Chapter 1
Eschatology and Truth
Robert Turner
John Zizioulas’ view of the Church as communion has engaged theologians of diverse backgrounds who have produced widely divergent evaluations of his contribution. Since the publications that develop Zizioulas’ ecclesiology were often prepared for conferences or theological commissions, it is fair to say that his collections of essays are not yet a work of synthesis. Our task is to find the unity in his work.1
In this chapter I propose that three principles regulate the ecclesiology of John Zizioulas: an ontological, an eschatological and an epistemological principle. The ontological principle is rooted in the difference between Creator and creation, and points to the ontological importance of salvation. The eschatological principle accounts for the relationship of the eschatological truth to history and shows that salvation is realized in historical and ecclesial events without being determined simply by historical causality. The epistemological principle establishes the role of ecclesial life for theological discourse, recognizes the limits of that theological discourse and the obligation to articulate the good news of salvation in Jesus Christ.
Ontology of Creator and Creation
Zizioulas begins the introduction to his collection of articles, Being as Communion, with the thesis which underlies his work: ‘The Church is not simply an institution. She is a “mode of existence,” a way of being. The mystery of the Church, even in its institutional dimension, is deeply bound to the being of man, to the being of the world and to the very being of God.’2 This ontological perspective articulates the meaning of salvation. Zizioulas is a theologian rather than a philosopher. ‘The eternal survival of the person as a unique, unrepeatable and free “hypostasis,” as loving and being loved, constitutes the quintessence of salvation, the bringing of the Gospel to man.’3 His understanding of salvation establishes the freedom of created being from non-being or non-existence. To account for salvation from death through union with Christ, he explains divine being’s capacity to offer salvation to created being and describes the ontological character of life in Christ. Zizioulas bases his approach to ontology on three premises which are fundamental to his understanding of being, both divine and created: a) true being’s freedom from necessity; b) being as a communion of persons; and c) the person as cause of being.
Christianity expressed its faith in a world of established cosmologies. Greek cosmology was fundamentally a monistic ontology. ‘Not even God can escape from this ontological unity and stand freely before the world, “face to face” in dialogue with it. He too is bound by ontological necessity to the world and the world to him.’4 A monistic approach eliminates true freedom for God because there is no absolute separation between divine being and the cosmos. In the monistic view, the act of creation by God is an aesthetic act without ontological significance. It achieves beauty by re-ordering of pre-existent matter. Without a beginning, there is no real possibility for the non-existence of created being, with the consequence that the being of God is confronted with a necessary relation to non-divine reality. The scriptural understanding of creation separated God from creation. The notion of creation ex nihilo expressed the otherness of the being of God from the being of the world. The being of creation is the result of God’s will. God is not obliged to create the world in order to be God, nor is the act of creation simply the act of ordering already existing being. God’s freedom in relation to the world is unconditional. In the Christian view of creation God creates because ‘… il veut qu’existe quelque chose d’autre en dehors de Lui, “quelque chose” avec quoi s’entretenir et s’unir.’5 [… he wants something to exist outside Himself, ‘something’ to which he can relate and unite himself.] Creation has ontological, not simply aesthetic, significance because the divine act of creation brings the world into existence.
For God to be free requires not only freedom from the world, but freedom within divine being. Freedom within divine being is based on the ontological significance of divine persons, and on the Father as the cause of divine personhood. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo alone fails to establish the freedom of God. The scriptural tradition of creation and the experience of the divine persons are the elements that save divine being from the claims of necessity. Zizioulas develops an understanding of the person with ontological content which conditions the discussion of the unity of divine being. Divine personhood is the starting point for discussion of divine being.6 By giving priority to divine person rather than divine substance, Zizioulas establishes the freedom of divine being. The particularity or otherness of the person is not added to being; rather it causes the being to exist and is therefore the point at which being can truly be treated. The personhood of God could be understood as a secondary characteristic of God, the divine substance being primary. Zizioulas rejects this approach: ‘… unless we admit on a philosophical level that personhood is not secondary to being, that the mode of existence of being is not secondary to its “substance” but itself primary and constitutive of it, it is impossible to make sense of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.’7 Being is infused with necessity without attributing real being to difference. The question is ‘… whether otherness can make sense in ontology, whether ontology can do anything more than rest on the idea of totality.’8 Zizioulas’ ontology of persons in communion seeks to make a unique contribution to ontology found in the realization of salvation in Christ.
