Reason and Professional Ethics

Peter Davson-Galle

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780754654841
• eBook ISBN: 9781317070771
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Many professionals confront ethical issues concerning their proper roles and the manner in which they should carry out those roles. This book is aimed at those studying for entry into the various professions (such as teaching or social work) where ethical questions are commonly faced. It introduces readers to both the techniques and depth of ethical argument drawn from the fields of critical thinking and informal logic and enables practitioners to use these techniques so they can be deployed as 'tools of thought' for thinking in a carefully reasoned and extended way about problems of professional ethics. The book also provides a brief introduction to some of the normative and meta-ethical theory relevant to the principled discussion of professional ethics. Post-graduate students and academics should also find the treatment of some of the complexities of extended reasoning, in particular its focus upon careful metacognitive tracking and planning of an inquiry, to be of interest.

Chapter 1
Introductory Remarks and Overview

Value Judgements and Professional Life

What follows is intended to assist you to think as carefully as possible about various aspects of professional life that involve value judgements, that is, judgements about what is right or wrong, good or bad, worthwhile or not. Many university courses of professional preparation predominantly ignore such matters or simply take for granted a series of value stances concerning ‘professional ethics’ – sometimes these have been codified as a Code of Ethics for the profession. Or, even if various value judgemental issues are raised and discussed, students are not trained in the skills of critical thought prerequisite for a rigorous exploration of the issues. Even when courses attempt this task, little is available in the published literature to assist students to carry it out. Largely speaking, the book aims at helping you to reason in a rigorous way about such professional ethical matters. Its intent is to assist you to identify professional issues that are value judgemental and to form considered views on those issues. There are two elements here. First, identifying value judgemental issues; second, forming a considered view on them. Let us look at them in turn.

Some Particular Value Judgemental Issues Concerning Professional Life

I will not be able to cover all professions or all ethical issues, so these will be just a few illustrations. As we will see, however, there are a few broad themes within which most particular ethical concerns can be placed. What I will do is illustrate matters using the teaching profession as an example, identify some themes, draw some connections to some other professions and suggest that the themes are general ones governing any profession.

Teaching as an Illustration

Compulsory schooling is an extended exercise in forcing individuals to do what someone else wishes them to do. Apart from such school students, the only other people in society who are deprived of their liberty for such extended periods of time are criminals and the insane. Of course some students may enjoy what they learn and some of the curriculum might be what students would have chosen for themselves if given the choice but I think that it is safe to say that much of the time this is simply not so.

If people are to be subjected to loss of freedom of action (and thought) for such extended periods then there had better be a reason for doing this. And not just any old reason but good reason – a case that would justify such force. As soon as one is talking this way, matters have become value judgemental. So, presumably the general form of such a ‘good reason’ would be something like: ‘Johnny and Janie should learn such and such because it is so worthwhile for them to do so that it is worth forcing such learning on them if necessary’. That is, we (or someone or other, anyway not Johnny or Janie) have a goal as to how we wish students to be and that goal is considered to be of such importance that it outweighs our normal granting of freedom of action (and of thought) to individuals.

The upshot of this is that one matter that is clearly value judgemental is setting the goals (or aims, or purposes) of schooling. We cannot avoid having someone decide such aims, for clearly teaching cannot go on in a goal-less vacuum. There had better be some direction for what is occurring in schools or schooling would be literally aimless activity, mere flailing about.

What would such goals look like? For a start, the goals operate at different levels of generality. At the detailed level, the purposes governing day-to-day teaching decisions are set by teachers. A teacher values having some pupil carrying out some particular language activity because that will help her understand sentence structure. But why bother having the goal of having one’s pupils understand sentence structure? Perhaps in service of the cause of having them able to express their own ideas and understand the ideas of others. Why bother with that? Perhaps because being able to do that allows them a better chance of being gainfully employed than otherwise. But why consider that important? and so on. In short, one’s rationale for considering the activities of schooling worth bothering with is, if pursued in some depth, likely to take one beyond the immediacy of schooling to broader and more fundamental value positions about what society should be like, what sorts of citizens it should have, how we should treat each other, the rights of various individuals and groups in society and so forth.

We have here a hierarchy of goals from nitty gritty ones concerning daily teaching tasks through to ‘life, the universe and everything’ goals of a very general sort. And it is the latter goals, the very general ones, which govern what are chosen as more particular goals. Look again at the chain of goals in the illustration of the last paragraph and you will see how the more general ones are appealed to in justification of earlier, less general, ones. So, who decides on goals at which levels?

Generally speaking, as I have noted, individual teachers’ power in choosing the directions of what they do is limited. Other people choose the policies, the broad aims, that lay out what it is that teachers should be trying to achieve (like: ‘students being employable’) and it is the stipulated task of teachers to act in ways that serve those preset aims – they only get to choose the detail of the means to achieving ends chosen by someone else.

