Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon

The Emergence of a New Sphere of Opposition

John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth, Nick Startin, John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth, Nick Startin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317422501
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

As the EU enters an increasingly uncertain phase after the 2016 Brexit referendum, Euroscepticism continues to become an increasingly embedded phenomenon within party systems, non-party groups and within the media. Yet, academic literature has paid little attention to the emergence of, and increased development of, transnational and pan-European networks of EU opposition. As the 'gap' between Europe's mainstream political elites and an increasingly sceptical public has widened, pan-European spheres of opposition towards the EU have developed and evolved.

The volume sets out to explain how such an innately contradictory phenomenon as transnational Euroscepticism has emerged. It draws on a variety of perspectives and case studies in a number of spheres – the European Parliament, political parties, the media, civil society and public opinion. Examining to what extent the pan-European dimension of Euroscepticism is becoming increasingly influential, it argues that opposition to European integration has for too long been viewed somewhat narrowly, through the paradigm of national party politics.

This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and professionals in EU politics, European studies, political parties, and more broadly to comparative politics and international relations.

1 Introduction

John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth and Nicholas Startin

The term Euroscepticism first appeared in the context of the United Kingdom (UK) in the mid-1980s. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a ‘Euro-sceptic’ as a person who is not enthusiastic about increasing the powers of the European Union (EU; see Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 14). It was, however, not until Delors’s three-phase plan for Monetary Union and the subsequent preparations for the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) that opposition towards the EU fully emerged as a major issue across EU nation states. There is no doubt that Maastricht, as the TEU is commonly labelled, acted as a key turning point in the evolution of the Eurosceptic debate. For many supporters and opponents alike it signalled the new politicisation of European integration with the name change from ‘European Community’ to ‘European Union’ a symbolic confirmation of this development. As Usherwood and Startin (2013) testify, it marked the moment when divisions between European and domestic policy within the member states began to become increasingly blurred both in terms of perception and reality and when opposition to ‘Europe’ changed from being a straightforward question concerning the pros and cons of EU membership to one that was couched much more in terms of the rationale of the route that the European project is taking. After Maastricht EU referendums become a feature of the political landscape in certain member states and, partly as a reflection of negative public opinion, politicians in many countries increasingly utilised Eurosceptic discourse to gain political advantage. The result of these post-Maastricht events has been the emergence of Euroscepticism as a permanent feature of national debates on Europe.

The advent of the economic and financial crisis in the Eurozone pushed the Eurosceptic debate into a new phase as Europe’s leaders struggle to grapple with increased hostility to the European project particularly in northern European countries like the UK and Denmark, and in southern Mediterranean countries like Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Italy, where political leaders and governments have struggled to resolve the social consequences (such as mass youth unemployment) of the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and the failure to reach a EU-wide consensus over refugee resettlement increased tensions between countries, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stating that ‘[w]e must acknowledge that the European Union’s misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation’ (The Guardian 2015). Euroscepticism has now become an increasingly significant phenomenon across the EU member states, impacting on political parties and party systems, on non-party and civil society groups and has become more prominent in EU member states’ media discourse (see Usherwood and Startin 2013). According to the European Commission’s biannual data sets, levels of opposition to the EU are at an all-time high leading academics such as Brack and Startin (2015) to proclaim that we are witnessing the gradual ‘mainstreaming’ of Euroscepticism across Europe.

