Converging Europe

Transformation of Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey

Ipek Eren Vural

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781409407096
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317159933
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Europäische Politik

'Converging Europe' evaluates the impact of European integration on social policy development since the launch and re-launch of the Lisbon strategy discussing the challenges posed by the still unfolding global economic crisis of 2007-2009. Given the unsettling economic conditions, does European coordination of social policies generate more social cohesion and integration or growing xenophobia, nationalism and exclusion? Informed by diverse theoretical perspectives, this book brings together a team of international experts working on an extensive range of policy issues central to the Lisbon agenda such as labour market policies, social protection systems, and social exclusion/poverty. Contributions assess the interfaces between European integration, the Lisbon strategy and social policy in three groups of countries related to the EU: old member states; the new member states; and a candidate country - Turkey. The richness of content and data allows rigorous analysis and critical comparative insights not only on the social outcomes of the Lisbon strategy but also more broadly on the dynamics and dimensions of European social policy. Pioneering the scholarly reflections on the repercussions of the global economic crisis of 2007-2009 for both the road map drawn at Lisbon and viability of national systems of social provision in Europe, this book is an important acquisition for policy makers and academics alike.

Chapter 1
Lisbon Strategy and Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey

İpek Eren Vural

The year 2010 marked the closing year of the Lisbon Strategy – the EU’s ten year medium term development plan. The Lisbon strategy was proposed as a solution to many of the EU’s chronic problems such as unemployment, productivity stagnation, weak macroeconomic performance, declining competitiveness vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan, an ageing population, fast technological innovation, financial and economic liberalization and challenges of globalization (Natali 2009). It declared a new strategic goal for the European Union to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs, and greater social cohesion’ (Council of European Union 2000). As such alongside the economic objectives which have been historically predominant at the EU level, the Strategy proclaimed greater significance attached to social policy matters.

It is acknowledged by analysts of European integration that an important factor which increased the significance and appeal of the Lisbon agenda was the inclusion of social dimension into this economic strategy (Borras and Jacobsson 2004; Van Apeldoorn 2009). The central objective of this edited volume is to evaluate the impact of European integration on social policy development since the launch (2000) and relaunch (2005) of the Lisbon strategy. While pursuing this objective the articles in this book also aim to locate social policy developments at the European and national levels within the context of the global economic crisis of 2007–2009. Rather than a single theoretical perspective shared by all of its contributors, this edited volume adopts theoretical pluralism while exploring the joint objectives outlined above. Thus the different chapters in the book are informed by diverse theoretical perspectives ranging from neo-Gramscianism to varieties of institutionalism. Rather than elaborating on a common theoretical perspective, this introductory chapter therefore aims to set the empirical terrain on which the subsequent chapters will build upon. For that purpose the chapter provides an overview of the ongoing debate about the rationale and functions underpinning the engagement with social policy in the Lisbon strategy, as well as the political factors underlying the process. This is then followed by an evaluation of the diverse interpretations of social outcomes of the Lisbon strategy.

On the Lisbon Agenda

The Lisbon strategy was a medium term development plan to facilitate structural transformation of the European economy, and to coordinate the reforms of economic and social policies at the national level. The strategy as such rested on two pillars: an economic pillar, and a social pillar.1 The economic pillar attributed central significance to increasing competitiveness and innovation as the safest path towards a knowledge based society. Competitiveness and innovation in turn were to be increased by fastening the process of structural reform and completing the internal market as well as generating effective policies for the information society and R&D (Moussis 2009:1; Rodrigues 2004:4). The social pillar aimed to raise employment levels, create social cohesion and combat social exclusion through structural reforms of the labour markets and social protection systems, by instituting an active welfare state, investing in people, and activating social policies (Council of the European Union 2000, Moussis 2009:1; Kroger 2009:2; Rodrigues 2004:5). Within this construct then competitiveness and social cohesion were interpreted as mutually reinforcing goals (Council of the European Union 2000; Bernhard 2010).

