The Unconscious

A bridge between psychoanalysis and cognitive neuroscience

Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber, Simon Arnold, Mark Solms, Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber, Simon Arnold, Mark Solms

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138920446
• eBook ISBN: 9781317416807
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Mental Health in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

The Unconscious explores the critical interdisciplinary dialogue between psychoanalysis and contemporary cognitive neuroscience. Characterised by Freud as 'the science of the unconscious mind', psychoanalysis has traditionally been viewed as a solely psychological discipline. However recent developments in neuroscience, such as the use of neuroimaging techniques to investigate the working brain, have stimulated and intensified the dialogue between psychoanalysis and these related mental sciences. This book explores the relevance of these discussions for our understanding of unconscious mental processes.

Chapters present clinical case studies of unconscious dynamics, alongside theoretical and scientific papers in key areas of current debate and development. These include discussions of the differences between conceptualisations of 'the unconscious' in psychoanalysis and cognitive science, whether the core concepts of psychoanalysis are still plausible in light of recent findings, and how such understandings of the unconscious are still relevant to treating patients in psychotherapy today. These questions are explored by leading interdisciplinary researchers as well as practising psychoanalysts and psychotherapists.

This book aims to bridge the gap between psychoanalysis and cognitive neuroscience, to enable a better understanding of researchers' and clinicians' engagements with the key topic of the unconscious. It will be of key interest to researchers, academics and postgraduate students in the fields of psychoanalysis, cognitive science, neuroscience and traumatology. It will also appeal to practising psychoanalysts, psychotherapists and clinicians.

Part I
Conceptual, historical and clinical studies

Chapter 3
Unconscious fantasy

An attempt at conceptual integration

Werner Bohleber
FRANKFURT

Juan Pablo Jiménez
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

Dominique Scarfone
MONTREAL

Sverre Varin
OSLO

Samuel Zysman
BUENOS AIRES

Introduction

Acknowledging the plurality of theories in psychoanalysis constituted a liberating advance within the analytic community, but it also concealed a potential inhibitive factor in attempts to integrate concepts. In fact, to date, there is no consensus on how to decide in favor of one or the other competing, at times mutually contradictory theory, and how to integrate divergent concepts and theories. In response to an initiative by IPA President, Charles Hanly, from 2009 to 2013, an IPA Committee on Conceptual Integration¹ studied the possibility of integrating concepts which, originating in different psychoanalytic traditions, differ entirely with respect to their fundamental assumptions and philosophies. In view of the theoretical and clinical diversity of psychoanalytic concepts, we realized the necessity of developing a method for comparing the different conceptualizations and their underlying theories and, further, placing them in a frame of reference that would allow for a more objective assessment of similarities and differences. Using this method, we began by studying the concept of enactment, the results of which were then published in a paper.² This was followed by a study of unconscious phantasy.

Unconscious phantasy³ is one of the central concepts in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Due to its clinical and theoretical importance, all psychoanalytic schools have developed their own concept of unconscious phantasy. In view of the pluralistic status of theory, it is hardly surprising to discover a large number of definitions, ranging from the classic wishful activity and psychic representative of instincts to a definition of a “not-me experience” as enacted in the analytic relationship.

In order to limit the spectrum of investigation, we were obliged to make a selection of the main papers. We have established a canon of important contributions from different psychoanalytic traditions: from Kleinian psychoanalysis Isaacs (1948), Segal (1991; 1994), and Britton (1995; 1998); from the Contemporary Freudians Sandler and Sandler (1994); from the modern American Ego Psychology Arlow (1969a; 1969b) and Abend (2008); from Self Psychology Ornstein and Ornstein (2008); from Relational Psychoanalysis Bromberg (2008); from French psychoanalysis Laplanche and Pontalis (1968), and Aulagnier (1975).

A model for comparing concepts applied to unconscious phantasy

In group discussions, we reflected repeatedly on the “philosophy” of integration on which our model is based. Recognizing the plurality of concepts is imperative. There are several perspectives and horizons under which phenomena are studied and conceptualized. Consequently, integration is an ideal to which we must adhere without thereby falling prey to the illusion that it can ever actually be attained. We are convinced, however, that steps towards better integration are possible, although we may expect to achieve only a partial integration. With this in view, there can be no justification for partisan or geopolitical reductionism. As we have observed, the terrain is shot through with many difficulties and potential misunderstandings between discussants. As Grossman (1995) and Hamilton (1996) have indicated, there is a danger that theories can come to represent the inner identity of a group to which the analyst wishes to be a part. Furthermore, he or she enters into an attachment relationship to specific theories, which, in turn, convey to him or her a sense of security. Theories are also “internal objects” (Zysman, 2012). This function of theory has become a particularly relevant factor in controversial discussions, as is often the case where the concept, such as unconscious phantasy, happens to be one of the most central concepts of psychoanalysis. Our own experience in group discussions has been that the various members became personally involved to a far greater degree than was the case in discussions on “enactment”. It took time to identify tensions, to focus on them in discussion and to open-mindedly follow one of the member’s detailed explanations of his theoretical convictions.