Or, at least, that is how things are now. I will return in a moment to question whether that is how things should be. But even if the task of teachers is not seen as the setting of broad aims but merely as the achievement of broad aims set by other people, it seems to be their professional duty to enter into the debate as to what those goals should be. After all, teachers are the counterparts of prison warders or psychiatric ward staff, those other institutional enforcers of lost freedom. If they have not thought about the aims that their actions are directed towards and satisfied themselves that the directions of the institution they are part of are proper directions, indeed, ones important enough to outweigh individual freedom, then a crisis of conscience surely looms for them (or should do so). And, on pain of unprofessional superficiality, their value judgements on these issues had better be well thought out – clearly conceived of and thoroughly explored as to the arguments which could be raised in their defence or in objection to them. Part of the task of what follows in the book is providing assistance for those readers who are (or will be) teachers to think through some ideas about what they judge schooling should be trying to achieve (at that ‘broad aim’ level of decision) and to do that thinking as rigorously and deeply as possible.

So, one value judgemental aspect of schooling for teachers to have a good hard think about is: What should schools be trying to achieve? What broad aims should their activities be directed at satisfying?

I remarked that, at the moment, teachers do not get to decide these things. (They have individual power at the nitty gritty end of the spectrum and some power collectively in setting things like school mission statements and whatnot but broad educational policy setting is something outside the hands of practising teachers.) And this raises another value judgemental matter concerning schooling. Who on earth has the moral right (or perhaps the duty – not the same thing, an issue we will return to in a later chapter) to decide upon those broad policy directions that lay down a framework governing, ultimately, what individual students learn at school? That is, who should have the power to decide the broad aims of schooling? (Note that this is not the legal matter-of-fact question: ‘who does have the power to decide the broad aims of schooling?’.) Perhaps, you might think, this should be a decision for teachers even if it is not that at the moment – after all, are not teachers the relevant educational experts? Or perhaps it should be parents that decide – it is their children of whom we speak. Or perhaps it should be the students themselves who decide; is it not a basic moral right to be in control of the contents of one’s own mind? – and schooling aims do dictate some of what goes into a student’s mind. Or perhaps it should be someone else or some combination of various parties – and so on. The point is that once one goes beyond simply noting who does, as a matter of fact, decide the broad aims at the moment to working out who should decide them, immediate ethical controversy ensues.

So, another value judgemental aspect of schooling for teachers to have a good hard think about is the following sort of ‘second level’ question: Who should have the power to decide the broad aims of schooling?

So far, we have focused upon the goals, or ends, or aims of schooling. But ethical questions also arise concerning the means to be chosen in achieving those ends. You might not see there to be any ethical dimensions here; surely, you might think, the educational research literature will simply provide matter-of-fact guidance as to what means are most efficient and effective in producing this or that learning outcome, in achieving various valued goals. Perhaps so, but sometimes the most efficient and effective method, even if known, should not be employed. As a dramatic illustration, allow me the assumption (quite plausible in my view) that the most efficient and effective way of getting children to learn arithmetic is to threaten them with amputation of finger segments if, in the teacher’s judgement, they are not working as hard as possible at their arithmetic – and to mean it and to have various students trundling around with less than a full count of fingers. One’s objection to that could not be how successful it was in getting arithmetic learnt; it is, by assumption here, more successful than anything else. Rather, despite its efficacy, the objection to it would be that it was unethical to adopt such a means to achieving the learning outcome. A less dramatic illustration, and one which involves current practice in schools, is the use of positive reinforcement as a way of shaping behaviour. Arguably this is immoral. I mention it now to emphasize that schooling involves actual, not just hypothetical, practices that are deserving of careful critical scrutiny. As another ‘real-world’ example, consider the controversy concerning the use of corporal punishment in schools or the widespread practice of incarceration (detention) of disobedient students – indeed the whole business of punishment and behaviour control is up for critical scrutiny.

So, a third value judgemental aspect of schooling for teachers to have a good hard think about is: What ethical constraints should there be on how teachers achieve the broad aims of schooling?

And, as you might guess, a further, second level, question is: Who should have power to decide what ethical constraints there are to be upon teachers ‘choices of means to ends?

That will do as illustration of the point that teaching is hardly a value-free business. To summarize, most value judgemental issues concerning teaching can be grouped into four main themes:

1. What should schools be trying to achieve? What broad aims should their activities be directed at satisfying?

2. Who should have the power to decide the broad aims of schooling?

3. What ethical constraints should there be on how teachers achieve the broad aims of schooling?

4. Who should have power to decide what ethical constraints there are to be upon teachers‘ choices of means to ends?

Other Professions

Although it is but one profession, I have explored the case of teaching in some depth because most readers will have some familiarity with schools and because much of what is said about teaching transfers across to other professions. Consider the first theme above. Every profession has aims. Generally speaking, you might feel that a fairly clear-cut answer is available as to what each profession should be trying to achieve, that is, what broad aims those employed in its institutions (or self-employed) should have their professional activities directed at satisfying. I suggest, however, that when it comes to pinning things down in more than the vaguest way, things become controversial fast. For instance, what about a scientist? What should a scientist be aiming to achieve? Let us put the following as a counterpart to our above question: What should science be trying to achieve? What broad aims should scientists’ activities be directed at satisfying?

