Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion

Catarina Belo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781409433866
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317176794
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Islamic Theology
• Index: Social Sciences

Comparing Averroes' and Hegel's positions on the relation between philosophy and religion, this book explores the theme of the authorities of faith and reason, and the origin of truth, in a medieval Islamic and a modern Christian context respectively. Through an in-depth analysis of Averroes' and Hegel's parallel views on the nature of philosophical and religious discourse, Belo presents new insights into their perspectives on the relation between philosophical knowledge and religious knowledge, and the differences between philosophy and religion. In addition, Belo explores particular works which have not yet been studied by modern scholarship.

Chapter 1
The Decisive Treatise: A Project for the Harmony between Philosophy and Religion

The Decisive Treatise is arguably, in modern scholarship on Islamic philosophy, Averroes’ most famous and most studied work. Since it considers specifically the relation between philosophy and Islam, a theme which guided Averroes’ philosophical project, it will be the starting point of our analysis. This remains a much-debated work, as regards both content and style. While some scholars have stressed its intended aim of demonstrating the harmony between philosophy and religion, in particular the compatibility between Aristotle’s philosophy and Islamic religion and precepts, others have argued that this is a legal document in the form of a fatwa (furnishing a legal opinion), advocating the permissibility of studying philosophy (falsafa, originally a Greek discipline) and conducting philosophical investigations within an Islamic framework.1 Arguments have been put forward in favour of labelling this work either a philosophical or a legal document. The full title of the work reads The Book of the Decisive Discourse/Treatise establishing the Connection between Religious Law/Religion and Wisdom/Philosophy. This connection, as one realises in reading the Decisive Treatise, addresses two questions: What is the status of the study of philosophy according to Islamic law? And what is the connection between the message of the Qur’an and Aristotelian philosophy? These two aspects thus complement each other, and both characterise Averroes’ intention in composing the book. The study of philosophy is set against the background of Islamic law whereby each action is judged according to five categories: obligatory, recommended, permissible, blameworthy or forbidden. Averroes speaks here clearly as a jurist and draws from his vast legal erudition, using a language which highlights the legal aspect of the work. This is not to say that the question of a possible compatibility between philosophy and the literal text of the Qur’an is not raised. For example, the issue of the creation of the world is addressed. If most theologians have considered the Qur’an to state that the world was created in time by God through his will and omnipotence, how is this reconcilable with Aristotle’s explicit affirmation in the Physics that the world, although spatially finite, has always existed and always will? Many studies have been devoted to this work, so it would be superfluous to provide a full synopsis here, but some of the main points made by Averroes are worth highlighting before proceeding to the differences between religious and philosophical language.

Let us then examine the various ways in which philosophy and religion converge, and whether Averroes’ exposition achieves its intended goal. After analysing the Decisive Treatise, we will compare it to his commentaries to check for congruence or any discrepancies.

First, it is important to address the similarities and differences between philosophy and Islamic law, and, more broadly, Islamic religion. This work is clearly addressed to a Muslim audience.2 Although the study of philosophy is foremost in his mind, the author draws on the Qur’an for corroboration of his statements, or the Sunna, the body of religious tradition in Islam, which includes the sayings and deeds of Muhammad. The positions taken are thus verified according to their consonance with the Qur’an or the Islamic tradition.

Subsequently the connection between philosophy and religion will be analysed in terms of content and ideas, and checked against the positions of Greek and Hellenistic philosophers and their Muslim followers on specific points such as the creation of the world and God’s nature. In this context, the charges of impiety levelled by al-Ghazzali against the philosophers and philosophy as an un-Islamic discipline must be also taken into account.

From a legal point of view, and with regard to the category into which the study of philosophy falls, Averroes argues that a Muslim who is intellectually gifted for philosophy and morally upright and religious not only is allowed, but has a duty, to study the sciences of the Ancients, in particular philosophy, with its various disciplines from logic to physics and metaphysics.3 Thus the study of philosophy is not just useful and certainly not to be condemned, but is in fact binding on certain Muslims. The obligation to study philosophy is drawn from Qur’anic verses to the effect that God commands believers to reflect on Creation (88:17–20) insofar as it reflects the Creator’s glory and omnipotence. According to Averroes, the study of philosophy is binding on some precisely because philosophy consists in the reflection on the world as made by God and so in the study of God’s attributes. The significance of philosophy is based on our capacity as human beings to understand the Creation and, to some extent, God’s nature. Studying philosophy, then, is not merely a reflection on existence, but primarily a reflection on God and his works, and hence a direct or indirect contemplation of God.

