The Social Construction of Corruption in Europe

Dirk Tänzler, Konstadinos Maras

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317015819
• Subtopic: Law Theory & Practice
• Index: Social Sciences

The volume demonstrates the suitability of the theory of social constructivism in portraying and analyzing the diversity of the phenomenon of corruption. The approach of social constructivism taken in this volume is able to reconstruct the 'construction of corruption' both from a societal perspective, by assessing it as generally accepted or tolerated behaviour in more or less standardized rule-governed social situations, and from the perspective of actors who perceive corrupt behaviour as problem solving in everyday life. The volume proves the usefulness of a social construction perspective for empirical research. It contains case studies of social definitions of corruption in eleven European countries that contribute in different ways to establishing a grounded theory of the phenomenon of corruption.

Chapter 1
The Social Construction of Corruption: Theoretical Reflections

Dirk Tänzler, Konstadinos Maras, Angelos Giannakopoulos and Ralf Rogowski

Since Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s book The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (1966), constructivism has been a social science success story. Its core argument is that social order exists as a product of human activity in its genesis (that is, social order is the result of past human activity) and in its existence at any instant of time (that is, social order exists only and insofar as human activity continues to produce it). Constructivism dates back to philosophical (and sociological) ideas of the nineteenth and even eighteenth centuries,¹ and can even claim to be the scientific faith of postmodern times. Recently, Mark Granovetter (2007) applied constructivism to the theory of corruption, arguing that corruption is not a ‘natural’ fact but a ‘social’ factum. So-called radical constructivism even goes a step further and calls corruption fiction.² Such talk of corruption as a social construction (or of crime as fiction) might sound frivolous. However, this somewhat artificial shift in perspective enables research to understand and explain corruption as a discursive effect.

One may roughly differentiate between two types of social constructivism: one that locates the generation of meaning within the communication of social systems and another that focuses on the interpretation of the social world by human individuals. The first paradigm is associated with Talcott Parsons’ theory of structural functionalism, and in particular with Niklas Luhmann’s currently popular social system theory; the latter is often referred to as methodological individualism, initially introduced by the Austrian School of National Economy. The introduction takes the position of neither of the above paradigms, and opts instead for a third position in explaining corruption that merges the two by emphasizing cultural and historical relativity and the context of the network society for a redefinition of corruption as immoral exchange.

The System Theory Approach: Corruption as a Mode of Communication

A powerful theory that puts functional differentiation at the centre of an analysis of modern society and understands the pre-modern character of corruption, that is, the commingling of private and public interests as its ‘unintended consequence’, is Niklas Luhmann’s (1979, 1997) social system theory. His theory characterizes modernity as the progressive emergence and establishment of independent function systems in politics, the economy, law, art, science and education. Societal function systems are conceived as self-referential systems of communication that follow their own autopoietic logics. Social system theory raises these two characteristics of modernity – functional differentiation and operational self-sufficiency of communication systems – to socio-ontological fundamentals of the structure of modern society.

The theory of social systems does ultimately assume that any form of interfering with the codes and programmes governing the operational modus of the societal function systems leads to corruption. Any intrusion of external factors distorts the logic of functional independency, because neglecting the system-specific code means abusing the operational logic for the sake of other, external, goal orientations (Hiller 2005: 61). The consequence is a dysfunction of the system, an interruption of communication (in the case of an organization, other members are excluded) and therefore an obstruction of the self-preservation of the economic, political, juridical, scientific or educational system.

In this view corruption consists in diverting the system from fulfilling its inherent functional objectives. Given the self-closure of the functional subsystems, the question is: where do corruptive interferences come from? If we take the example of the political system, that is, the struggle for gaining and maintaining power, corruption means that political decisions are taken not on the grounds of the system’s logic but, rather, according to economic calculations. Similar processes occur in other function systems when economic objectives are not pursued using economic means, but rest upon the exercise of political influence; when scientific experiments are not carried out for the sake of scientific progress, but to serve economic or political interests; or when legal decisions are taken not on the basis of the prescriptions of the law, but following other considerations. In all of these cases the functional logic of the subsystems is diverted to serve objectives other than those programmed by the code of the system.

Assuming that corruption would usually emerge from this diversion helps us better understand what motivates the use of such notions as a breach of trust and contract with the principal, abuse of entrusted power for private gain or overlapping of universal and particular enactment of roles. System theory solicits viewing corruption in sociologically neutral terms as social problem solving and treating negative labelling as a separate act of ascription. The irony of Luhmann’s system theory lies in understanding that problems are rarely solved, but that resolution leads to new, often more complex, problems. Furthermore, if corruption is understood as the rupture of communication, this in itself then becomes an interesting social fact with the potential for opening new unconventional options. The key to comprehending corruption as a diversion or as a kind of switch of action orientation lies in understanding the way something universal in nature becomes the object of particular goal-seeking. The implications become clear if we look more closely at this universality.

