The European Union in International Climate Change Politics

Still Taking a Lead?

Rudiger K.W. Wurzel, James Connelly, Duncan Liefferink

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317237297
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In recent years climate change has emerged as an issue of central political importance while the EU has become a major player in international climate change politics. How can a 'leaderless Europe' offer leadership in international climate change politics - even in the wake of the UK's Brexit decision?

This book, which has been written by leading experts, offers a critical analysis of the EU leadership role in international climate change politics. It focuses on the main EU institutions, core EU member states and central societal actors (businesses and environmental NGOs). It also contains an external perspective of the EU's climate change leadership role with chapters on China, India and the USA as well as Norway. Four core themes addressed in the book are: leadership, multilevel and polycentric governance, policy instruments, and the green and low carbon economy. Fundamentally, it asks why we have EU institutional actors, why certain member states and particular societal actors tried to take on a leadership role in climate change politics and how, if at all, have they managed to achieve this?

This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in EU studies and politics, international relations, comparative politics and environmental politics.

Part I
Introduction

1 Introduction

European Union climate leadership

Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel,¹ Duncan Liefferink, and James Connelly

Introduction

There is no shortage of would-be leaders in EU climate change politics. The EU institutions (e.g. European Council, Council of the EU, Commission and the European Parliament (EP)), member states and societal actors have all, though to varying degrees and at different time periods, tried to offer leadership in EU and international climate change politics. Importantly, public support for EU environmental policy in general, and climate change policy in particular, has been consistently high (e.g. Eurobarometer 2015). The economic recession which followed the 2008 financial crises triggered only a moderate drop in public support for EU action on climate change, although considerable variation exists between member states.

As will be discussed in more detail below, at first sight the EU seems ill equipped to offer political leadership because decision-making powers are dispersed among a wide range of political actors including EU institutional and member state actors thus making the EU a ‘leaderless Europe’ (Hayward 2008). In the 1950s, when the EU was founded, ‘efforts were made in “taming” the “beast” … of leadership’ (Blondel 1987: 3). The dispersal of the EU’s decision-making powers has, however, led to the emergence of a wide range of veto actors which have repeatedly led the EU into political stalemate and ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf 1988) from which it is able to escape, typically, only after lengthy periods of arduous negotiations and by adopting complex compromises and sub-optimal policy solutions. The victory of the Leave Campaign in the Brexit referendum in June 2016, which will lead to the UK exiting from the EU (see Chapter 12), has plunged the EU into the most serious crisis in its history, which it will be able to overcome only with skilful leadership.

This chapter will first give a short historical overview of EU climate change politics in a global context, followed by an introduction to the key analytical concepts and themes of this book.

A short history of EU climate change politics

As a brief introduction to the chapters which follow, this section provides a thumbnail guide to core events and actions in EU internal and external climate change politics.

The following five phases of EU climate change policy can broadly be identified: (1) late 1980s to 1992: formation and formulation phase; (2) 1992–2001: Kyoto Protocol negotiation phase; (3) 2001–2005: Kyoto Protocol rescue phase; (4) 2005–2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and negotiation of a follow up agreement phase; and, (5) since 2015: 2015 Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase.

Various EU institutional actors (Chapters 2–5), member states (Chapters 6–12) and societal actors (Chapters 13–14) as well as non-EU countries (Chapters 13 and 16–18) reacted somewhat differently to the challenges of climate change and the changing opportunity structures of EU and/or global climate change politics. As will become clear in the following chapters, from the perspective of different EU institutional, member state, societal and non-EU actors the phases can appear differently.

Late 1980s–1992: formation and formulation phase

In 1986 the EP became the first EU institution to request a common climate change policy (see Table 1.1 and Chapter 4). Two years later the Commission issued a communication on climate change. In 1990, the European Council adopted a resolution which demanded the early adoption of GHGE reduction targets on the UN level. In the same year a joint Environment and Energy Council adopted a political agreement on the stabilisation of the EU’s CO₂ emissions by 2000 (compared to 1990) which, however, was conditional on other highly developed countries taking similar steps. According to Haigh (1996: 162) it enabled the EU ‘to take a strong and leading role, particularly in relation to the United States’. While the US had acted as a leader on the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depleting substances, in climate change politics it was the EU which started to take over the leadership role from the US (see Chapters 2 and 17).