The rise in prominence of Euroscepticism in recent years has not gone unnoticed by academics. The number of scholarly contributions analysing the phenomenon has increased to such an extent that Mudde (2012) describes the evolving field of Eurosceptic studies as a ‘true cottage industry’. Traditionally the majority of work in the field has focused on two main areas, first, on the impact of Euroscepticism on political parties and domestic party systems; and, second, on Euroscepticism in terms of attitudinal data at the mass level. The first major contribution to this field was Taggart’s (1998: 366) much-cited ‘touchstone of dissent’ article, which provided the first academic definition of Euroscepticism: ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) further extended their study of party-based Euroscepticism by introducing their much-cited ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categorisation. This distinction offers a valuable tool for separating out those parties that are strongly opposed to European integration (i.e. ‘hard Eurosceptics’) and those who show signs of contingent opposition (i.e. ‘soft Eurosceptics’), ‘with attitude towards a country’s membership of the EU being viewed as the ultimate litmus test of whether one fell into the first or second camp’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 240). However, such binary definition has been questioned by scholars in the field for its looseness (see e.g. Flood 2009 and Mudde 2012). In response, Kopecký and Mudde’s (2002) ‘two sides of Euroscepticism’ presents a typology that distinguishes between support for European integration and support for the EU which in turn leads to four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe (Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Eurorejects and Europragmatists). Yet, despite these categories being ideal-types, this approach has not succeeded in solving the terminological issues surrounding the definition of Euroscepticism. By confining ‘Eurosceptics’ to the rank of parties supporting the general ideas of European integration and being pessimistic about the EU’s reflection of these ideas, the authors only captured one facet of this concept. While further contributions have attempted to solve these problems (see Vasilopoulou 2011), the two aforementioned conceptualisations still dominate the Eurosceptic studies literature. This is despite more recent research suggesting that due to the evolving complexity of party-based Euroscepticism, such categorisations contribute to a semantic confusion surrounding this notion (Leruth 2015).

In recent years there are signs that a more holistic approach to the study of Euroscepticism as advocated by Usherwood and Startin (2013), with greater focus on other key actors – such as the role of non-party groups and civil society, the impact of referendums (Opperman 2013) and the media (Bijsmans 2015) on the debate as a whole – has begun to emerge and there have been some notable contributions in recent years – see FitzGibbon (2013) and de Lange and Guerra (2009) on non-party groups, Holmes (2008) and Startin and Krouwel (2013) on referendums and Daddow (2013) and de Wilde et al. (2013) on the media. One certain conclusion to be drawn from the existing literature, where there is little contention, is that most commentators now agree that the notion that Euroscepticism is just a passing phenomenon, as the EU struggles to create a convincing narrative with regard to its future role and direction, is no longer valid. Euroscepticism has moved from the realm of political phenomenon to constituent element of the European political sphere – at both the domestic and supranational levels.

An area of the academic literature on Euroscepticism that has received little or no attention is the emergence of, and increased development of, transnational and pan-European networks of opposition to the EU. While it is understandable that the transnational (or horizontal) dimension of Euroscepticism, i.e. the coordination of opposition to the process of European integration across several countries, has been neglected by the academic community who have traditionally focused their energies on the national dimension, there is no doubt that a pan-European (or vertical) Eurosceptic narrative, i.e. the coordination of opposition to the process of European integration at the EU level, has begun to emerge in recent years, particularly since the advent of the ‘Eurocrisis’. It is therefore time to acknowledge that the assumption, often portrayed by the pro-EU academic community, that Eurosceptics, because of their nationalist and pro-sovereignty sentiment, are unlikely bedfellows in terms of cross-border cooperation is no longer a given. The reality is that through tactical and strategic necessity, we are witnessing the emergence of a pan-European and transnational dynamic among those voices that oppose European integration and that this is a dynamic which is likely to develop and to become more influential in the coming years.

As there has hitherto been a lack of modelling and theorising in this area, (partly due to the fact that it is a recent phenomenon and partly because so few scholars are working in this field), the aim of this book is to bridge this gap in the literature in the field of Eurosceptic studies. As a broad theme, the collection of work in this volume will examine how and to what extent the pan-European dimension of Euroscepticism is becoming increasingly influential in the debate about the future direction of the European project. Drawing on the work of leading academics in the field, it will examine, in the context of the economic crisis in the Eurozone and the May 2014 European elections, to what extent we are witnessing an emergent European public sphere with an ostensible government – pro-EU actors – and an opposition – Eurosceptic actors.