Social systems process communication by using specific codes and programmes that allow them to generate their own realities. The code indicates the function of the system in society, for example that an economy deals with scarcities, politics with power, the legal system with law, science with truth and art with beauty. Programmes translate the codes into policies and allow the system to build up a set of procedures, rules and norms that bind the decision-making process. This enables the system to streamline decision making and to convert decisions into binding, usually irreversible and norm-conforming, outcomes of procedures. Once norms are created, decisions can be expected. A corruption-inducing situation emerges when the automatism of rationalizing decision making through procedure is interrupted and procedural outcomes become an object of negotiation. Whereas the rule-bounded procedures previously guaranteed the scope and content of predictable decisions, it is now the negotiation between the individuals involved in the decision-making process itself and the criteria used that determines how the process can or should end. As a result, rule- and norm-based procedures are no longer universally binding and valid, and negotiation substitutes (uncertain) outcomes for (predictable) decisions (Reiter 2009: 383).

The key to understanding negotiations is being aware of their potential for opening up alternatives not determined by the rules governing the procedure. Consider, for example, a typical case of petty corruption: the issuing of passports by civil servant X, who is supposed to act in accordance with the norms of the procedure that set out the modalities for decision making. Suppose further that Y, as a possible recipient of this kind of public service, has a problem with the rules of this procedure (for example, the time for issuing the passport being too long). Y persuades X, by whatever incentives, means and temptations, to reconsider the binding force of the procedure and deviate from obediently following the rule. If X agrees, the procedure loses its universal, normatively objective and procedurally firm validity and becomes a particular, context-dependent and inter-subjective object of negotiation, the outcome of which can vary according to the socio-cultural circumstances: How much is Y willing to pay in order to receive the passport more quickly? How can time be measured with money? To what extent can X and Y trust each other? Y is by all means willing to acknowledge that the delivery of some public services is associated with certain monetary preconditions. However, persuading X to bend the rule and ignore the required procedure (shortening the legally prescribed period for issuing the passport) leads to a kind of identity switch: instead of being a public good everybody is, in principle, entitled to, the passport becomes an item of (price) negotiation or an exchange article. Instead of being a public service it is transfigured into a commodity, the value of which is determined by the law of supply and demand. Agreeing to corrupt administrative practice by setting a price higher than that officially prescribed, both X and Y tacitly convert the service into a commodity that is in short supply and urgent demand.

Furthermore, as an illegitimate exercise of influence, corruption operates by switching or converting symbolic media (money, power, cultural capital, status or authority). The possible influences of one particular medium (money, for example) are deployed in order to obtain influence in the field of operation of another medium (for example, power or administrative procedures) (Luhmann 1979: 175). Political parties use positions of power to acquire financial gains, or wealth and status are exchanged for political influence; scientific research and experiments are undertaken to achieve the strategic economic goals of multinationals; former public office holders transfer knowledge and/or administrative know-how from the public to the private sector; and public services are allocated to those in powerful socio-political networks. Or, to use the example of petty corruption mentioned above, administrative procedures are substituted with a selling–buying scheme (that is, one’s demand is the other’s supply).

Understanding corruption as the substitution of rules or procedures by negotiations and transfers from one medium to another underlines the principal insight that corruption should first and foremost be seen in a neutral manner, without quickly jumping to normative judgements. That corruption can be observed across all social fields and domains of action further indicates that such exchanges, diversions, conversions and transfers are part and parcel of the way modern society functions; that they are the modes by which the various function systems interact, inform and influence each other. As an exchange relation, corruption functions as an indicator of wants and fulfilments or demands and supplies being transferred from one system to another and converted from one medium to another. This does not imply universal exchangeability of needs and goods, because the conditions for converting media into each other are socially regulated and restricted by norms, values, ethics, laws and judicial prescriptions. If corruption should then in principle be seen as a transfer mechanism, it is reasonable to concur with system theory that its social function consists in providing society with functional equivalents. Corruption is an indication that function systems should be checked for the compatibility of demands and supplies in order to better fulfil their tasks through transfer of media.

Viewed in this way, corruption, or what subsequently comes to be characterized as corruption, becomes a permissible and even recommendable course of satisfying mutual needs. In evolutionary terms corruption (that is, exchanges between power, money and social status) turned out to be one of the most powerful mechanisms of economic restructuring, political reorganization and institutional transformation in the pathways of European modernity as well as the transition process of former socialist countries. In nineteenth-century England, what is now called corruption served to elevate individuals of the economically powerful class to top positions of political privilege and social distinction. In the case of transition from socialism to capitalism in the late twentieth century, corruption paved the way for the new ruling classes.

