Dying to Self and Detachment

James Kellenberger

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317147510
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Religion

Exploring the religious category of dying to self, this book aims to resolve contemporary issues that relate to detachment. Beginning with an examination of humility in its general notion and as a religious virtue that detachment presupposes, Kellenberger draws on a range of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary sources that address the main characteristics of detachment, including the work of Meister Eckhart, St. Teresa, and Simone Weil, as well as writers as varied as Gregory of Nyssa, Rabi'a al-Adawiyya, Søren Kierkegaard, Andrew Newberg, John Hick and Keiji Nishitani. Kellenberger explores the key issues that arise for detachment, including the place of the individual's will in detachment, the relationship of detachment to desire, to attachment to persons, and to self-love and self-respect, and issues of contemporary secular detachment such as inducement via chemicals. This book heeds the relevance of the religious virtue of detachment for those living in the twenty-first century.

Chapter 1
Humility

I. Introduction

We begin our effort to understand dying to self and detachment with an exploration of humility. For the religious traditions that value detachment the religious virtue of detachment has an essential connection to the virtue of humility. This is not to say that humility has always been regarded as a virtue. Aristotle, if he recognized it at all, seems to have regarded it as a vice, a deficiency in regard to magnanimity.¹ In the popular culture of the twenty-first century, while courage is held in high moral esteem, the regard given to humility is more questionable. Humility, however, is not universally dismissed as a virtue. Many see it as having moral value. In fact, a number of contemporary philosophers are relatively clear that humility is a morally valuable trait and so is a moral virtue, although they disagree about its character. For traditional Christianity and Judaism and for other religious traditions, humility is a religious virtue. However, if humility is a religious virtue is it different from humility as a moral virtue? In this chapter our focus will be on the general notion of humility and on humility as a moral virtue.

Clarifying the general notion of humility and identifying the core contrasting states that oppose humility will provide a basis or platform that allows us to see how humility can in different forms be a moral virtue and to address the paradox of one’s being proud of one’s humility, even when it is a moral virtue. In the next chapter we will examine the character of humility when it is a religious virtue.

We will start with the question: What is the best way to understand the general notion of humility? Then in the third section we will take up the question: What are the core contrasting states that humility opposes?

II. Understanding the General Notion of Humility

The “general notion of humility” is what people in general understand by “humility” and its cognate “humble,” as expressed in their ordinary discourse. Whether or not they regard humility as a virtue, people proficient in English use “humility” and “humble” in ordinary discourse with comparative ease. And in that discourse a range of common-use features of humility may be noted. Each of these features embodies an expression of humility or a way of being humble. Here are several:

1. Having a low opinion of oneself, especially when others have a higher opinion of one, as expressed in one’s saying, “Yes, I have come through some hard times, but I was lucky. It was not due to any thing I did.”

2. Having a low estimate of one’s merit, as expressed in one’s saying, “Thank you for the kind words, but I am not really such a good mathematician [or such a good carpenter, etc., or such a good person].”

3. Having a modest opinion of one’s importance or rank, so that when reasonable judgments can vary one’s judgment is on the low side, as expressed in one’s saying, “My contribution was not that much. Not nearly as much as S’s.”

4. Absence of self-assertion, as expressed in one’s demurring or remaining silent when one has made a contribution or has an ability or has merit, even though one does not fear being contradicted.

5. Claiming little as one’s desert, as when one says, “No, I don’t deserve that award. Please give it to S,” especially when in the eyes of others one deserves it.

6. Having or showing a consciousness of one’s defects, as when one says or reflects, “I get angry far too easily.”

7. Not being proud, haughty, or arrogant, expressed of one by others when they say, “She is a humble person,” meaning she is not one or more of these.

All of these expressions of humility are included in various dictionary definitions of “humility” or “humble.”² In addition, we can observe that in popular parlance not being vain or vainglorious is another way of being humble, as is being modest. Dressing modestly may not in itself be an expression of humility, but one who is modest about her accomplishments is being humble in one of the ways of being humble. Dictionaries sometimes partially define “humility” and “humble” in terms of modesty and being modest.

