The European Security Strategy

A Global Agenda for Positive Power

Sven Biscop

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754644699
• eBook ISBN: 9781351890236
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica europea

In December 2003 the EU adopted the European Security Strategy, the first ever common strategic vision of the Member States. This volume examines how the Strategy can form the basis of a comprehensive approach that integrates all dimensions of EU external action, from aid and trade to defence, under the same agenda of 'effective multilateralism' or global governance. This agenda can be translated into the core public goods to which every individual on earth is entitled; promoting access to these global public goods can be the essence of a distinctive European approach emphasizing long-term stabilization and conflict prevention. On that basis, the Strategy can be a global agenda for positive power - global because of its worldwide scope and comprehensive nature - for an EU with effective power to achieve positive objectives. The book will appeal to audiences interested in the EU as an international actor, foreign policy, security and defence, development and trade. It is also suitable for policy makers in the EU institutions and the Member States.

Chapter 1
Reinventing Security

In the Oxford English Dictionary definition, security is ‘the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; […] a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger’. Also described as ‘freedom from fear’, security thus clearly contains a subjective element, an element of perception. The second part of the definition can also be expressed as ‘confidence in the future’, which has a more positive ring to it. Security policy can then be defined as a policy aiming to keep an object, in this case the values and interests of the EU, safe. Since there are many kinds of danger, security is by nature a very broad concept that comprises several dimensions. Traditionally however, both security and security policy have been associated only with the military dimension, with the use of politico-military instruments to avert military danger.¹ The recognition of the broad nature of security is characteristic of the EU. Defence policy is the aspect of security policy that has to do with self-defence against acts of aggression. A strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-today policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed.

This chapter will explore how, as a consequence of the major change of the security environment, new approaches to security policy have been developed, and how these eventually found their way into a security strategy for the EU.

A New Security Environment

During the Cold War, Europe’s security was essentially defined in politico-military terms, as the avoidance of direct military danger by a clearly identified foe. This uni-dimensional definition was a product of the bipolar constellation, in which Europe’s security was deemed to hinge on avoiding armed conflict on the European continent by maintaining a nuclear and politico-military balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union. So European security policy was forged under American leadership, mostly within the framework of NATO, and was essentially limited to defence policy. The non-military dimensions of security were regarded as being of much less consequence for Europe’s security, as were developments in other parts of the world. There was a tendency to develop security policy without taking other external policy aspects into consideration.

The end of the Cold War produced a drastic change in Europe’s security environment. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself meant the end of a direct and major military threat to Europe’s security, i.e. one that could threaten the very survival of the EU. Accordingly, defence policy became less important. The EU Member States had long ceased to be a threat to one another, and through enlargement the deeply integrated European ‘security community’ was extended to Central and Eastern Europe (Deutsch, 1957). But the end of the Cold War also triggered a wave of inter- and intra-State armed conflicts in the vicinity of the EU. Although they have not threatened the EU directly, they have produced negative spill-over effects, e.g. refugee flows and disruption of trade. At the borders of the enlarged EU, the risk of such conflicts is still very real, while the stabilization of the Balkans is far from complete, as outbreaks of violence in Kosovo showed in 2004. In these conflicts, the civilian population has been targeted more than ever before; they can be described as ‘unconventional’ or ‘small wars’ in which the parties do not respect international norms and target society as such (Thiele, 2002, p.68). At the same time, international terrorism poses a much more diffuse and difficult to assess threat, which in the minds of many the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is closely intertwined.

Since the EU has recognized that there no longer exists a major direct military threat to its territory, other factors, which can constitute the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third States, or that can intrinsically affect the values and interests of the EU, have come much more to the fore: organized crime, illegal immigration, social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and respect for human rights, failed States, ineffective multilateral institutions, ecological problems etc. These factors are much less easy to grasp than the previous clearly identifiable threat; they are both more difficult to predict and to manage. Another element of the changing security environment is the growing awareness of the importance of values in international relations, such as democracy and respect for human rights and an effective international legal order. Not only has awareness of other dimensions of security increased, the number of international players – State and non-State, legal and illegal – has grown too. The multidimensional nature of security can no longer be ignored.

