One Korea

Visions of Korean unification

Tae-Hwan Kwak, Seung-Ho Joo, Tae-Hwan Kwak, Seung-Ho Joo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781138361355
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317085652
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

On the Korean peninsula, there exist two sovereign states—the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)—both of whom hold separate membership at the United Nations. This book discusses the construction of "one Korea" and highlights the potential benefits of unification for the Koreans and the international community. Arguing that Korean unification is intrinsically international in nature, the authors outline how the process and outcome would impact upon the policies of the four major powers—the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. In addition, the authors highlight the possible far-reaching repercussions of unification on the political and economic dynamics of Northeast Asia. Making a case for the two Koreas and interested powers to plan and orchestrate their acts for sustained peace and gradual unification on the Korean peninsula, this book examines the Korean question and the related issue of peace building in Northeast Asia from a global perspective. It will be of interest to students and scholars researching politics and international relations.

1 One Korea unification vision through neutralization

Tae-Hwan Kwak

Seventy-one years have passed since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945. In reality, there exists two sovereign U.N. member states: the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The DPRK is a nuclear armed state, threatening peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The road to a peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula appears to be getting bumpier and far from reality.

Upon inauguration as President in February 2008, Lee Myung-bak took a hard-line policy toward the North, renouncing the “Sunshine Policy,” suspending many inter-Korean economic projects, and linking inter-Korean cooperation with Pyongyang’s denuclearization process. Lee’s hard-line policy combined with North Korea’s missteps and aggressive behavior in 2010 rapidly deteriorated inter-Korean relations, heightening tensions and mutual distrust between Seoul and Pyongyang. But President Park Geun-hye in February 2013 adopted a new policy toward North Korea known as “the Korean peninsula trust-building process,” to improve inter-Korean relations, and Park’s new policy has not been effective.

Because of Kim Jong-Il’s sudden death on December 17, 2011, the DPRK was unstable and uncertain, but it appears to have been stable under the Kim Jong-un regime. With new leadership changes in South Korea in 2013, inter-Korean relations were expected to improve. A unified Korean peninsula may be achieved under peaceful conditions. Unfortunately, conditions for the peace and unification processes on the Korean peninsula do not exist and thus need to be created.

The ROK and the DPRK have different unification formulae. The two Koreas need to agree on a common unification formula. The author has proposed that a common Korean unification formula through neutralization be considered as an alternative to the conflicting unification formulae of the two Korean states.

In this chapter, the author attempts to (1) evaluate conflicting unification formulae of the two Koreas and (2) propose one Korea unification vision through neutralization based on a neutralized peace system on the Korean peninsula as an alternative to the two Koreas’ existing unification formulae.

Core issues to be resolved in the peace and unification process

A unified Korean peninsula may not be achieved without first building a peace regime replacing the Korean armistice regime. Therefore, favorable conditions for peace and unification on the Korean peninsula need to be created. Let us take a brief look at six core issues.

First, there is an absence of mutual trust between the ROK and the DPRK. The build-up of inter-Korean mutual trust is an urgent task. There is neither mutual trust between the two Koreas nor a political will to make all efforts to achieve a peaceful unification. The inter-Korean agreements for creating favorable conditions for peace and unification on the Korean peninsula need to be respected, observed, and implemented. But deeply-rooted mutual distrust and hostility, incompatible ideologies, and conflicting political, social, and economic systems between the two Koreas are key obstacles to the peace and unification process. These issues need to be resolved first. The two Koreas need to engage in a policy of reconciliation and cooperation. With an engagement policy change of the two Koreas, one can expect an improvement in inter-Korean relations.

Second, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through the Six-Party Talks needs to be achieved. The DPRK declared itself a nuclear state in the preamble of the April 13, 2012 revised constitution, and made a statement to abandon North Korea’s denuclearization in January 2013. But the DPRK had been committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula under the September 19 joint agreement (2005). None of the Six-Party Talks members will accept North Korea’s nuclear power status. The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a prerequisite to peace regime building on the Korean peninsula. Thus, denuclearization and peace regime are essential conditions for realizing a unified Korean peninsula.¹

Third, the ROK and the DPRK as key players need to take the initiative to work together to create favorable conditions for a peace and unification process on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas have conflicting approaches to peace regime building on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK has consistently insisted on concluding a U.S.–DPRK peace treaty replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement in order to resolve mutual mistrust, reduce hostile interactions, and pave a new road to the peace and unification process. On the other hand, the ROK has maintained a 2+2 formula (inter-Korean peace agreement + China and U.S. guarantees) to build up mutual trust through mutual exchanges and cooperation by a step-by-step approach. The two conflicting approaches to peace regime building need to be compromised. However, the United States and China prefer a multilateral peace treaty for building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.²

Fourth, there exists two Korean states: the ROK and the DPRK. Both became UN member states in 1991. But the DPRK advocates one Korea, two systems and two governments, not two Korean states. This position is not in accordance with international law, but both Koreas agreed to recognize the special relationship in inter-Korean relations. Now is the time for both Koreas to accept the two Korean states on the Korean peninsula as sovereign states, and formally recognize each other, by concluding a basic treaty and establishing normalized relations between the ROK and the DPRK.³

Fifth, the ROK and the DPRK have different Korean unification formulae: the “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” (DFRK) formula of North Korea and the “Korean National Community” (KNC) of South Korea. The DFRK formula requires an abolition of ROK’s National Security Law and U.S. troop withdrawal from the South, and other points as preconditions for implementing the North Korean unification formula. The KNC formula has no preconditions for implementing the plan. Because of conflicting unification formulae, an alternative to the existing unification formulae of the two Koreas is thus desirable.