The EU signed the UN framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) at the 1992 UN Rio ‘Earth summit’. Because it had not yet adopted adequate common policy measures to implement its commitments under the UNFCCC, the EU created a ‘capability-expectation gap’ (Hill 1993) which it was able to close only with the adoption of legally binding climate policy measures within the framework of the 2000 and 2005 European Climate Change Programmes (ECCPs).

In early 1992, at a time of high public environmental awareness and relatively strong support for deeper European integration, the Commission proposed an EU-wide carbon dioxide (CO₂)/energy tax which was, however, vetoed by the UK on sovereignty grounds (see Chapter 12). The Council adopted the Commission’s proposals for a Framework Directive on energy efficiency measures by member states (SAVE), a Decision on renewable energy (ALTENER) and a Decision to monitor CO₂ emissions, but these were insufficient measures for reaching the EU’s proposed CO₂ emissions stabilisation target.

Table 1.1 Main phases of EU climate change politics

Late 1980s–1992: formation and formulation phase • 1986: EP climate change policy resolution • 1988: Commission communication • 1990: European Council for early adoption of targets. Joint Environmental and Energy Council agreed CO2 stabilisation of by 2000 (at 1990 levels) • 1991: Commission’s proposal for EU climate change policy 1992–2001: Kyoto Protocol negotiation phase • 1992: UN Rio conference adopted UNFCCC: EU accepted CO2 stabilisation by 2000 (compared to 1990) • 1997: Kyoto Protocol negotiations: EU proposed 15% reduction of three GHGs by 2010 (compared to 1990) but settled for 8% reduction of six GHGs by 2008–12 (compared to 1990/1995) • 1998: Burden sharing agreement • 2000: First ECCP 2001–2005: Kyoto Protocol rescue phase • 2001: US dropped out of the Kyoto Protocol. EU Environmental Council and European Council for Kyoto Protocol ratification • 2002: EP voted (540 to 4 votes) in favour of Kyoto Protocol ratification. Kyoto Protocol ratified by EU • 2003: Commission’s EU ETS proposal 2005–2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and negotiations of a follow-up agreement • 2005: Kyoto Protocol entered into force. EU ETS became operational. • 2007: European Council agreed ‘20–20 by 2020’ climate and energy package: • Unilateral 20% GHGE reductions by 2020 (compared to 1990) • Binding 20% renewable energy by 2020 • Non-binding 20% energy efficiency improvement by 2020 • Conditional 30% GHGE reductions by 2020 if ‘comparable efforts’ by other developed and ‘adequate efforts’ by leading developing countries • 2008: EU adopted legally binding CO2 limits for cars, revision of EU ETS and effort sharing decision • 2009: EU agreed €7.2 billion fast track money for climate mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. Copenhagen climate conference (COP15) resulting in the Copenhagen Accord • 2014: European Council adopted ‘2030 climate and energy package’: • at least 40% reduction of GHGE by 2030 (compared to 1990) • at least 27% increase of renewables by 2030 • indicative energy saving target of 27% by 2030 Since 2015: Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase • 2015: Paris Agreement: • Limit global temperature rise to 2.0/1.5°C • Peak of global emissions as soon as possible • Voluntary national reduction pledges (NDCs) • 2016 onwards: Ratification process of the 2015 Paris Agreement

1992–2001: Kyoto protocol negotiation phase

During the 1992 UNFCCC negotiations the EU acted largely as a symbolic leader because it did not yet have in place significant reduction measures to back up its ambitious rhetoric. In the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol the EU initially offered a 15 per cent reduction in GHGE by 2010 (compared to 1990 levels) on condition that its main economic competitors (at the time the US and Japan) would accept similar reductions. Because the US accepted only a 7 per cent reduction target, the EU settled for an 8 per cent reduction target in GHGE by 2008–12. Against initial opposition from the EU the US insisted on the inclusion of the following flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol: (1) emissions trading, (2) joint implementation (JI), which allowed developed countries jointly to implement GHGE reduction projects with economies in transition, and (3) the clean development mechanism (CDM) which permitted developed countries to sponsor GHGE reduction projects in developing countries for which the former could earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits.

