to identify key actors and processes in the construction of the RSI’s ISP.

This book is organized into seven chapters. Following a brief review of existing approaches to and theoretical models of institutional change, Chapter 2 presents a new theoretical model of a two-step process of institutional change based on agent-based historical institutionalism. It discusses detailed definitions and different types of RSIs and institutional change.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 offer case studies for ASEAN, ECOWAS, and the OAU/AU respectively. Each chapter assesses the strategic landscape of the region, member states’ expectations of the utility of each institution, and member states’ discussions concerning the potential transformation within the institution. At the end of each chapter, I present a within-case analysis to generate patterns of institutional change in the same RSI. More specifically, for ASEAN, the periods of 1968–1976 and 1988–1997 are examined. From 1968 to 1976, ASEAN issued the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), and Bali Concord I. This period is also divided into two phases. The first is from 1968 to 1971, when ASEAN adopted the declaration of ZOPFAN in the context of US and British political and military retrenchment from Southeast Asia. The second is from 1972 to 1976, when ASEAN issued TAC and Bali Concord I, while the Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified behind the Sino-US rapprochement. From 1988 to 1997, ASEAN created the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, two ASEAN-led multilateral institutions whose membership includes states outside of Southeast Asia. Another strategic change, US and Soviet disengagement from the region after the end of the Cold War, was witnessed during this period. Whereas ASEAN maintains a central position in both institutions, these newly established institutions formally focus on security issues.

Two periods for ECOWAS are also examined. One is from 1976 to 1981, during which time ECOWAS issued two security protocols: the Protocol on Nonaggression (PNA) (1978) and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) (1981). Although ECOWAS functionally began as a socioeconomic institution, as stipulated in its 1975 treaty, these security protocols allowed ECOWAS to assume security functions, including collective self-defense and collective security, at least on paper. I examine these two protocols and analyze the regional interstate and domestic conflicts that resulted from the Portuguese retrenchment from West Africa in the African continent in 1975. The second period is from 1989 to 1999. During this period, ECOWAS reformed its security functions through two sets of important security decisions or documents. One set is from 1989 to 1993, when ECOWAS created its Standing Mediation Committee, the Declaration of Political Principles, and the Revised Treaty. The other is from 1994 to 1999, during which time ECOWAS created the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS). Through these declarations and documents ECOWAS officially established a comprehensive security mechanism, which included a peacekeeping function. In this section I analyze the strategic trend of the non-involvement of the great powers and the United Nations and how it influenced ECOWAS discussions. I also address how changes in the regional balance of power influenced ECOWAS to change.

Concerning the OAU/AU, I examine two periods: 1979–1982 and 1989–2002. In the former period, the OAU decided for the first time to establish a peacekeeping mission in Chad. I analyze the effect of the 1979 Chad Civil War on the OAU’s internal discussions and the process of the formation of OAU peacekeeping forces. In fact, although the OAU convened a defense committee from the mission’s inception, the institution itself lacked a military function; however, it managed to form a peacekeeping force. This case study is particularly interesting because the OAU did not institutionalize peacekeeping, or any other security mechanisms, within the organization as a whole following the mission in Chad. In the latter period, after the end of the Cold War, the OAU undertook a clearly observable change, transforming itself into the AU, an institution that maintained the right to intervene in intrastate conflicts under certain conditions. This period included sequential changes in the OAU and is divided into two phases. The first is from 1989 to 1993, when the OAU decided to establish the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, through the 1993 Cairo Declaration.

The second is from 1994 to 2002, when the OAU decided to replace itself with the AU through its adaptation of the Constitutive Act. Analyzing the development of the African regional strategic landscape during the 1990s, the OAU’s institutional transformation to AU is analyzed.

Following these case studies, Chapter 6 contains cross-comparison analyses of ASEAN, ECOWAS, and the OAU/AU based on each case study conducted. Finally, Chapter 7 presents conclusions that yield academic contributions and policy implications derived from this study.

2
Theory of institutional change in regional security institutions (RSIs)

Why and how do variances in changes in regional security institutions (RSIs) occur? In International Relations (IR), the theory of institutional change in RSIs has been neither rigorously discussed nor constructed. Although many IR scholars have addressed international institutions, their theoretical frameworks have not focused on institutional change. Theories relevant to institutional evolution do exist; however, one can draw more detailed theories of institutional change from other disciplines (e.g., North 1990; Campbell 2004; Scott 2013), ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Theory of institutional change in regional security institutions (RSIs)
• 3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
• 4 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
• 5 Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU)
• 6 Dynamics of institutional change in RSIs
• 7 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index