We have developed a model comprising five steps:

• Step 1: The history of the concept
• Step 2: Phenomenology of the concept
• Step 3: The rules of discourse when discussing concepts
• Step 4: Dimensional analysis of the concept
• Step 5: Integration as an objective

Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of the steps, we would like to emphasize that our task is not to provide a detailed discussion of unconscious phantasy as such, but to elaborate a conceptual map or a schema for classifying the various conceptualizations.

Step 1: History of the concept “unconscious phantasy”

The history of the concept ¨unconscious phantasy¨ dates back to the Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1893–95), the Fliess papers (particularly May 25, 1897, p. 252), and the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895). Earlier terms used for the same concept (such as ¨unconscious ideas¨, Breuer & Freud, 1893–95, e.g. p. 222) were later subsumed under “phantasy”. According to Freud’s “central usage” – a term introduced by Bott Spillius (2001) – phantasies are wish fulfillments arising from instinctual frustrations due to repression. The theoretical background originates in Freud’s topographical model. While phantasies may be conscious, they may pass over to the preconscious, from where they are retrieved once again. This standpoint remained unchanged following the introduction of the structural model. Freud differentiates between two forms of unconscious phantasies: “Unconscious phantasies have either been unconscious all along and have been formed in the unconscious; or – as is more often the case – they were once conscious phantasies, day-dreams, and have since been purposely forgotten and have become unconscious through ‘repression’” (1908, p. 161). This expression “unconscious all along” puts us in contact with what Freud referred to as primal phantasies (Urphantasien). Freud claimed that they are transmitted phylogenetically, as memories from mankind’s prehistory. They are not a product of repression: they are mankind’s current phantasies of primal scene, seduction, and castration.

The Kleinian approach introduced by Susan Isaacs (1948) in the Controversial Discussions at the British Society, introduces radical changes to the concept. Unconscious phantasies are not limited to the repressed phantasies, but are the mind’s content underlying – and accompanying (at least) from birth onwards – the entire structure of mental functioning. This entails accepting the existence of an early psychic activity, which, however rudimentary, establishes the infant’s connection to an external world. The introduction of the concept of projective identification (Klein, 1946) pursued this direction yet further in stressing the idea that the introjection of objects is preceded by projective identifications on them. Existing “real” objects are not the ¨real¨ contents of our mind; our internal objects are unconscious phantasies about given ¨real¨ objects. According to Klein and her disciples, unconscious phantasies exist prior to the acquisition of verbal language, and the non-verbalized ones are primarily expressed through feelings, sensations, and corporal states and movements. They may be equated with what Bion referred to as preconceptions in his theory on the development of thinking. From the clinical perspective, unconscious phantasies are also the stuff of which transference is made. In the Kleinian clinical approach, the analysis of the transferential phantasies represents the via regia to the problems of the patient and to the interpretation thereof. A first ever approach to unconscious phantasies as a co-construction by the patient and the analyst was made by Baranger and Baranger (1969 [2008]). They started from Isaacs’s classical definition and, based on the dialogical nature of psychoanalytical therapy, and with references to Merleau-Ponty and to the concept of “field” in the Gestalt psychology, they postulated the existence of a shared “psychoanalytic field” where a “field phantasy” can be identified and analyzed. Many problems coming to the fore in this perspective, as e.g. communicational consequences of mutual projective identification, were dealt with by David Liberman (1974). The Kleinian expansion of the concept also highlights the intimate connection of unconscious phantasies with human creativity. Accordingly, Hanna Segal explores the relationship between unconscious phantasies and symbolization, and children’s play (equated to free associations) with art and sublimation. She asserts that art and play differ from dream and daydream “because unlike those they are also an attempt at translating phantasy into reality” (1991, p. 101).