Not all expressions of humility are equally profound. Some engage us more deeply than others. One may have a low estimate of one’s merit or importance only periodically or only once. This would then be a single humble act, possibly out of character. Not being arrogant or proud, by contrast, is closer to a way of being. Also one of the identified features of humility, claiming little as one’s desert, may be expressed in what one says or in what one truly feels. Each is recognized as an expression of humility, although the second is more profound. Making an apology is similar. The child who under parental duress says to his sister, “I’m sorry,” has fulfilled the parental instruction to apologize even if his apology is not from the heart.

Some of these expressions of humility require relationships to others or a social setting, such as (3) having a modest opinion of one’s importance or rank and (5) claiming little as one’s desert. But not being proud does not require a social setting. A hermit can be proud or not proud. While the noted expressions of humility can vary in their profundity and in their requirements, each is identifiable as a feature of humility in the general notion of humility, and each is a way of being humble.

Even though each is identifiable as a distinct way of being humble, there is some overlap among many of these features of humility. Specifically, (1) having a low opinion of oneself, (2) having a low estimate of one’s merit, (3) having a modest opinion of one’s importance or rank, and (4) an absence of self-assertion all overlap, so that often what indicates that one feature applies indicates that the others do as well; and (2) and (5) claiming little as one’s desert, similarly overlap. Moreover, some of these features may be incompatible in their requirements. (5) does not require self-knowledge, but (6), being conscious of one’s defects, does. And (6) seems to contradict (1) having a low opinion of oneself, since such a low opinion could be false. Yet all are features of humility in some expressions of humility despite such contradictions. In the same way, regarding games—to use Ludwig Wittgenstein’s well-known example—while some games require physical dexterity and some do not, and while some are played on a board and some are played on a field, each is a game.³

Philosophical Accounts of Humility

Different contemporary philosophical accounts of humility—efforts to define or to say what humility is—typically focus on some one characteristic of humility and offer it as a defining feature. J.L.A. Garcia in his discussion of humility considers and presents a number of such accounts.⁴ What is of interest is how each is in touch with—echoes—common-use features of the general notion of humility. Among the accounts Garcia considers are:

1. Julia Driver’s account: humility is someone’s underestimating her good features. Driver’s account echoes or is close to (1) having a low opinion of oneself and to (2) having a low estimate of one’s merit. Driver is offering an account of modesty, but she allows that “humility is closely akin to modesty.”⁵ Dictionaries, as we noted, sometimes partially define “humility” in terms of modesty.

2. Owen Flanagan’s account: humility is someone’s not overestimating her good features. This account echoes or is close to (3) having a modest opinion of one’s importance or rank, to (4) absence of self-assertion, and to (5) claiming little as one’s desert.⁶

3. Norvin Richards’ account: humility is someone’s having a proper perspective on herself, knowing herself and her good qualities, in the face of the temptation to exaggerate. Richards’ account echoes or is close to (4) absence of self-assertion, and to (6) having or showing a consciousness of one’s defects.⁷

4. Robert Roberts and Jay Wood’s account: humility is unconcern with others’ opinion. This is their characterization of “humility as opposed to vanity”; their characterization of “humility as opposed to arrogance” is different. The person who is humble, as opposed to arrogant, has no disposition “to ‘infer’ some entitlement claim from a supposition of one’s superiority, and to think, act, and feel on the basis of that claim.” The person who is humble in this way avoids a “preoccupation with [his or her] own entitlements.” Both of Roberts and Wood’s accounts echo or are close to (1) having a low opinion of oneself, to (3) having a modest opinion of one’s importance or rank, and to (5) claiming little as one’s desert. Their characterization of “humility as opposed to arrogance” is particularly close to (5).⁸ In their account Roberts and Wood are aware that there are different expressions of humility, for they distinguish between humility in its opposition to vanity and humility in its opposition to arrogance. They are also aware that humility, or humility in its profound expression, requires a turning from self-concern or a preoccupation with oneself. This, as will be argued, is a feature of an expression of humility when it is opposed to humility’s core contrasting states. Later in this chapter we will briefly return to Roberts and Wood’s comments on humility.