Both examples show that in periods of transition, which are accompanied by far-reaching socio-institutional changes and reorganization of the rules of the game, corruption tends to become an issue of serious social concern. When new modes of exchange and media transfer replace the accustomed ones, perceptions of norm-violation and denigration of values arise. Until the new institutional arrangements assume clear-cut forms delineating well-defined areas of competencies, obligations and entitlements, claims of corruption are bound to arise as an unavoidable consequence of the shifts in the ways transfers between the spheres of social action take place. Corruption becomes the object of a negative normative judgement, and the moral or moralizing discourse of corruption arises.

Methodological Individualism: Corruptive Behaviour as Meaningful Action

System theory, which provides a powerful scientific tool for the explanation of corruption in terms of an irritation of systemic functionality, has the disadvantage for an analysis of corruption that it conceives the individual first of all in terms of a disruptive factor: particular goal-seeking hampers the universal functioning of the system, and the intentions of the individual actor are classified as being of a subordinate value at the most. Yet this invalidation of the meaning which corruptive behaviour has to the acting individuals has its shady side: the problem, which the particular (corruptive) act is supposed to solve, is interpreted only from the standpoint of the system, not from that of the individual – but it is rather obvious that these two standpoints must necessarily differ. Thus, the approach of system theory cuts off one dimension of social reality and for this reason must be completed by an individualistic approach considering this very dimension.

Seen from the perspective of the individual, nominating and relating things, events and experiences is an act of bestowing good reasons upon the existence of a phenomenon. The individual actor estimates his or her own actions not so much in the light of their consequences for the functioning of a surrounding system, but rather in relation to his/her own motivations and interests. Economics has adopted this perspective for its model of the utility-maximizing individual who blocks out the general context of society and follows his or her rational interests for self-preservation. Altruistic motives, which also arise in economists’ explanations, have no intrinsic value and seem to be constraints that restrict successful, egoistic action. The economic approach furthermore tends to describe corrupt conduct as just a means of optimizing the allocation of goods and services (for example, grease, slush or speed money) after a market failure. We share Granovetter’s (2007) criticism of the economic theory of corruption for excluding social aspects in assessing the incentives, values and meaning of economic actors, and subscribe to his suggestion that an analysis of social, cultural and historical elements of corruption is needed that transcends mere economic explanation.

In carrying out such a sociological analysis the subjective and the objective meaning of a particular action have to be distinguished. We follow here Max Weber (1978), for whom the meaning an action has for the acting individual itself differs from the meaning the same action has for a person observing it. For external observers, corruption is indisputably a problem. It is a norm-deviant and law-breaking behaviour that diminishes the social contract. But for those participating in it, corruption often seems to be the solution to a problem. As Alfred Schutz (1962) argues, it is this latter perspective which has to be taken as a starting point for the formation of second-order constructs by sociology. As is the case with system theory, such an approach reveals the discrepancy between functional imperatives and individual intentions, yet the latter are not conceived as disturbances of the former, but vice versa: the former (incarnated in social institutions) are conceptualized as determining factors (and possibly as hindrances) for the acting individual.

There seem to be at least three kinds of subjective motivation that collide with or do not conform to institutional rule settings. First, the actor automatically follows routines or other habitualized plans of behaviour using unreflected tacit knowledge of problem solving that is taken for granted and proven in everyday life. Secondly, a rational actor reflecting on the situation believes³ he or she is entitled to resources that the institution cannot provide and therefore looks elsewhere to attain them. Such a rational calculation is not a universal standard model of action, but a theoretical construction or ideal type related to the utopian idea of modernity. Thirdly, the material or immaterial gratifications of the institutional role appear to the actor to be considerably deficient. When the actor believes that the institutional role values are violated, the justification for gratifying desires through corruption prevails. This means that acting in the institutional role does not achieve the value of esteem that the role deserves and the actor perceives that he or she does not receive the acknowledgement the role acting is entitled to. Depending on whether the acquired gratifications can be accounted for by the actor’s need for wealth and power or, rather, result from the internal processes of an institution, the motivations of the actors differ, that is, the reasons for their decision to willingly act in a corrupt manner differ. Of course, one can distinguish degrees of justification for certain types of behaviour. For example, it can very well be the case that the greed for (more) wealth and power can be justified or rationalized in terms of how the actor comes to perceive his or her access to wealth and power as unrestricted. Or the actor is motivated to embark on corrupt conduct on the grounds of belief that his or her action is justified as necessary to re-establish the value-import of his or her institutional role.⁴

The constructivist view of corrupt conduct as a problem-solving act performed by individuals has further advantages. A lawyer may, for example, be asked: Given a set of val...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The Social Construction of Corruption: Theoretical Reflections
• Part 1: Disenchanted Modernity
• Part 2: Catch-Up Modernization
• Part 3 Semi-Modernity
• Index