Learning from Chinese Philosophies

Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised Self

Karyn Lai

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9780754633822
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317106623
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Religion

Learning from Chinese Philosophies engages Confucian and Daoist philosophies in creative interplay, developing a theory of interdependent selfhood in the two philosophical traditions. Karyn Lai draws on the unique insights of the two philosophies to address contemporary debates on ethics, community and government. Issues discussed include questions on selfhood, attachment, moral development, government, culture and tradition, and feminist queries regarding biases and dualism in ethics. Throughout the book, Lai demonstrates that Chinese philosophies embody novel and insightful ideas for addressing contemporary issues and problems.

I
Reviewing the Old

CHAPTER ONE
Self and Society in Confucian Thought

Human Nature and the Sources of Self: Ren

The concept ren was in use in pre-Confucian texts such as the Book of Documents (Shujing) and the Book of Poetry (Shijing), although it had a narrow referent.¹ In the former, for instance, ren refers to the benevolent attitude of the ruler (King Tang) to his subjects; in two hunting poems in the Shijing, ren denotes a manly or virile quality, in the case of two huntsmen who were ‘handsome and ren’.²

There is general consensus amongst scholars that the scope and depth of the concept underwent dramatic change in the Analects, where ren is mentioned in 58 of its 499 passages. Nevertheless, readers are often disconcerted by its lack of proper definition and this leads in part to its diverse translations into English as benevolence, humanity, sympathy, compassion, magnanimity and human-heartedness and, more recently, as ‘authoritative [personhood]’.³

Etymological analysis of the Chinese character – on the left half, the character signifying ‘human,’ and on the right half, ‘two’ – suggests that ren pertains to human relatedness. The Shuowen lexicon, the earliest surviving Chinese dictionary, compiled in 90 CE by Xu Shen, identifies qing, human sympathy and closeness, as a meaning of ren. It also refers to the term xiang, which denotes mutuality and cooperation (Shuowen jiezi, p. 365).

In the Analects, ren is not to be equated with effectiveness in any one single sphere (Analects 5:8). It is associated with virtues or moral capacities such as deference, tolerance, making good on one’s word, diligence and generosity (17:6); uprightness, courage, resoluteness (17:8); and honesty and trustworthiness (13:27). It is not reducible to any one quality or virtue, or even a set of them. It is realised in different contexts: deference at home, respect in handling public affairs, and doing one’s utmost in interactions with others (13:19); and, perhaps of paramount importance, a person committed to ren does no wrong (4:4).

Ren is often coupled with practical wisdom (zhi), the two capacities working together, and sometimes in tandem with other ones (Analects 6:22; 6:23; 9:29; 15:33). In its coupling with zhi, ren refers to an attitude manifest both in speech (12:3) and action (4:22; 14:27). It is associated with a commitment to hard work (6:22) and its realisation is an overwhelmingly difficult task, arduous (15:10), and perhaps even life-threatening (15:9). The cultivated Confucian gentleman, the junzi, cleaves to ren at all times; ‘never for a moment does a gentleman part from [ren]; he clings to it through trials, he clings to it through tribulations’ (Analects 4:5; trans. Leys, 1997, p. 15).

The embodiment of ren as an attitude which guides decisions and behaviour is most clearly articulated in a seemingly simple statement that the ren person is not anxious (Analects 9:29 and 14:28). Yet, the profundity of being at ease in one’s environment is conveyed in the statement that the ren person is calm and composed in a range of situations.

The Confucian paradigmatic person (junzi), who is also the embodiment of ren, is at ease. He is ‘calm and unperturbed; [while] the petty person is always agitated and anxious’ (Analects 7:37, trans. Ames and Rosemont, 1998, p. 119; see also Analects 13:23 and 15:2). Confucian scholar Antonio Cua aptly expresses the enviable disposition of the man of ren: ‘[h]is easeful life is more a matter of attitude and confidence in his ability to deal with difficult and varying situations, rather than an exemplification of his infallible judgment and authority’.⁴

What are the training processes involved in attaining such composure? One should learn widely, yet being focused in purpose, inquire earnestly yet reflect closely at what is at hand (Analects 19:6). In Analects 4:6, the ultimate importance of ren and the difficulty of fully embodying it are clearly articulated:

The Master said, ‘I have yet to meet people who are truly fond of authoritative conduct (ren) and who truly abhor behaviour contrary to it. There are none superior to those who are fond of authoritative conduct. . . . Are there people who, for the space of a single day, have given their full strength to authoritative conduct? I have yet to meet them. As for lacking the strength to do so, I doubt there are such people – at least I have yet to meet them.’ (Trans. Ames and Rosemont, 1998, p. 90)

Kongzi here presents a problem with his ren ideal. The problem is one of motivation and commitment rather than a lack of ability to pursue that ideal. However, this passage also raises more questions than it answers. Are we looking for a commitment to pursue ren or is it an inborn capacity? Does ren admit of degrees such that it may be possible for one to embody ren only partially? If so, how is it manifest in stages of progression? It is to some of these questions we now turn.

Human Nature in the Analects

Kongzi upheld an optimistic humanism in his conceptualisation of the ideal community. The tenor in the Analects regarding human nature suggests – though it is never explicit – that there is an innate disposition in all humans toward the good. Kongzi remarked that ‘If a junzi lived among [the barbarians] there would not be vulgarity or corruptness’ (Analects 9:13, trans. mine; see also 4:25; 13:16; 8:2; 13:19).