The governance tool introduced for the achievement of these objectives was an intergovernmental coordination procedure known as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). OMC was based on determination of common objectives at the European level, national implementation of these objectives, and surveillance by the European Commission and member states. (cf. Schäfer 2004:8; Rodrigues 2009:11) The coordination foreseen through the Open Method of Cooperation was based on voluntary compliance by member states towards common European objectives, which left policy choices at the national level precluding formal sanctions against member states that did not meet agreed standards (Scharpf 2002:652). The employment and labour market objectives of the Lisbon strategy were pursued within the rubric of European Employment Strategy (EES), which had been initiated in 1997 and served as a model in the design of the OMC. Following the launch of Lisbon strategy, OMC processes for social inclusion, pensions and health care were initiated towards meeting the objectives of creating social cohesion and modernizing social protection systems.

As the current volume is concerned with the social policy outcomes of the Lisbon strategy, it would be appropriate to provide an overview of the substance of the Strategy in that respect. Labour market objectives of the Lisbon strategy aimed to tackle unemployment and poverty through raising employment with the ultimate objective of attaining full employment. Towards that end, the strategy targeted to reach by 2010 an overall employment rate for the EU of 70 per cent, of at least 60 per cent for women, and of 50 per cent for older workers (55–64) (Council of Europe 2001). Measures endorsed in pursuit of these goals within the EES guidelines were predominantly supply side measures such as active labour market policies, and flexibilization of labour markets together with measures towards ensuring employment security (Council of the European Union 2001). Active labour market policies aimed to improve access, participation, and employability of workers in the labour market by providing guidance, training, work practice, a job, vocational guidance, counselling, to the unemployed (Council of the European Union 2001). To foster social inclusion, particular attention was called for reducing employment, pay, and access gaps amongst disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, disabled, and older workers.

Flexibilization of labour markets on the other hand was envisaged to increase the adaptability of both enterprises and employees to meet the challenges of competitiveness and productivity (Council of the European Union 2001; Commission of the European Communities 2003). Modernization of work organization, and working arrangements, lifelong learning, investment in human capital, improvements in quality jobs as well as reconciliation of work and private life through development of care facilities were endorsed as measures to increase flexibility of labour markets and enhance employment security (Council of European Union 2001; Commission of the European Communities 2003).

Structural reforms of the labour market to foster activation and flexibilization were to be complemented by modernization of social security systems which would simultaneously ‘make work pay’, remove inactivity, poverty and unemployment traps, while providing safety nets for the unemployed and the marginalized, to prevent risks of social exclusion (Commission of the European Communities 2003).

Social inclusion strand of the Lisbon strategy echoed the goals of the European Employment Strategy. While endorsing employment as the main solution to poverty, it also emphasized access to social services (health, education, justice), measures to prevent social exclusion (access to technology, prevention of life crises, promotion of family solidarity), and measures to help particularly disadvantaged groups such as women, disabled and elderly (Council of the European Union 2000; Daly 2006:469).

Interpretations on the launch of Lisbon strategy, its social dimension, and the outcomes of the process are diverse. For many, the emergence of Lisbon agenda and inclusion of social dimension created new expectations about the future contours of European integration (cf. Goetschy 2007, Maria Rodriguez, Natali 2009:122, Zeitlin 2008) According to Goetschy (2009:75) structural reforms proposed in the Lisbon strategy in relation to the labour market and modernization of social protection systems, aimed to achieve the right balance between regulation and deregulation, equity and efficiency that would facilitate protection of the European social model, and diffusion of its intrinsic values and principles beyond EU. For more critical accounts, the Lisbon strategy has been an extension of the neoliberal thrust that has been in effect in the process of European integration since the 1990s and its commitment to social cohesion was bound to remain hollow, symbolic rather than substantive (cf. Van Apeldoorn 2009:27, 41).

Despite such diverse interpretations on the nature and outcomes of the Lisbon strategy, there is some agreement amongst most scholars that inclusion of social dimension to the Lisbon agenda involved an attempt (either genuine or spurious) at reconciliation/recalibration of the economic and social objectives of European integration. There is also some agreement that such reconciliation aimed at increasing the legitimacy of the European project. Differences in analyses emerge however in relation to the power dynamics underlying this reconciliation attempt, and the object of the legitimation that would be brought forward by the Lisbon strategy. Thus there are competing accounts to explain why the Lisbon strategy was launched and why a social dimension was added to it.

