The EU as International Environmental Negotiator

Tom Delreux

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781409411826
• eBook ISBN: 9781317033455
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Delreux examines how the EU functions when it participates in international environmental negotiations. In particular, this book looks at the internal EU decision-making process with regard to international negotiations that lead to multilateral environmental agreements. By studying eight such decision-making processes, the book analyses how much negotiation autonomy (or 'discretion') the EU negotiator (the European Commission or the Council Presidency) enjoys vis-à-vis the member states it represents and how this particular degree of discretion can be explained. The book's empirical evidence is based on extensive literature review, primary and semi-confidential document research, as well as interviews with EU decision-makers. It is aimed at a readership interested in EU politics and decision-making, global/multilateral governance, environmental policy science and methodological development of Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781315616292-1

This book is about the European Union as a negotiator in international environmental negotiations. More in particular, it looks at the internal political processes in the EU when the EU negotiates multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). In international environmental negotiations, the EU is mostly represented by a (set of) EU negotiator(s). The EU is often seen as a single actor, as a unitary negotiation partner. However, it is not. Within the EU, member states and the European Commission determine how the EU is functioning at the international negotiation level. These internal EU processes are analysed in this book. It focuses on the interplay between negotiations at the EU and at the international level. How does the EU function when it operates as global actor in the field of international environmental politics? How and to what extent do member states pool their voices, delegate negotiation authority and aim to speak with a single voice at the international level? In which way is a common EU position established? How does die institutional context of the EU transform the aggregated preferences of the member states into bargaining power that can be played in international negotiations? By answering such questions, this book analyses the decision-making process within the European Union in order to gain a better understanding of. on the one hand, the way the EU operates during international negotiations, and. on the other hand, the internal balance of power between the various EU actors.

The EU is usually seen as an important player in global environmental governance and international environmental negotiations. It has been labelled a 'frontrunner' (Damro, 2006), a 'crucial actor' (Damro, Luaces, 2001), an 'influential global actor' (Rhinard, Kaeding, 2006), or a 'powerful global actor' (Jokela, 2002). Some scholars even portray the EU as an 'environmental leader' (Zito, 2005; Kelemen, 2010). ¹ Because the EU is an important player in the negotiations, the negotiation role, positions, strategy and bargaining power of the EU have to be taken into account in order to understand the process and the outcome of international negotiations leading to an MEA. To comprehend the political dynamics and events at the international level, understanding the processes at the level of the key players is important. Therefore, the political processes inside the EU need to be unravelled. In the current international relations literature, it is generally assumed that explaining the behaviour of a political actor negotiating at the international level requires taking into account the politics at its internal level (Moravcsik, 1993; Milner, 1997; Jupille, 1999). Such actors are not black boxes and their internal political dynamics matter. This claim is certainly true when analysing the EU as an international actor. The EU is not a state with a single domestic level, but a complex multi-level polity with its own institutional context in which the preferences of the future parties to the MEA are aggregated, and possibly formed and transformed.

¹ The claim that the EU shows leadership in international environmental negotiations is particularly made with regard to biotechnology (Tiberghien, Starrs, 2004; Falkner, 2007) and climate change (Yamin, 1998; Chagas, 2003; Cameron, 2004; Costa, 2006; Schreurs, Tiberghien. 2007; Oberthür, Roche Kelly, 2008; Schmidt, 2008). However, other scholars question the leadership role of the EU, stating that this claim is only made by the EU itself (Jokela, 2002; Bretherton, Vogler, 2003; Dessai, Schipper, 2003; Vogler, 2005), that the EU has not yet fulfilled its leadership potential (Liberatore, 1997; Ott, 2001), that the EU is not perceived as a leader by the negotiation partners (Elgström, 2006; Elgström, 2007), or even that the EU is characterized by a 'leadership deficiency' (Sjöstedt, 1998). Although scholars do not agree on the leadership character of the EU, there is a broad agreement in the literature that the EU is a key player in international environmental negotiations.