Ontological difference within divine being is expressed by the concept of person. The unity of divine persons is expressed by one divine substance, but this one substance is not the starting point for the discourse on divine being.9 Zizioulas does not abandon the importance of the unity of divine being expressed by the one divine substance, but speaks about the unity of divine being with an understanding of person that expresses unity of substance by the communion of persons. Personhood means otherness, difference, but not in isolation, because the full meaning of personhood is found in the communion of persons. Personhood not only describes ontological difference, but is the starting point for ontological unity. Instead of depending on two principles, Zizioulas shows us that personhood serves as the basis for both difference and unity because both ekstasis and communion are constitutive of personhood.
Personhood is constituted by ekstasis, the movement outside of self. It is an ekstasis which takes the person beyond the particularity of his ontological identity. Personhood ‘… affirms the integrity and catholicity of being (cf. hypostasis) and must of necessity overcome the distance of individualization (cf. ekstasis).’10 True freedom in an ontological sense is not simply the possibility of choice between limited options. The ecstatic character of the freedom of the person is found fully only in the ecstatic love of divine personhood.11 Communion with otherness is a movement out of self, not by necessity, but by the freedom which constitutes love. The personhood of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit establishes difference and unity by the ecstatic character of personhood. The divine persons are not modes of action in regard to creation, but rather modes of being which constitute divine being. The reason the divine persons are persons is therefore not their work within the economy of salvation, but the freedom of God expressed in ecstatic love that makes divine being personal. In constituting divine being, personhood assures freedom within divine being and so, like the concept of substance, establishes the unity of divine being.
The next step is to show that the person is not only the principle of difference and unity but also the cause of being; persons, not substance, cause being to exist.12 The personhood of God is not required by divine substance.13 The personhood of God is caused by the person of the Father.14 The ontological principle of God ‘… does not consist in the one substance of God but in the hypostasis that is, the person of the Father.’15 The importance of this starting point is the freedom of the being of God from ontological necessity: ‘… the substance never exists in a “naked” state, that is without hypostasis, without “a mode of existence” … divine substance is consequently the being of God only because it has these three modes of existence, which it owes not to the substance but to the one person, the Father.’16 The Father as the ontological principle of God does not create a subordinationism because the divine persons share the same substance, and because, considered in isolation from the Son and Spirit, the Father alone is not a personal hypostasis, or personal mode of existence. Father and divine substance would be synonymous because Father would not express a particular personal mode of existence.
Zizioulas’ understanding of God begins with the divine persons, but his discussion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit is not limited to the economy of salvation. His interest is the real possibility of God’s freedom from necessity. Neither limiting our discussion to the economy of the Trinity, nor the concepts of substance and person alone would assure the freedom of God in discourse on divine being. Divine being as a communion of persons through ecstatic love, along with the person of the Father as cause of divine being, establishes the freedom of God. Because of this freedom, divine being can be the source of created being’s freedom from non-being. The communion of divine persons is essential for the Christian hope of salvation.
Zizioulas contrasts the ontological state of created being and divine being by pointing out that created being is not free.17 The concept of the fall of mankind does not change the fundamental ontological reality of created being. Zizioulas rejects a natural capacity for the survival of the cosmos or the human person. The beginning of the world establishes its separateness from divine being, so its mortality is not simply the mortality of particular beings of all of created being.18 The Fall does not constitute the ontological need of creation for salvation from non-being.19 Speaking of a naturally eternal soul places in question the true distinction between divine being and creation. There is no natural means for the true survival of created being. The mortality of created being is overcome only through communion in the personal life of God.20 This ontological concern means that Zizioulas does not begin his discussion of salvation by talking about sin.21 His starting point is the ontological distinction between divine being and created being.
The creation of the human person in the image and likeness of God, as a person capable of freedom, was God’s means of providing for his creation.22 Personhood becomes the link between God and creation, for the human person offers a unique contribution to the rest of creation. Humanity is unique within creation because it was created in the image and likeness of God, and so represents the extension of personhood to created being. The freedom of the person, which makes it possible for his actions to transcend necessity, and the solidarity between mankind and the rest of material creation, are the basis for the mission of mankind in creation. The fall is interpreted within this view of personhood. It expresses the ecstatic movement ...