Parties, Elections and Electoral Contests

Competition and Contamination Effects

Marc Guinjoan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781472439086
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317083702
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Essays in Politics & International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

According to the Duvergerian theories, in the long run, only viable parties are expected to stand for elections. Non-viable parties should join a pre-electoral coalition with another party or withdraw from competition entirely. Why then do non-viable political parties throughout the world systematically continue presenting candidates? This book responds to this evident but unanswered question to create a general theory about deviations from the Duvergerian equilibrium. The author argues that, far from being just a random or irrational decision, the choice of political parties to present candidates when they do not expect to achieve representation can be explained by the overlap of electoral arenas, that generate opportunities for viable parties to present candidates where they are non-viable. In sum, political parties will take advantage of their viability in an arena to present candidacies in other arenas where they do not have chances to become viable. The building of this new theory on electoral contamination allows the construction of a new and more encompassing conceptual framework through which to make sense of what, until now, has been understood as disparate phenomena and contributes to a better understanding of political parties' strategic behaviour.

Index

All index entries shown here correspond to the page numbers within the printed edition only. Within this digital format these page numbers allow for cross referencing only.

Actor, political 41, 54, 76, 88, 113

Agreement, (pre-)electoral 5, 67, 70, 72, 77, 80, 86

Arena(s)

local 4, 15, 36, 41, 48, 54, 76, 83, 130

national 9, 20, 34–35, 37, 62, 111, 120, 128, 132

overlapped 39, 41, 51, 53, 55, 98

regional 5, 26, 34–35, 37, 58, 62, 65, 67, 82, 91, 107, 110–111, 120, 123, 128–129, 132–133

superposition of 39, 41, 42

Asymmetric viability 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 67, 70, 90, 95, 96, 106, 107, 108, 112, 116, 120, 121, 133

Ballot

dual- 29

second 109, 116, 119, 121–123, 125, 150

single- 29, 37

Benefits

expected 11, 15–16, 41, 52–53

benefits of competing 11, 16, 41, 52, 77

Bicameral legislatures 5, 26, 33–34, 37, 107

Campaign

manager(s) 4–5, 57, 74–5, 92, 130, 136

elect...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• About the Author
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• The Duvergerian Gravity and the Emergence of Contamination Effects
• Contamination Effects: The Institutional and Sociological Incentives to Compete
• Contamination Effects: The Organisational Incentives to Compete
• Qualitative Empirical Analysis: The Organisational Incentives to Compete
• Quantitative Empirical Analysis: The Institutional and Sociological Determinants to Compete
• Conclusions
• Appendix
• References
• Index