Ethnic Conflict in Asymmetric Federations

Comparative Experience of the Former Soviet and Yugoslav Regions

Gorana Grgić

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780367173630
• eBook ISBN: 9781134821198
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In the last years of their existence, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) found themselves facing a similar and very grim state of affairs. After their disintegration, the former Yugoslav republics spiralled into a set of ethnic conflicts that did not leave a single one of them unscathed, and in the ex-Soviet space, conflicts were far more limited.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the difference in state collapses and ensuing conflicts in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by focusing on their asymmetric ethnofederal structure and the different dynamics of ethnic mobilization that the federal units experienced. Moreover, it explores the links between identity politics and international relations, as the latter has been a latecomer in research on ethnonationalism and ethnic conflict. Finally, it contributes to the literature on the democratization-conflict nexus by proposing that the sequencing of ethnic mobilization and political liberalization has significant effects on the likelihood of conflict.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of Post-Soviet politics, Balkan politics, ethnic conflict, peace and conflict studies, federalism, and more broadly to comparative politics and international relations.

Part I

Introduction

In their last years of existence, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) found themselves facing a similar and very grim state of affairs. The pushes for political and economic liberalization were growing stronger, secessionist movements were threatening the total collapse of these ethnofederations, and the threats to ethnic minorities within breakaway republics were becoming increasingly conspicuous. However, what followed after their disintegration was markedly different. While the former Yugoslav republics spiralled into a set of ethnic conflicts that did not leave a single one of them unscathed, in the ex-Soviet space conflicts were far more limited.

To understand the main sources of divergence, it is worth to briefly travel in time. First stop, Gazimestan monument in Kosovo Polje on June 28, 1989. The President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević is on an eighteen meters high stage surrounded with hundreds of thousands of Serbs who have come to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. In a speech laden with references to the battle against the Ottomans, Serbian heroism and pride, Milošević utters prophetic sentences – “Six centuries later, now, we are engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet” (BBC 1989). This unequivocal signal would soon become the reality as less than two years later Slovenia and Croatia would experience violent conflicts within their borders.

Stepping back into the time machine, the next stop is Kazan State University in Tatarstan on August 5, 1990. Boris Yeltsin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, is giving a speech as part of his tour of Russia’s regions. His message to the autonomous republics and smaller nations is to “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” (Chernobrovkina 1990). These words have to be placed within a context of struggle against the central Soviet government, yet they will also prove highly consequential.

Over a quarter of century later, there is still a lack of consensus over the causes of collapse of the two states and violent conflicts that ensued in the successor states around the time of the disintegration. The theories of state collapse and conflict have included competing explanations ranging from the deficient institutional system and inevitability of failure of the socialist project; economic shocks and crises; the precariousness of regime liberalization; spillover; to the ‘ancient hatreds’ and the existence of ‘bad men of history’ and their greed. Granted, each of these perspectives offers an important piece of the puzzle to understand the dynamics that contributed to the demise of the two ethnofederations. As with most explanations in the domain of social sciences, parsimony does not necessarily lead to accuracy and it is certainly not the aim of this book to offer one definitive perspective on the etiology of conflict in the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states and territories. Rather, it is to explore how operating on the intersection of comparative politics, international relations and nationalism studies can offer an explanation that takes into account the nature of institutional setup and the way it interacted with political and social developments.

Namely, both the USSR and SFRY were asymmetric ethnofederations, with their respective core republics, Russia and Serbia, pitted against the rest of the republics – collectively, the periphery. This was mainly due to their size, population and asymmetric representation in state institutions. However, the two core republics vastly differed in the way in which they reacted to the institutional changes that were aimed to loosen the authoritarian rule. The advent of perestroika and glasnost in the former Soviet Union triggered the rise of liberal-democratic movement as the dominant stream of popular mobilization in the Soviet core, Russia. On the other hand, in the years of increased political pluralism the Yugoslav core, Serbia, experienced overwhelmingly illiberal nationalist mobilization.

In cases where such early and strong nationalist mobilization in the core was paired with peripheral nationalist mobilization, the conflicts were almost inevitable (such as in Croatia and Kosovo). These conflicts also had the strongest potential to spread to other republics, because of the regional security dilemma they created (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Yet, in the case of the former Soviet Union, the ethnic conflicts tended to have their epicentre in the periphery (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria), making them more limited in spread than they would have been had Russia adopted an exclusively nationalist agenda initially.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the difference in state collapses and ensuing conflicts in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by focusing on their asymmetric ethnofederal structure and the different dynamics of ethnic mobilization that the federal units experienced. It aims to approach the issue from a comparative perspective by analysing conflict occurrence in these two regions. In doing so it will combine insights from several sub-disciplines of political science. The main motivation of this work is to test whether the spatio-temporal dynamics of ethnonationalist mobilization can be a useful explanation for occurrence of conflicts in former Soviet and Yugoslav republics and provinces. At the centre of analysis is the distinction between the mobilizational dynamics in the core federal republics as opposed to the non-core, or peripheral units, as well as the effects of political liberalization in relation to the emergence of ethnonationalist mobilization.