Intergovernmentalist and institutionalist approaches, which view the member states of the Union, and Union institutions such as the Commission, Council, and European Parliament as the primary loci of political power, see this reconciliation attempt as being built upon compromises primarily between the member states, and European institutions in relation to the distribution of competences. These approaches therefore point to the external and internal conditions shaping the preferences/choices of member state governments, such as increasing pressure of globalization, completion of the internal market and European Monetary Union (EMU) in the European Union, and the constraints such developments pose for the social policy capabilities of the member states, as well as their socially destructive consequences in terms of growing insecurity, and unemployment for their citizens (cf. de la Porte and Pochet 2002:11; Goetschy 2009:76; Berghman 2009:170; Borras and Jacobsson 2004:186). From a similar point of view rational choice variants of the institutionalist theories pointed towards the policy coordination pressures created for member states by the negative externalities spilling over from EMU on welfare outcomes (Collignon 2004). According to institutionalist and intergovernmentalist accounts then the Lisbon strategy emerged as a compromise solution to two tradeoffs, which historically hampered the development of social policy at the European level, one between the European integration and national competencies, the other between economic competitiveness and social cohesion (Natali 2009). In relation to the former, the intergovernmental coordination proposed in the sphere of social policy by the Lisbon strategy, and in particular the flexibility of the governance mechanism developed for that purpose, Open Method of Coordination (OMC), offered a middle way solution to offset the hesitation of member state governments to transfer their powers in the sphere of social policy to the supranational level (cf. Borras and Jacobsson 2004:186; Berghman 2009:170; cf. Schäfer 2004, 11, Goetschy 2009:76). In relation to the latter trade off between economic competitiveness and social cohesion, the increased emphasis attached to social policy in the Lisbon strategy aimed to correct the essential contradiction in the process of European integration, that of the unbalanced and asymmetrical regulation. Acknowledged as the characteristic of European integration process, asymmetrical regulation refers to the predominant economic bias of the integration process and the restriction of the social policies at the supranational level merely to market securing and market enabling measures (Scharpf 2002). The Lisbon strategy entailed multiple compromises to surmount this asymmetrical regulation by trading increased commitment to social policy at the supranational level in exchange for greater commitment for economic liberalization to complete the internal market, and pursue the modernization of social and labour market systems at the national level (cf. Goetschy 2007:500). It is important to note in this context that coordination was seen as necessary not only to mitigate the adverse impacts of the EMU on social policy but also to ensure the smoother functioning of the EMU in the longer term and the legitimacy of the European integration project (Collignon 2004; Euromemorandum 2010; Begg 2008:431).

Institutionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches also view the changes in the domestic power coalitions, political party compositions of the negotiating member state governments and partisan composition of the European Council as factors that facilitated the inclusion of a social agenda in the Lisbon strategy. Within such accounts the prevalence of left of centre governments in the majority of EU countries between 1997–2001 and their influence over the EU agenda is accounted amongst the factors that fostered the inclusion of a social dimension to the Lisbon strategy (Natali 2009, Schäfer 2004, Tucker 2003:14; Manow et al. 2004). Meanwhile analyses informed by pluralist theory view inclusion of a social dimension into the Lisbon strategy as the outcome of alliances and conflicts between the groups of transnational actors (cf. Pochet 2006).

