Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology

New Expanded Edition

Hans Henrik Bruun

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754645290
• eBook ISBN: 9781317058830
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

First published in 1972, this book on Weber's methodological writings is today regarded as a modern classic in its field. In this new expanded edition, the author has revised and updated the original text, and translated the numerous German quotations into English. He has also added a new introduction, where he discusses major issues raised in the relevant secondary literature since 1972. The author traces the relationship between values and science in Max Weber's methodology of its central aspects: value freedom, value relation (Wertbeziehung), value analysis, the ideal type and the special problems which pertain to the sphere of politics. Weber's thought is presented and discussed on the basis of a meticulous analysis of all available, published or unpublished, original material. The book is indispensable for all serious Weber scholars and provides the general student with a clear, accessible and authoritative exposition of major aspects of Weber's methodology.

Chapter 1

Values as a Problem of Scientific Inquiry: Value Freedom

One of the fundamental problems arising out of the relation of values to scientific inquiry is whether the definition of “scientific inquiry” excludes certain value elements from the predicate “scientific”, and, if so, what these value elements are and in what connections they are excluded. More succinctly, the question can be formulated as follows: Is the sphere of scientific inquiry defined in such a manner that we can point to a sphere of value elements separated from it by virtue of this definition?

It is quite obvious, indeed a commonplace to anyone familiar with the methodology of the social sciences, that this question can be answered in the affirmative in the case of Max Weber. At least in certain connections, Weber demands a complete separation of the value sphere from that of scientific inquiry; in these connections, values are, in his view, illegitimate elements in the process of scientific inquiry. This principle or demand (both terms will be used in the following) Weber calls the demand for the value freedom (Wertfreiheit1) of scientific inquiry.

Weber was certainly not the first to formulate a principle of this kind. In Germany, Georg Simmel, Heinrich Rickert and Georg Jellinek had, each in his own field (ethics, philosophy and political science, respectively), advanced similar ideas before Weber’s first complete formulation of the demand in 1904.2 The logical assumptions underlying it have an even longer history, since in their essentials they reach back to Aristotelian logic, and may be found in their relevant form in Hume (“Hume’s Law”), Kant and J.S. Mill.3 Although the paternity of the principle of value freedom must therefore be attributed to others, Weber was the first to extend the principle to all the social sciences, to think out its premises thoroughly and in all their ramifications, to apply it in a number of different fields, and to demonstrate its scope and consequences: in short, to discuss exhaustively what he himself called “the meaning of value freedom”; and his treatment of the various aspects of the principle of value freedom is broadly accepted as valid even today. Against this background, the claim that Max Weber was the true author of the principle of value freedom, as this principle is currently understood and discussed, does not seem unwarranted.4

The external context of Weber’s demand for value freedom

Why was it that Weber, rather than some other scholar, came to explore the principle of value freedom in all its details? Although the answer to this question is of no particular importance from the point of view of the theoretical discussion of the principle, a brief account of the circumstances under which the principle came to be formulated may nevertheless be useful.

The first fairly complete formulation of the principle of value freedom, its premises and consequences, was given by Weber in 1904 in Objectivity. The immediate cause was that a new team of editors was taking over the periodical Archives of Social Science and Social Policy (Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik). This event in itself was peaceful enough; but Weber’s declaration, on their behalf, that the periodical, “as a representative of an empirical specialized discipline”,5 would observe the principle of value freedom, was calculated to underline the distance that separated him from the “historical” school of economics under the leadership of Gustav Schmoller. In Knies I-II, Weber’s criticism of the philosopher Wundt was partly based on the principles of value freedom, as set out in Objectivity. In the following years, Weber levelled similar critiques at the jurist Rudolf Stammler (in Stammler) and the “energeticist” biologist, Professor Ostwald (in Energ.Th.Cult.). In parallel, the question of value freedom was raised by Weber in the stronghold of historico-ethical economics, the Social Policy Association (Verein für Sozialpolitik), in particular during its 1909 congress in Vienna, where he made vigorous interventions, backed up by Werner Sombart.