The background to this shifting importance of security factors is globalization. The growing dependence on global financial and trade networks has decreased the risk of conflict between the powerful States (NIC, 2005, p.98). Globalization has resulted in interdependence, which has proven to be more than economic: it also has political, cultural and security aspects. As a consequence of globalization, itself a source of tensions between those that benefit from it and those that suffer its negative effects, Europe’s interests are inseparably linked to the stability of its worldwide interaction with other players, and vice versa. This interdependency implies that events anywhere in the world can have an immediate impact on Europe – there no longer is a fixed correlation between the importance of developments for European security and their geographical distance from the EU. It further means that the security of one is dependent upon the security of the other, hence the need for multilateral cooperation. As Kay (2004) neatly sums it up,

under conditions of interdependence, power becomes diffuse – and it works through multiple channels, involves a host of new actors, removes existing hierarchies among issues, and reduces the utility of military force.

In effect, therefore, the security of Europe nowadays is dependent on the stability of the international system as such.

New Approaches to Security

In response to this changing security environment and based on a new assessment of security threats, a number of States and international organizations have sought new ways to deal with security – ways that go beyond the traditional realist, State-centric and defence-oriented, politico-military approach. The use of politico-military instruments can deal effectively with immediate security threats, by ending violence or preventing its eruption, but the underlying causes of instability, conflict and terrorism demand a much broader, long-term and permanent policy of conflict prevention. ‘9/11’ has demonstrated that possession of the greatest military might on earth, including the most advanced technology, cannot by itself guarantee security.

Thus these novel approaches are all much more encompassing than NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted by the Heads of State and Government meeting in Washington on 23–24 April 1999. The Alliance does recognize ‘the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension’. But because of its very nature, that of a defence organization, NATO can only offer the politico-military part of the answer to the new security environment: collective defence (Article 5), peace support operations (‘non-Article 5 missions’), and politico-military dialogue and partnership.

One ‘new’ approach to security that involves the EU Member States in fact dates back to the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1973: the comprehensive view of security taken by the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe now OSCE), which is reflected in the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. The OSCE considers

the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental cooperation […], to be just as important for the maintenance of peace and stability as politico-military issues.

Security is further seen as indivisible. ‘States have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore cooperate’, to the benefit of all parties, since ‘insecurity in one State or region can affect the well-being of all’ (OSCE, 2000, pp.1-3). This cooperative aspect of the OSCE approach to security amounts to inclusiveness or ‘institutionalised consent’ (Nolan, 1994; Cohen and Mihalka, 2001): security policy is aimed at reassuring third countries, through cooperation in a wide range of fields, rather than deterring them. In the words of former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans:

consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism (Evans, 1994, p.96).

In practice the OSCE has not emerged as the leading security organization in Europe. It has focussed on a number of specific issues and instruments which have often proved very successful, including confidence and security-building measures, peaceful settlement of disputes, election monitoring and minority rights. Thanks to its pan-European membership, the OSCE also contributes to disseminating the comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. Through their membership of the OSCE, the newly independent countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States e.g. can be familiarized with this approach and its underlying values.

A first limited attempt to draft a distinctive European security strategy was undertaken within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). In the resulting Common Concept, adopted on 14 November 1995, the WEU states:

acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent.

The Common Concept stressed ‘Europe’s new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe’s security is not confined to security in Europe’, and described the security environment, highlighting inter alia the importance of ‘the maintenance of international peace and order and the widest possible observance of generally recognised norms of conduct between States’ and of ‘democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’, as well as the need to ‘prevent economic imbalances from becoming a threat to our continent’. In terms of how to deal with this new environment however, the document was limited to an assessment of Europe’s military capabilities and the identification of partners for cooperation. At that time, a real review of strategy proved to be politically unfeasible because of divisions between the Member States; furthermore the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to which WEU provided a military arm, was then still in its infancy. Nevertheless, as the first official European assessment of the changing security environment, it was an important and all too easily forgotten step in the development of the EU as an international actor.