Keeping in mind the importance of popular protests and the voicing of discontent with the existing institutional setup in bringing about changes that eventually led to the collapse of the USSR and SFRY, there seems to be disproportionately little scholarly work assessing the extent to which dynamics of popular mobilization played a role in these changes. Moreover, the mobilization in question was ethnonationalist in character, meaning that the calls were made not only for regime change, but also for gaining more autonomy or seceding from the federal states completely. There is little doubt that the emergence of exclusionary ethnonationalism was among the primary causes of conflicts in the territories of former Soviet and Yugoslav republics. Yet, in the Western Balkans,¹ the ethnic conflict virus seemed to have infected the entire region, whereas in the post-Soviet space the conflict contagion was far more limited. This is exactly the puzzle that this book will address – how is it that the successor states of the Soviet Union managed to escape widespread conflicts and why most of the violence was limited to the Caucasus,² and how to best explain the fact that almost all of the former Yugoslav republics got dragged into brutal wars.

The argument that will be provided in this book looks at the dynamics of ethnonationalist mobilization as the explanatory variable for the occurrence of violent conflicts. More specifically, it makes a case for a nuanced analysis of the spatial and temporal settings of mobilization. First, it is important to emphasize the impact of spatial dimension of mobilizational dynamics, since the states in question were asymmetric ethnofederations with core and peripheral units. The expectation here is that ethnonationalist movements within the core republic bear more serious implications for the mobilization of the periphery than vice versa. Second, the impact of temporal sequencing of ethnonationalist mobilization and the opening of the polity (or liberalization) is crucial for the success of future democratic transition. Namely, mobilization that precedes liberalization has greater chances of resulting in ethnic outbidding and subsequently in conflict than does the opposite sequence of events. Following the temporal and spatial distinctions, the book will argue that mobilization preceding liberalization (‘early’ mobilization) and core mobilization are more likely to lead to violent conflict than mobilization following liberalization (‘late’ mobilization) and peripheral mobilization. By combining the two dimensions, it will be argued that early core mobilization will be more likely to lead to conflicts than late core mobilization.

More specifically, the book will examine the timing of ethnonationalist mobilization in core states (Russia and Serbia) versus the peripheral mobilization (in selected cases of the remaining republics and provinces in the USSR and SFRY). It finds that in the former USSR, the core republic mobilized on an ethnic basis after liberalization of the polity commenced in 1985–1986. The conflicts that occurred throughout the late 1980s and during the 1990s on the territory of the former Soviet Union were mostly the result of, in some cases, very strong and early peripheral mobilization. However, they remained relatively concentrated in their scope, without spreading outside of the areas where they first escalated. On the other hand, the core republic in the former SFRY mobilized early, which was coupled with early peripheral mobilization. These dyads were particularly prone to escalation of conflict. In that respect, it will be argued that the mobilization-liberalization sequence within the core has strong implications for the occurrence of regional conflicts.

This book operates on a mezzo level by borrowing assumptions from nationalism studies, comparative politics and international relations to analyse the behaviour of ethnic groups within the first- and second-order administrative units of collapsing federal states and/or the successor states that are collectively viewed as regions. First, it is important to consider the role asymmetric ethnofederal setup played in bringing about the violent collapse of Yugoslavia and the less violent collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, it is equally crucial to account for the sequencing of liberalization and ethnic mobilization within domestic polity and its effect on the likelihood of conflict occurrence. Third, the so-called “ethnic security dilemma” dynamics is useful in studying the tides of ethnonationalist mobilization (Posen 1993). Lastly, the conflicts that are studied could be best described as ‘internationalized ethnic conflicts’ set within the said regions in which neighbours generally have ethnic or political ties to states in conflict and thus an incentive to intervene.

Even though no two regions in the world make for perfect cases to compare, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia still provide a very good testing potential. With their socialist legacy, federal arrangements and ample cases of regional separatism, there is a possibility of holding certain variables constant and investigating differences in regional conflict dynamics. Of course, one has to acknowledge that even with these important similarities come caveats, since Yugoslavia had a softer version of communism to start with and it was also more confederal in its institutional arrangements. On the other hand, the core republic in the Soviet Union did not possess institutions on a republican level like the ones in the peripheral republics due to its size and power. Moreover, Russia used to be a powerful empire immediately prior to the creation of the communist state, which was very different to the experience of the core republic in the former Yugoslavia.

Yet, in the period between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, both of these regions underwent similar developments with political and economic liberalization, democratization, ethnonationalist movements gaining clout, the state collapse and escalation of conflicts (although not always in that order). What makes them uniquely suited for studying the impact of ethnonationalist mobilization is that they experienced conflicts of varying intensities. Moreover, the core units had different patterns of ethnonationalist mobilization. However, in both regions some peripheral units mobilized early and others late, while at the same time most of them experienced violent conflict. These variations thus enable effective comparison of the selected cases and provide for the assessment of causal links.