Euroscepticism and the transnational dynamic

Eurosceptics’ raison d’être is opposition to European integration. That is they oppose, to varying degrees, institutionalised cooperation among European countries. Their alternative is generally for a regression back to the nation state as the basis of all legislative and political sovereignty. From this assumption it follows that Eurosceptics themselves will not seek to build coalitions of like-minded actors across Europe. We would thus expect to find little evidence of formal attempts by Eurosceptics to coordinate their activities between actors from various European countries as this would appear to be diametrically opposed to their pro-sovereignty and nationalist motivations and their distrust of trans-European cooperation. Instead, we would expect to find opponents of European integration focused on the domestic sphere, as on the surface it would appear that the political opportunity structures for Eurosceptic activists are almost all rooted in the national domestic sphere – principally referendums, European Parliament (EP) elections and national Parliaments. Corroborating this assertion, Mair (2007) has argued that there is no European political sphere, no arena of contestation for European-related issues. Hitherto, both the ideological orientation and practical, tactical considerations for anti-EU activists have led them to the conclusion that it is the national domestic sphere and not a pan-European one that is the most relevant arena for their energies.

A closer look at the empirical evidence, however, appears to contradict this assertion as anti-EU activists have moved beyond the national political sphere. Rather, they have sought to engage with like-minded activists across Europe to build networks of support. Wary of appearing as overtly nationalist, these actors have often sought to portray themselves as ‘internationalist’ in outlook, though sceptical of European integration. What they have sought to articulate is a ‘different form of Europe’ from ‘this type of Europe’ to quote the Irish Eurosceptic activist Declan Ganley (FitzGibbon 2013). Indeed, many Eurosceptics are scathing of the term ‘Eurosceptic’ itself, believing it pejorative with negative connotations to radical nationalism. The fascinating element of this transnational scepticism is its clear contradiction with itself. In other words, in order to further their stated goal of achieving national withdrawal from the European integration process or the ending of the EU project itself, Eurosceptic activists have had to establish some form of transnational cooperation as a singular focus on the national sphere has failed to help them achieve their goals. In the last decade or so European integration has progressed to the extent that a single country cannot alone hold up events at the European level. Eurosceptics who restrict their activities to the domestic level risk not just being labelled as nationalist but of becoming irrelevant as the trajectory of European integration has moved beyond their sphere of influence.

Pan-European European Union scepticism in practice

The time when cross-border Eurosceptic cooperation was haphazard, chaotic and ephemeral is passing. Through tactical and strategic necessity, as well as a sense of shared ideological conviction, we have begun to witness the growing emergence of cooperation in a number of key areas and between several key political actors. First, within the context of the EP, pan-European cooperation has become increasingly evident among the various Eurosceptic parties. Although as Brack (2013: 51) points out, ‘since 1979, there have been MEPs overtly asserting their opposition to the EU project or its implementation’, what is particularly significant in recent years is the way in which such cooperation has become more entrenched and institutionalised as well as statistically more significant in terms of the number of groupings and the number of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). While Figure 1.1 suggests that ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parliamentary groups peaked in the late 1970s and 1980s, most of these groups tended to express a much lower degree of opposition to the European Community than to the post-Maastricht Union.

Figure 1.1 The evolution of Eurosceptic party groups within the European Parliament, 1979–2014

Notes: The left-wing soft Eurosceptic groups are: Communist and Allies (1979–1989); Left Unity (1989–1994); European United Left (1989–1995); European United Left-Nordic Green Left (1995–). The right-wing ‘soft’ Eurosceptic groups are: the European Progressive Democrats (1979–1984); the European Democratic Alliance (1984–1995); the Union for Europe of the Nations (1999–2009); the European Conservatives and Reformists (2009–). The ‘hard’ Eurosceptic groups are: the Technical Group of the European Right (1984–1994); Europe of Nations (1994–1996); Independents for a Europe of Nations (1996–1999); Europe of Democracies and Diversities (1999–2004); Independence/Democracy (2004–2009); Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2009–2014); Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (2014–); and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (2015–).
*Data from the 2014–2019 parliamentary term is accurate as of August 2015.