For more critically informed political economy approaches, and in particular neo-Gramscian approaches, which emphasize social forces underpinning state power and analyse the role of class agency in shaping European integration, the Lisbon strategy is an extension of the class project representing the interests of transnational fractions of the European capitalist class (Hager 2009, Van Apeldoorn 2009; Holman and van der Pijl 2003:80; van der Pijl 2006:32; Holman this volume). While acknowledging the centrality of nation states for the organization of formal political power and class formation (Van Apeldoorn, Overbeek, and Ryner 2003) these approaches reject attributing any independent source of power to nation states in their analyses (Bieler and Morton 2001:18). The central claim of these approaches is that the relaunch of the European integration in the second half of the 1980s and the neoliberal agenda that became prominent in due process (reflected in the completion of the Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, and the European Monetary Union) is the product of a transnational class strategy supported by the transnational fraction of the European capitalist class (Van Apeldoorn, Overbeek, and Ryner 2003; Van Apeldoorn 2009, Holman and van der Pijl 2003; Van Apeldoorn 2002). During this period, asymmetrical regulation referred earlier emerged as an important corollary of neoliberal restructuring. Neo-Gramscian approaches highlight the socially deregulatory impact of the asymmetrical regulation at the national level, in particular how market integration at the European level, and European Monetary and Economic integration, constrain the social capabilities at the national level (Holman 2004:716; see Bieling, and also Otto Holman in this volume). These approaches maintain that while rules on internal market intensify regime competition by urging member states to attract and retain transnationally mobile capital, the monetary union involves the transfer of all powers available for member states to correct macroeconomic imbalances (interest rate adjustments, government expenditures, and devaluations) to the supranational level (Van Apeldoorn 2009:26; Holman 2004:726; Gill 2001). The only means available for nation states under European law are supply side strategies, involving lower tax burdens, further deregulation and flexibilization of labour market conditions, increasing wage differentiation, and welfare cutbacks (Scharpf 2002:649; Van Apeldoorn 2009:26). Moreover, neo-Gramscian approaches posit that asymmetrical regulation of European governance is not coincidental; rather it is an integral part of a concerted and coordinated transnational class project. European Economic and Monetary Union, which form the basis of asymmetrical regulation in the European Union, has been the concerted and conscious strategy of the transnational fractions of the capitalist class (Van Apeldoorn 2002; Holman this volume). The latter have also been powerful in the designation of the Lisbon strategy (van der Pijl 2006).

One strand within the neo-Gramscian approach view the addition of social cohesion alongside the other pillar of competitiveness within the Lisbon strategy as a reflection of the attempts of transnational fractions of the European capitalist class to secure the support of popular classes by incorporating some of their interests and aspirations into a dominant ideology that sustain its interests. For example, Van Apeldoorn argues that articulation of competitiveness with social cohesion in Lisbon strategy helped (at least initially) to solidify the bloc of social forces underpinning the emergence of embedded neoliberalism as a ‘hegemonic class project articulated and propagated by – and reflecting as well as mediating the interests of – social and political forces bound up with European transnational capital’ (Van Apeldoorn 2009:22; Hager 2009). In effect Van Apeldoorn argues (cf. 2009:22, 25), asymmetrical regulation characteristic of European Union was maintained intact within the Lisbon Strategy by strengthening the promotion of competitiveness at the supranational European level, while maintaining the function of social cohesion at the national level (Van Apeldoorn 2009:22; Bernhard 2010).

Yet another strand within neo-Gramscian approaches, adopt a different perspective on the social rationale of the Lisbon strategy. According to this view the governance structure of the EU does not entail political structures that can generate the formation of transnational support coalitions through provision of concessions or side payments to subordinate groups (Holman 2004; 725; van der Pijl 2006:34). The social purpose of the Lisbon strategy, according to this view is rather an outright attempt to deregulate national welfare systems (Holman, this volume) As the Lisbon strategy did not address the asymmetrical regulation underlying European integration (i.e. promotion of competitiveness at the supranational level while maintaining social cohesion at the national level) it reinforces the generation of market conforming social policy rather than improving the social deficit at the EU level (Holman 2004). Bernhard (2010) also agrees that the discourse of the Lisbon strategy strengthened the neoliberal hegemony through relegating conflictual social policy issues to the national level while promoting neoliberal competitiveness at the European level.

Another common agreement in the literature is that the inclusion of the social dimension into the Lisbon agenda aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the European project in the eyes of the wider European public. Post Maastricht and post EMU periods that is early 1990s and 2000s were characterized by successive waves of legitimation crises of the European integration as a project. As the contending theoretical approaches conceive the primary drivers of European i...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Lisbon Strategy and Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey
• PART I LISBON STRATEGY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
• PART II REFORM DYNAMICS IN OLD EUROPE
• PART III EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL
• PART IV EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL POLICY TRANSFORMATION IN TURKEY
• PART V EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LISBON STRATEGY
• Index