Assessing the Balance of Power in Central-Local Relations in China

John Donaldson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317205326
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

How do we understand the evolution of central-local relations in China during the reform period? This book addresses this question by focusing on eight separate issues in which the central-local relationship has been especially salient – government finance, investment control, regional development, administrative zoning, implementation, culture, social welfare and international relations. Each chapter introduces a sector and the way the center and various local governments have shared or divided power over the different periods of China's reform era. The balance of power is gauged dynamically over time to measure the extent to which one level of government dominates, influences or shares power in making decisions in each of these particular domains, as well as what is likely to occur in the foreseeable future. The authors assess the winners and losers of these changes among key actors in China's society. The result provides a dynamic view of China's changing power relations.

1 Introduction: Understanding central–local relations in China

John A. Donaldson

DOI: 10.4324/9781315616568-1

China’s leaders are compelled to rule a unitary state while simultaneously sharing power with lower levels of government. In a country with such a massive population and continental size, no central leader – no matter how powerful, no matter how feared – can rule without the active participation of local governments. Orders issued from the aerie of any of China’s ancient capitals meant nothing if officials further down the line paid little attention to them. Moreover, no ruler can possibly be knowledgeable enough to understand fully all local situations and provide nuanced orders accordingly. Thus, in order to effectively rule a unified China from a unitary government, central leaders throughout history had to secure some degree of compliance from local governments and grant them at least some measure of discretion in implementation.

In short, China’s leaders have had to balance carefully central control and local discretion. This balance is difficult to achieve, and even more difficult to maintain. To make matters worse, no balance between local and central power is ever ideal; no pattern ever fixed. On the one hand, too much central control could sap energy and innovation, with inflexible implementation creating unnecessary local problems. On the other hand, too much local power could create centrifugal forces that might render a country as massive as China even more difficult to govern. How does China’s central leadership ensure the loyalty and compliance of its subordinate local governments and allow for flexible policy implementation, while simultaneously projecting power down to the remotest areas? This question reflects a fundamental ruling dilemma of leadership in large unitary states. One scholar described this millennia-old dilemma of the push–pull of central versus local decision-makers as follows: Because of this dilemma, China’s power has continuously vacillated between levels of government. This is no trivial issue, for politics is at stake – whose preference prevails, who gets what – and these vital issues depend on the formal and informal workings of this central–local dynamic.

Because of this tension between the centralizing predilections of the rulers and the decentralizing dictates of the environment, the perennial problem of Chinese rulers has been to prevent power from slipping from center to the periphery. . . . Whatever the device, and whatever the temporary success achieved, the basic contradiction in the system soon manifested itself again: few decision-making centers allow power to be retained at the center; this power, however, is likely to be illusory since the center soon becomes bogged down with the great volume of decision-making and communication demanded of it. Many decision-making centers, on the other hand, ease the burden on the center and allow it, in theory at least, to deal with important policy matters only. The likely outcome of this arrangement, however, is that regional centers are liable to usurp the powers and prerogatives of the center.

(Whitney 1970, p. 166)

Among academics, much has been written about how to understand the relationship between central and local governments. Yet the domains in which this relationship is set have been less systematically studied. Of course, some of these dimensions have received individual, focused study. Yet a comparative study of several dimensions can address vital questions that have not yet received full attention. Does this relationship play out differently when the stakes are material compared to when they are non-material? Do finance and welfare policies have the same meaning for the central government as they do for the local? Do the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization of power vary depending on the issue at stake? Who wins and loses when power is distributed in differing ways across different issues?

This book addresses these and other important questions by examining critical issues over which the central and local governments tussle. Issues such as investment control, government finance and taxation, regional policy, culture protection and promotion, policy implementation, social welfare, and even foreign policy – the nature of the conflict varies within each of these areas. Each chapter analyzes a single issue, examining the balance of power between central and local levels. Naturally, there are many other issues that could be discussed – a book this size cannot cover all the different dimensions of conflict between the center and the local. The hope is that by addressing a variety of issues, a more nuanced understanding of central–local relations can be reached.

Each chapter author was asked to review the relevant debates pertaining to changes in the balance of power between central and local governments for one particular issue. To this end, each chapter contains a review of the issue and traces the changes that have occurred since the start of the reform era. Each author was also asked, based on his or her analysis, to make and defend a specific argument that could help in gauging the balance of power between central and relevant local governments, and, as far as possible, help us to understand what factors will influence future changes.

In this process, caution is needed, since the study of the balance of power between central and local governments is often based on a false premise: that there is limited power to share, and that as one level gains power, other levels lose it. Yet in many ways, power among levels is not zero-sum. After all, decentralization, theoretically a loss for the center, was partially a strategy for deepening support for reform, a major priority of the center. Thus, the empowerment of local governments, far from signaling the weakness of the center, was planned by the center in order to pursue its core goals. Moreover, decentralization can strengthen the state’s overall capacity not only by helping reforms reach the grassroots, but also by presenting a safety valve for regionalist pressures, helping to preserve the state overall. Part of the challenge reformers faced was the need to rapidly institutionalize after the anti-bureaucratic reaction of the Cultural Revolution and the chaos that ensued in its wake. Since 1978, China’s government apparatus has been institutionalizing steadily, increasing the total power that governments on different levels can share (e.g., Li 1998; Chung 1998). Thus, allowing provincial and other local governments to take a role in this effort does not inherently weaken the center; in practice, it helped to construct the state as a whole.