Well, it might be thought that the answer is clear cut and uncontroversial: qua scientist, one should be attempting to discover what reality is like. It might be surprising to you, but even at this ‘broad brush’ level, controversy exists (for instance: should science bother to try to find out truth about reality or is it enough to merely learn how to control it? – the latter is something achievable even with false theories, as human history has demonstrated). Anyway, even if one were to be happy with the ‘pursuit of truth’ broad aim, issues arise concerning which truths one should pursue. What is more important to find out than what? Where should our priorities lie? Should we fund pure, curiosity driven, research or only research of a more applied sort that, in some fairly direct way, benefits us? (And if both, then with what priorities?) Indeed, should some research be performed at all? Some decades ago, the so-called Race and IQ controversy flared. Two psychologists, Hans Eysenck and then Carl Jensen, reported upon some research that they had (individually) carried out comparing the IQ of three racial groups in America. Roughly speaking, Asian-Americans seemed to score more highly than white Americans and black Americans scored the lowest. All sorts of ordinary scientific debate occurred as to whether the research had been carried out competently or not but one interesting element was the suggestion that even if the research were to be competent and it were to be true that IQ differs across races, then it would have been better had we never known that. Such knowledge is divisive and dangerous and thus, it was argued, the research that led to it should never have been permitted. In short, some aims that scientists might have are held to be improper because some truths should not be known. I hope that I have said enough to illustrate that genuinely controversial issues arise concerning the settling of the aims of science.

How about a social worker? Again, let us try a counterpart question: What should social work be trying to achieve? What broad aims should social workers’ activities be directed at satisfying?

Again, it might be thought, the answer is clear enough is it not? – Assist people in disadvantaged circumstances. Well, perhaps. It depends a bit upon what is meant by ‘assist’ and by ‘disadvantaged’. There is room for differing interpretations here and such differences might mean different social workers committed to conflicting goals. To illustrate: am I assisting someone if, as a result of my intervention, he is now better able to do what he wants? Surely so, you might think; but what if what he wants is not good for him (whatever that means)? Anyway, even if, in assisting him, one is acting for his good, what if what is for his good is not for the good of someone else (say his spouse, or society generally)? Or, what if he emphatically rejects what one thinks is good for him? Anyway, what (or who) is to determine what is ‘good’ for someone anyway?

The above bit of thinking aloud should do three things I hope. The first is persuade you that, not only is social work an activity directed towards goals that involve moral stances, it is unclear and controversial just what those valued goals should be. The second is to illustrate that some obvious-looking and attractive answers can be seen to be murky and troublesome after a little thought (yet too often things do not receive such thought but are left at a slogan-style level). The third is to illustrate some issues which not only appear in this little monologue but which tend to be recurrent issues in many discussions of professional ethics – not just in social work. One is personal autonomy – individual freedom of thought and/or action (and respect by others for that autonomy). Another is the well-being or welfare of the individual – what is good for her. Another is what is good for the group. (And note: all of the above are both murky and might conflict.) Finally, given that people will have different views on various professional issues involving moral values, is there any way of working out who is right (if it even makes sense to talk of any one view being right)?

Clearly, given that controversy will exist concerning the legitimacy of various suggested aims or goals for the guidance of Social Workers’ professional practice, we are led to the question: ‘who should set those goals?’. So: Who should have the power to decide the broad aims of social work?

I won’t continue down the list of professions but I trust that it is clear that each profession has to have some aims and, given controversy about what those aims should be, a further issue arises concerning the locus of legitimate power to set those aims.

As you might predict, counterparts of themes 3 and 4 above (concerning teaching) exist for other professions as well. I will not laboriously work through them but will content myself with a few quick illustrations.

For the sake of illustration, assume truth as an aim of science; now, is it legitimate for a scientist to cause another creature to suffer in the pursuit of truth? Assume clients’ welfare as an aim of social work; now, is it legitimate for a social worker to lie to a client even if it is for the client’s own good? Assume patients’ health as an aim of nursing; now, should a nurse ever dispute o...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• 1 Introductory Remarks and Overview
• 2 Proposition Types
• 3 Structuring Arguments
• 4 Subjecting Arguments to Criticism: Logic Criticism
• 5 Subjecting Arguments to Criticism: Premise Criticism
• 6 Extended Reasoning: the Basics
• 7 Extended Reasoning: Some Complexities
• 8 Babble and Murk
• 9 Some Ethical Theory
• Index