The Andalusian philosopher answers potential objections to the study of philosophy. For instance, philosophy could be detrimental to those who study it. In particular, this discipline stands accused of fostering irreligion and immorality, leading its adherents astray. Averroes rebuts this charge by stressing that philosophy is beneficial for most who study it, and only accidentally leads to their moral and religious downfall. In this respect it is no different from jurisprudence (fiqh), an indisputably Islamic discipline.4 In fact, not to engage in this kind of enquiry and grasp God in a philosophical and spiritual (that is, non-anthropomorphic) way may lead to irreligion and unbelief in this group of people. The three different ways of believing in God are laid out by Averroes in the Decisive Treatise and will be explained later when the distinction between the three different classes of people is expounded.

Another objection against philosophy is that it did not exist when Islam originated in the Arabian Peninsula, with the underlying assumption that it is a foreign and un-Islamic discipline, unlike, for instance, jurisprudence and other Islamic sciences that are directly anchored in the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna rather than the works of the ancient Greeks. Averroes replies to this objection to the effect that neither did jurisprudence exist at the birth of Islam but was developed later, with the implication that it would not have been known to Muhammad and his companions. This, however, would not obviate the charge that philosophy, born in ancient Greece, has its roots in the books of the Ancients rather than the sources of Islamic religion. Averroes stresses that the main Islamic disciplines did not exist at the time of Muhammad, including Qur’anic exegesis and the occasions of revelation; therefore this constitutes no obstacle to the study and practice of philosophy. Addressing the charge that the content of philosophical works goes against the explicit text of the Qur’an, Averroes begins by replying that one must read the Ancients’ books with a critical eye with a view to discerning if it, and what in it is truly against religion. He will later explain the way in which philosophy does not contradict the Qur’an.

The parallelism between philosophy and jurisprudence is worth considering. We have seen that Averroes was both a philosopher and a noted jurist, having authored his own manual of Islamic law under the title of Bidāyat al-mujtahid (translated into English as The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer).5 He compares both disciplines in various ways, and seeks to legitimise philosophy through their similarities. He illustrates the commonalities between jurisprudence and philosophy by drawing on a polysemic Arabic term, qiyās, which is used in both disciplines. In the context of Islamic law, qiyās is translated as ‘analogy’ and consists in the method whereby a judge decides on a new case on the basis of previous, similar cases. In the context of philosophy, it translates as ‘syllogism’, the Aristotelian type of logical reasoning which consists of two premisses and a conclusion, in which the premisses are better known than, and lead to, the conclusion (for instance: ‘All humans are mortal; all philosophers are human(s); therefore all philosophers are mortal’). Thus in both cases, analogy or syllogism, one can draw the unknown from the known, constituting an invaluable tool for the expansion of knowledge. In drawing on these two meanings of qiyās, Averroes implicitly argues that philosophy is just as legitimately Islamic as jurisprudence, given that legal analogy was developed sometime after the birth of Islam. Averroes argues that since analogy was a later development aimed at expanding our knowledge of jurisprudence, the use of syllogistic logic to expand our knowledge of Creation and the Creator is all the more appropriate.6 In this way is the study of philosophy legitimised as useful and profitable, being in fact worthier than jurisprudence, for it does not just study human action but all existents.

According to Averroes, religion teaches true knowledge and true practice. The former comprises the theoretical sphere, such as the knowledge of God, Creation and the afterlife, and could be said to overlap with philosophy in spite of being arguably more comprehensive than philosophy, as we shall see. Religion also comprises true practice, which leads to true happiness and includes the outward actions, regulated by jurisprudence, and asceticism, which regards the actions of the soul.7 Both are necessary for the achievement of eternal bliss, but Averroes’ preference for theory may stem from Aristotle’s appraisal of the theoretical sciences as ranking above the practical ones. Man is a political animal, but he is more essentially a rational animal. The contemplative life is more valuable still than the practical life, and contemplation is that which characterises divine activity, as stated by the Stagirite.8

