Part I
Book discussion and introduction
1 European transnational government for the Other
In the way Said (2003) expressed concerns about the Orient as an alter-ego of Western societies projecting their own cultural norms and rules of identification onto the epistemologically construed external Other, the Roma are politically imagined as the āinternal Otherā (Balibar 2009) of the European model or Europeanness. Yet, Balibar (2009) considers that Roma need to be socially integrated, but social integration is a neoliberal problematisation in itself, and his statement confirms, once more, that Marxist realist analysis can, unfortunately, overlap discourses of power such as neoliberalism. They are seamlessly portrayed as an unrevealed subject1 (e.g. āwho are the Roma ?ā)2, under continuous scrutiny, inquiry and assessment of its peripherality, as part of a dialectical politics of appropriation and re-subjectification3 of a boundary subject, strengthening the political imaginary of a European core identity. This brings similitudes to Black People in America and Jews in Europe (Kalmar & Penslar 2005), āsubjected to a kind of internal Orientalismā (Wilson III 1981: 63), a Western colonising knowledge of the Other entangled with governmental practices, which aimed at exorcising the idiosyncrasies of an imagined non-Westerner or non-European which grounded their existence and expansion.
āVocabulary, imaginary, rhetoricā (Said 2003: 41) of the Westās Orientalism placed subjects of knowledge in a continuum of āscrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or [and] governingā (p. 41). Notwithstanding, Orientalism is much more than a political doctrine of the West. It is an apparatus of knowing, colonising cultural identities and territorialising alternatively construed political subjectivities, employed by architectures of power ā transnational polities ā which reify and project their geopolitical needs of government (e.g. neoliberalisation of Eastern Europe) onto subjects of governance (e.g. the Roma in Europe). The Roma were construed, in Balibarās terms, as the internal Orientals or Orientalised subjects of a purified idealised Europe and āneoliberal conception of European governanceā (Balibar 2009: xi), which still conforms to modern architectural models of apprehension and incorporation of the socially disobedient Other. Furthermore, he argues that the expansion of Europe and the EU triggered divisive mechanisms of categorisation and governance in relation to the Roma and Eastern Europe, which by default were projected as the reversed Other. The latter were mainly construed in relation to an antithetical ideology ā socialism and its reminiscences ā threatening the security of the Western model of economic and social development. EU enlargement brought these distinctions and dialectical antagonisms at the forefront of political and economic integration of the neighbouring antipode, which commanded processes of translation, epistemological and cultural appropriation. As he further suggests, within the political imaginaries of the already constituted EU, the Roma were projected as āstateless peopleā and, therefore, disentangled from previous or current regimes of citizenship structured by Eastern European modern states in order to be appropriated as a signifier of processes of accommodation of Eastern Europe within larger frameworks of governance produced by a neoliberal Europe. In my terms, Roma were subjected to a dislocated spatialisation of governance, which diffused their subjection from the nation state policies towards transnational neoliberal governmental power discussed in this introduction.
In substance, EU enlargement implied a sort of pre-accession neoliberal ānormalisationā of Eastern European statesā which had to undergo reformatory transitions promoted by big international actors such as the World Bank (WB), the European Union (EU), the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which raised concerns about a population not yet developed or socially integrated, implicitly not subjected to its legislative structures and ideological contents.
More recently, the processes of EU accession have been an important impetus focusing international attention on Roma issues from Central and Eastern Europe (ā¦) Roma issues emerge under political criteria for accession as part of the subchapter on āhuman rights and the protection of minoritiesā that was adopted at 1993 European Copenhagen European Council.