In modern North American ego psychology, Jacob Arlow’s conception of unconscious fantasy remains the most influential (1969a; 1969b). In contrast to the Kleinians, for Arlow, the difficulty of the concept arises from the fact that unconscious fantasies are composed of elements with fixed verbal content, and that they have an inner consistency, namely, that they are highly organized. Arlow used the term fantasy in the sense of daydream, and finds it of greater relevance to speak of unconscious fantasy functioning as a constant feature of mental life. He grouped fantasies around basic childhood wishes. Arlow adopts a visual model to illustrate the interaction between fantasy thinking and the perception of reality. Two centers of perceptual input supply data from both the inner and outer eye. Whereas unconscious fantasy activity supplies the “mental set” in which perceptual input is perceived and integrated, external events, by contrast, stimulate and organize the reemergence of unconscious fantasies. However, the function of a third agency of the ego is to integrate, correlate, judge, and discard the competing data of perceptual experience. The result is a composite mixture of the two inputs. Not only the id, but also the ego and the superego play a part in the formation of unconscious fantasies. They are compromise formations.

As contemporary Freudians, Sandler and Sandler (1994) criticize the Kleinian extension of the concept of unconscious phantasy as covering practically every variety of unconscious mental content and thereby overloading it. The Sandlers sought to solve the conceptual problem by distinguishing between two sorts of unconscious phantasies: past unconscious and present unconscious phantasies. Phantasies of the past unconscious occur in the first 4–5 years of life. They are accessible only by reconstructions based on the patient’s material and our interpretations of the past as are rooted in psychoanalytic theory. Phantasies in the present unconscious may be considered partial derivatives of the past unconscious. When the adult individual experiences pressure of any sort his immediate unconscious response issues from his past unconscious as a move towards action or phantasy. However, these derivatives that undergo changes over the course of development, are linked more closely to representations of present-day persons, and are subject to a higher level of unconscious secondary process functioning. In so far as they arouse conflict they disturb the equilibrium of the present unconscious. Here, the entire range of defense mechanisms together with compensatory mechanisms comes into play. Phantasies in the present unconscious function in an adaptational manner by way of involving constant defensive modifications of self- and object representations, and in so doing repeatedly restore the individual’s equilibrium. They have a stabilizing function that maintains safety and well-being in the face of disruptive urges of various kinds, such as humiliating experiences.

In the self-psychological conceptualization of Ornstein and Ornstein (2008) the drive wishes are no longer motivating factors of the unconscious fantasy and its content. This place is now occupied by environmental responses. Unconscious fantasies have a variety of contents directly dependent on environmental influences and specific, individual childhood experiences. If the environment is good enough, fantasies become the source of many of our passions and ambitions. If caretakers are unavailable, or humiliate and treat the child sadistically, unconscious fantasies may become the foundation for symptomatic behavior and for retaliative fantasies. The Ornsteins describe two classes of unconscious fantasies that depend on the dual function of self-object transferences. Not only are they repetitions organized by traumatic experiences, they also represent the search for an experience capable of inducing a desired change. These hopes for change are then organized into a so-called “curative fantasy”. This may be organized at various levels of consciousness and assumes the form of a deep inner conviction that some very specific experiences must first be undergone for recovery to begin.

Philip Bromberg (2008) is a representative of the relational perspective. For the latter, unconscious fantasy has lost its universal character as representative of the drives, and has become a function of dissociated self-states that aids symbolization. In the first stage, the fantasy is a “not-me” experience, dissociated from self-narratives and from narrative memory. It is largely unsymbolized by language and, in the transference-countertransference relationship, assumes the function of an enactment. If areas of dissociation are no longer foreclosed and the capacity for internal conflict has already begun to develop, this would provide an opportunity for symbolizing the enactment. The enactment creates a new perceptual context and allows its symbolization as an unconscious fantasy. In this process, the unconscious fantasy has a hermeneutic function along the way from an action to the conscious understanding of the analytic relationship.

Contemporary findings in developmental research have introduced some new ideas on unconscious fantasy. Freud’s concept of primary process thinking, such as early cognitive functioning in infants and young children, which also manifests itself in the production of unconscious fantasies, was not supported. Research has shown that the child acquires an implicit knowledge of interaction with the caretaker at an early stage and forms expectations and interactional representations thereof. These representations are considered the basic building blocks that constitute unconscious fantasies. They assume the form of unconscious belief statements about the self and the other, and the patterns of their relationship. Here, unconscious is understood as being that which is only implicitly available to the child. Developmental research confronts psychoanalysis with findings emphasizing the significance of exogenous events and their mental representations. While this ongoing debate is interesting, the question remains as to how, if at all, this kind of res...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Preface
• INTRODUCTION
• PART I Conceptual, historical and clinical studies
• PART II Scientific perspectives from psychoanalysis and cognitive neuroscience
• PART III Clinical studies
• PART IV Conclusions
• Index