Yet even though the distribution of power is not zero-sum, central and local priorities are often in conflict. On the surface, policies that secure borders, promote domestic political stability, and check inflation and budgetary expenditures should be universally supported. Yet even on these “common ground” issues, central and local governments are often at odds – so much more so in respect of issues where interests clearly diverge. Conflict emerges from several sources. First, local governments often pursue local interests and adopt policies that contradict central initiatives and priorities, even in domains that should clearly be part of the central purview. For example, it is a central government responsibly to maintain fiscal stability by controlling inflation. Yet local governments have often invested excessively, fueling inflation – a behavior that the central government struggles to control (see Chapter 3). Local governments have engaged in foreign policy, and while this behavior is usually consistent with and supportive of centrally determined foreign policy, some local government actions are not wholly in tune with central priorities (see Chapter 9). Second, abuse of local power can often threaten stability when local residents, both rural and urban, organize to resist the encroachment of their rights. This can occur when powerful forces threaten the livelihoods of local citizens, leading to resistance. In these cases, ordinary people often expect – or at least hope – that the central government will intervene. Third, if central and local governments struggle over such political and economic issues, how much more might they clash on less fundamental issues, such as regional development policy, welfare policy, and other issues in which interests and priorities vary to an even greater degree? To be sure, China’s governments at all levels are increasingly capable and institutionalized, allowing levels of government to divide an increasingly larger pie. Yet the issue of who gets to set China’s course and establish vital policies remains one of the major issues in understanding Chinese politics.

Central and local governments in the reform era of the People's Republic of China

Comprehending the issues outlined above requires an understanding of China’s administrative hierarchy – the different levels of government that often vie for power. Yet, as Chapter 6 documents, the tensions in the system have sometimes compelled stronger measures that not only shift power up or down the hierarchy, but also alter the hierarchy itself. China’s administrative hierarchy can appear to be fixed and well established. Thus, it is important to remind ourselves that over China’s history, different dynasties have not only shifted power among levels of government, but have also added or subtracted levels in order to maintain control and monitor subordinate governments (Fitzgerald 2002; Zhou 2005).

Today, the number of levels of government in China has more or less settled at four. Yet even here, the story is more complex than it initially appears. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides a clear legal basis for only three forms of local government – provinces, counties, and townships. Article 95 establishes People’s Congresses and People’s Governments in provinces and in provincial-level municipalities directly under the central government, as well as in counties, county-level municipalities, municipal districts, townships, ethnic minority townships, and towns, with standing committees established at every level from county and above (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 95). Article 111 establishes residents’ committees and villagers’ committees in villages, as well as detailing the process for these committees’ election, and their powers and functions (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 111). Yet most forms of prefecture-level governments (with the exception of autonomous prefectures, which are mentioned in the constitution) and sub-provincial municipalities are not mentioned in the constitution.

In addition to providing a constitutional basis for local governments, the constitution clearly establishes the central government’s formal hierarchy over lower levels of government. The powers formally held in central hands include the establishment of new subservient units, the approval of most boundary changes, and the annulment of local regulations and decisions that contradict central law. Specifically, the constitution lists as a function of the National People’s Congress the power to approve the establishment of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government as well as to approve the establishment of special administrative regions (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 62). The approval of the geographic divisions of each unit is the purview of China’s State Council (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 89), with the exception of the boundaries at township level, which can be set by provincial-level governments (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 107). Moreover, the constitution privileges the central government, granting it authority and legitimacy over local governments. For instance, among the functions and powers of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress is listed the power to annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of provincial-level governments that contravene China’s constitution, statutes, or administrative rules and regulations (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 67).

Irrespective of legal status, the number of levels of sub-national government now formally stands at four as shown in Table 1.1: province, prefecture, county, and township. These sub-national governments also appear in differing forms, having variations in different regions – such as in designated ethnic minority areas – as well as in urban and rural areas. Furthermore, there are additional forms of government that do not strictly “count” as levels, but nevertheless perform distinct governmental functions. For instance, China’s 15 deputy provincial-level municipalities, though classified at what is considered a half level, enjoy additional rights not accorded to prefecture-level municipalities. The administrative village, not considered a level of government, performs a number of important functions for hundreds of millions of Chinese rural residents. Together, the various functions performed by different levels represent a complex interweaving of powers, functions, and responsibilities.

As can be seen in Table 1.1, each level below the center has several types of governments, each of which acts somewhat differently and has its own responsibilities. In addition, most levels also have a form that is classified as “autonomous” – areas with large ethnic minority populations that formally have extra flexibility and functions (e.g., Lai 2009). Since all of the chapters in this book depend on an understanding of the functions and responsibilities of each level of government, these are described below.

Province

Most provinces have landmasses and populations that can rival countries. Always important in politics since their establishment during...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Routledge Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction: understanding central–local relations in China
• 2 Central–provincial power relations in the fiscal realm of China, 1980–2014
• 3 China’s perforated investment control, 1978–2013
• 4 China’s regional development policy
• 5 China’s administrative hierarchy: the balance of power and winners and losers within China’s levels of government
• 6 Implementation: changing norms, issue-variance, and unending tugs of war
• 7 China’s culture policy and the central–local relationship
• 8 Recentralization in China’s social welfare regime
• 9 Central–local interactions in foreign affairs
• Index