There is some attempt in the Analects to provide justification for an innate ethical disposition rooted in transcendent tian (colloquially translated ‘heaven’) (Analects 7:22; 7:23; see also 2:4 and 18:8). On the whole, however, this line of argument is simply too ambiguous and imprecise as there were many diverse meanings of tian during that time.⁵ Discussions of tian in the Analects seem to focus on the continuing development of a heaven-endowed nature, rather than the justification of the idea. In this regard, fulfilling the mandate of heaven (tianming) was understood to be an important part of human self-realisation. Kongzi claims in Analects 2:4 that he had come to understand it at fifty – that is, only in his mature years – and had his ear attuned, presumably to this mandate, at sixty.

This ethical cosmology of humans and tian in partnership persisted in the continuing development of Confucianism through to the Neo-Confucian period. It provided justification for two key fundamental Confucian themes, that in every human being lies the potential for self-development, and that the ultimate fruition of human self-cultivation was to be realised in human society. Hence, it is hardly surprising that in the Analects, there is considerable focus on how human nature might be developed (1:12; 3:19; 4:13; 6:25; 8:8; 15:32; 20:3), though scant evidence that Kongzi had attempted to define human nature. The few discussions of human nature (xing) in the Analects focus only on its development. Analects 17:2 rushes quickly through the notion of xing to focus on its cultivation or practice, xi: ‘By nature [xing] men are nearly alike, by practice [xi], they get to be wide apart’ (trans. Legge, 1991a, p. 318).

The lack of definition of xing in the Analects has resulted in a wide variety of interpretations regarding its meaning.⁶ It does appear that dwelling on the ‘correct’ understanding of xing in the Analects may be pointless and indeed misguided as we are told that Kongzi himself did not discuss it (Analects 5:13). If we are to mirror the emphasis in the Analects on the cultivation of (human) nature rather than dwell on its precise definition, we would agree with Angus Graham’s remark that the passage Analects 17:2 is really a sociological observation rather than a philosophical point.⁷ What can be gleaned from the passage is that there is an inherent nature shared by individual human beings. This incipient moral goodness is subsequently overshadowed by habits or everyday practice, or improved through cultivation. The debate on the cultivation of human nature developed much further both within and outside the Confucian school. Yet, within the Confucian school itself, the disagreements between Mengzi and Xunzi have been a focal point for those attempting to understand Confucian philosophy.

Mengzi: The Cultivation of Innate Human Nature

Mengzi’s optimistic assessment of human nature is captured in a short, cryptic phrase: ‘human nature is good’ (xing shan)(Books of Mencius 6A:6). He pauses to consider different pictures of xing:

Kung-tu Tzu said, ‘Kao Tzu said, “There is neither good nor bad in human nature,” but others say, “Human nature can become good or it can become bad, and that is why with the rise of King Wen and King Wu, the people were given to goodness, while with the rise of King Yu and King Li, they were given to cruelty.” Then there are others who say, “there are those who are good by nature, and there are those who are bad by nature. For this reason, Hsiang could have Yao as Prince, and Shun could have the Blind Man as father, and Ch’i, Viscount of Wei and Prince Pi Kan could have Tchou as nephew as well as sovereign.” Now you say human nature is good. Does this mean that all the others are mistaken?’ (Mencius 6A:6; trans. Lau, 1979b, p. 247)

The different conceptions of human nature are offered as contrasts to Mengzi’s own, include the following:

(a) There is no morality (or immorality) inherent in human nature;

(b) Humans are born as blank slate, a tabula rasa. They become good or bad, depending on the influences around them;

(c) Humans do possess inherent moral quality, though it is not a universal feature of all to be born intrinsically good; some humans are born good, and others are born bad.

Asked to clarify his position that human nature is good, Mengzi begins with the refutation of Gaozi’s (Kao-Tzu) view that the capacity for goodness is not inherent or intrinsic in human nature.⁸ In his extended responses to Gaozi’s views, Mengzi situates the source of morality in the mind-heart (xin), which is the seat of compassion, shame, respect and right or wrong. Not only is xin an intrinsic feature of humanity, it also distinguishes humans from other animals (Books of Mencius, 2A:6; 4B:19; 6A:8). However, xin cannot at the same time be a determining force that drives all human actions toward goodness; this would have defeated the Confucians’ stance on the necessity of self-cultivation. Mengzi also wants to say that humans must persist in becoming good (weishan), and that this venture is grounded in their possession of the mind-heart (xin). But many scholars agree that Mengzi does not properly refute Gaozi’s argument. Indeed, Mengzi’s refutation consists primarily in an emphatic assertion of his view.

Mengzi must also resist the position in (c), that innate moral characteristics or propensities are variable and different across individuals. The claim that goodness is a universal human quality or capacity is a fundamental theme in Mengzi’s optimism regarding the moral efforts of humanity and the potential perfectibility of all humans, regardless of hereditary status.⁹ He sets out a lengthy argument in his attempt to establish that xin is universally possessed by all humans, boldly proclaiming: ‘The sage and I are of the same kind’ (Mencius, 6A:7; trans. Lau, 1979b, p. 249). The irrelevance of hereditary status to moral cultivation (and, ultimately, to involvement in good government) was an important underlying theme in Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s philosophies. Both, common men without noble birthright, had undertaken to provide advice on good government to those already in power, on the basis of their moral cultivation and ethical commitments.

This discussion of Mengzi’s views on human nature is rather fluid; it slips from a discussion of xing, human nature, to xin, the moral mind-heart of humanity. However, this slippage is intended as it captures and reflects the plasticity in Mengzi’s concept of human goodness. Benjamin Schwartz notes that ‘the center of Mencius’ problematique in de...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I: Reviewing the Old
• Part II: Realising the New
• Conclusion
• Glossary of Chinese Terms
• Bibliography
• Index