In 1998, the EU adopted the ‘burden sharing’ agreement which set member states differentiated reduction targets for achieving the EU’s collective 8 per cent CO₂ emissions target. Germany and the UK, which were at the time the EU’s largest GHGE emitters, accepted CO₂ reductions rates of 21 and 12.5 per cent respectively. Germany benefited from ‘wall fall profits’ (due to the deindustrialisation of the former East Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), and the UK was helped by its 1980s ‘dash for gas’² which has a lower carbon content than coal (see Chapters 8 and 12).

In October 2000, the Environmental Council accepted most of the Commission’s communication Towards a European Climate Change Programme (CEC 2000) thus paving the way for the adoption of the first ECCP in 2000.

2001–2005: Kyoto Protocol rescue phase

On 13 March 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol which had been signed by his predecessor Bill Clinton (see Chapter 16). Because, at the time, the US was the largest emitter of GHGE, the Kyoto Protocol seemed doomed. However, a few weeks later, the Environmental Council agreed that the EU should pursue the Kyoto Protocol ratification process. After approval by the European Council and overwhelming support from the EP the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol in May 2002 (see Chapters 4 and 5). After much lobbying from the EU, both Japan and Russia eventually ratified the Kyoto Protocol (thus reaching the required 55 per cent of the total 1990 CO₂ emissions from industrialised countries) which entered into force in 2005.

Frustrated by the veto to its CO₂/energy tax proposal and encouraged by the early experience with emissions trading in the US, the Commission’s Directorate General for Environment (DG Environment) commissioned studies on emissions trading in the late 1990s (see Chapter 3). Following meetings with member governments and stakeholders, the Commission published its proposal for an EU ETS Directive in 2001 (CEC 2001). The EP and the Environmental Council speedily adopted a modified version of the Commission’s EU ETS proposal in 2003 (Skjaerseth and Wettestad 2008). The EU had thus somewhat belatedly been transmogrified from an emissions trading laggard to a leader which set up the world’s first supranational ETS (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; Wurzel 2008; see also Chapter 3).

2005–2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and follow-up agreement negotiation phase

The EU ETS, which became operational in 2005, has become the EU’s main climate change policy instrument (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008) although, within the framework of the second EPCC, the EU also adopted Directives on energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy and concluded a voluntary agreement with the European, Japanese and Korean automobile manufacturers on the reduction of CO₂ which, however, was later overtaken by legislation as the voluntary agreement had failed.

In March 2007 the European Council meeting affirmed the EU’s climate leadership when it adopted the ‘20–20–20’ climate and energy package which included a binding unilateral 20 per cent CO₂ reduction target by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels), a legally binding 20 per cent renewable energy target by 2020 and a non-binding 20 per cent energy efficiency improvement by 2020. The EU also adopted a 30 per cent CO₂ emissions reduction target by 2020 which was, however, made conditional on ‘comparable efforts’ by other developed and ‘adequate efforts’ by leading developing countries. After arduous negotiations the EU adopted the effort sharing decision (which replaced the burden sharing agreement) and agreed on a review of the flagging EU ETS at the European Council in December 2008. In order to strengthen its international climate leader position the EU offered €7.22 billion in ‘fast track’ funding for climate adaptation measures in developing countries and tried to form alliances on the international level (see Chapter 2).

However, although the EU had adopted relatively ambitious internal climate change policy measures and pledged significant climate funds for developing countries, it was not able to significantly influence the Copenhagen Accord which ‘was taken note of’ rather than...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword and acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Part I Introduction
• Part II EU institutions
• Part III Member states and neighbouring European states
• Part IV Civil society
• Part V Europe and the wider world
• Part VI Conclusion
• Index