A striking point separating theory from practice is the existence of a consensus (ijmā’) of the learned community of Muslims, the ulema (‘ulamā’), which is binding on practical matters, as opposed to the lack of consensus regarding matters of theory. Averroes states that in order for any theoretical position to be condemned (or approved) it must be submitted to the ulema for approval on the basis of a consensus. While that consensus can be established regarding the specific aspects of religious practice, no such consensus is available in matters of theory. For a consensus to be formed, all the scholars involved in deciding on a given issue at a particular time must be known, but that consensus cannot be traced back with regard to theoretical issues.9 Therefore Averroes concludes that no specific philosophical theory can be condemned as heretical by any Muslim with certainty, as al-Ghazzali had misguidedly attempted. This point shows the greater emphasis laid on orthopraxy than orthodoxy in Islam, and for Averroes allows the possibility of philosophical debate and the acceptance of Aristotle’s theories concerning the natural and the celestial world.10

Although any obstacles to the study of Greek philosophy by Muslims have thus been removed, one must still be guided by religious principles in studying such works. These must be studied discriminately and critically, and one should accept only that which conforms to religion while rejecting that which is opposed to it.

Having proved that according to Islamic law the study of philosophy is incumbent on some Muslims, Averroes goes on to discuss the particular issues on which, according to al-Ghazzali, philosophy goes against religion. The main work in which Averroes counters al-Ghazzali’s criticism point by point is the Incoherence of the Incoherence, consisting of sixteen questions on metaphysics and four questions on the natural sciences, for a total of twenty questions.11 In the Decisive Treatise, a short, programmatic work, he does not discuss all these issues, but stresses three that laid Islamic philosophers open to the charge of impiety (kufr). These consist of the eternity of the world, God’s knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection, in other words: the philosophers’ defence of the eternity of the world, of God’s ignorance of individual things or persons, and of the theory that only the soul, but not the body, survives death. Averroes’ exposition of these issues in the Decisive Treatise illustrates his method of interpreting the Qur’an with a view to showing the congruity between philosophy and religion.

As for the creation of the world, Averroes claims that the Qur’an explicitly points to the existence of something together with God before the creation of the world, such as God’s throne and the waters on which he stood before the start of creation properly speaking. This indicates that there was never a point in time when God was alone in existence. While Averroes takes pains not to contradict the Qur’anic account of Creation, he argues that it is at bottom not incompatible with Aristotle’s proof for the eternity of the world expounded in the Physics. The Stagirite argues that the world must be eternal, never having come into existence at a point in time and never ceasing to exist, on account of the activity of the Prime Mover, which Averroes identifies with God. In Aristotle’s contention, everything that is active or actual must be rendered actual, and drawn from a state of potentiality to actuality, through something that is actual and possesses the quality that it actualises in the other. For instance, something can only be rendered white by something – its cause – which in some way possesses whiteness. Aristotle further claims that actuality ultimately precedes potentiality, meaning that the first principle of everything must be something which is permanently actual. Therefore, the Prime Mover is the first cause of all motion, an action which produces the passage from potentiality to actuality, and hence existence. The first cause of the world can be said to create by setting in motion. Moreover, the Prime Mover’s permanent actuality translates into a permanent activity and therefore an eternal world, which, Averroes defends, is an eternal creation. Against the Muslim theologians’ argument for a creation out of nothing at a specific moment, Averroes defends an eternal, permanent creation. The Prime Mover’s setting in motion constitutes the creation process, because nothing exists without being drawn from potentiality to actuality. This must be done at one time, in an eternal act. If God had been idle at any point in time, his omnipotence would have been compromised. Although his arguments for the eternity of the world are provided in the commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and the Incoherence of the Incoherence, the Decisive Treatise explains why this position is compatible with a legitimate interpretation of the Qur’an. Before studying Averroes’ rules for the interpret...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Philosophy and Religion in Hegel and Averroes
• 1 The Decisive Treatise: A Project for the Harmony between Philosophy and Religion
• 2 Demonstrative Discourse in Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
• 3 Dialectical and Rhetorical Discourse in Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric
• 4 Hegel’s Attitude to Religion in the Early Writings
• 5 Hegel: Religion, Philosophy and Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit
• 6 Representation and Christianity in the Berlin Lectures
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index