The general reaction within the Association to these interventions was by no means positive.6 This was a major reason behind Weber’s interest in the creation of the German Sociological Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie) in 1909, and for his insistence on having the principle of value freedom written into the statutes of the Society. This measure, however, aggravated the problem instead of solving it. The study of sociological questions was still in its infancy, and the members of the Society belonged to many different scientific traditions, some of which were far from being value-free. Already at the first congress of the Society, in 1910, a strong anti-value-freedom group had emerged under the leadership of Rudolf Goldscheid. Weber consequently felt impelled to intervene in a large number of the debates, but did not meet with the success that he had hoped for. At the second congress in 1912, the differences of opinion grew critical: in Weber’s view, almost all the speakers offended against the officially established principle of value-freedom, and the discussions became, in the words of one observer, “a veritable chase after prescriptive demands that the speakers had, or were alleged to have, formulated”.7 Weber grew ever more tired of the role as methodological Don Quixote8 which he found himself playing; he had already withdrawn from the executive committee of the Society, and when in 1913 Goldscheid was elected (co)president, Weber left it altogether.9

Simultaneously, the discussion in the Association of the principle of value freedom – a discussion often referred to as the “quarrel about value judgments” (Werturteilsstreit) – came to a head. On Weber’s initiative,10 the Association decided to place various aspects of the question of value freedom in the science of economics on the agenda for an enlarged meeting of the main committee (from which, unlike the ordinary congresses, the public was excluded). Prospective participants were requested to send in advance a short summary of their views on four aspects of the question: “1. the position of moral value judgments within the science of economics, 2. the relation of “developmental trends” to practical valuations, 3. the designation of goals for economic and social policy, 4. the relation of the general principles of methodology to the special tasks of academic teaching”.11 Weber’s contribution, the Memorandum, was far more comprehensive than those of the other contributors, and put his own views on value freedom in their most systematic form as yet (although the subjects singled out for discussion did lead him to concentrate on particular aspects of the question12). The small volume (Äusserungen) containing the printed contributions to the symposium was never put on sale, and probably only existed in some two hundred copies.13 Apparently, the Association was anxious to ensure that the details of the methodological brawl should not become widely known. This concern was manifested even more clearly at the meeting itself, on January 4th and 5th, 1914, where it was decided, on Schmoller’s proposal, to keep no record of the debates. Consequently, we only possess fragmentary accounts of the discussions, including Weber’s contributions to them. But one gets the impression that the proceedings soon grew heated, and correspondingly less fruitful, and that Weber in particular defended his position with great intensity. The debate came to a dramatic conclusion. In Boese’s words:

As … the body of opinion wholly or partly hostile [to Weber] continued to increase, (in essence, only Sombart declared himself in complete agreement with him), Max Weber rose once more and delivered himself of a forceful statement which, in fairly blunt terms, gave his opponents to understand that they did not see his point; he then left the meeting in anger.14

This stormy session was followed by a period of relative calm. Weber’s only subsequent contribution to the discussion of value freedom was the publication in 1917 of the Value Freedom article, which was in fact a revised and enlarged version of the Memorandum. In the two lectures Sc.Voc. and Pol.Voc. (1917/19), aspects of the problem are still discussed, but in a different setting. Here, the existential aspects are much more prominent than the academic ones, and in Pol.Voc., the sphere of practical politics is the focus of interest.

As the discussion of the external context of Weber’s demand for value freedom has made clear, he formulated the demand in relation to numerous different branches of the social sciences: pure and applied economics, sociology (in a number of varieties), law and political science. In fact, he extended it to cover the social sciences in general, but at the same time took great care to discuss in detail how it could and should be applied in each of the fields mentioned. But, paradoxically, this important reason for the scope and depth of Weber’s discussion was one of the main causes of its fragmentary character. He treats the demand for value freedom in sections, so to speak, according to the context of the discussion, bringing the central principle to bear now in one direction, now in another; thus, various aspects of the problem are highlighted, depending on the concrete argument. In the present account, however, where Weber’s basic position is of greater importance than his various immediate reasons for stating it with regard to this or that particular discipline, I have chosen a more systematic approach, in order to ensure that the general view of the problem be kept clear: after a short initial exposition of the general principle of value freedom, as formulated by Weber, the discussion will concentrate on his treatment of the various groups of problems that the principle gives rise to.

The principle and its premises in their most general form

The fact that Weber mostly discusses the principle of value freedom with regard to some particular discipline, and often in a polemical context, probably explains why his formulations of the principle are usually limited in scope. In fact, general statements of the...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Series Editor’s Preface
• Preface
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Values as a Problem of Scientific Inquiry: Value Freedom
• Chapter 2: Values as a Precondition of Scientific Inquiry: Value Relation
• Chapter 3: Values as an Object of Scientific Inquiry: Value Analysis
• Chapter 4: Values as an Instrument of Scientific Inquiry: The Ideal Type
• Chapter 5: The Complementary Relation of Values and Scientific Inquiry: Politics and Science
• Bibliography
• Name Index
• Subject Index