The concept of human security is usually thought to have originated in the 1993 and 1994 Human Development Reports (UNDP, 1993 and 1994; Commission on Human Security, 2003). It is also very much present in the report drawn up by UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan in preparation of the September 2000 Millennium Summit (Annan, 2000). Human security takes the individual and his community as point of reference, rather than the State, by addressing both military and non-military threats to his/her security. The security of the State is seen not as an end in itself, but as a means of – and necessary precondition for – providing security for people. Indeed, the State itself can be the source of the insecurity of its citizens. Thus, territorial integrity, traditionally the cornerstone of security policy, is not seen as the overall priority: human life and dignity are the keywords. The UNDP lists seven dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. This very broad, but therefore also unwieldy definition, with ‘vulnerability’ as its defining feature, inter alia is prominent in Japan; in 1998 then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi became one of the proponents of human security (Fukushima, 2004).

Another school of thought limits human security to ‘vulnerability to physical violence during conflict’ (Acharya, 2001). This is the view often found in Canada which under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy became one of the leading promoters of human security. Axworthy (1999a and b) defines human security as ‘freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives’: that is ‘freedom from fear’ as opposed to ‘freedom from want’, the latter corresponding to well-being rather than security. In order to bring the human security concept into practice, Canada has identified five policy priorities – protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety – which are reflected in a focus on a number of specific issues, including landmines, the International Criminal Court, women and children in armed conflict, small arms proliferation and child soldiers (Nelles, 2002; McCrae and Hubert, 2001). This focus on a number of specific issues has led critics to denounce human security as ‘niche diplomacy’ (Copeland, 2001). In this Canadian view, the pursuit of human security can involve the use of force. This was also the conclusion of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established on the initiative of Canada within the framework of the UN General Assembly to look into the concept of humanitarian intervention. The commission identified as a basic principle that ‘where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or State failure, and the State in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’, including, under strict conditions and if authorized by the Security Council, by military means (ICISS, 2001).

Like comprehensive security, human security highlights the interconnections between different dimensions of security. It seeks to cross the boundaries between humanitarian relief, development assistance, human rights advocacy and conflict resolution (Uvin, 2004). It also underlines the global nature of security challenges, which results in mutual vulnerability. Human security therefore requires comprehensive and cooperative responses. While comprehensive security raises the question ‘which threats to our security?’ and cooperative security ‘which security partners?’, human security adds ‘whose security?’. Human security is geared to attaining justice and emancipation, not just order and stability. The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, a non-governmental grouping of Western and Asian think-tanks, has attempted to merge the two approaches by including the individual level in its formulation of comprehensive security, which is defined as the ‘pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means’, a definition that includes both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ (CSCAP, 1996).

For its part, the Council of Europe has developed the concept of democratic security, building on the assumption that armed conflict between democracies is unlikely, and aiming to protect the individual by guaranteeing the rule of law and respect for human rights. Democratic security thus highlights one specific dimension of security. The Vienna Declaration adopted by the first Council of Europe Summit of Heads of State and Government (9 October 1993) states that

the end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security.

Comprehensive security can be linked to another concept that emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s: global public goods (GPG). Public goods are characterized by non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability (Ferroni and Mody, 2002, p.6). Global public goods provide benefits that are

quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999, pp.2-3).

GPG can be grouped under the following broad headings, the core GPG to which every individual is entitled:

• physical security and stability – ‘freedom from fear’;
• an enforceable legal order that ensures the equality of all;
• an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of everyone – ‘freedom from want’ – and allows all to participate fully in decision-making;
• wellbeing in all of its aspects – access to health, to education, to a clean environment, etc.

GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured or enjoyed without access to the other. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG; an excessive gap between haves and have-nots will lead to destabilization. Indeed, it is often only when a threat to the global order is perceived that such deficiencies are taken seriously (Harriss-White, 2002, p.189). Ensuring access to GPG requires effective global governance. An international system that fails to provide the core GPG, as a State should do at the national level, lacks legitimacy. The idea of promoting global governance in or...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Reinventing Security
• 2 Comprehensive Security
• 3 A Secure Neighbourhood
• 4 A Secure World
• 5 Securing the Capabilities
• 6 Securing Implementation
• Bibliography
• Index