Each of these philosophical accounts of humility Garcia finds inadequate, but each he also finds “captures a truth” about humility.⁹ In saying this he indicates the strengths of these accounts. Each echoes one or more features of humility, whatever problems they may have as a full account of humility. Garcia himself offers his own account of humility—an “if and only if, and to the extent that” definition of humility—that, briefly put, makes humility “being unimpressed with ourselves.”¹⁰ Garcia expresses his conviction that there must be something in which “humility consists,” and for him the something in which humility consists will be necessary and sufficient for humility. However, although he does not say so, in allowing that the conceptions of humility he rejects capture features that may characterize the humble person, he in effect supports the polythetic nature of the concept.

Why Humility Is a Polythetic Concept

A polythetic concept applies to a class that is not defined by necessary and sufficient properties. Instead, its members are marked by characteristics shared by many but not all instances, rather as, in Wittgenstein’s language, family resemblances may be shared.¹¹ Polythetic concepts have been contrasted with monothetic concepts. For monothetic concepts all the instances of the class to which it applies are included in the class by virtue of necessary and sufficient conditions. Is humility a polythetic or a monothetic concept? Do the instances of humility share only family resemblances (so that the concept is polythetic), or are all the instances of humility included in the class by virtue of necessary and sufficient conditions (so that the concept is monothetic)? On the evidence of common usage, backed up by dictionary definitions, and allowing that the different contemporary philosophical accounts capture or echo one or more sometimes-present features of humility, we may say that humility is polythetic (so that instances of humility are not defined or captured by a single set of necessary and sufficient properties, but instead are marked by characteristics shared by many but not all instances). The common-use features of humility in its general notion and the different contemporary philosophical accounts, which echo them, show us different ways of being humble or of expressing humility.

Humility, then, is best understood as a polythetic concept. Is “humility” a “trouser-word,” getting its meaning in different uses from a range of different contrasts, each being a different way of not having humility? To some extent it may be. One can be humble in not being concerned with the opinion of others or in not being self-assertive or in not being arrogant. But it is not a trouser-word to the extent that “real” is, “real” being J.L. Austin’s prime example of a trouser-word.¹² For humility can be expressed positively by, for instance, having an awareness of one’s defects or shortcomings or claiming little as one’s desert or being lowly or having lowliness of mind. Yet humility does have several contrasting negatives that provide it, as it were, with different meanings in different contexts. While this does not make “humility” a polysemic word, like “branch,” it does make it somewhat like “real,” of which Austin says, it “has the baffling feature of having neither one single ‘meaning’, nor yet ambiguity, a number of different meanings.”¹³ As a polythetic concept “humility” has one meaning, but that meaning allows different expressions of humility in different contexts. And this means that there are different ways of being humble. Allowing that there are different expressions of humility of course is not to allow that they are all equally profound.

III. Core Contrasts between Humility and Pride and between Humility and the Pride–Shame Axis

Although the concept of humility is polythetic, at the same time there is an abiding core contrast to humility to be noted. At its core, especially but not only in a strong strain of traditional religious understanding, humility has a deep opposition to pride. In fact, there are two oppositions here. One is between humility and pride itself and the other is the opposition between humility and the axis of pride–shame. Both will be explored in this section.

We begin with the opposition between humility and pride. One of the features of humility in its general notion is not being proud, haughty, or arrogant, so that one of the opposites of humility is pride. Furthermore, pride has inveterately been regarded as the opposite of humility, traditionally and in modern moral and religious sensibilities. Dictionaries typically partially define “humility” in terms of the absence of pride or of being proud, and all the philosophical accounts presented are compatible with ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Humility
• 2 Religious Humility
• 3 Detachment
• 4 Will and Self-Will
• 5 Stress and Various Attachments
• 6 Desire
• 7 Stimuli
• 8 Simulacra
• 9 Peace and Joy
• 10 Morality, Religion, and Spirituality
• 11 Self-Respect and Self-Love
• 12 Contemporary Detachment
• Bibliography
• Index