In conceptual terms, two kinds of actors take a central place in EU decision-making processes with regard to international negotiations: member states and EU negotiators. The member states are often represented by one or more actors, negotiating on their behalf. I label these actors the 'EU negotiator(s)'. In practice, the EU negotiator is usually the Commission, the Presidency, one or more member state(s), or any combination of these. The EU decision-making processes studied in this book are thus characterized by the relation between actors who are represented (the member states) on the one hand, and actors who represent them (the EU negotiators) on the other hand.

The central concept, around which the analysis in this book is built, is 'discretion'. Discretion should be understood as the autonomy, the range of potential independent action or the degree of freedom enjoyed by the EU negotiator vis-à-vis the member states. The discretion enjoyed by the EU negotiator vis-à-vis the member states is crucial to understand the dynamics and the outcomes of the international negotiations. It determines the EU's flexibility with regard to reacting on proposals by the negotiation partners and it determines how far the EU negotiator can go along with the direction in which the international negotiation process and its outcome are moving. In other words, the EU negotiator's discretion defines whether the EU negotiator constantly needs to consult the member states or whether the EU negotiator can react with a certain degree of autonomy to the dynamics of the international negotiations. The extent to which the EU negotiator's hands are tied is thus decisive for his negotiation behaviour at the international level (Moravcsik, 1993; Meunier. 2005; Meunier, Nicolaïdis, 2006).

1. Aim of the book

1.1. Research question

The aim of this book is to answer the following research question: which conditions determine the EU negotiator's discretion vis-à-vis the member states during international negotiations leading to a multilateral environmental agreement? In order to identify the conditions under which the EU negotiator enjoys a particular degree of discretion, this book goes beyond the single case study method, as it has been used in studies on the EU decision-making process with regard to other external policies of the EU (mostly in the trade policy domain). It analyses and compares the EU negotiator's discretion in eight international negotiations leading to an MEA: the UN Desertification Convention, the African-Eurasian Waterbirds Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, the Aarhus Convention, the Rotterdam PIC Convention, the Cartagena Protocol, the Stockholm POPs Convention and the SEA Protocol

By studying the EU negotiator's discretion, I focus on the core element of the EU decision-making process and of the relation between the representing and the represented actors: the balance of power in the EU. Do the member states still dominate the process or is the degree of discretion enjoyed by the EU negotiator so high that the latter rales the process? Which actors or which institutions are pulling the strings in the context of the EU as an actor in international environmental politics: those who delegate or those who represent, or - in the theoretical terms used in this study - the principals or the agent? In their overview and assessment of research dealing with similar questions in the area of the EU's external trade policy, Dür and Zimmermann mention that various authors come to different conclusions on the question whether the EU negotiator enjoys a high degree of discretion or not (Dür, Zimmermann, 2007). ² This may indicate that the EU negotiator's discretion is not constant in every decision-making process and that the research focus should be shifted from explaining the EU negotiator's discretion in a single decision-making process towards identifying the scope conditions and causal mechanisms of discretion. This book takes the observation by Dür and Zimmermann as a starting point and aims to identify the conditions under which the EU negotiator enjoys a particular degree of discretion.

² As examples of studies demonstrating that the Commission dominates the process, Dür and Zimmermann mention Johnson, 1998; Coleman, Tangermann, 1999; and Woll, 2006. By contrast, examples of studies emphasizing member state dominance are Aggarwal, Fogarty, 2004; De Bièvre, Dür, 2005; Meunier, 2005; and van den Hoven, 2004.

1.2. Puzzle

Studying EU decision-making processes with regard to negotiations leading to an MEA not only contributes to a better understanding of the EU's role in international environmental politics. It is also particularly relevant and interesting from the perspective of EU politics because of a twofold reason. First it teaches us something about the way the EU deals with so-called 'mixed agreements', which are an increasingly important component of the EU's external relations. Second, the study of these decision-making processes fits in the framework of the general debate about the balance of power in the EU. Both the member states and the EU negotiators are faced with dilemmas. Their respective trade-offs do not only determine the way the EU negotiates at the international level, but also the internal balance of power within the EU. Let us have a deeper look at these two points.