Source: European Parliament Archives.

The EP currently includes four openly Eurosceptic groupings, two that can be considered as ‘hard’ Eurosceptics and two others that can be considered as ‘soft Eurosceptic’, to use Taggart and Szczerbiak’s classification. The ‘hard’ Eurosceptic grouping Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD; formerly Europe of Freedom and Democracy, EFD), which comprises MEPs from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Italian Five Star Movement and the Sweden Democrats, among others, has become a significant voice for dissent within the EP. Similarly, the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group formed in 2009 and set up by the UK Conservative Party in conjunction with like-minded parties of the right in Poland and the Czech Republic has added a new dimension of pan-European party opposition to the EU. In developing distinct alternatives to EU policies based around reform of existing EU policies and return to national competencies in specific areas, the ECR have created something approaching the institutionalised opposition of Western democratic states. Following the 2014 European elections and a major reshuffle in terms of party affiliation within the EP, the ECR became the third largest group, with 70 seats. While the EFDD and ECR groups have significantly raised the profile of Euroscepticism in the EP over the past few years, on the left of the political spectrum the confederal European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group has, since 1995, articulated a classical left-wing critique of European integration. The group’s focus on internationalist and not nationalist alternative policies gives them the appearance of pro-integrationism. However, the participation of their affiliate members in campaigns to defeat EU-related referendums in Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden under the GUE/NGL banner with the use of EP funds, shows that left-wing transnational Euroscepticism in the EP has in many ways a longer history and a more practical impact than its right-wing counterparts. In addition, in most recent years the Greens-European Free Alliance group became increasingly opposed to neoliberal policies advocated by the European Commission, e.g. by voicing concerns over the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

In contrast to the long-term presence of left-wing Euroscepticism, cooperation in the EP has been ill-fated for the parties of the Radical Right with the implosion of the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty group after nine months of chaotic existence in 2007 (see Startin 2010). From an historical perspective, the majority of Radical Right MEPs have remained unattached within the EP. In the wake of the 2014 European election results, the two most high-profile Radical Right politicians in European politics, Marine Le Pen (French National Front) and Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom) attempted to form an ‘even harder’ Eurosceptic group together with the Austrian Freedom Party, the Italian Northern League and the Belgian Vlaams Belang, based on the ‘European Alliance for Freedom’, a pan-European party launched in 2010. After several unsuccessful attempts to find allies from two additional member states in order to comply with EP rules, the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group was launched in June 2015, and includes the Polish Congress of the New Right, the United Romania Party and former UKIP MEP Janice Atkinson. As a result, the 2014–2019 EP accounts for the highest number of ‘hard Eurosceptic’ MEPs since the first direct elections took place in 1979, with EFDD, ENF and non-attached MEPs accounting for 13.05 per cent of the EP (see Figure 1.1).

While the EP is the most obvious arena for pan-European Euroscepticism to develop, it is by no means the only arena in which those seeking to contest European integration have mobilised. Moreover, the groups listed above are in many ways political ‘marriages of convenience’ that form to gain ac...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Modelling transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism
• 3 To cooperate or not to cooperate? The European Radical Right and pan-European cooperation
• 4 Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’? Modern conservatism, the European Conservatives and Reformists and European integration
• 5 Contesting integration: the Radical Left and Euroscepticism
• 6 Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism
• 7 ‘Stop TTIP’: towards a transnational Eurosceptic opposing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership?
• 8 Transnational Euroscepticism as ideational solidarity? The ‘No’ campaign in the Irish referendums on the Lisbon Treaty
• 9 Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news: a transnational perspective
• 10 Religion and the European Union: a commitment under stress
• 11 Conclusion
• Epilogue: Transnational and pan-Euroscepticism after Brexit
• Index