The ROK and the DPRK agreed in the second paragraph of the June 15 (2000) Joint Declaration to work together to construct a unified Korea: Seoul’s KNC unification formula proposal for an inter-Korean confederation and Pyongyang’s proposal for a low-level federation have common elements, and the two governments can thus work together toward achieving national unification. No discussions on this issue have been held by the two Koreas for the past 16 years. This means that the two Koreas lack political will to unify the Korean peninsula.

Sixth, the ROK and the DPRK agreed to construct a unified Korea in the second paragraph of the June 15 (2000) Joint Declaration: ROK’s proposal for a confederation and DPRK’s proposal for a low-level federation have common elements, and thus they will work together for achieving a national unification. Thus, it is desirable that the two Koreas need to agree on a common unification formula.

Conflicting unification formulae of the two Koreas

One of obstacles to the Korean unification process is that the ROK and the DPRK have conflicting unification formulae, and they thus need to work together sincerely to find a mutually acceptable unification formula for constructing one Korean state. Let us first take a brief look at the DPRK’s unification formula, which the ROK cannot accept.

The DPRK’s unification formula: Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK)

Kim Il-sung set forth the DFRK plan in his report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on October 10, 1980.⁴ Kim claimed that the DFRK plan was “the most realistic and shortest way to realize Korea’s reunification on the basis of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.” Kim spelled out the basic features of the DFRK’s formula, its composition and functions, and the ten-point policy that should be carried out by the federal government. He further stated:

Our party holds that the country should be reunified by founding a Federal Republic through the establishment of a unified national government on condition that the North and the South recognize and tolerate each other’s ideas and social systems, a government in which the two sides are represented on an equal footing and under which they exercise regional autonomy respectively with equal rights and duties.⁵

The DFRK’s formula is a federal (originally translated as confederate in English) system in which the two regional governments can coexist under one roof, i.e., a Supreme National Federal Assembly (SNFA) and a Federal Standing Committee (FSC) are the unified government of the federal state. The SNFA should be formed with an equal number of representatives from the North and the South and an appropriate number of representatives of overseas Koreans. The FSC, a permanent organ of the SNFA and a unified government, would guide the regional governments in the North and the South and administer all affairs of the federal state.⁶ Kim Il-sung, spelling out the operation of the SNFA and the FSC in a speech on September 9, 1983, said:

It would be reasonable that as the unified government of the federal state, the supreme national federal assembly and the federal standing committee elect their respective co-chairman both from the north and south, who will run these bodies in turn.⁷

The DFRK’s formula appears to be persuasive, but it has several structural deficiencies. First, North Korea claims that the DFRK is a complete form of federation, not an interim step to the final federation form in the unification process. In fact, if the DFRK is a final form, the problem is that the ROK cannot accept it, primarily due to the preconditions for implementing it. Second, given incompatible ideological, political, economic, and social systems, how long can such a federal state survive? There was no mention about power distribution in a federal state and power sharing between the two regional governments and a central government in a unified Korea. Third, there are at least five preconditions for establishing the DFRK: (1) resignation of the current ROK government, (2) abolition of anti-communist policy in the South, (3) elimination of National Security Law in the South, (4) U.S. troop withdrawal from the South, and (5) release of political prisoners, including communists in the South. The ROK must accept these conditions for establishing a federal state under the DFRK’s formula. Needless to say, Seoul cannot accept these conditions and the DFRK’s formula, because it perceives the DFRK as a means to communize the South.

The ROK’s Korean National Community (KNC) unification formula

During the late 1980s, the Soviet Union and East European socialist states went through a rapid process of disintegration, as the Cold War was rapidly dismantled. In the midst of such changes, President Roh Tae-woo, who was inaugurated in February 1988, promoted a new North Korea policy in the changing international security environment. Roh, in a special declaration on July 7, 1988, acknowledged North Korea as a partner in good will. Based on this premise, he proposed that Seoul and Pyongyang develop a joint national community in which the two Koreas would enjoy co-prosperity. Subsequently, to achieve this common goal, the Roh government passed an Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act on August 1, 1990, thereby opening a new era of exchange and cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang.⁸

In an address to the National Assembly on September 11, 1989, Roh presented his original KNC unification formula, which has been the official unification formula of the ROK.⁹ Thanks to such efforts, Seoul and Pyongyang reached a set of historic agreements, including the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchange and Cooperation (referred to as the Basic Agreeme...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of contributors
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 One Korea unification vision through neutralization
• 2 North Korean unification strategy: strategic culture and future prospects
• 3 U.S. policy toward Korean unification and the policies of the ROK and the DPRK
• 4 Future vision for a unified Korean peninsula: a U.S. perspective
• 5 Obama’s policy toward the Korean peninsula: a Korean perspective
• 6 Maintaining the status quo or promoting the reunification of the Korean peninsula? A Chinese perspective
• 7 China and Korean unification strategies: a Korean perspective
• 8 Future vision of a unified Korean peninsula: a Russian perspective
• 9 Russia and a unified Korea: a Korean perspective
• 10 Japan’s policy regarding Korean rapprochement and unification
• Conclusion
• Index