(WB 2000: 38)
Prior to 1990, āāEuropeanā institutions paid little attention to Roma/Gypsiesā (Kovats 2001: 1), but after the fall of the iron curtain, when the former socialist states joined transnational polities such as the Council of Europe and OSCE, Western European states and associated large polities became increasingly interested in securitising Eastern European Roma migration (WB 2000), which was portrayed as a threat to āthe stabilityā of the European economic area. As already suggested, the Roma themselves were the signifier of Eastern European poverty and de-regulation, whose status had to be supervised constantly, and the OSCE was the first to pay attention to issues of securitisation of Eastern European populations. The High Commissioner of National Minorities(HCNM) (1993) report underlined both the intrinsic and extrinsic scope of its policies and prioritisation of their instrumental character aimed at migration prevention through a process of state allegiance enhancement involving higher standards of living āfor the sake of such improvements, but also for the reduction in pressures on international migrationā (p. 10). These programs were designed to provide āan enduring sense of belongingā (p. 10), social and economic, to migrants from Southern-Eastern Europe to Western Europe, who āunable to reintegrate at home may be likely to consider the international migration againā (p. 11). The implication of this programmatic deliberate governance of the Other as the migrant populations to the West was the localisation of the implementation of development and social integration programs in the home countries and ideological abode in the political and economic government of Western Europe:
Every effort should be made to support such returned migrants, particularly in the context of more comprehensive programs for improving literacy, job training, and economic opportunity for Roma in their own countries.
(HCNM 1993: 11)
Furthermore, under the requests for enlargement of the economic area, the EU started to āmonitor candidates on minority protectionā (Gugliemo & Waters 2005: 771) and frame its migration prevention policies as social integration of the Roma and populations generally considered āpoorā and āvulnerableā. Yet, once the European inclusion of the Eastern European states was achieved, the EU internalised the problematic of governance and strengthened the focus on social integration and minority rights. Thus, āunderlying concerns about Romani migration have not disappearedā (Kovats 2001: 2), but they have rather been incorporated into new strategies of securitisation of Roma migration as human and social development. Hence, it can be implied that the social integration of the Roma and the Europeanisation of its contents expanded progressively as a European discursive practice and bureaucratic machinery, but, in practical terms, continued as a transnational apparatus of governance of Eastern European migration. In other words, securitisation of mobility was politically translated into the language of human development and social integration, which mainly represented the Eastern European Roma as a European āproblemā that needed further assessment and supervision. New mechanisms of knowledge production and technologies of institutional governance, mainly extraneous to Romani civil society and nation states, became engines for transnational securitisation policies. Although the problematic of governance had become European, the population subjected to it has not been yet Europeanised. It was rather placed in a liminal position from where it was expected to acquire and realise the commitments of the so-called European social integration. Generally, the Europeanisation of the problematic of government for the Roma brought a dialectical command and technical passage between the freedom of movement and technologies of securitisation of migration in the format of human development and guided or āgood governanceā, largely employed by all transnational organisations for development.
Security is directly linked to development: there is no development in chronically insecure environments (ā¦). Security is key to regional stability, poverty reduction and conflict prevention (EC 2003: 7) (ā¦) The concept of security is increasingly understood not just in terms of security of the state, but also embraces the broad notion of human security, which involves the ability to live in freedom, peace and safety. Security must be both as a national interest and as part of individual rights. Security systems reforms is an integral component of good governance [my emphasis].
(p. 8)
In this case, security is tied to human development and governance, but also to further EU enlargement and, therefore, to migration prevention strategies, which discursively construed by transnational actors in development (EC 2003; WB 2000, 2005) need to be implemented by sending states. Thus, the migration of the Roma to Western countries remains a primary concern for regional EU stability and a target of securitisation apparatuses.
However, the current situation of Roma living in poor conditions in enlargement countries has had consequences in terms of the increased number of Roma temporarily migrating to EU member states under visa-free regime and even applying for asylum. This can have a negative impact on visa liberalisation, which is one of the greatest achievements towards the integration of the Western Balkans into EU.
(EC 2012: 17)
In this regard, the transition has been made from a āhuman rightsā perspective to that of āgovernanceā, which ābecame an integral part of the [EU] Poverty Reduction Strategyā (EC 2003: 5). āGovernanceā or āgood governanceā was conceived by both WB (1992) and EC (2003, 2006) as a more comprehensive and less authoritarian concept in its definition, but a more controlled, pervasive and effective mechanism in its actions and leverage. It generally aims to organise the conduct of particular people and states, including the migration of Eastern European Roma to Western Europe.