Outline

Chapter 1 commences by first examining the concepts of ethnicity, ethnonationalism and ethnic mobilization. It then lays out the theoretical model that drives the case study analysis and argues that variation in the occurrence of ethnic conflicts is due to the integration of key factors: sequencing of liberalization and mobilization, and setting of mobilization (core republic versus peripheral republics within asymmetric federations). The model uses spatio-temporal dynamics of ethnonationalist mobilization to determine the likelihood of conflict occurrence.

The key expectations are that mobilization that takes place before liberalization, or early mobilization, is more likely to lead to conflict than late mobilization since the polity has greater chances of becoming fragmented along ethnic rather than ideological lines. Moreover, mobilization of the core unit is more likely to evoke strong response from the periphery than vice versa, since such behaviour on part of the core implies potentially greater threat to the peripheral units due to power disparities. Paired together, one would expect that the cases of regions in which the core mobilizes early are more likely to escalate to conflict than the cases in which we see late core mobilization or solely early peripheral mobilization.

Chapter 2 provides a comparison of the key political, institutional and cultural aspects across the two asymmetric ethnofederations. It also explores the control and confounding variables that are important to emphasize before moving on to the empirical analysis section of the book. Furthermore, this chapter also refers to the competing accounts of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It explores the arguments within the relevant literature that deal with explanations for ethnic mobilization, as well as the causal paths between mobilization and violence. Chapter 2 also examines the links between regime change and conflict, focusing primarily on political openings and democratic transitions. Lastly, it inspects the scholarship that tackles the question of regions and units within them, as well as the implications of intra-regional differences on the occurrence of conflicts.

Chapter 3 is the first of the four empirical chapters. It focuses on the key developments with respect to ethnonationalist mobilization in the two core federal republics, Russia and Serbia. The chapter provides brief historical backgrounds for understanding the bases for mobilization in these two republics, while closely following the dynamics of ethnonationalist movements throughout the 1980s. Crucial for the main argument of the book, this chapter emphasizes the central role of mobilization and political liberalization sequencing, as it demonstrates that the two core republics experienced a significantly different order of events, as well as ethnonationalist movements that were unalike in strength and scope. This chapter also illuminates the importance of essentially opposite elites’ agenda and response to the collapse of the state once it became apparent.

Chapter 4 examines the paths of early ‘mobilizers’ in both regions. It offers in-depth analysis of Armenia, Georgia, Kosovo, Slovenia and Croatia. The analysis traces the bases for ethnonationalist mobilization, from ethnic identity and incentives to mobilize to capacity to do so, and investigates the different paths to violent conflicts. Overall, early peripheral mobilization in all cases led to violent conflicts, however there are substantial differences in the primary aims of ethnonationalism in these republics and provinces. In the former Yugoslav republics, the conflicts that broke out were the product of secessionist goals of federal units of the first order, while in the former Soviet republics, the conflicts initially occurred due to competing claims regarding the definition of republican borders within federal republics. This in turn serves as a potential explanation for the comparatively higher spread of conflicts in the former Yugoslav region.

In Chapter 5, the peripheral units that mobilized late and experienced conflict are considered. The three cases inspected are those of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya and Moldova, which had markedly different post-mobilizational paths, spanning from low-intensity and short duration conflicts to high-intensity and recurring wars. This chapter demonstrates how late peripheral mobilization can also lead to conflict, however, such outcomes are in close relationship with the developments in the core. Namely, in the case of former Yugoslavia, the ethnonationalism of Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the product of ethnic security dilemma, and a response to the early core and periphery mobilization in Serbia and Croatia. On the other hand, the ethnonationalist mobilization in Chechnya and Moldova arose as a result of the political opening in the Soviet Union, which only subsequently triggered counter-mobilization from the core. Thus, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is best understood as the product of conflict spillover, whereas Chechen and Transnistrian wars tended to be more localized.

Chapter 6 is the last in the empirical section and it presents the cases of early ethnonationalist mobilization that avoided large-scale violent confrontations. The ‘near misses’ in the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia had all mobilized prior to political liberalization. This chapter accounts for the reasons behind averted escalation to violence.

The final chapter provides a summary of the main findings and offers conclusions regarding the impact of mobilization dynamics on ethnic conflict occurrence. Throughout the study, there is a significant support for sequencing of ethnonationalist mobilization and political opening as one of the key determinants for the occurrence of violence, particularly within the core unit. The last chapter also provides an outline of implications of the main findings. First, how the theoretical framework presented in this project can help in understanding the interaction between regime change and nationalist movements more broadly in other federal settings, as well as in unitary states. Second, more nuanced implications for the success of democratic transition and avoidance of ethnic conflict is proposed. Lastly, this book aims to make a contribution to the scholarship that explores the link between regime change and conflict by focusing on liberalization, rather than democratization effects.

For a while, it seemed that the state of world affairs was quite unkind to the students of post-communist regions, as the global security agenda shifted elsewhere taking with it academic interest. However, the recent resurgence of Russian power in its Near Abroad opened many of the questions regarding the activation of latent nationalism and its role in escalation to a full-fledged war. This work seeks to demonstrate that the study of former Soviet and Yugoslav republics in the last decades of their existence still bears relevance as it offers contributions to understanding under which c...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• PART I
• PART II
• PART III
• PART IV
• Index