1.2.1. Mixed agreements as an increasingly important component of the EU's external relations

Most research on the EU as an international actor deals with either the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the EU's external trade policy. These policy areas constitute the ends of the intergovernmental-supranational continuum of the EU's external relations. CFSP is characterized by an intergovernmental dynamic, national competences and memberstates maintaining their sovereignty as international actor, although possibly represented by a common representative, such as the High Representative or previously the rotating Presidency. External trade policy, by contrast, has a more supranational character, based on EU competences, which mostly results in the Commission negotiating at the international level on behalf of the member states. While the CFSP is mainly member state driven, the Commission plays a key role in trade policy-making. The EU's external environmental policy is situated somewhat in-between both ends of the continuum.

So far, less scholarly attention has been paid to what happens in the middle of this continuum. This might surprise as many issues in international politics are covered by the competences of both the EU and the member states. These are 'shared competences' and the international treaties touching upon this kind of competences are 'mixed agreements'. Both the EU and the member states are a party to these agreements. Mixed agreements do not only occur in the environmental policy domain. Other well-known examples are the EU-US Open Skies Agreement various Stabilization and Association Agreements with Balkan countries, or trade agreements including the so-called 'new trade issues' ³ (Meunier, Nicolaïdis, 2000; Leal-Arcas, 2003; De Bièvre, Dür, 2005; Billiet, 2006; Dür, Zimmermann, 2007). Nowadays, mixed agreements are thus part and parcel of the day-to-day practice in the external relations of the EU. Therefore, the limited attention in the political science literature for the way the European Union copes with (negotiations on) mixed agreements is striking. By contributing to the understanding of the functioning of the EU in this kind of international politics, this book aims to fill a significant gap in the existing literature.

³ In the introduction to the special issue of lounial of Common Market Studies on the EU in international trade negotiations, Dür and Zimmermann mention that 'the constant expansion of the scope of international trade created substantial tensions between the Council of Ministers and the Commission over how to negotiate and how to ratify international agreements on "behind the border" issues" (Dür, Zimmermann, 2007, pp. 773-774). This puzzle, emerging the last decade in the international trade area, lias been present in the EU decision-making processes with regard to international environmental negotiations since a long time.

As both the EU and the member states will become a party to an MEA, they are both present around the international negotiation table. The issues covered by EU competences should be negotiated by the European Commission, while the member states can formally negotiate the issues on which they still have competences. However, such a clear division between EU and national competences undermines the EU's ability to speak with a single voice, which is assumed to decrease its bargaining power (Frieden, 2004). Practice teaches us that the member states usually opt to pool their voices and to delegate negotiation authority to one or more EU negotiator(s). Question is then how the EU deals with the tension between the striving to be perceived as a strong negotiation bloc on the one hand and the legal situation, which suggest a division in the negotiation arrangement, on the other hand (Delreux, 2006). The EU decision-making process with regard to negotiations leading to a (mixed) MEA is a clear example of the hybrid nature of the EU: neither a state nor an international organization, neither completely supranational nor fully intergovernmental. It is intriguing to examine how the EU deals with this tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. given the particular political international context of international environmental politics in which the EU strives to play an important role. In this respect, studying these processes goes to the heart of the EU's nature.

1.2.2. Balance of power in the EU: a dilemma for the member states and the EU negotiator

When MEAs are negotiated, both the member states and the EU negotiator are confronted with a political dilemma. This means that they have to make choices and that these choices determine their political behaviour in the EU decision-making process. One of the driving questions behind the study of the EU negotiating MEAs is how the member states and the EU negotiator cope with their dilemmas.

The dilemma for the member states departs from the assumption that member states want to influence MEAs. This is a plausible assumption beca...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Routledge Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The EU and Mixed Agreements
• 3 Member States as Principals, EU Negotiators as Agents
• 4 The EU as Negotiator in Eight International Environmental Negotiations
• 5 Explaining the EU Negotiator’s Discretion
• 6 Unravelling the EU Decision-making Process
• 7 Conclusions
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index
• Series List