Sound management of migration is also a factor in ensuring overall a good governance (⦠). By promoting good governance the EU is addressing one of the important roots of migration.
(EC 2003: 12)
There was a broad understanding about the need for a new and strong partnership of all key actors in this field. Moreover, it became evident that only a targeted culturally sensitive approach, which aimed at inclusion of Roma into mainstream society, could lead to progress.
(EC 2010: 4)
Furthermore āmarginalisationā was conceptually connected to poverty, and the social integration of populations such as the Roma became āinstrumental in reducing povertyā (EC 2003: 5). In other words, programs of human development and social integration of āthe vulnerableā as mechanisms of securitisation of migration became entangled with the concept of governance of the Eastern European Roma. Yet, the whole responsibility for the undertaking was left in the hands of the EU member states and the site for the exercise of āgood governanceā was confined to their jurisdiction (EC 2012). Overall, these institutional efforts for āgood governanceā and social integration of the Roma have been expanded and incorporated into a matrix of transnational neoliberal governmental power practically enacted by main transnational polities and organisations which deal with worldwide ādevelopmentā and governance of the Other (Escobar 2012).
Furthermore, cooperation takes place in the framework of international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the United Nations and their Agencies, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the World Bank, as well as in multilateral initiatives, such as the Decade for Roma inclusion 2005ā2015, or more informal networks focused on Roma issues.
(EC 2010: 28)
All these transnational actors devise programs of social integration which, considered to be beneficial to the targeted population, are part of a broader neoliberal economic instrumental rationality which is expected to be incorporated into the new EU state apparatuses of governance. Decreasing welfare through the integration of the Roma into the official labour markets is aimed to be beneficial primarily to the Eastern European states, which can reduce their costs and adjust their economies to the national and global markets.
According to a recent research by the World Bank, for instance, full Roma integration in the labour market could bring economic benefits estimated to be around ⬠0.5 billion annually for some countries. Great participation of Roma in the labour market would improve economic productivity, reduce government payments [my emphasis] for social assistance and increase revenue from income taxes. According to the same World Bank study, the tax benefits [my emphasis] of Roma integration in the labour market are estimated to be around ⬠175 million annually per country (EC 2011: 3). Studies demonstrate that the exclusion of Roma entails important economic consequences in terms of direct costs for public budgets as well in terms of indirect costs losses in productivity.
(EC 2010: 3)
In other terms, the social integration of populations considered to be living at the edge of the newly āliberalisedā economies becomes āboth a moral and economic imperativeā (EC 2012: 5) that needs to be endorsed by the nation states. The latter āhave the primary responsibility and competences to change the situation of marginalised populationsā (EC 2012: 5) by engaging with the transnational governmental powerās legal and technical or semiological apparatuses.4 Thus, the social inclusion of the reversed Other to these political and economic commitments advocated by transnational organisations for development is part of a process of global economic āliberalisationā and integration. Furthermore, this transnational governmental power and its enactments are mainly upheld by and in need for technical knowledge apparatuses and mechanisms of identification of the targeted populations.
[C]ountries need to look carefully at their statistical instruments (for example, censuses and household surveys) and administrative data to assess how they can better capture information on Roma and other minorities that will be useful from a policy perspective. (⦠) More information on international practices, particularly in addressing the privacy issue on ethnic identification, is needed.
(WB 2000: 39)
In order to get useful data in the long term, the Commission will also foster cooperation between national statistical offices and Eurostat so as to be able to identify methods to map the EUās least developed micro-regions, where the most marginalised groups live, and in particular Roma, as a first step.
(EC 2011: 13)
The quotes show how technical knowledge about the Roma and their conditions of existence is an essential component of governance, in a continuous process of regional expansion and diversification of its mechanisms of production, which are mainly yielded by transnational organisations and polities in collaboration with states, experts and also scholars in the field. Following this brief analysis, European social integration, the program of governance questioned in the framework of this book, can be seen as a reflection of these particular articulations between global-national social, economic forms of governance ...